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series foreword
THoSE WHo UNDERTAKE A study of American political thought must 
attend to the great theorists, philosophers, and essayists. But such a study is 
incomplete, however, if it neglects American literature, one of the greatest 
repositories of the nation’s political thought and teachings.
America’s literature is distinctive because it is, above all, intended 
for a democratic citizenry. In contrast to eras when an author would aim 
to inform or influence a select aristocratic audience, in democratic times, 
public influence and education must resonate with a more expansive, less 
leisured, and diverse audience to be effective. The great works of America’s 
literary tradition are the natural locus of democratic political teaching. 
Invoking the interest and attention of citizens through the pleasures af-
forded by the literary form, many of America’s great thinkers sought to 
forge a democratic public philosophy with subtle and often challenging 
teachings that unfolded in narrative, plot, and character development. Per-
haps more than any other nation’s literary tradition, American literature 
is ineluctably political—shaped by democracy as much as it has in turn 
shaped democracy.
The Political Companions to Great American Authors series highlights 
the teachings of the great authors in America’s literary and belletristic tradi-
tion. An astute political interpretation of America’s literary tradition requires 
careful, patient, and attentive readers who approach the text with a view to 
understanding its underlying messages about citizenship and democracy. 
Essayists in this series approach the classic texts not with a “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” but with the curiosity of fellow citizens who believe that the 
vii
great authors have something of value to teach their readers. The series 
brings together essays from varied approaches and viewpoints for the com-
mon purpose of elucidating the political teachings of the nation’s greatest 
authors for those seeking a better understanding of American democracy.
Patrick J. Deneen
Series Editor
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Introduction: Thoreau as a  
Political Thinker

Writer, naturalist, theorist of civil disobedience, and anti- 
slavery activist, henry David thoreau (87–862) both inspired and ir-
ritated audiences in his time, and the words he left behind both inspire and 
irritate readers today. thoreau’s inspiring quality derives from the eloquence 
of his call to live more intensely, to “suck out all the marrow of life . . . to put 
to rout all that [is] not life . . . to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its 
lowest terms, and, if it prove[s] to be mean, why then to get the whole and 
genuine meanness of it . . . or if it [is] sublime, to know it by experience, and 
. . . give a true account of it.” thoreau’s irritating quality proceeds from his 
tendency to insult “the mass of men” and to appear hypocritical. in “Civil 
Disobedience” (849), for example, thoreau protests slavery vehemently 
and characterizes those who do not share his moral vehemence as “men of 
straw” and “lump[s] of dirt.”2 Yet just a few pages later he writes, “as for 
adopting the ways which the state has provided for remedying the evil, i 
know not of such ways. they take too much time, and a man’s life will be 
gone. i have other affairs to attend to.”3 such statements provoked Vincent 
Buranelli—in a famous 957 Ethics article—to dismiss thoreau’s political 
thought as “false and bizarre.”4 Buranelli had trouble deciding which was 
worse—that thoreau was so illogical or that he was so self-assured in that 
“illogicality.”5 “thoreau is not merely often wrong, but wrong to an incred-
ible degree. . . . he dogmatizes from nothing more solid than his own 
inspiration. . . . it is difficult not to feel exasperated with him.”6
notwithstanding Buranelli’s exasperation, the past half century has 
seen a steady accumulation of scholarship that takes thoreau seriously as a 
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political thinker. the roots of thoreau’s resurgence in contemporary theory 
are more political than intellectual. an inspiration to Martin luther King 
Jr. and the american civil rights movement, thoreau’s theory of civil dis-
obedience captured the attention of political theorists in the 960s eager to 
evaluate the events swirling around them.7 hannah arendt and John rawls 
engaged thoreau in their own ruminations on civil disobedience, yet in 
the end, both denigrated his political significance. reinterpreting thoreau’s 
refusal to pay his poll tax in protest of the Mexican War as a private act 
of conscientious refusal aimed at preserving his integrity rather than as a 
public act of civil disobedience aimed at transforming public policy, arendt 
and rawls privatized the meaning of thoreau’s resistance.8 While rawls 
offered his reinterpretation as a friendly amendment, arendt characterized 
thoreau’s (so-called) politics as morally solipsistic: “[thoreau] argued his 
case not on the ground of a citizen’s moral relation to the law, but on the 
ground of individual conscience and conscience’s moral obligation. . . . tho-
reau did not pretend that a man’s washing his hands of [wrong] would make 
the world better. . . . here, as elsewhere, conscience is unpolitical.”9
left to arendt and rawls, thoreau’s reemergence in contemporary po-
litical theory might have ended as abruptly as it started. Yet thoreau found 
his reader in philosopher stanley Cavell, whose 972 Senses of Walden 
inaugurated a new era of appreciation of thoreau as a political thinker. 
refuting arendt’s and rawls’s characterization of thoreauvian civil disobe-
dience as privatistic, Cavell argued that the key to understanding thoreau’s 
civil disobedience was recognizing “that the completion of the act was the 
writing of the essay which depicts it.”0 in the writing and publication of 
“Civil Disobedience,” thoreau achieved the “public address” that—on 
arendt’s and rawls’s terms—distinguishes public acts of civil disobedience 
from private acts of conscientious refusal. emphasizing the public purchase 
of writing itself, Cavell opened the way to exploring the political purchase 
of “words,” “sentences,” and “portions” in thoreau’s works beyond “Civil 
Disobedience.”2
Moving Walden (854) from the periphery to the center of political 
interpretation, Cavell read it as “a tract of political education, education for 
membership in the polis.”3 Walden is an expression of both “absolute hope” 
and “absolute defeat”—hope in freedom’s possibilities in postrevolutionary 
america, defeat in the face of the pleasure-seeking frivolity that masquer-
ades as freedom in thoreau’s united states.4 Walden, however, seeks to 
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snatch hope from defeat by making readers capable of seriousness again.5 
it focuses readers’ attention on the basic question of modern freedom: 
What does it mean to have a self, to be human?6 Cavell wrote of Walden, 
“it would be a fair summary of the book’s motive to say that it invites us 
to take an interest in our lives, and teaches us how.”7 Yet in urging us to 
take an interest in our lives, Walden also urges us to recognize how we fail 
to live “deliberately,” to pursue a life that we have reflectively “weighed,” 
“pondered,” and “found good.”8 this realization then spurs us to “press to 
the limits of experience,” to awaken to life itself.9 only then, says Cavell’s 
thoreau, do we become worthy of freedom.
Cavell’s brilliant reinterpretation of Walden as “a tract of political edu-
cation” cleared the way for political theorists to further explore thoreau’s 
political significance. the appearance of two articles in Political Theory: An 
International Journal of Political Philosophy in the early 980s confirmed 
thoreau’s rebirth as a serious subject for the field. nancy l. rosenblum’s 
98 essay, “thoreau’s Militant Conscience,” elaborated thoreau’s idea 
of militancy as “a distinct political stance” and defended his view of an-
tagonism as an essential quality of life.20 Different in emphasis, though not 
necessarily in substance, from Cavell’s thoreau, rosenblum’s thoreau is 
proto-nietzschean. though he adheres militantly to his conscience, that 
conscience may ultimately lie beyond good and evil:
For thoreau conscience was secular, and removed from its original theological 
meaning, where it had to do with obedience to God—with sin, faith, and doubt. 
nor was conscience a matter of conforming one’s will to a universal norm, as 
it had been for Kant. . . . Conscience is a felt experience. . . . thoreau spoke 
of an inner voice that is intangible, unspecifiable, and probably evanescent. 
. . . Conscience has no permanent identifiable content . . . and subjectivity, not 
universalizability, is its chief recommendation.2
rosenblum’s thoreau defends the wildness of both subjectivity and life; he 
cheerfully accepts “perpetual antagonism”: “however simple this may be 
. . . it is a political view of the world. its reality is conflict and its chief value 
is personal power.”22
George Kateb’s 984 essay, “Democratic individuality and the Claims 
of Politics,” considered thoreau (along with emerson and Whitman) as 
a representative of a new and distinct form of democratic excellence, an 
excellence centered on the liberation of human energies, the transcendence 
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of status, and the “acceptance of the dangers and opportunities of being 
self-conscious creatures, able to see ourselves, see through and around 
ourselves, and thus able to reject identification with any role or set of con-
ventions.”23 Kateb placed greater stress than rosenblum did on the moral 
constraints of thoreauvian democratic individuality. right and wrong are 
objective, not subjective, for Kateb’s thoreau, and uncorrupted common 
sense is adequate to their discernment. Both rosenblum and Kateb saw 
tension between the claims of morality and the claims of life in thoreau’s 
ethics, but rosenblum focused on those moments when thoreau demands 
the emancipation of life from the dictates of (inherited) morality, while 
Kateb emphasized how thoreauvian faithfulness to life ultimately requires 
respect for the equal rights and dignity of every human being.24 together, 
Cavell, rosenblum, and Kateb set a broad set of parameters for interpreting 
thoreau as a theorist of individuality and democracy. Dispensing with the 
controversy of whether thoreau’s work merits serious attention by political 
theorists, Cavell, rosenblum, and Kateb changed the debate to why and 
how thoreau’s work is politically significant. this debate continues and is 
the occasion for this book.
showcasing eight previously published and eight brand-new essays on tho-
reau’s political thought, A Political Companion to Henry David Thoreau 
aims both to recap and to advance recent debate on thoreau as a political 
thinker. integrating the work of both emerging and established scholars, 
the book is divided into four parts.
Part i, “thoreau and Democracy,” centers on the perennial question of 
whether thoreau can be accurately described as a democrat. opening the 
part is nancy l. rosenblum’s “thoreau’s Democratic individualism.” re-
vising her earlier, proto-nietzschean interpretation of thoreau, rosenblum 
situates thoreau in the context of early-nineteenth-century, transatlantic 
romanticism and shows how democratic commitments temper thoreau’s 
romanticism. Democratic equality and minimum respect for others con-
strain thoreau’s “impulse to detachment,” “transforming his heroic indi-
vidualism into a distinctively democratic individualism” (5). at the same 
time, rosenblum shows how thoreau puts forward a “distinctively romantic 
justification” for democracy: democracy is “the political order that best cor-
responds to the romantic sense of infinite potentiality” (5). rosenblum 
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thus reconciles the romantic with the democratic thoreau, showing how 
the two not only temper but also enrich each other.
Brian Walker’s “thoreau’s alternative economics: Work, liberty, and 
Democratic Cultivation” strengthens the case for viewing thoreau as a 
democrat. reading thoreau’s Walden as a “democratic advice book,” Walker 
argues that “thoreau’s central theme is that working conditions in a market 
democracy can easily undermine liberty and erode autonomy. his goal in 
Walden is to set out strategies by which people can enact their freedom de-
spite working conditions that are likely to threaten their autonomy and well-
being” (40). Walker’s thoreau translates the ideal of autonomy into a set of 
concrete practices by which democratic citizens can resist the encroachment 
of market forces and the domination inhering in modern labor conditions. 
Walker therefore demonstrates in detail thoreau’s conviction that freedom’s 
possibilities ought to be democratically accessible.
in contrast, leigh Kathryn Jenco’s “thoreau’s Critique of Democracy” 
argues against democratic interpretations of thoreau. such interpretations, 
says Jenco, elide thoreau’s fierce critiques of representation, on the one 
hand, and of majoritarianism, on the other. Jenco’s thoreau insists that 
the best parts of ourselves cannot be represented; he also insists that the 
nobility of our souls ought not to be subject to majoritarian dictates. Jenco 
acknowledges that thoreau does not positively specify what constitutes a 
just regime, but she interprets this silence as indicating dissatisfaction with 
all the available alternatives and as a command to imagine new ones. Com-
placency about democracy, Jenco’s thoreau warns, “will inhibit the search 
for better (perhaps more liberal?) possibilities and foreclose any attempt to 
seek a higher moral ground” (88).
Part ii, “Conscience, Citizenship, and Politics,” explores how thoreau 
imagines america, how he understands liberal democratic citizenship, and 
how he has been received in contemporary politics. Bob Pepperman taylor’s 
“thoreau’s american Founding” provides an arresting reading of thoreau’s 
A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (849). taylor reveals how 
A Week represents nineteenth-century new england as a society built on 
historical battle, bloodshed, and conquest and, more specifically, on the 
graves of american indians. taylor uses this analysis to evoke thoreau’s 
infrequently noted historical consciousness and his sensitivity to the social 
and temporal constraints of individual freedom.
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George shulman’s “thoreau, Prophecy, and Politics” situates thoreau 
in relation to the american tradition of prophetic speech and narration. 
Focusing especially on thoreau’s public opposition to slavery, shulman 
shows that thoreau takes up the calling of a prophet, “one who announces, 
bears witness, and warns,” one who “engages a political life he maligns but 
also dreams of transforming” (28). at the same time, thoreau makes the 
american prophetic tradition his own, crafting “two registers of expression 
to perform a prophetic office . . . the anti-slavery lectures bespeak Puritan 
(and liberal) idioms of conscience and rights in a jeremiadic form, while 
Walden bespeaks a romantic idiom of rebirth by experiments in nature” 
(28–29). intertwined with shulman’s analysis of thoreau’s transformation 
of american prophecy is a larger meditation on the political danger and 
promise of prophetic speech for american politics.
My own “thoreau and John Brown” spotlights thoreau’s public defense 
of Brown’s 859 attempt to incite a national slave insurrection and evaluates 
the significance of this defense for our understanding of thoreau’s politics. 
the 859 “Plea for Captain John Brown” brings thoreau’s thinking on moral 
complicity, revolutionary violence, and the ethical significance of mortality 
into sharp relief and shows that action plays a much more central role in 
thoreau’s political thought than critics usually acknowledge. i also suggest 
that the best way to conceptualize thoreau’s politics is as one requiring 
the public performance of conscience. thoreau believed that Brown nobly 
exemplified the translation of conscientious commitment into political ac-
tion, and thoreau enacted his own abolitionist commitments by publicly 
defending Brown as “the most american of us all” (57).
harry V. Jaffa’s “thoreau and lincoln” first appeared in 969, yet his 
sharp critique of thoreau remains one of the most penetrating. Contrast-
ing thoreau with lincoln, Jaffa demonstrates lincoln’s superior sensitiv-
ity to human fallibility and freedom’s fragility. although thoreau insisted 
that “action from principle” separates “the diabolical from the divine,” he 
failed to ask the crucial question: “Does the separation of the diabolical 
from the divine send the diabolical or the divine forth to rule the world? 
thoreau’s strictures against law and constitutional majority rule can only 
lead . . . to lawless tyranny” (203). unlike thoreau, lincoln perceived the 
morality inherent in law’s rule. law not only protects citizens from their 
bestial nature but also provides the moral education essential for humans 
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who “see through a glass darkly.” Furthermore, “the principle of law is that 
it is not a respecter of persons, and it thereby takes on an attribute of justice. 
. . . this connection between law and justice, and hence between law and 
conscience, seems never to be recognized by thoreau” (85).
William Chaloupka’s “thoreau’s apolitical legacy for american 
environmentalism” deals not with thoreau himself but with his political 
reception—specifically, his reception by late-twentieth-century american 
environmentalism. earth Day greens gravitated toward thoreau as they 
sought symbols for their emerging movement: “What the greens found in 
thoreau was an ethical gesture and a romanticism that deeply satisfied 
them. the earth Day generation was drawn to thoreau by his wilderness 
values and a spiritualism propelled by landscapes” (206). Yet the greens’ 
gravitation toward thoreau, according to Chaloupka, was politically fatal. 
influenced by thoreau’s anti-political values, earth Day environmentalists 
failed to have “the explicit conversation about politics that, in retrospect, 
dearly needed to happen” (206). he observes, “Whereas green commit-
ments could be expressed by gestural protests, conscientious consumerism, 
and a fairly narrow approach to lobbying and litigating, larger questions 
of the movement’s position toward long-term and large-scale structural 
change seemed beyond its grasp” (206). although Chaloupka grants that 
the reasons for environmentalism’s political failures are multiple, he insists 
that thoreau’s undue influence on the movement counts among them.
Part iii of the book, “reverence, ethics, and the self,” examines the 
metaphysical and ethical concerns both informing and issuing from thore-
au’s politics. susan McWilliams’s “thoreau on Body and soul” shows how 
thoreau resists modern conceptions of a unified self and hearkens back to 
ancient conceptions of human duality in which body and soul conflict. Yet 
thoreau’s conception of human doubleness is not strictly dualist, for inward 
and outward life occasionally correspond. “Certain labors of the body may 
invigorate the spirit; certain spiritual contemplations may elevate the body. 
. . . thoreau conceives of a human being who, through disciplined explora-
tion and contemplation of his own nature, discovers himself to be the site 
of a harmonious, mysterious interplay between matter and spirit” (230). 
McWilliams, however, insists that thoreau’s quest for harmony is distinct 
from the modern quest for self-integration and, in turn, self-mastery: “self-
reflection reveals that we must always remain at least partly mysterious to 
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ourselves. . . . the pursuit of self-knowledge . . . begets awareness of self-
mystery” (230). awareness of self-mystery is essential to virtue, for only by 
acknowledging the self ’s troublesome nature can one avoid the viciousness 
that inevitably ensues from projects of mastery, especially political ones.
Christopher a. Dustin’s “thoreau’s religion” argues that thoreau’s 
worldview is “theological” without being “positively theistic” (257). under-
standing thoreau’s religion requires us to resist a dualistic conception of 
reality opposing nature and divinity. “those who read thoreau as either 
replacing God with nature or locating the divine entirely within it are 
themselves somewhat hasty in treating nature as conceptually solid ground. 
they overlook the indefinite nature of thoreau’s nature” (257). thoreau’s 
“religion” is a way of seeing, a form of communion that reveals how “nature 
points beyond itself, to a transcendent ground that is neither separable from 
nor reducible to it” (259). “thoreau’s vision of God as immanent in nature,” 
Dustin concludes, “is incomplete without the moment of transcendence that 
relates the natural, and the human, to a source lying beyond both” (284).
Jane Bennett’s “thoreau’s techniques of self” examines thoreau’s proj-
ect of self-fashioning, focusing especially on the personal precursors of civil 
disobedience. rather than asking “What is civil disobedience?” Bennett’s 
thoreau asks, “What kind of being could be disobedient to civil authority?” 
(39). Bennett then elaborates eight techniques for forging such a self: “mov-
ing inward, idealizing a friend, keeping quiet, going outside, microvisioning, 
living doubly, hoeing beans, and eating with care” (296). “these exercises 
are to be practiced daily until they become second nature. taken as a group, 
they display how thoreau’s art of the self combines bodily discipline with 
relaxation of intellect . . . intellectual rigor with flight of fancy” (296).
thomas l. Dumm’s “thoreau’s solitude” explores the relationship 
between solitude and derangement in thoreau’s thought. thoreau claims 
that “in solitude, we are alone in a sane sense” (326). Yet at the same time, 
Dumm notes that “solitude’s sanity is connected to a kind of derangement, 
or at least a reckoning of sanity that is not our usual sense of being sane” 
(326). What connects madness to solitude is the activity of thinking—in 
which we forget time and place, disregard social convention, talk to our-
selves, and imagine ourselves in the company of those who are physically 
not there. “this is madness,” Dumm insists, “but it is a fine madness, a sane 
madness, a kind of thinking through which we split ourselves wide open 
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in order to touch our wounds, to actually find out whether we exist” (337). 
Dumm concludes that such madness is essential to human integrity.
Part iV, “thoreau and Political theory,” situates thoreau within the 
classical and contemporary canon of political theory. Melissa lane’s “tho-
reau and rousseau: nature as utopia” examines the authors’ respective 
relationships to the utopian tradition of Western thought. lane argues that 
while rousseau’s ideas of utopia “fit the standard utopian tradition whereby 
only a reformed society . . . can produce a good and free person, thoreau 
in Walden stands that tradition on its head, proposing that individual self- 
reform is the only path to a reformed society” (34). thoreau’s and rous-
seau’s later writings also reveal interesting differences in the ways they 
relate to nature. although both place a high premium on exploring nature’s 
wildness, “for rousseau, this remains pure consolation, [while] for thoreau, 
it blossoms into a new relationship to the landscape in which the positive 
meaning of utopia is reclaimed in its etymological sense of topos or place” 
(342). interspersed with the comparison of thoreau and rousseau on na-
ture as utopia are subtle and stimulating reflections on their contrasting 
conceptions of law, freedom, and self-government.
anthony J. Parel’s “thoreau, Gandhi, and Comparative Political thought” 
carefully assesses the nature and extent of thoreau’s influence on Gandhi’s 
political thought. Gandhi especially cherished thoreau’s “Walking,” “life 
without Principle,” and “Civil Disobedience,” and Parel systematically 
analyzes how those particular essays impacted Gandhi’s thought. although 
Gandhi began practicing passive resistance well before he read “Civil 
Disobedience,” Parel shows that Gandhi welcomed thoreau’s essay as a 
“scientific confirmation” of that practice (385). Parel concludes that it is 
essential to understand Gandhi on his own terms, not just in terms of his 
Western influences. Gandhi’s satyagraha involves forms of social reform, 
principled nonviolence, and virtue ethics that extend far beyond thoreau’s 
influence or anyone else’s.
shannon l. Mariotti’s “thoreau, adorno, and the Critical Potential 
of Particularity” offers an arresting interpretation of the parallels between 
thoreau’s nature writing and the critical theory of theodor W. adorno. 
Both thoreau and adorno “identify a critically valuable quality in particular 
things” (393). employing a “microscopic gaze” as opposed to an “abstract-
ing idealist gaze,” both draw out the world’s “nonidentical” qualities “to 
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highlight the illusory harmonies of late modern society” (394). through 
this sustained comparison, Mariotti offers an alternative interpretation of 
the political significance of thoreau’s nature writings: these writings work 
on us politically by urging us to change “the ways we think and perceive 
. . . to work against the mainstream social forces that threaten our ability 
to negate and think against convention” (44). thoreau seeks to “awaken 
us to what is violated and lost through the abstract ways of thinking that 
increasingly characterize modern society” (48).
andrew norris’s “thoreau, Cavell, and the Foundations of true Politi-
cal expression” assesses the political philosophical significance of stanley 
Cavell’s 972 masterpiece of thoreau interpretation, The Senses of Walden. 
“The Senses of Walden is not simply a reading of Walden but . . . a reading 
of it that takes the form of a rewriting of it, a reiteration of its senses or 
meanings, and hence its perceptions and senses of the world” (424). this 
reiteration aims to show how Walden works to revive our “ability to sense the 
world,” as well as “the society lost in the senses of our degenerate language” 
(425). Both thoreau and Cavell seek to regenerate our sense of political 
possibility by giving new life to the language we use to compose the world; 
when we as readers collaborate with them as writers to revive language to 
ever fuller significance, we discover our own power to transform our lives 
by transforming our lives’ very terms. in becoming self-reflexive about how 
language constitutes us and we constitute it, we also educate ourselves in 
the nature of both freedom and limitation. thoreau and Cavell call on us 
to “actively inherit . . . our language” rather than “passively repeat . . . it,” 
for only through such active inheritance can we achieve the presence to our 
lives essential to “choosing” itself (435–37).
together, the sixteen chapters of this volume offer a multitude of reasons 
to find thoreau both inspiring and irritating. thoreau’s inspiring and ir-
ritating qualities, in fact, collaborate. thoreau is intent on keeping a certain 
distance from his reader—from those who embrace his sense as well as 
those who reject it. thoreau does not seek to convince his reader so much as 
to provide an occasion for thinking “without bounds; like a man in a waking 
moment, to men in their waking moments.”25 there must be space between 
writer and reader for this to occur; the mind of one cannot collapse into 
the mind of the other. repelling us even as he charms us, thoreau creates 
intellectual agon; within that agon lies the promise of original thought.
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Part I
thoreau and Democracy

thoreau’s Democratic 
Individualism
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Thoreau’s famous aversion to ordinary society and his heroic 
individualism are american variations on familiar romantic themes. Be-
ginning in the late eighteenth century, poets, artists, and political thinkers 
from Wordsworth and Coleridge to Constant and mill articulated a unique 
set of discontents with bourgeois society and with the political arrange-
ments of emerging constitutional democracy. “romanticism” ushered in the 
glorification of self-sacrificing militarism against arrant, selfish materialism; 
the ecstasy of beauty and creativity against mundane happiness; the law of 
the heart against arid legalism; and utopian visions—from apolitical qui-
etude and withdrawal to hope for total revolution. Put simply, for romantic 
sensibilities, the world was incommensurate with their sense of infinite, 
individual potentiality. This chapter is about the inhibitions american 
democracy imposed on Thoreau, tempering his impulse to detachment 
and transforming his heroic individualism into a distinctively democratic 
individualism.
romanticism’s interest for political theorists is heightened if criti-
cism leads to constructive political thought. The standard repertoire of 
justifications for democracy includes protecting popular interests, moral 
education through political participation, and democratic deliberation as 
the ideal mechanism for distributive justice. Thoreau proposed another, 
distinctively romantic justification: democracy as the political order that 
best corresponds to the romantic sense of infinite potentiality. for all its 
failed revolutionary promise and the massive shame of slavery at its heart, 
Thoreau saw american democracy as the most hospitable order yet devised 
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for the intense experience and expression of a many-sided self—by poten-
tially innumerable individualists. The inhibitions of democracy both shape 
Thoreau’s social criticism and enable him to move beyond romantic aversion 
and disassociation to positive reconciliation.
romantic aversion and Social Criticism
Thoreau’s litanies of discontent with the prosaic, outpourings of ridicule 
and disdain, and defiant gestures of isolation and retreat are familiar to 
any student of romanticism—english, continental, or american. he shares 
the general romantic critical agenda, which entails contrasting heightened 
experience and the insufferably mundane. “Wherever a man goes, men will 
pursue and paw him with their dirty institutions, and, if they can, constrain 
him to belong to their desperate odd-fellow society.”1 The quiet despera-
tion of his neighbors, “always on the limits, trying to get into business and 
trying to get out of debt” (Walden, 6), struck Thoreau as it has every 
romantic—as averse to poetry and philosophy and finally unproductive. 
“The twelve labors of hercules were trifling in comparison with those which 
my neighbors have undertaken . . . but i could never see that these men slew 
or captured any monster or finished any labor” (Walden, 8). few comments 
could be more disdainful of the american belief in the dignity of work and 
the public obligation to work. Whereas even frederick Douglass defined 
freedom as industry and the enjoyment of gains—as the very opposite of 
the degraded labor of slaves—Thoreau saw slavery of another kind. Those 
who were commonly deemed good citizens, he wrote at his most aggressive, 
“put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones. . . . [They] com-
mand no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the 
same sort of worth only as horses and dogs.”2
When Thoreau writes “our foe is . . . the all but universal woodenness 
of both head and heart, the want of vitality in man,”3 he says “our,” but 
“i” and “you” are the dominant pronouns.4 “it is evident what mean and 
sneaking lives many of you live,” he writes in Walden (6), “seeking to curry 
favor . . . lying, flattering, voting, contracting yourselves into a nutshell of 
civility, or dilating into an atmosphere of thin and vaporous generosity.” his 
criticism is accompanied by familiar assertions of romantic exceptionalism. 
The thought that “authors are a natural and irresistible aristocracy in every 
society, and, more than kings or emperors, exert an influence on mankind” 
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is nothing new (Walden, 103). neither is Thoreau’s affinity for extraordinary 
souls: “if one listens to the faintest but constant suggestions of his genius, 
which are certainly true, he sees not to what extremes, or even insanity, it 
may lead him; and yet that way, as he grows more resolute and faithful, his 
road lies” (Walden, 216). his description of the expressive imperative could 
have been written by any number of romantics, or by nietzsche: “i perceive 
that, when an acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does not remain 
inert to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws, and spring 
and grow and flourish as best they can, till one, perchance, overshadows 
and destroys the other. if a plant cannot live according to its nature it dies; 
and so a man” (“resistance,” 81).
nothing makes Thoreau’s aversion clearer or is more calculated to épa-
ter la bourgeoisie than his recurrent attack on domesticity. anti-domesticity 
comes in several modes (Byron’s Don Juan despises petty contentments, for 
example), but romantic militarism is the most powerful, whether it takes 
the form of exhilarating revolutionism or the cult of Bonaparte. even the 
conservative Chateaubriand lamented that “the palace of the Tuileries, so 
clean and soldierly under napolean, began to reek, instead of the smell 
of powder, with breakfast odours which rose on every side . . . everything 
resumed an air of domesticity.”5 militarism’s attraction for romantic sensi-
bilities is clear: war is not work; heroism is not business as usual; the army is 
a brotherhood of soldiers, which alfred de vigny described as a “sacrificial 
family,”6 that excludes women, who are held responsible for the breakfast 
odors Chateaubriand despised.
from his early essay “The service” to his last essays on John Brown, 
Thoreau resorts to military terms to describe his self-reliance and detach-
ment from the unabidably prosaic: “You must live within yourself, and 
depend upon yourself, always tucked up and ready for a start, and not have 
many affairs” (“resistance,” 78). of course, in his political tracts, Thoreau’s 
rejection of domesticity serves a specific purpose: by not needing to rely on 
the government’s protection for family and property, he demonstrates the 
seriousness of his disavowal of political allegiance. But the dominant impetus 
is romantic aversion to the drearily mundane, and Thoreau’s self-distancing 
from everything domestic is thorough. he entertains no alternative repub-
lican vision of the family as a school of civic virtue. he does not single out 
bourgeois family life for attack or find in the poor any moral relief from the 
middle-class household’s obsession with luxury and consumption. Thoreau’s 
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description of John field’s home and family in Walden communicates un-
relieved revulsion. instead of the innocent Wordsworthian child, there is 
a “poor starving brat” and a “wrinkled, sibyl-like cone-headed infant,” and 
there is field’s wife “with round greasy face and bare breast thinking to 
improve her condition one day; with the never absent mop in her hand, and 
yet no effects of it visible anywhere” (Walden, 204).7 The sentimental family 
as haven turns stifling: household echoes haunt, and life “breathes its own 
breath over and over” (Walden, 208). Thoreau will have none of it: “i kept 
neither dog, cat, cow, pig, nor hens, so that you would have said there was 
a deficiency of domestic sounds; neither the churn, nor the spinning-wheel, 
nor even the singing of kettle, nor the hissing of the urn, nor children cry-
ing, to comfort one” (Walden, 127). and there are no women.8
Thoreau’s romantic assaults and claims of exceptionalism are repeat-
edly offset, however, by the inhibitions of democracy. he confronts ameri-
can democracy as an unalterable social and political reality, but he takes its 
principal tenets as his own, and democratic equality constrains his disdain 
and impulse to withdraw. The problem for Thoreau is how to announce his 
estrangement without adopting an aristocratic ethos, without violating the 
primary inhibition of democracy by characterizing individuals as constitu-
tionally unequal by birth, and without making it impossible to retain the 
modicum of respect for others without which democracy is pure formalism. 
it is one thing to call his neighbors “a distinct race from me by their preju-
dices and superstitions, as Chinamen and malays are” (“resistance,” 83) 
and to feel that “they are our austrias, and Chinas, and south sea islands” 
(“Plea,” 121). it is another to indulge romantic exceptionalism in terms of 
unyielding biological or dispositional differences. Thoreau occasionally 
crosses the democratic line: differences of constitution, not streams and 
mountains, “make the true and impassable boundaries between individu-
als and between states” (“Plea,” 122), for example, or, most threatening to 
democracy: “not all men can be free, even.”9
a dizzying internal movement jogs Thoreau’s writing—romantic revul-
sion and self-distancing, but also backtracking from aloofness and tentative 
reconciliation in repeated succession.10 The village Cape Codders are beau-
tiful “only to the weary traveler, or the returning native,—or, perchance, 
the repentant misanthrope,” Thoreau writes, leveling and immediately re-
tracting the charge of philistinism.11 his essays are littered with apologetic 
addenda and jogged by self-conscious halting: “This may be to judge my 
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neighbors harshly” (“resistance,” 83). hesitations and asides stand alone 
or are embedded in critical propositions: “When we heard at first that he 
[John Brown] was dead, one of my townsmen observed that ‘he died as the 
fool dieth’; which, pardon me, for an instant suggested a likeness in him 
dying to my neighbor living” (“Plea,” 118). rhetorical devices for checking 
himself form just one element in the larger movement of Thoreau’s thought 
in response to the inhibitions of democracy.
responsiveness to the Inhibitions of Democracy:  
Detachment and Doing Good
There is nothing new about a program of isolation as a condition for imagi-
native receptivity and creation, and Thoreau is famous for situating himself 
at some remove from daily society on the “neutral ground” of Walden Pond 
or mount Ktaadn. The insights of literary critics who see escapism and dis-
placed political criticism in romantic naturalism are blunted in Thoreau’s 
case, since his political essays were contemporaneous with his writings 
about nature, and even the latter contain overt social commentary. in any 
case, no argument has yet been made to justify the assumption, implicit in 
this widespread charge of “displaced criticism,” that a perfectly just or ideal 
society would undercut the imperative to withdraw to nature or render 
the experience of undisturbed feeling and immediate unity superfluous. 
Thoreau represents both his Wordsworthian appreciation of the “indescrib-
able innocence and beneficence of nature” (Walden, 138) and his “hard 
primitivism,” the sublime experience of “vast, Titanic, inhuman nature,” 
“more lone than you can imagine,”12 as vital to well-being.13
nonetheless, Thoreau’s accounts of his withdrawal to Walden and 
Ktaadn do hold political interest insofar as they reflect his responsiveness 
to the inhibitions of democracy. The claim that both Walden Pond and the 
Concord jail are a “far country” is unremarkable except by contrast—Byron 
and shelley were actual expatriates. in this company, Thoreau’s romantic 
orthodoxies are less notable than the fact that he does not allow detachment 
to fatally separate him from his neighbors. We know that Walden Pond was 
within range of Concord, and Thoreau remarks on how close the maine 
forests are. Both are available to anyone, and neither is more than a partial 
and temporary retreat.
more important, Thoreau’s choice of escape is less hostile than alter-
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native modes of romantic separation from society: the bohemianism of the 
pseudo-outlaw or the proletariat, the dandyism of an aristocracy of sensibility, 
Coleridge’s elite “pantisocracy,” Byronic militancy, Promethean nay-saying, 
vulgar nietzscheanism, or napoleonism. Thoreau did not contemplate the 
bitter retreat of the wounded soul to a garret or some other scene of mar-
tyrdom. There is every difference between being driven mad by the slights 
of philistines and being drawn to Walden Pond. D. h. Lawrence’s thought 
that “absolutely the safest thing to get your emotional reactions over is 
naTure”14 is confirmed in Thoreau’s testament: “The most sweet and ten-
der, the most innocent and encouraging society may be found in any natural 
object” (Walden, 131). The point is precisely that Thoreau does not remove 
to some better company, real or imagined; there is no elite circle of beauti-
ful souls or exclusive republic of letters. he does not indulge in the “soft 
primitivism” of the south seas, with its challenge of an ideal community, or 
create domesticated pastorals; on the contrary, “from the desperate city we 
go to the desperate country.” if Thoreau’s declarations of solitude and self-
reliance seem to cross the boundary out of democratic society, the affront is 
modulated, and the way back is kept open. in a dialogue in Maine Woods, 
Thoreau has mount Ktaadn advise him to return home.
a second instance of the inhibition of democracy at work is the way 
Thoreau tempers his most provocative exhibition of romantic exceptionalism: 
his repudiation of the common moral duties that accompany Christian and 
secular egalitarianism and that were vigorously promoted by the churches 
and reform societies of new england. his townspeople are devoted in 
many ways to the good of their fellows, Thoreau observes, but the profession 
“doing-good” does not agree with his constitution (Walden, 73). his refer-
ences to “benevolent societies” are always ironic, and he calls self-styled 
reformers the greatest bores of all. he wishes “one at least may be spared to 
other and less humane pursuits.” his defiance borders on the unconditional: 
“Probably i should not consciously and deliberately forsake my particular 
calling to do the good which society demands of me, to save the universe 
from annihilation” (Walden, 73).
Thoreau’s disclaimer of the obligation to do good turns out to be neither 
misanthropy nor sheer romantic egotism. he means that too many have 
made it their mission to mind others’ business when they should mind their 
own; this is Thoreau’s definition of a good neighbor and the unexceptional 
caution behind the observation that “man is the artificer of his own happi-
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ness.” a more profound point underlies this statement: “self-emancipation 
even in the West indian provinces of the fancy and imagination,—what 
Wilberforce is there to bring that about?” Thoreau is advising that slavery is 
a summum malum, but liberation per se is not a summum bonum (Walden, 
8). There is none. absolute injustice does not have a positive counterpart. 
emancipation offers little clue to the goods that are valuable or to a well-
spent life (“be not simply good—be good for something,” Thoreau empha-
sizes). ordinary philanthropy is premised on an array of assumptions about 
well-being and a good society that Thoreau found doubtful. “economy” is 
his exhaustive assessment of his own “necessaries of life,” but they do not 
hold for everyone, or even for himself for long. Because needs cannot be 
stereotyped, compassion always rests on untenable ground: “Love for one’s 
fellow-man in the broadest sense” is not true philanthropy (Walden, 74).
What is? “Be sure that you give the poor the aid they most need, though 
it be your example which leaves them far behind” (Walden, 75). for Tho-
reau, the relation between personal life and social reform is the unplanned, 
unintended effect of heroic individuality. “i want the flower and fruit of a 
man; that some fragrance be wafted over from him to me” (Walden, 27). 
True philanthropy is the spread of a constant superfluity, which costs the 
hero nothing and of which he is unconscious: “broadcast and floating in the 
air,” seeds of virtue take root (Walden, 164).
This definition of doing good is a retreat from Thoreau’s show of in-
difference to others. still, it seems to confirm a romantic disregard for 
ordinary moral duty. There is only the weakest family resemblance to the 
benign moral influence preached by his friend Bronson alcott. Thoreau’s 
great man is a force of nature—a meteor, volcano, or vital seed—not de-
fined by his exemplary relation to society, uncommitted to civic virtue or 
aristocratic service, a philanthropist despite himself.15 Thoreau seems at 
his most detached and transcendental here, preoccupied with the ineffable 
“fragrance” of the hero and genius. But even here, on the subject of the 
influence of greatness, the inhibitions of democracy are at work. Tortuously 
but decisively, democratic inhibitions recall Thoreau from imaginative flight 
to neighborly concern, from exceptionalism to equality.
it is worth considering this dynamic in some detail. Thoreau translated 
aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound, but his heroes, unlike that quintessential 
romantic rebel, are not gods or supermen. he drew his pantheon of he-
roes from wide reading in history and literature, but he also found men 
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he likened to heroes among his small local acquaintance: a native ameri-
can Penobscot, Joe Polis; the anti-slavery raider John Brown; the Concord 
woodcutter alek Therien, a “true homeric man.” nothing could be farther 
from Julien sorel’s lament in stendahl’s The Red and the Black that great-
ness has gone from the world and napoleon’s “fatal memory will keep us 
from ever being happy.”16 emerson, who wrestled with the same inhibitions 
of democracy as Thoreau, called his heroes “representative men,” but except 
for napoleon, emerson’s heroes are all unrepresentative great thinkers.17 
Carlyle’s heroes are deliberate men of action, such as Cromwell.18 emerson 
and Carlyle complement each other, Thoreau observes critically: they omit 
Christ and practical heroes like Columbus, and “above and after all, the 
man of the age, come to be called workingman, it is obvious that none yet 
speaks to his condition.” Carlyle especially exaggerates the heroic in history: 
“The common man is nothing to him [Carlyle].”19 The opening passage of 
On Heroes says as much: “The history of what man has accomplished in this 
world, is at bottom the history of the Great men who have worked here.”20 
The rest are there to be commanded.
Thoreau never doubts that some men are extraordinary, but the inhi-
bitions of democracy ward off the anti-democratic politics of genius that 
typically follow. There is no natural aristocracy to legislate or govern in 
Thoreau’s political thought. There is no nietzschean will to power. Thoreau’s 
heroes do not excite erotic attachment, arouse collective passions, cultivate 
disciples, or inspire the cult of personality and mass mobilization that are 
often characterized as the political expression of romanticism. Certainly, 
Thoreau had no use for passive reverence. The hero serves others by show-
ing them what they can be and do. he is an exemplar of individuality. so 
there is no absolute gap between the extraordinary individual and the rest. 
anyone can learn from the spectacle of greatness.
Thoreau brings together romantic heroism and that article of faith 
shared by every party in america—the possibility of improvement. “We are 
all great men” is not a fact but a democratic aspiration. Thoreau preserves 
the necessary modicum of respect and intuitive understanding:
most men, even in this comparatively free country, through mere ignorance 
and mistake, are so occupied with the factitious cares and superfluously 
coarse labors of life that its finer fruits cannot be plucked by them. Their 
fingers, from excessive toil, are too clumsy and tremble too much for that. . . . 
We should feed and clothe him [the common man] gratuitously sometimes, 
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and recruit him with our cordials, before we judge of him. The finest qualities 
of our nature, like the bloom on fruits, can be preserved only by the most 
delicate handling. Yet we do not treat ourselves nor one another thus tenderly. 
(Walden, 6)
The democratic heart of Thoreau’s account of heroism and genius follows 
from his notion of an exemplary life: for greatness to have historical effect, 
the hero must be recognized. Consent is a powerful democratic inhibition, 
and we see it operating in Thoreau’s essays on John Brown. for harp-
ers ferry to be the beginning of the end to slavery, John Brown must be 
acknowledged as great. Thoreau is apprehensive: “when a noble deed is 
done, who is likely to appreciate it? They who are noble themselves” (“Last 
Days,” 148). his neighbors are not, and he pleads, “Do yourself the honor to 
recognize him.” Thoreau is palpably relieved when other abolitionists come 
round to his view of Brown as heroic: “the living north, was suddenly all 
transcendental” (“Last Days,” 147).
Democratic Individualism: Consent and Disobedience
The chief inhibition of democracy operates on Thoreau personally: he can-
not “cast his whole influence” without his countrymen’s consent, a constraint 
he accepts as a moral, not just a practical, imperative. Thoreau writes about 
representative democracy, in which legitimacy depends on popular support. 
The difficulty he faced was not so much articulating the political promise of 
independence as he saw it, or knowing what was right, but rather justifying 
his own standing. he poses this question at the outset of Walden and returns 
to it in his essays: “Who is Thoreau that others should listen to him?” how 
is it that, speaking for himself (“We commonly do not remember that it is, 
after all, always the first person that is speaking” [Walden, 3]), he can truth-
fully say he is appealing “from them to themselves”? english and continental 
romantics did not have this problem. Disappointed with the french revo-
lution, they could revolutionize literature and adopt political conservatism. 
Postrevolutionary generations of european romantics could give free rein 
to aristocratic expressions of genius when repulsed by prosaic affairs and 
hounded by philistines, boast that their true peers were great souls across 
the ages, or enjoy the delicious martyrdom of the poet maudit.
Thoreau speaks to his fellow citizens with startling directness.21 he 
does not soliloquize, or pose as a nightingale singing for his own consola-
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tion, or talk to God or to kindred spirits only. he is unwilling to identify 
with shelley’s unacknowledged legislator. his acute self-consciousness is 
alien to prophetic speech. Thoreau is not a bard speaking for others; the 
challenge is precisely how to speak for himself, to them. he does not “wish 
to quarrel with any man or nation . . . to split hairs, to make fine distinc-
tions, or set myself up as better than my neighbors” (“resistance,” 86). he 
intends to avoid the mistake of positioning himself too close or too far: “one 
cannot be too much on his guard in such a case, lest his action be biased by 
obstinacy, or an undue regard for the opinions of men” (“resistance,” 84). 
sheer self-assertion—“giving a strong dose of myself”—will not do.22 he 
needs to rely, if not on fellow feeling, then on some common ground.
Thoreau could have attempted to establish his standing on common 
moral ground, in Tom Paine’s terms, say, as men rather than as american 
citizens, pronouncing the rights of man and the “we” of common sense. This 
enlightenment bond assumed universal moral agency, self-evident moral 
truths, and resistance to tyranny (though not always institutional democ-
racy). shelley invokes it with “man, equal, unclassed, tribeless, nationless.”23 
But Thoreau is averse to radical universal claims and does not appeal to 
natural rights. he does not imagine that all interests can be harmonized. 
and the centrality of paradox in his writing challenges Paine’s common 
sense directly.
an alternative course was mapped out by a generation of continental 
romantics: humboldt, schiller, and Constant. all three began with a no-
tion of the development of each individual into “a complete and consis-
tent whole” and soberly considered the political conditions for cultivating 
individuality.24 They judged men and women too weak to withstand the 
exertions of a tutorial state, whether these derived from political absolutism 
or the rigorous demands of revived civic republicanism. individuals cannot 
develop collectively and in public. They offered a romantic justification for 
liberal, limited government and a severe public-private divide: constitutional 
bulwarks against official intrusion into personal life ensured self-protective 
withdrawal. a privileged private sphere and circle of friends constituted 
the only imaginable context for self-cultivation and expression. Thoreau did 
not follow humboldt and Constant in privileging privacy and insisting on 
vigilant self-protection against the claims of politics.
in contrast, and in response to the inhibitions of democracy, Tho-
reau addresses his neighbors as citizens of massachusetts and the united 
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states, and he speaks to his “countrymen” “practically, and as a citizen” 
(“resistance,” 64). he finds common ground with readers as democratic in-
dividuals. Both elements of “democratic individualism” need emphasizing. 
Thoreau defines america as a constitutional regime when he opens “Civil 
Disobedience” with the reminder that american government is a recent 
tradition dating from the revolution (“resistance,” 63). With this, he rules 
out appeal to america’s religious tradition and continuity with the chosen 
people and their city on the hill (even maintaining that the french Jesuits’ 
mission and morals were superior to the Puritans’). Thoreau addresses indi-
viduals in their political capacity. each person is ultimately responsible for 
the support of political authority that may fatally interfere with his business 
or make him an agent of injustice. Democracy invites individuals to “cast 
[their] whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but [their] whole influence” 
(“resistance,” 76). Thoreau’s point is that american democracy throws 
individuals back on themselves, for it is equally clear that he is interested in 
democratic individualism, not collective identity. he does not identify the 
people or nation, as Wordsworth and herder did, with a common history 
and culture. history offers no firm common ground, in his view. slavery 
confronts the promise of independence and the rhetoric of liberation with a 
massive contradiction from the start, which is why Thoreau does not talk of 
original promises or breaches of compacts. racial and cultural differences, 
including the great divide between north and south, ensured that any ap-
peal to the authentic voice of an american people would be in bad faith. 
Dred Scott showed definitively that “the people” officially excluded slaves 
and freedmen, whom Thoreau explicitly counted as fellow citizens.
To understand the powerful hold democratic individualism had on 
Thoreau, we must recall that he confronted a host of virulent, systematic 
ideologies propounding ascriptive inequality—including biblical and scien-
tific racial theories and quasi-romantic assertions of historical and cultural 
identity and hierarchy. These were not examples of liberal hypocrisy or rare 
exceptions to a hegemonic liberal-democratic ideology, residual pockets of 
irrational prejudice. They were powerful, independent forces in american 
political life. it is bad history and an awful error of moral judgment (to which 
scholars of romanticism are prone) to assume the existence of a liberal- 
democratic consensus and to characterize every tension as self-contradiction 
within democratic principles. if the only political categories we recognize 
are absent feudalism and socialism and pervasive bourgeois liberalism, we 
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are likely to imagine that the inhibitions of democracy operated on Thoreau 
unconsciously or against his will. We are also likely to underestimate his 
hesitation to embrace romantic exceptionalism and his impulse to resist the 
thought that differences are absolute and unbridgeable.
Democratic individualism is Thoreau’s common ground. it remains to 
be shown that although romanticism is tempered, democratic individual-
ism has not lost its romantic resonance altogether. romanticism is there 
in his preoccupation with the experience of democracy, of consent and 
dissent, for men and women personally, particularly in his insistence that 
democracy means “giving a strong dose” of oneself (“Life,” 155). romantic 
individualism wants recognition—not only the equal moral recognition that 
is supposed to accompany the rights of man and citizen but also recogni-
tion for one’s unique particularity. Thoreau offers himself as an example of 
what it means to give a strong dose of oneself, and his self-seriousness is a 
demonstration of true democratic respect for individuality.
Thoreau speaks only from personal experience of government, and only 
about what attracts his attention. Chattel slavery may be an enormous evil, 
but it becomes his affair only when it reminds him of “slavery of all kinds” 
and the need for self-emancipation, or when government tries to make him 
an agent of injustice—when it is forcibly impressed on him that southern 
slavery entails slavery in massachusetts. not even great political questions 
are permitted to eclipse his personal perspective on events. no action is 
right, regardless of whether it is commonly deemed moral, if it is not ex-
pressive. That, not political efficacy, is the standard for casting one’s whole 
influence. Thoreau abhorred organizations, for example, and although he 
did not join the local vigilance committee that aided fugitive slaves, he ac-
knowledged such groups as quasi-governments committed to protecting the 
weak and dispensing justice. He did not attack a federal arsenal. “i quietly 
declare war with the state, after my fashion” (“resistance,” 84).
“Comparatively Good” Government and  
Democratic reconciliation
Thoreau despised docility. But there is more to democratic individualism 
than resistance, and political philosophy’s single-minded focus on Thoreau 
as an advocate of civil disobedience is misleading.25 opposition is not the 
defining element of his romantic political thought. opportunities to cast 
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one’s whole influence arise as part of a life in which men and women have 
other affairs to attend to, Thoreau reminds us. more than once in discussing 
the anti-slavery movement, he repeats the caution, “i do not think it is 
quite sane for one to spend his whole life in talking or writing about this 
matter, unless he is continuously inspired, and i have not done so” (“Plea,” 
133). This is the same partial, conditional quality that characterizes his 
detachment and his account of Walden. Thoreau’s horizon, with its “own 
sun and moon and stars, and a little world all to myself” (Walden, 130), 
designates a sphere of aesthetic delight, philosophical contemplation, “epi-
phanic moments”; it sets his experiences apart from the mundane lives of 
his disconsolate neighbors and is the emblem of undemocratic retreat. But 
his self-distancing is measured: “i wish to speak a word for nature, for 
absolute freedom and wildness, as contrasted with a freedom and culture 
merely civil”—only a word.26 Thoreau always has “several more lives to live” 
(Walden, 323).
in “slavery in massachusetts,” Thoreau’s thoughts move from preoc-
cupation with injustice and regret that “remembrance of my country spoils 
my walk” to the successful resumption of his consideration of the water lily 
in nature, “partner to no missouri Compromise.”27 We know that just as 
often his thoughts moved in the other direction. and at still other moments, 
Thoreau “to some extent reckoned himself” among “those who find encour-
agement and inspiration in the present condition of things, and cherish it 
with the fondness and enthusiasm of a lover” (Walden, 16).
more broadly, then, Thoreau’s “little world all to myself” suggests that 
every standpoint is one among other possible worlds. it evokes diverse and 
changing horizons. it brings to mind Thoreau’s subversive attack on higher 
law and his anti-foundationalism, his skeptical search for the “hard bottom” 
in Walden (70–71): “Let us settle ourselves, and work and wedge our feet 
downward through the mud and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradi-
tion, and delusion, and appearance . . . through poetry and philosophy and 
religion, till we come to a hard bottom”—all the while confident that the 
search for a “realometer” will be disappointed, and finally giving himself 
over to “fish in the sky, whose bottom is pebbly with stars.” Thoreau is no 
systematic epistemologist, and we do not find an exploration of perspectiv-
ism on the order of nietzsche’s. We do, however, get a picture of romantic 
plenitude and fluid perspectivism and insight into the fact that each entails 
a corresponding view of democracy.
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Thoreau puts the authority of a single standard or standpoint on ameri-
can democracy in doubt each time he speaks of laws, policies, or political 
representatives as “comparatively good.” america is a “comparatively free 
country,” for example (Walden, 6). The u.s. Constitution is “comparatively 
good,” he writes, and so is the railroad that runs through Concord.28 Tho-
reau does not intend to compare the relative merits of american institutions 
to others, actual or ideal. and he takes for granted the divergent evaluations 
different social groups make of a set of facts: the railroad running through 
Concord did not have the same significance for the poor irish immigrants 
who built it, the southern slaves escaping by it, and those who benefited 
most from the expanding national economy. The point is that Thoreau’s own 
response to the railroad is alternately disturbed and thrilled, like marx’s 
estimate of the awesome productive power of modern industry (Walden, 
116, 118). The comparative mode indicates Thoreau’s lack of a single fixed 
perspective. it invites readers not only to attend to others’ standpoints but 
also to recognize that they assume more than one themselves.
Thoreau’s great perspectivist set piece, which appears toward the 
end of “Civil Disobedience,” surveys his shifting orientations toward the 
u.s. government and Constitution: “seen from a lower point of view, the 
constitution, with all its faults, is very good; the law and the courts very 
respectable” (“resistance,” 86). Thoreau has in mind the obvious advances 
of representative democracy over monarchy and the way american federal-
ism and separation of powers provide a useful “friction” in the machinery of 
government. moreover, the ordinary activities of government are expedient, 
and Thoreau is happy to pay his highway taxes. Laws may even contribute 
to private life and virtue: “the effect of good government is to make life 
more valuable” (“slavery,” 106). from this perspective, citizens accede to 
authority at no great cost and to real advantage.
Thoreau continues: the state and american government “are even in 
many respects very admirable and rare things, to be thankful for” (“resis-
tance,” 86). he means that representative democracy is the best design for 
creating and undoing political authority, because it sets off its partial and 
conditional character. elections indicate the dependence of government on 
the consent of men and women personally and individually, and democracy 
invites individuals to give a strong dose of themselves. also “very admirable 
and rare” is the fact that federal and state constitutions enumerate civil 
and political liberties. Thoreau was no fond legalist, but he closely followed 
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the judicial treatment of fugitive slaves Thomas sims and anthony Burns 
and insisted that government refused to recognize the dignity of the in-
dividual when basic rights of citizenship, among them habeas corpus and 
due process, were being denied. massachusetts’ personal liberty laws were 
estimable. Thoreau had his moments of political affirmation.
“But seen from a point of view a little higher, they [the Constitution and 
government] are what i have described them.” Thoreau repeats his “harsh 
and stubborn and unconciliatory” stand that the Constitution is a pro-
slavery document (“resistance,” 74). from this point of view, withdrawal 
of allegiance and personal resistance may be felt imperatives. it need not 
take an injustice like slavery to occasion this harsh view, either; government 
also inhibits democratic individualism by imposing its discipline on daily 
life through the militarist conversion of men into “small moveable forts” or 
by reinforcing the expectation that everyone should engage in the sort of 
labor that contributes to national economic growth. Thoreau wrote before 
the rise of the welfare and disciplinary state, but conformity and tyranny of 
the majority were familiar enough. he knew all about the way individuals 
unreflectively internalize norms—that is, what leads to self-enslavement and 
“lives of quiet desperation.” Thoreau was inspired to resist when government 
“fatally interfered with my lawful business” (“resistance,” 107).
finally, “seen from higher still, and the highest, who shall say what 
they [the Constitution and government] are, or that they are worth looking 
at or thinking of at all?” Thoreau can abide the cranking of the machinery 
of government so long as he does not have to assist in its smooth workings. 
“Those things which now most engage the attention of men, as politics and 
the daily routine, are, it is true, vital functions of human society, but should 
be unconsciously performed, like the corresponding functions of the physi-
cal body. They are infra-human, a kind of vegetation” (“Life,” 178; emphasis 
in original). Thoreau has his moments of detachment when he practically 
does not recognize the state.
from this standpoint, Thoreau briefly imagines that democratic govern-
ment could reciprocate his unconcern by allowing a few of its citizens to 
live aloof, “not meddling with it, nor embraced by it” (“resistance,” 89). 
he contemplates a government that admits the need to obtain personal 
consent for every public measure and allows for individual exemptions 
from every obligation—not limited to the rare high ground of conscientious 
objection but whenever an individual’s affairs compel disagreement. We 
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should hesitate to see this libertarian vision as a definitive political ideal, 
however. Thoreau also observes that “to act collectively is according to the 
spirit of our institutions,” and he can imagine government activism and a 
strong tutorial state. Why should public projects stop with highways, he 
asks: “new england can hire all the wise men in the world to come and 
teach her.” villages should “take the place of the nobleman of europe” and 
be patrons of fine arts. They should foster magnanimity and refinement 
(Walden, 109). ordinarily, when a regime is characterized as comparatively 
good, the question for political theory is what constitutes the best form of 
government. But Thoreau has no interest in utopia; these suggestions are 
brief asides. his “higher still” standpoint is neither a foundation for political 
idealism nor a justification for retirement to his own little world.29
for Thoreau, the question is always the same: how much must an 
individual have to do with democratic government at all? By posing the 
question and admitting that he sometimes almost does not recognize it at 
all, Thoreau indicates his ongoing relation to democracy, however tentative 
and intermittent, and even if government’s contribution to well-being is only 
comparatively important. from the standpoint “higher still, and the high-
est,” he is not prescribing a permanent stoic shift of consciousness within 
or supersensible transcendence. The point is to refuse to permit res publica 
to work to the detriment of res privata. Thoreau’s answer is clear: he is not 
wholly taken up with romantic aloofness or contemplative transcendence, 
with active opposition, moral appreciation, or expedient acquiescence. he 
assumes all these standpoints on democracy.
When Thoreau designates the perspective from which government is 
hardly worth thinking about as “higher still,” he leaves things in the com-
parative mode. he parenthetically adds “and the highest” but does not 
assert that one perspective is better or truer than the rest or that one en-
lists higher capacities so that the true self is identified with resistance, say, 
or contemplation. he does not try to willfully center himself by fixing his 
sights on one horizon or another; nor does he propose that, true or not, one 
perspective should master the others, if only for the sake of psychological 
peace or personal integrity. Thoreau accepts sometimes unpredictable and 
contrary perspectives in himself and acknowledges the fact that some expe-
riences and ends are incompatible and only “comparatively good.” nothing 
is gained by invoking higher law or plumbing the depths for some integral 
nature, whether for the purposes of political theory or life; he must exploit 
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the discontinuity of “several lives.” These are the grounds on which liberal 
pluralists such as isaiah Berlin concede the contribution of romanticism to 
political theory: it “has permanently shaken the faith in universal, objective 
truth in matters of conduct, in the possibility of a perfect and harmonious 
society.”30
finally, as the several perspectives Thoreau lays out in “Civil Disobe-
dience” indicate, laws and government not only look different, depending on 
where he stands, but also excite the exhibition of different aspects of oneself. 
Despite its injustices and inhibitions, Thoreau sees representative democracy 
as the political complement of the romantic self, where it can feel at home. 
he would have agreed with George Kateb that “individuality’s meaning is 
not fully disclosed until it is indissociably connected to democracy.”31
romantic Political thought
i have argued that Thoreau’s romanticism is tempered by the inhibitions of 
democracy and that, duly constrained, romanticism characterizes his politi-
cal thought. What is romantic political thought? since there is no reason 
to assume an alignment between political opinion and aesthetic sensibility, 
it cannot be defined in terms of the political ideas writers identified with 
romanticism happen to adopt. nor is there any justification for identifying 
romantic political thought exclusively with revolution, on the one hand, or 
with conservatism, reaction, or, more accurately, imaginative nostalgia for 
Catholic medievalism, hellas, or folk traditions, on the other.32 Political 
aspirations are particularly unhelpful in defining romantic political thought 
in america, where the powerful inhibitions of democracy leave their mark 
on every variation from utopian communitarianism to Thoreau’s democratic 
individualism.
Whether it is associated with beautiful hierarchy or perfect equality in 
a community of friends, romantic political thought has the unifying feature 
of holism. What distinguishes the holism of romantic political ideals from 
that of philosophical idealists such as hegel are the peculiar gratifications 
held out by the former. romantic holism is aesthetic and psychological 
rather than metaphysical or sociological. The romantic sensibility can feel at 
home there because its infinite potentiality is somehow mirrored in political 
community. The poet may even be an acknowledged legislator. “The true 
sorrow of humanity consists in this;—not that the mind of man fails; but 
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that the course and demands of action and of life so rarely correspond with 
the dignity and intensity of human desires,” Wordsworth wrote, and roman-
tic political thought is critical of any order that frustrates expressivism and 
correspondence.33 When it proceeds beyond criticism, it envisions political 
community as a setting for romantic plenitude. This is not conventional po-
litical theory, of course. romantic political thought is preoccupied less with 
justice and institutional design than with the presence or painful absence 
of complementarity between self and political world. Thoreau’s political 
thought conforms to this rough definition.
Contemporary literary studies of romanticism emphasize the dark 
underside of holism and of the longing for correspondence between self 
and world.34 They point up the fragmented quality of the self, the historical 
situatedness of the writer, and the way presumably authentic expressions 
of individuality—including both rebellion and detachment—are socially 
constituted, deconstructing grandiose romantic claims of “uninfluenced 
originality” and “creative imagination at once free and unfathomable.”35 es-
pecially for romantic works devoid of explicit social content, critics set out to 
“expose these dramas of displacement and idealization” and the methods by 
which “the poem annihilates its own history, biographical and sociohistorical 
alike, and replaces these particulars with a record of pure consciousness.” 
The “de-transcendentalizing” of emerson is well under way.36
But american romantics, and certainly Thoreau, seem to have antici-
pated the thrust of these demystifying, unmasking, perspectivist approach-
es. Consider some of the elements of Thoreau’s writing. for instance, the 
political parameters of where we stand and what we see from there were 
evident to him: expansion and conquest, dispossession and enslavement 
govern one’s view of american history, government, and culture. Thoreau 
distinguishes official ideology on the “original” settlement of america and 
the War of independence from the stories told by native americans and 
slaves: history “for the most part . . . is merely a story agreed upon by 
posterity” (Cape Cod, 197). The indian was the native of the new World 
(“three thousand years deep into time” [Maine Woods, 79]), which was not 
really discovered at all; nor were the Pilgrims the first european settlers 
(“new england commences only when it ceases to be New france” [Cape 
Cod, 183]). and in Cape Cod, Thoreau undermines authoritative accounts 
of property claims based on colonization and dispossession. in “Life without 
Principle” (167–68), he asserts that even “broad and truly liberal” intellec-
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tuals “come to a stand against some institution in which they appear to hold 
stock” and “continually thrust their own low roof, with its narrow skylight, 
between you and the sky.”
using the language of classical economics—profit, loss, labor, cost, 
speculation, and enterprise—Thoreau juxtaposes the promises and actu-
alities of commercial and industrial growth, without subscribing to the 
competing ideology of republicanism and moral economy.37
Thoreau also reflects on the formation of public opinion: “The only 
book which america has printed, and which america reads,” he insists, dis-
missing the Bible, is the daily newspaper (“resistance,” 100). he parodies 
elements of popular culture—advice books to young men of the business 
class on self-improvement, for example—and considers how the increased 
presence of novels in the literary marketplace will affect the reception of 
his own work.
Thoreau’s writings stand out from the romantic primitivism of his time 
for their lack of ethnocentrism. and in his vast, systematic, and appreciative 
reading, he is a thoroughgoing multiculturalist, reading the “scriptures of 
nations” and avowing the superiority of the hindu Laws of menu over the 
Christian Bible.
Thoreau’s scattered references to “former inhabitants” and “borrowing” 
add up to a series of sensitive reflections on appropriation (Walden, 40). 
and he anticipates reader response: “a man receives only what he is ready 
to receive, whether physically or intellectually or morally. . . . We hear and 
apprehend only what we already half know. . . . every man thus tracks himself 
through life, in all his hearing and reading and observation and traveling.”38
as for this self, Thoreau reports standing “remote from myself” as a 
spectator (Walden, 135); he is “the scene, so to speak, of thoughts and af-
fections,” a “thoroughfare” (“Life,” 172). he would rather be a passage for 
mountain brooks than for town sewers, but he has no illusion of self-control 
in this matter or even transparent self-understanding. it is not surprising 
that several of Thoreau’s great set pieces are perspectivist riffs on the vari-
ability of how things look and what they mean, depending on where we 
stand, and on the instability of anyone’s standpoint, including his own.
The question for contemporary studies of romanticism is whether to 
leave matters here, with an analysis that portrays expressivism and holism 
as a reactive longing or romantic ideology, a suspect and inevitably failed 
pursuit, or whether, this time with fragmentation and constraining contexts 
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in plain view, to reconfirm romantics’ positive efforts at resolution or recon-
ciliation and at political thought.39 i have argued that Thoreau’s “escapist” 
transcendence on the one hand and his political resistance on the other are 
moments in a comprehensive vision of democracy as a political order that 
corresponds to the experience of individuality.
of course, if holism is thought to require an organic conception of 
political community or a sacred or reenchanted order, the judgment is 
certain to be that romantic political thought, including Thoreau’s, fails. But 
romantic holism no more demands these things than it does overarching 
metaphysical synthesis or emotional solidarism. it should be enough to 
show that a particular political order can be more hospitable than others 
to expressivism and can correspond more fully to “dignity and intensity of 
desire”—even if what is expressed is the interplay of contrary desires or 
perspectives, that is, romantic plenitude rather than underlying unity.
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The consTanT choices and self-direction entailed in meaningful 
work enliven all our capacities. While strolling through the streets of new 
York’s Upper east side as people catch their morning taxis, it is hard not 
to be impressed by their sleekness and fervor—the alert eyes, purposeful 
movements, and general liveliness of a caste of individuals with invigorating 
and demanding employment. one great advantage of the modern era is the 
array of stimulating occupations for those lucky enough to have the taste, 
capacity, and fortune of birth to find meaningful work. For so many others, 
work is of another sort: arduous labor, loud machinery, or confinement in 
some cubicle, unable to leave because aging parents depend on them for 
support. in its contrasting roles as our foundational source of empowerment 
and one of our most invasive afflictions, work plays a dominant role in shap-
ing the energies and capacities we bring to our families, our communities, 
and political action.
The role that work plays has become greater in recent decades. in the 
United states, the number of hours spent at work each year has increased 
significantly since the early 1970s. according to the U.s. Bureau of Labor 
statistics, women worked an average of 20 percent more in 1996 than in 
1973, adding a full 233 hours to their working year, while men added 100 
hours to theirs.1 The proportion of people with very long workweeks has 
risen significantly in every occupation.2 There have also been important 
changes in the quality of work. corporate downsizing and a shift in organi-
zational structure have made careers much less stable, and there has been 
a marked rise in contingent work and temporary employment.3 in america, 
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the conditions that permitted one to envision a stable career are vanish-
ing for many people.4 in a society that enshrines labor as a calling, these 
transformations in the shape and place of work are likely to have many 
far-reaching effects.
political theorists have long given attention to the fundamental role 
that work plays in political life.5 But very few voices in our tradition discuss 
employment from the point of view of the individual laborer attempting to 
maintain freedom and equilibrium in relation to the world of work. a major 
exception is henry david Thoreau’s Walden.6 some critics have dismissed it 
as the work of a petulant and disaffected romantic individualist, but this is 
not an accurate reading of the text.7 More careful attention reveals Walden 
to be a carefully constructed study of the tensions between liberty and em-
ployment in times of economic change.8 Walden is a rare work of political 
theory that asks us to think critically about our relation to the work we do, 
and it gives advice as to the strategies and practices we might adopt if we 
want to elaborate more flexible responses to the shifting economy of work 
in which we find ourselves.
Thoreau’s central theme is that working conditions in a market democ-
racy can easily undermine liberty and erode autonomy. his goal in Walden 
is to set out strategies by which people can enact their freedom despite 
working conditions that are likely to threaten their autonomy and well- 
being. after a careful reading of Walden, we may still be uncomfortable 
with many of Thoreau’s strategies—his idea of voluntary poverty does not 
appeal to everyone—but at least we will no longer underestimate Walden’s 
complexity and subtlety as a reflection about the preconditions for demo-
cratic enactment in market societies.
Walden and Employment
Few political philosophers have made their livings as day laborers. Thoreau 
worked as a house painter, mason, land surveyor, gardener, and pencil 
maker so that he would have the free time to be a writer, naturalist, and 
abolitionist lecturer. his insights about the centrality of employment stem 
in part from the strenuous ideal of democracy he absorbed while growing 
up in Jacksonian america and in part from his vulnerability as a day laborer 
within the swiftly restructuring economy of his time.9 Walden is filled with 
references to economic transformations that parallel those of our era in 
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many ways: a new interconnectedness brought about by the development 
of transportation infrastructure; diminished distances owing to the growth 
of railways, canals, and roadways; the rise of newspapers; the increasing 
power of large corporations; and the swift changes in working conditions 
brought about by the spread of factory labor.10 The commercial spirit had 
taken hold of concord, as it had so much of the republic in the postwar pe-
riod.11 Thoreau’s mother took in boarders, his father ran a struggling pencil 
manufacturing business, and the family lived in “honest poverty.”12 Thoreau 
attended harvard as a scholarship student, but, as edward emerson wrote: 
“The comparatively small amount which it cost to maintain a boy at harvard 
. . . was enough seriously to strain the resources of the family.”13
Given this background, it should not be surprising that Thoreau con-
sidered the question of employment to be “the most practically important 
of all questions.” in 1851 he wrote:
There is little or nothing to be remembered written on the subject of getting 
an honest living. neither the new Testament nor poor richard speaks to our 
condition. i cannot think of a single page which entertains, much less answers 
the questions which i put to myself on this subject. . . . is it that men are 
too disgusted with their experience to speak of it? or that commonly they 
do not question the common modes? The most practically important of all 
questions, it seems to me, is how i shall get my living, and yet i find nothing to 
my purpose in any book. . . . i consider that society with all its arts, has done 
nothing for us in this respect.14
Walden was an attempt to fill this lacuna and to explore how citizens forced 
to fend for themselves in a market democracy might make a living without 
scotching their liberty.
a careful reading of Walden leaves little doubt that employment is 
the enframing theme of the book. in the opening section, “economy,” in 
which Thoreau gives reasons for reading his book, he repeatedly underlines 
the occupational problems facing his fellow residents in concord. images 
of particular forms of employments and their drawbacks crowd the first 
pages of Walden (1–52): Thoreau writes of his fellow citizens in their roles 
as farmers, teamsters, slave drivers, surveyors, herdsmen, town officers, 
inspectors, sailors, factory operatives, merchants, masons, housewives, and 
carpenters. When Thoreau writes of visiting concord, he speaks primarily 
of work spaces—of “shops and offices, and fields” (2)—and of the despera-
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tion he finds there. The word labor and its cognates are mentioned dozens 
of times in the opening section of Walden—seven times on the first three 
pages alone. When Thoreau wrote a précis of the book to deliver on the 
lyceum circuit, he first entitled the speech “Getting a Living.” There can be 
little doubt what this book is about.
Democracy and Employment
Thoreau argues that whatever one may think of the american political sys-
tem (he calls it “comparatively free” [3]), at the level of everyday work life, 
it has produced only limited improvement over the feudalisms of europe. 
Mortgaged to the banks, deeply in debt, threatened with financial failure, 
and toiling without cease, the men and women of concord are, for all their 
seeming independence, still living as if they were “serfs of the soil” (1–3). 
“The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation. What is called resignation 
is confirmed desperation” (4). compared with the rest of the world, cer-
tainly, america is free, but working conditions consistently reproduce some 
of the worst aspects of the old tyrannies. despite the ostensible liberties of 
the american nation, Thoreau’s audience still finds itself “lying, flattering, 
voting, contracting yourselves into an atmosphere of thin and vaporous gen-
erosity” (4). Walden is about how the american project of democratization 
may be seen as blocked and disabled by everyday working conditions.
Thoreau makes four sorts of argument about the tensions among de-
mocracy, autonomy, and employment. First, to be free means having time 
for one’s proper pursuits—time to figure out what one wants to do and then 
go out and do it. Yet earning a living can easily fill up or overshadow the 
time for such pursuits.15 “The laboring man . . . has no time to be anything 
but a machine” (3). second, there is a tension between work and democratic 
capacities. employment conditions frequently entail a “contraction and di-
lation” (4) of the self, which undermines autonomy and upsets our ability 
to make the rational calculations necessary for the meaningful enactment 
of liberty (3, 22, 61). Third, there is also the problem of the narrowing of 
our choice set. seeking success in the current work environment means 
accepting what public opinion values as the best life at any given moment. 
But individual tastes may well lead people to want a sort of life that differs 
from the narrow subset their society values and promotes. “The life which 
men praise and regard as successful is but one kind. Why should we exag-
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gerate any one kind at the expense of others” (12)? individuals whose tastes 
or capacities lead them to develop their talents outside of socially approved 
work paths need strategies to protect their pursuits in the face of socially 
sponsored exaggerations about what is admirable and what is not. Fourth, 
a concern with maintaining employment may prevent people from taking 
principled political positions and thus make them acquiesce in immoral 
policies. as Thoreau suggests in “civil disobedience”:
practically speaking, the opponents to reform in Massachusetts are not a hun-
dred thousand politicians at the south, but a hundred thousand merchants 
and farmers here who are more interested in commerce and agriculture than 
they are in humanity, and are not prepared to do justice to the slave and to 
Mexico, cost what it may.16
in Walden, Thoreau carefully draws our attention to the fact that he 
moved to his cabin “on independence day, or the fourth of July, 1845” (55), 
and the book is studded with references to the political nature of his explo-
rations of independence and freedom. George Kateb writes of Thoreau and 
his generation as the intellectual inheritors of the founding; they “disclose 
its fuller meaning.”17 Thoreau shares with other writers of his time the idea 
that the republicanism of the founding period established only the insti-
tutional preconditions for democracy and liberty and that the real work of 
creating a democratic culture remains to be done.18 The founding period 
opened up a new possibility, but the crucial challenge is to enact democracy, 
to flesh it out in concrete attitudes, practices, and institutions. people too 
easily mistake the legal preconditions of liberty for the real thing. here is 
how Thoreau puts the problem in “slavery in Massachusetts”:
now-a-days, men wear a fool’s cap, and call it a liberty cap. i do not know but 
there are some, who, if they were tied to whipping-post, and could get but 
one hand free, would use it to ring the bells and fire the cannons to celebrate 
their liberty. so some of my townsmen took the liberty to ring and fire; that 
was the extent of their freedom; and when the sound of the bells died away, 
their liberty died away also; when the powder was all expended, their liberty 
went off with the smoke.19
Thoreau is not alone in his belief that we need to think through how 
we might establish real liberty in the United states. Much of the work of 
emerson, Margaret Fuller, George ripley, elizabeth cady stanton, Walt 
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Whitman, Bronson alcott, and other antebellum reformers can be usefully 
read within this perspective of a hortatory literature of democratic enact-
ment. There is widespread recognition in this era that most of the values 
democrats take seriously—liberty for all, equality among people, personal 
autonomy—are very hard to realize in an everyday world long formatted by 
more hierarchical visions and under working conditions that produce both 
opportunities and severe challenges.20 democratic capacities are fragile 
and evanescent. They tend to fade from sight amid the bright temptations 
of everyday life unless they are enacted in concrete practices, strategies, 
and dispositions. This belief in the evanescence of the central democratic 
capacities is clearly an echo of republicanism, with its vision of human lib-
erty constantly threatened by the corruptions of power and money and by 
general inattentiveness.21 Walden is a particularly interesting work within 
this tradition because of the way it works out the theme of democratic en-
actment in relation to the economy of everyday life and the trade-offs of 
work and leisure.
Democracy and Self-Cultivation
Walden is also important because of its focus on individual laborers trying 
to navigate the dilemmas of their work lives. The book reflects many of the 
conventions of a broader democratic advice genre that rose to prominence 
in the antebellum period. in the United states in the 1830s and 1840s, there 
was a widespread exploration of how citizens might prepare themselves for 
their new roles as democratic citizens, while as fathers and sons they at-
tempted to orient themselves in a market economy and as mothers they 
trained future citizens.22 Bookstores were filled with manuals of advice, 
young men’s guidebooks, periodicals for mechanics, and exemplary biogra-
phies of famous americans such as Ben Franklin and George Washington.23 
The Boston area, in particular, was a center for this movement of democratic 
self-cultivation, with its popular lyceum lectures, young men’s mercantile 
libraries, evening schools, and literary societies.24 a wide range of writers 
advised ordinary americans how they might give themselves some of the 
skills and capacities the upper classes counted on as their birthright.25 The 
question that guides this literature is how individual citizens might teach 
themselves the requisite skills to make full use of the new material and 
political conditions around them. That these writers should stress self-
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cultivation is not surprising in an era when public education was still the 
preserve of the upper classes.26
Modern scholarship has not been particularly sympathetic to the 
antebellum literature of democratic self-cultivation. For example, cayton’s 
influential essay on emerson stresses elements of social control and class 
domination within the movement for democratic self-culture. cayton argues 
that local boosters and businesspeople in many american cities wanted 
to maintain moral order among the young men in their employ, and the 
self-culture movement was a means to inculcate business-friendly values.27 
cayton’s work is typical of much recent scholarship on nineteenth-century 
moral didacticism in its debunking tone and its unwillingness to see that there 
might have been something more going on than mere moral indoctrination. 
Modern middle-class scholars who have had the advantages of a free public 
education and access to colleges and universities have generally not been 
very sensitive to the predicaments facing clerks and mechanics who were 
struggling to rise in society without the benefits of adequate training.28
perhaps another reason for the modern scholarly disdain for this move-
ment (and for writers like Thoreau) is that the focus on the individual in the 
democratic self-cultivation movement seems to foreshadow the narcissism, 
privatism, and self-concern detected in our own era by some scholars.29 cer-
tainly, one can never be too vigilant about the narcissism that individualistic 
societies tend to engender. But an anachronistic reading of our own reputed 
insufficiencies into the writers of the Jacksonian era underestimates the 
important functions democratic self-cultivation plays in periods of social and 
economic upheaval. Writers of that time were aware that society was trans-
forming from one in which people acquired their social rank by accident of 
birth to one in which a new mobility was available to most adult white males. 
The challenges and opportunities of mobility made pressing the questions of 
self-cultivation and of education in general. aristocrats had tutors, rhetoric 
instructors, and a college education to prepare them for the public sphere. 
how were those born to an average lot to achieve the capacities necessary for 
full civic participation? We have “no schools for ourselves,” Thoreau writes in 
Walden; “our education is sadly neglected” (71).
recent scholars also may tend to underestimate the benefits of the 
self-cultivation literature if they do not recognize the importance of self-
preparation in nonaristocratic societies. in market democracies, a great 
deal is at stake in terms of how dispositions and habits are formed. as 
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Thoreau shows, the successful practice of self-cultivation can easily mean 
the difference between a life spent in freedom and a life caught in a spiral 
of desperation. aristocrats can rely not only on an elaborate educational 
infrastructure but also on relatively secure liberties, since they are assigned 
these freedoms along with their estates and their rank in society. By con-
trast, the liberties of citizens in a market democracy are often won by their 
own efforts and capacities. not all individuals who concern themselves with 
their dispositions and self-training are narcissistic; for some, it may be a 
matter of survival or preparation.
as neufeldt has pointed out, Thoreau’s work has deep resonances with 
the literature of democratic self-cultivation. Thoreau owned a number of 
“young men’s guides,” and a passage in the opening section of Walden paro-
dies this self-help literature.30 But Walden stands out within the literature on 
democratic self-culture because it sees democratic citizenship as existing in 
tension with—rather than supported by—the practices involved in everyday 
work, business, and enterprise. as shklar and Wood have shown, the social 
revolution inaugurated by the founding generation had a radical influence 
on the way americans understood the place of labor in life.31 The attack on 
aristocracy after the revolution was cast in terms of an assault on idleness 
and leisure, and it brought a “heightened appreciation of the significance 
and dignity of labor.”32 shklar has argued that the standing of american 
citizens was, from the beginning, tied up with their status as workers: free 
democratic citizens neither labored in the degraded conditions of the slave 
nor loafed in the idleness of the aristocrat. When Thoreau writes in Walden 
of “serfs of the soil,” of the need to move from noblemen to “noble villages of 
men” (72),33 or of the servility of businessmen who contract and dilate their 
personalities (4), he is wielding tropes taken from a discourse about aris-
tocracy and slavery that was central to the language of democratization in 
his day.34 The radicalism of Thoreau’s perspective consists in his suggestion 
that, far from generalizing access to the liberty and dignity the aristocratic 
classes enjoyed, everyday working conditions in america might merely be 
generalizing toiling desperation. This is why Walden is a work of democratic 
advice literature. Thoreau sees the conditions of american employment as 
the most stubborn obstacle to the enactment of real freedom.
What is democratic about democratic self-cultivation? certainly Tho-
reau’s primary concern is not with encouraging more political engagement 
and mobilization, as if these were good in themselves. he is, for example, 
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profoundly skeptical about the influence exerted by the unprincipled and 
easily manipulated voters of Massachusetts on the political and legal life of 
the state. 35 ordinary people are too thoroughly submerged in their work 
worries to exert an autonomous and principled stance on political issues, 
and to encourage them to be more politically active while they are in such 
a state would only result in the passage of other problematic laws such as 
the Fugitive slave Law or the bills launching war with Mexico. instead, 
what Thoreau wants to democratize is the experience of liberty, leisure, 
and self-cultivation formerly monopolized by the upper classes. This is 
democratic in the sense that it is premised on the value of the common 
man, on the idea that all people are equally worthy of ethical concern and 
development; no longer should only the upper class have a chance at a full 
life. self-cultivation and leisure were formerly monopolized by the upper 
classes, but now these states might be attained by everyday people; this, in 
turn, would allow them to develop a sense of principle and perhaps resist 
the manipulations of newspaper editors and jingoistic warmongers. This is 
the second sense in which Thoreau’s is a democratic theory: he assumes that 
the population at large is voting and exerting a role through public opinion, 
and he assumes that the question of whether they develop a sense of ethical 
principle is important in a way it was not when the population at large was 
less influential in political decision making.
it should be noted that Thoreau does not think all americans—not 
even all those who are economically vulnerable—will necessarily need the 
strategies he sets out. he explicitly exempts from his arguments all those 
who can, on reflection, describe themselves as well employed, however that 
might be (10). and some people, he suggests, are so strong and valiant that 
they will come out well anywhere. To these, he emphasizes, he does not 
speak (9). Thoreau also excludes from his concern those who have inherited 
(or dishonestly attained) wealth (164). By exempting from his discussion 
anyone who feels a comfortable meshing between work and liberty, Thoreau 
traces out an audience of those who labor without a calling, a group rarely 
addressed within american literature.
An Experiment in Philosophy
how does one address the predicament of the mass of people who try to 
enact liberty and their own particular vision of the good without being able 
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to rely on inherited wealth or standing? how might the myriad blessings of 
our modern technology and productivity be unlocked for the class of people 
apparently so ill served by modern developments? “i wish to show at what a 
sacrifice [the advantage of modern civilization] is at present obtained, and 
to suggest that we may possibly so live as to secure all the advantage without 
suffering any of the disadvantage” (20). at issue is how those who have 
trouble getting a living can nonetheless achieve what Thoreau believes he 
has achieved—namely, the ability to escape misery and desperation—and 
how they can learn to find “encouragement and inspiration in the pres-
ent condition,” even to the extent of “cherish[ing] it with the fondness and 
enthusiasm of lovers,” as Thoreau says he does (10).
after reviewing a number of the typical occupations of his day, Thoreau 
introduces the strategy that he believes offers the best alternative to the 
“enslavements” (4) everyday work life so frequently entails. he suggests that 
moderns who seek to enact democratic liberty have much to learn from the 
ancient philosophical schools of various nations. “The ancient philosophers, 
chinese, hindoo, persian and Greek, were a class than which none has 
been poorer in outward riches, none so rich in inward” (9). What Thoreau 
finds particularly attractive in these schools is their strong emphasis on 
bringing wisdom to bear on the practices of everyday life. “To be a phi-
losopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a school, 
but so to love wisdom as to live according to its dictates, a life of simplicity, 
independence, magnanimity and trust. it is to solve some of the problems 
of life, not only theoretically, but practically” (9). The “independence” in 
this passage is important. in developing his democratic experiments outside 
of schools and other institutions, Thoreau sees himself as returning to a 
philosophical independence abandoned by many modern philosophers. 
as Thoreau puts it, “success of great scholars and thinkers is commonly 
a courtier-like success” (334). The worry that philosophy may be under-
mined if the working conditions of philosophers become too courtier-like— 
toadying to superiors, courting public reputation, establishing power blocs, 
and so on—is part of Walden’s general criticism of those forms of life in 
which participants’ stated goals (love of wisdom in philosophy, love of 
freedom and independence among everyday citizens) are mangled in their 
enactment and thus are not adequately embodied in the occupations people 
adopt to realize them. he thinks more “Yankee” shrewdness needs to be 
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applied to resolving the tensions between our higher-order values and the 
practices of our everyday work lives. 
This idea that ancient philosophy might offer the key to modern work 
predicaments goes back very far in Thoreau’s thought. early in his Journal he 
wrote that “Zeno the stoic stood in precisely the same relation to the world 
as i do now. . . . Bred a merchant . . . he strolls into a shop and is charmed by 
a book by Xenophon and straightaway becomes a philosopher.”36 The key to 
Walden is the way it combines ancient philosophical practices and modern 
economic calculations to set out a strategy by which citizens can realize 
their liberty.37 The seriousness with which the ancient philosophers took the 
challenge of maintaining their poise in the pursuit of the good, and their 
willingness to reform the practices of their everyday lives so as to reflect 
their higher values, become the central attitudes that enable a democratic 
citizen to reopen the space of freedom at the level of daily life.
Thoreau’s description of the philosopher as somebody who solves the 
“problems of life” may at first reading appear to be a fundamental mis-
understanding of ancient philosophy. after all, in the works of plato and 
aristotle, which are the focus of our contemporary curriculum in the field, 
the philosopher’s development of wisdom and insight leads him away from 
political involvement and creates a marked tension with the political life 
of the demos. philosophy is defined in contrast to, and in many ways as an 
alternative to, everyday democratic life.
Thoreau was a well-trained classicist, one of the best of his genera-
tion,38 but the harvard curriculum of his day gave less exposure to plato 
and aristotle than to such writers as cicero and the hellenistic stoics, who 
emphasized a more complex relation between philosophic practice and 
political life. Thoreau’s principal classics teacher, eliot professor of Greek 
literature c. c. Felton, encouraged his students to see the close connec-
tion between classic literature and the everyday lives of ancient peoples.39 
Moreover, Thoreau’s vision of ancient philosophy comprised chinese texts, 
such as the Analects of confucius, which are quoted throughout Walden,40 
as well as numerous indian texts, such as the Laws of Menu, the Bhagavad 
Gita, and the Vedas, all of which emphasize philosophy as a form of advice 
on how to live as an ordinary householder.41 all these traditions gave the 
philosopher a large role in acting as an example and in setting out pathways 
for others to follow as they confronted the challenges of everyday life.
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as many recent scholars have stressed, the relation between the an-
cient philosopher and the political realm is considerably more complex than 
the simple question of whether the philosophically enlightened citizen will 
participate in politics.42 While one strain of ancient thought encouraged a 
turn away from political life, another looked on philosophy as ideal training 
for public affairs, since it taught how to preserve moral integrity amid the 
tumult of political struggle.43 philosophers frequently found employment 
as tutors and advisers in powerful households, teaching politically involved 
citizens how to balance political position, public functions, activities, and 
obligations.44 Given the constant fluctuations and reversals of political life in 
the ancient world (in some ways comparable to the fluctuations and reversals 
of work life in modern times), the citizen needed to stabilize his desires and 
sense of self so as to maneuver with maximum flexibility, to show himself 
as capable of ruling, of being ruled in turn, and of holding high office while 
resisting the temptations of corruption and immorality.45
one reason philosophers came to be seen as fitting advisers to citi-
zens and rulers was that they were versed in exercises by which individuals 
learned to bring their passions and desires under control.46 To operate well 
as a citizen or ruler, one had to learn attention, concentration, and resistance 
of temptation. none of these capacities is easy for humans to attain, plagued 
as they are by anxiety, greed, and fear. Thus, much of the training in the 
ancient schools was designed to help people circumvent the temptation of 
their passions. For example, the epicureans formulated various aphorisms 
to quell fears and realign the individual with the natural world. one of 
these, discussed in hadot’s illuminating book on ancient philosophical 
practices, is the so-called tetrapharmakon: “God presents no fears, death 
no worries. and while good is readily attainable, evil is readily endurable.”47 
philosophers could teach a range of exercises and strategies to help people 
navigate the everyday temptations and obstacles of political life while pre-
serving their moral integrity and political reputation. Walden is a modern 
revival of this tradition. Thoreau uses the narrative of his experiment at 
Walden pond to show how the resources of ancient philosophy can be used 
by those who find themselves vulnerable within the modern market system. 
as i show in the next section, the similarity lies not just in general attitude; 
the practices and exercises Thoreau sets out in Walden are functionally 
identical to the techniques found in ancient philosophy.
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Exercises, Strategies, and Replacement Practices
Thoreau advocates a number of exercises and practices as a means of offset-
ting the forces that threaten autonomy, liberty, and happiness: (1) Thought 
experiments can clarify our relation to our fundamental needs and thereby 
counteract anxiety. (2) Maxims can be coined to offset the autonomy- 
hampering effects of public opinion. (3) household accounting methods, 
centered on autonomy, can establish an equilibrium between one’s higher-
order goods and the practices of everyday life, particularly with regard to 
the relation between work and leisure. (4) replacement practices can be de-
veloped to encourage individual flourishing while offsetting both economic 
dependency and social relations of exploitation. (5) Ways of approaching 
nature and the physical world can be designed to expand and train the self 
and especially the body, as well as to open up to nature in a way that makes 
it more than just a tool of human needs. (6) dietary and sumptuary strate-
gies can be adopted to promote the various goods set out above.
in line with my suggestion that Walden is a work about democratic 
enactment for those facing uncongenial employment choices, these prac-
tices and exercises can be separated into two categories. on the one hand 
are those meant to liberate the time and tranquility needed to elaborate 
projects expressing one’s personal autonomy (practices 1 through 4). on the 
other hand are those more exclusively tied up with Thoreau’s own individual 
sense of the good life, the particular perfectionistic doctrines to which he 
adheres. These include the observation of nature by living in a cabin in the 
woods rather than in a small apartment in the city, and so on.
i make this distinction because each category of practice admits to dif-
ferent degrees of generalizability. practices in the first group are generally 
relevant to most citizens who are interested in preserving their freedom 
under conditions of market democracy. Those in the second group can be 
interpreted only as reflections of Thoreau’s personal tastes and inclinations, 
such as his dislike of tea or his preference for country living. These are 
relevant to fewer people compared with the advice Thoreau gives about 
maintaining liberty in a potentially overwhelming labor environment. Thus, 
i concentrate primarily on the first category of practices in claiming Thoreau 
as a philosopher of democratic enactment. They illustrate how Thoreau re-
formats ancient philosophical practices as elements of a democratic politics 
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of example to address the tension between work and autonomy in market 
democracies.
Thought Experiments to Offset Anxiety
Thoreau believes that one of the great obstacles to autonomy is anxiety. 
self-governance, which is to say the ability to guide ourselves by our own 
developing sense of the good, requires a certain poise and presence of mind 
that are easily lost in a complex existence with many cares. For example, 
worries about long-term economic security can easily lead to a harried life 
what soon subverts the ends sought through pursuing such security.
Thoreau shows that, for a correct balance of ends and means, our cal-
culus of liberty must take as its base point a well-understood knowledge of 
our most fundamental physical needs. These play such a large role in our 
struggle for freedom that Thoreau capitalizes them as if they were deities: 
“The necessaries of life for man in this climate may, accurately enough, be 
distributed under the several heads of Food, shelter, clothing, and Fuel; 
for not till we have secured these are we prepared to entertain the true 
problems of life with freedom and a prospect of success” (7).
in the second half of the “economy” section, Thoreau guides read-
ers through a set of thought experiments designed to sensitize them to the 
border between what they do and do not need in terms of fuel, shelter, 
clothing, and food. These exercises cultivate a disposition to distinguish be-
tween what one needs as a physiological organism and what public opinion 
and habit make one think one needs. an ability to step away from the sense 
of the socially necessary allows one room for maneuver; one is no longer 
locked into a set of trade-offs between anxiety-producing complexities and 
an unrevisable set of goods. an example of Thoreau’s strategy here can be 
found in his section on shelter:
if one designs to construct a dwelling house, it behooves him to exercise a little 
Yankee shrewdness, lest after all he find himself in a workhouse, a labyrinth 
without a clew, a museum, an almshouse, a prison, or a splendid mausoleum 
instead. consider first how slight a shelter is absolutely necessary. i have seen 
penobscot indians, in this town, living in tents of thin cotton cloth, while the 
snow was nearly a foot deep around them, and i thought they would be glad 
to have it deeper to keep out the wind. (18)
There are numerous noteworthy elements in this passage, but i will point 
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out just a few. note the parallel between Thoreau’s strategy here and the 
second part of the epicurean tetrapharmakon, which states that the good 
is readily attainable, and evil is readily endurable. Thoreau tries to remove 
the sting of autonomy-harming anxiety by stressing that it is easier than 
we think to get the goods we need to endure even the greatest local evils, 
which in new england is the winter’s cold. Thoreau addresses each of the 
necessities of life in turn and through a similar set of reflections gives read-
ers a more realistic vision of what they really need and what are luxuries for 
them (luxuries, that is, if they desire, above all, to maintain their autonomy). 
ancient philosophy was replete with such therapies aimed at clarifying 
our vision of nature so as to release us from potentially harmful passions 
and anxieties.48 Thoreau’s strategy is the same as the ancient techniques, 
although Thoreau is careful to cast his arguments in terms of values his au-
dience already holds; for example, he asks why Yankees, who are so shrewd 
about building machines and forming commercial enterprises, nonetheless 
permit their own lives to sink into desperation.
notice also the didactic use Thoreau makes of the indians. he con-
sistently refers to native americans as having managed to work out a 
relation with the necessities of life that does not force them to lose their 
liberty—which allows them to live in the realm of stark necessity while 
being ingenious enough to maintain forms of real richness (19), liberty, and 
comfort (21). Throughout Walden, native americans exemplify a popula-
tion living in relation to the new england climate in a way that allows them 
to maintain their freedom and happiness without the problems Thoreau 
sees his fellow countrymen facing.
Maxims to Offset the Effects of Public Opinion
in the hellenistic schools and in other ancient philosophical traditions, 
such as confucianism and Buddhism, adherents memorized maxims that 
summed up the complex moral and physical attitudes advocated by their 
school.49 These short sayings were then used as guides in daily life, as a 
source of moral orientation amid constant choices, dilemmas, and stress. 
Maxims in Walden play a similar role. Thoreau is elaborating a new ethos 
of everyday life, and Walden’s place in it is analogous to Poor Richard’s 
Almanac’s in the ethos he is calling into question. The maxims in Walden 
sum up and reinforce a particular attitude toward work and time, rendering 
the ethos into a portable form for use in daily life.
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Thoreau employs maxims as a means of stabilizing the new ethos he is 
developing in the face of a public opinion that continually threatens to upset 
it: “The cost of a thing is the amount of what i will call life which is required 
to be exchanged for it” (19). “Money is not required to buy one necessary 
of the soul” (213). “how can he remember well his ignorance—which his 
growth requires—who has so often to use his knowledge?” (3). “simplify, 
simplify” (60). These maxims are meant to stick in the mind and generate 
the dispositions that ground the replacement ethos.
Thoreau mirrors Mill in his sensitivity to the autonomy-hampering 
effects of public opinion in a mass democratic society and to the threats 
public censure poses to liberty. But Thoreau’s economic vulnerability as a 
day laborer led him to insights Mill missed. Most important is Thoreau’s sug-
gestion that the most dangerous influence of public opinion may well be the 
way it shapes our attitudes as consumers, misleading us into thinking that 
we can afford things we cannot (not if we want to maintain our autonomy). 
public opinion can create autonomy-harming ideas about what our needs 
truly are. The maxims studding Thoreau’s text are designed to help read-
ers remind themselves that, from the perspective of their fragile freedoms, 
many more items may turn out to be luxuries than they first think.
An Alternative Household Economics
Thoreau’s reflections are based on the assumption that people are forced to 
be self-supporting but that freedom entails an ability to maintain contact 
with one’s ideals, with what Thoreau terms “proper pursuits” (18). in modern 
conditions, he suggests, that may be possible only with the most simplified 
life, since the means by which one gains the resources for a complicated 
existence are likely to destroy the time and psychic poise needed to keep 
a firm grip on one’s proper pursuits. Thus, individuals who are threatened 
with a desperation-producing work life may find it useful to revise their 
basic wants and needs downward.
Thoreau advances a number of formulas and maxims designed to help 
the individual achieve an acceptable equilibrium between the need to pre-
serve autonomy and the need to gain the necessities of life.50 some were cited 
earlier. But there are also more general algorithms for determining what is 
affordable if one ranks the maintenance of autonomy as a high priority. one 
such equation is the following: “The cost of a thing is the amount of what 
i call life which is required to be exchanged for it, immediately or in the 
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long run” (19). as richardson has pointed out, Thoreau was a careful reader 
of the works of adam smith, ricardo, and say, and the aforementioned 
formula is a virtual paraphrase of smith’s definition of cost in The Wealth 
of Nations.51 as Thoreau says in Walden, “economics is a subject which 
admits of being treated with levity, but it cannot be so disposed of” (18). 
“he must be a great calculator indeed who succeeds” (60). Thoreau gives 
sample account books for a household economy centered around creating a 
space for liberty, offering an example of an accounting practice that takes 
freedom seriously (31–40). he shows how an everyday practice (drawing up 
the household accounts) can be reformatted as a means of enacting liberty 
in the daily lives of average citizens.
A Pattern Book of Practices
Much of Walden, and of Thoreau’s other work, focuses on the creation of 
practices that might serve as better means of realizing autonomy than the 
customary work practices of concord. Walden is a pattern book of replace-
ment practices to help people elude the financial dependency that leads to 
desperate lives within ostensibly free societies. Much of Thoreau’s ingenuity 
in Walden and in his miscellaneous essays is devoted to showing how the 
entirely banal practices of everyday life—walking, talking with friends, 
botanizing, reading and writing, doing day labor—can be rethought and 
reconstructed to enhance autonomy. Walden is an attempt to work out an 
acceptable culture—that is, practices, exercises, and dispositions—that will 
render poverty livable. replacement practices aim to make poverty lush 
rather than barren, thus disclosing it as a position individuals might choose 
if they felt their liberty threatened by the standard work lives they encoun-
tered. native americans and ancient philosophers were able to create fully 
satisfying lives in conditions of great material poverty, and it is not unrea-
sonable to believe that amid the much greater material wealth of bustling 
america, such savage comforts (21) may be even more easily attainable.52
Using the material advantages of our society, we can work out replace-
ment practices that take advantage of any comforts available to us within a 
position of poverty. The aim is to escape boredom, avoid despair, maintain 
our financial independence, extend our faculties, and open up a space to ex-
press our autonomy. Thoreau’s discussion of replacement practices generally 
follows a standard pattern. after examining the customary way of achiev-
ing particular ends, Thoreau explains why the standard practices should 
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be questioned and perhaps rejected. he then offers his own approach and 
discusses how it enhances autonomy.
a good example is the practice of walking, which Thoreau discusses 
both in the essay “Walking” and in Walden. he concentrates on walking 
not for exercise or as part of business but in its most banal form—strolling 
around outdoors with no real purpose in mind: “i think that i cannot pre-
serve my health and spirits, unless i spend four hours a day at least—and it 
is commonly more than that—sauntering through the woods and over the 
hills and fields, absolutely free from all worldly engagements”53
The customary practice to which Thoreau contrasts his ideal of saunter-
ing is that of staying inside all day—not so much staying inside a building as 
staying inside the cares and problems of one’s work and home life. “Walking” 
and numerous other passages in Thoreau’s works devoted to the benefits of 
sauntering are really about the relation between labor and leisure and about 
setting out strategies so that one can work without occluding one’s self and 
sense of the good.
Thoreau also contrasts beneficial walking to the sort of walking during 
which one ruminates about one’s housework or other cares: “of course it 
is of no use to direct our steps to the woods, if they do not carry us thith- 
er. . . . it sometimes happens that i cannot easily shake off the village. The 
thought of some work will run in my head and i am not where my body 
is,—i am out of my senses. in my walks i would fain return to my senses.” 
he argues that walking can be used to regain contact with one’s bodily 
senses and with nature, removing oneself mentally from the world of work. 
“What business have i in the woods, if i am thinking of something out of 
the woods?”54 in Thoreau’s work, the exercises that return us to everyday 
experience are valued because they refresh the faculties and give the self a 
ballast outside public opinion and standard custom (72–73). This, in turn, 
allows one to make better judgments about the choices that come up in 
everyday life. This is but one example of the many replacement practices 
Thoreau envisions and recounts.
My argument is that something more went on at Walden pond than 
mere moral perfectionism. To read Walden as nothing more than Thoreau’s 
working out of “private business,” his personal attempt to answer the ques-
tion “how then shall i live?” misses the large sections that are sincere and 
nonparodistic attempts to write a workable piece of democratic advice 
literature aimed at those whose liberty is threatened by their employment. 
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The first five pages and the last five pages of Walden are very straightfor-
ward about addressing an audience made up of the poor and others whose 
work lives threaten to subvert their “proper pursuits.” one can see Walden 
as a parody of advice literature only if one focuses on a few satirical sections 
and ignores the harrowing discussion of human toil and desperation in its 
opening pages. Walden is a democratic advice book for the poor and work-
weary (1).
Thoreau’s Alternative Economics
in 1851 Thoreau wrote that the question of getting a living is “the most 
practically important of all questions” because everyone must answer it 
before going on to explore and then express the possibilities of freedom.55 
The very structure of Walden mirrors and reinforces this message. it opens 
with “economy,” a section in which Thoreau focuses on mundane worries 
such as employment, food, shelter, and livelihood. But once these self- 
oriented issues are addressed, he turns to the world outside—the commu-
nity in concord and the contemplation of nature. Thoreau is one of the first 
moderns to develop an idea of the physical environment as an autonomous 
presence toward which human beings have some accountability, a dialogic 
partner with its own interests and processes rather than just a tool for hu-
man ends.56 The book may begin with a certain degree of self-concern, but 
this is just a stepping-stone on the way to a greater objectivity.
The rhetorical conventions of Walden, with its quasi-allegorical history 
of the individual soul’s progress from the mundane world of business and 
self-centered worries to participation in a suprahuman realm beyond, with 
“new, universal and more liberal laws” (209), link it to other philosophical 
allegories, such plato’s Republic. But in contrast to the philosopher-sage 
socrates, who justifies an aristocratic politics of guardianship, the democrat-
sage Thoreau illustrates strategies that can make the individual self-reliant.
perhaps the best way to understand the exercises and practices advo-
cated in Walden is to see them as a form of ethical-political athleticism that 
Thoreau hopes will inspire and liberate others. in the same way that a great 
athlete can inspire us to great effort and grace, so Thoreau acts out writ-
large versions of democratically pertinent skills such as self-direction, the 
maintenance of ideals, economic awareness, and frugality. he writes fre-
quently of the importance of setting examples, even if they seem dauntingly 
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strenuous: “Be sure that you give the poor the aid they most need, though it 
be your example which leaves them far behind” (49). an 1851 journal entry 
reads: “if you would convince a man that he does wrong, do right. But do 
not care to convince him. Men will believe what they see. Let them see.”57 
“does Wisdom work in a tread-mill? or does she teach how to succeed by 
her example?”58 Through recounting his experiments by the pond, Thoreau 
hopes to inspire his readers to question the choices and decisions they make 
unthinkingly and perhaps adopt a more rigorous household economics, one 
that takes their life goals into account. Thoreau reformats the familiar re-
publican vocabulary about preserving liberty through resisting luxury and 
renders it applicable to the case of individual citizens attempting to make 
their way as laborers in a modern market economy.
But Thoreau is well aware that the strenuous practices and exercises he 
advocates will not appeal to all. he carefully includes in Walden an episode 
of failed advice-giving through which he meditates on the stringency of 
his example. in the chapter “Baker Farm,” Thoreau encounters an irish 
immigrant and his family in a shack near the pond. The irishman, John 
Field, labors day and night for a local farmer hoeing a bog, but he never 
manages to get ahead. Thoreau summarizes for him an autonomy-oriented 
household economics based on extreme simplicity:
John heaved a sigh at this, and his wife stared with arms a-kimbo, and both 
appeared to be wondering if they had capital enough to begin such a course 
with, or arithmetic enough to carry it through. it was sailing by dead reckon-
ing to them, and they saw not clearly how to make their port so; therefore i 
suppose they still take life bravely, after their fashion, face to face, giving it 
tooth and nail, not having the skill to split its massive columns with any fine 
entering wedge, and route it in detail;—thinking to deal with it roughly, as one 
would handle a thistle. But they fight at overwhelming disadvantage,—living, 
John Field, alas! without arithmetic, and failing so. (134)
Thoreau, it is obvious, is well aware of just how radical his austere household 
economics will appear to some of his readers. 
We might think that Thoreau overestimates the degree of freedom 
open to people who live in conditions of poverty and does not adequately 
recognize the predicaments poverty can bring—the way the attainment 
of freedom is complicated by having to fend for both self and family, for 
example. We might also find that Thoreau does a poor job of accounting 
for the importance of cultural capital. not all poor people have an intact 
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family to rely on, can draw benefit from a harvard education, and live in 
a community as vibrant as that of antebellum concord. To be completely 
satisfying, Thoreau’s alternative economics would have to take all these 
things into consideration and would have to reflect more articulately on the 
weight of structures and institutions. still, no book can do all things, and 
Walden brings considerable illumination to the issues it touches. The book 
insists that america is “comparatively free” and that strategies to circumvent 
any disadvantages in its institutions are thus both thinkable and pursuable. 
Thoreau’s strategy is certainly not based on any illusions about the grimness 
of poverty. indeed, few northern writers of this time paid as much attention 
as Thoreau did to the fate of poor laborers, to the people living in human 
sties by the railroad tracks: “The forms of both old and young are perma-
nently contracted by the long habit of shrinking from cold and misery, and 
the development of all their limbs and faculties are checked” (22).59
Thoreau clearly does not romanticize poverty, but he does refuse to 
see all poor people as similarly situated with regard to life and choice. 
he forcibly reminds us by his own example that there is great diversity 
in the experiences and capacities of poor people, that economic poverty 
can coexist with widely varying degrees of social capital, and that poverty 
is not in all cases the worst of afflictions. Thoreau is less likely than some 
middle-class writers to see poverty as intrinsically and always a barren and 
liberty-destroying condition.60 Walden questions the automatic connection 
we make between economic improvement and increased liberty by pointing 
to groups such as the native americans and the ancient philosophers, who 
maintained liberty in conditions of poverty, and to the workers of concord, 
whose freedom often diminished as their economic lives improved. These 
arguments are not frequently heard in american political thinking.
The best way to read Walden is to see it as addressing people of all classes 
who have talents and tastes that are not adequately mirrored in the lifeways 
deemed profitable in their time. Walden is designed to render readers more 
sensitive to their choices about the place of work in their lives and about 
the trade-offs they make between freedom and consumption. Thoreau’s 
strategy of voluntary poverty as a means to achieve liberty and develop 
one’s own projects is designed for people with a strong sense of autonomy 
who might conceive of projects that cannot be realized through their work. 
certainly, not all people have these characteristics. But as social scientists 
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from Weber onward have shown, the modern employment system tends to 
produce highly disciplined individuals able to eschew short-term comfort in 
the name of more evanescent goals.61 The system that produces the sorts of 
dilemmas Thoreau addresses is also likely to reproduce the forms of charac-
ter that allow the strategies in Walden to make sense to people.
Thoreau’s strategies are but one part of the political theory necessary 
to address the tensions between employment and freedom found in modern 
democracies. We also need to explain the structural changes in economic 
and political systems that allow these tensions to persist. But in terms of 
the immediacy of its advice and its utility for individual citizens, Walden is 
thus far without parallel. in On Liberty Mill suggests that it is important 
for democratic societies to produce individuals who undertake experiments 
in living and thus serve as generative centers of innovation for their society, 
illustrating escape routes from the tyranny of majority custom.62 Thoreau’s 
Walden is an exemplary account of one such experiment in living, and one 
that shows a constant awareness of the exemplary functions of its innova-
tions. it contains an array of practical suggestions that readers might take 
up as part of their own democratic activities. as a democratic advice book, 
Walden has a proximity to action that contemporary political theory often 
lacks. Much modern political philosophy is a philosophy of postponement, 
in the sense that the extension of liberty entails waiting for a collective 
social actor willing to put radical changes into practice—the proletariat 
finally coming to consciousness, or a constitutional convention finally be-
ing convened and bringing about the redistributions of rawls’s difference 
principle.63 The thrust of much modern political theory is to postpone our 
political activity to some distant day. There is a utility in Thoreau’s focus on 
immediate enactment, on the possibility that we might “adventure on life 
now” (9), and in his emphasis on showing us how it might be done. citizens, 
after all, have to fight for their freedom in the here and now, in the (it is 
hoped) brief period before the institutional designs of political philosophers 
and activists are finally realized.
Walden also has a number of advantages in terms of understanding 
democratization in nineteenth-century america. Unlike some european 
visitors, Thoreau clearly sees the inequalities in the United states in the 
antebellum period, and he specifically warns against ignoring the poor: 
“it is a mistake to suppose that, in a country where the usual evidences 
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of civilization exist, the condition of a very large body of the inhabitants 
may not be as degraded as that of savages. i refer to the degraded poor” 
(22). nonetheless, Thoreau refuses to see poverty itself as an affliction and 
believes that we underestimate the possibility of rendering it tolerable. 
he also shows great attentiveness to the social and political ramifications 
of such economic changes as the expansion of the commercial press, the 
growth of new means of communication and transport, and the develop-
ment of new forms of labor. Much of his thinking is focused on themes 
that later writers, such as habermas,64 theorize as the colonization of the 
lifeworld—the expansion of economic and political systems into the dense 
web of unreflective practices and tacit understandings that make up our 
customary life.
Thoreau’s analyses of this process are neither apocalyptic nor overly 
optimistic, and his concern throughout is practical. his central goal is to 
show how the disadvantages of the modern era can be circumvented while 
its advantages are secured (20). it is this willingness to celebrate the con-
veniences of a market society and at the same time recognize that the real-
ization of liberty within its conditions requires high levels of imagination, 
creativity, and self-control that makes Walden such an interesting work for 
democratic theorists in an era of economic restructuring. Thoreau brings 
serious thought and sustained experimentation to bear on an area of life 
seldom examined within our tradition—the border between our individual 
life projects and the means we adopt to make a living. in a time such as 
ours, which has seen the spread of employment to new populations and a 
deep restructuring of work conditions, Walden may well be one of our most 
resonant and useful works of political theory.65
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Most recent scholarship on Henry David Thoreau’s political thought places 
him firmly within the liberal-democratic camp.1 There are good reasons for 
this: Thoreau embodies more famously than any American writer the spirit 
of freedom and individualism that seems to animate liberal democracy, and 
his act of “civil disobedience” continues to inspire modern-day political 
activists to conscientious, public-spirited activity in an affirmation of the 
democratic way of life.2 The problem with this interpretation, however, is 
that it fails to take seriously how deeply Thoreau’s numerous and overt criti-
cisms of democracy, and his exhortations to transcend it, are grounded in 
a deontological moral philosophy that renders impossible the mediation of 
justice through democratic institutions. This is overlooked even by those 
commentators who interpret Thoreau’s disgust with government and ma-
jority rule a bit more literally. Most deny that his political essays provide 
anything more than an interesting statement of his own personal com-
mitments, whose criteria for legitimacy cannot be applied realistically to 
society as a whole.3 In this chapter I instead read Thoreau’s political project 
as an exercise in criticism and make a serious effort to understand Thoreau 
as he understood himself: as a poet and critic who pointed out with more 
coherence than is usually acknowledged the incompatibility of represen-
tative democracy with his fundamental moral commitments. In so doing, 
I do not intend to entirely vindicate Thoreau’s political views so much as 
to illuminate his insights about moral and political obligation that remain 
obscured on a democratic reading; from there, I point to the contribution 
he can make in accounting for the real but often overlooked costs incurred 
by democracy.4
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Thoreau’s radical responses to conflicts of political and moral obligation—
his controversial support for abolitionist John Brown, his public denuncia-
tion of the Fugitive Slave Law, and his refusal to pay the poll tax in protest 
over the war in Mexico and the slavery issue—are usually interpreted as 
criticisms meant only to reform the hollowness of contemporary democratic 
practice. I argue, however, that Thoreau’s own explanations for these acts 
reveal a much deeper concern that the theory and practice of democracy 
itself, not just democracy in its current manifestation, threaten the com-
mitments that facilitate moral practice in our personal lives. By pointing 
out that such a system renders our voluntary responsibilities to ourselves 
and to our neighbors less compelling and meaningful, Thoreau indicts de-
mocracy for incurring real costs that, tragically perhaps, cannot be resolved 
by the system that created them. Thoreau does embrace the liberal values 
he has come to symbolize for many—free expression, civil disobedience, 
the liberty to follow one’s conscience—but he provokes questions about the 
extent to which these values should or even can survive embedded within 
a democratic matrix.
His two main points of criticism address the failure of the government 
to secure true consent and the inadequacy of its representative capability. 
Thoreau’s criticisms are phrased in terms familiar to a democratic concep-
tion of government, but this does not mean that he endorses the ideals of the 
democratic project. rather, he consistently portrays the democratic regime 
as a force that polarizes mind and body, disrespects the right in favor of the 
democratic process, and substitutes offices and institutions for the actions 
of men. This suggests that democratic readings of Thoreau’s work, most 
prominently those of Nancy rosenblum and George Kateb, pay insufficient 
attention to the crucial relationship of his only stated moral obligation, what 
Thoreau calls the “perception and performance of right,” to his political 
thought. By insisting, moreover, that democracy’s liberal variant is capable 
of assuaging Thoreau’s objections because it enables him to be left alone, 
these thinkers fail to grapple with Thoreau’s larger challenge: “Is a democ-
racy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it 
not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the 
rights of man?”5
I begin my analysis by situating Thoreau’s work within its intellectual 
and historical context, to make clear the singularity of his approach to poli-
tics. I go on to identify his precise criticisms of representative democracy by 
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tying them to more formal categories of political and moral obligation—a 
vocabulary that helps explain why Thoreau’s criticisms of the state are also 
necessarily criticisms of representative democracy and points the way to 
more refined definitions of the terms he employs. This leaves me better 
equipped, in the last section, to sketch a tentative picture of Thoreau’s 
vision for a just polity and to gesture toward the kind of insight into politi-
cal life we stand to gain from properly understanding Thoreau’s political 
criticisms—criticisms that, though somewhat utopian, remain compelling 
in their insistence that the best kind of politics maintains the integrity of 
its citizens’ moral commitments.
Thoreau’s Moral Philosophy
Thoreau’s essay “resistance to Civil Government” introduces his most com-
plete model of action from principle: “the perception and performance of 
right.”6 His pairing of perception and performance implies that one cannot 
neglect the duty to do what is right any more than one can neglect the 
duty to ascertain what that right is. Thoreau grounds this morality in an 
epistemologically obscure higher law, belief in which is a major component 
of the transcendentalist project initiated by his friend and mentor ralph 
Waldo emerson.7 emerson’s essays explain higher law as a kind of spiritual 
symbolism imparted by nature from which man should properly derive 
his moral understanding. “All things are moral, and in their boundaries 
changes have an unceasing reference to spiritual nature. . . . [every change] 
shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong, and echo the Ten 
Commandments.”8
A major tenet of the higher-law philosophy is that nature refines man’s 
understanding by revealing specific moral truths and disciplines his reason 
by revealing the holistic correspondence between thought and things. All 
are fragments of the divine, and each one implies all others and the whole.9 
The higher law directs the outward appearance of nature, and nature 
itself acts as a metaphor describing an individual’s place within the uni-
verse and the ongoing and inevitable interaction of substance and concept, 
body and mind, that manifests within that individual. Again and again in 
Walden—the work in which Thoreau offers his most complete model of 
a life of principle—he affirms the transcendentalist dependence of moral 
understanding on the laws made manifest through careful scrutiny of the 
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natural world.10 “What I have observed of the pond is no less true in ethics,” 
Thoreau observes.
If we knew all the laws of Nature, we should need only one fact, or the de-
scription of one actual phenomenon, to infer all the particular results at that 
point. Now we know only a few laws, and our result is vitiated, not, of course, 
by nay confusion or irregularity in Nature, but by our ignorance of essential 
elements in the calculation. Our notions of law and harmony are commonly 
confined to those instances which we detect; but the harmony which results 
from a far greater number of seemingly conflicting, but really concurring, 
laws, which we have not detected, is still more wonderful.11
In Thoreau’s mind, the individual is responsible both for uncovering 
these “higher laws” of nature and for employing them to evaluate and direct 
his conduct. Disagreements and moral conflicts within a community of peo-
ple living in accord with these laws are impossible: as nature is harmonized, 
so too will be the conscientious actions derived from natural observation. 
The exercise of one’s sense of right, if truly in accord with natural, higher 
laws, is incapable of infringing on the same exercise by someone else. “I 
perceive that, when an acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does 
not remain inert to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws . . . 
till one, perchance, overshadows and destroys the other. If a plant cannot 
live according to its nature, it dies; and so a man.”12
Once the individual conscience recognizes this law, its moral authority 
is binding and irrevocable in all matters. Although a distinction can logically 
be made between the dictates of authority and the requirements of obliga-
tion—a terminological hedge many philosophers employ, ironically, to jus-
tify a prima facie obligation to obey state laws—Thoreau does not recognize 
this distinction, because to know the higher law is to recognize an obligation 
to obey it.13 This is what Thoreau means by “action from principle.”
By emphasizing personal regard for “right” over demands to act for the 
“common good,” Thoreau establishes the individual as the only source of 
moral authority. This reduces all potentially political obligations to moral 
ones, an identity that informs his perception of political authority as an 
extension of the moral authority of persons, not rules, laws, institutions, or 
traditions.14 He derides the U.S. government for being merely a “tradition,” 
lacking the vitality of even a single living man; it is not the laws of the nation 
that make men just, but vice versa.15
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Many commentators on Thoreau have remarked that the inherent 
subjectivity of Thoreau’s conscience-based consent to law cannot sustain 
universal applicability. rosenblum asserts that for Thoreau, “conscience has 
no identifiable content” and as such is unable to “create new social norms or 
inspire sociable relations.”16 This echoes the usual protest that using one’s 
private conscience as a political guide would result in anarchy or worse, as 
no justification could be given for public behavior or injurious actions toward 
other individuals, nor could any vision of a public (i.e., interpersonal) good 
be conjured.17 It is important to point out, however, that Thoreau himself 
brooked no questions on this point. As he understood it, conviction in the 
higher law would not encourage arbitrary justification for any behavior but 
instead would present very strict ethical standards that, though accessible 
only to individuals, could be expected to converge much the same way as he 
observed the laws of nature do. Although disagreements may arise, Thoreau 
maintains the somewhat naïve confidence that “the faintest assured objec-
tion which one healthy man feels will at length prevail over mankind.”18
Thoreau’s appeal to higher law in making anti-statist arguments actu-
ally follows a pattern of political criticism pioneered by many of his con-
temporaries, who, like Thoreau, believed that the key to reforming society 
was the reform of individuals. Many of the radical abolitionists with whom 
Thoreau associated either personally or intellectually subscribed to an 
ideal of self-government that derived from puritan antinomianism, which 
held that both knowledge of and capacity for implementing God’s law was 
implanted in every individual.19 This doctrine upheld the importance of a 
personal relationship with God so vehemently that its believers accorded 
socially directed reform no leverage. These reformers instead promoted an 
ideal of individual accountability, and some, most famously William Lloyd 
Garrison, sought to persuade others through the formation of societies and 
communities organized around these principles. Others promoted more 
directly political agendas; for example, Beriah Green’s “anti-political politi-
cal theory” advocated the replacement of democratic practice with elitist 
leadership.20
Thoreau is quick to distance himself from these “no-government men” 
in his essay “resistance to Civil Government,” but apparently for reasons 
outside of their skeptical attitude toward the state, since—as the essay’s title 
suggests—Thoreau harbors such sentiment himself. Whereas Garrison calls 
for a repudiation of all earthly authority, Thoreau calls “not for no govern-
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ment, but at once a better government,”21 which denies not the possibility of 
a just government but the legitimacy of the present regime. In affirming the 
res privata—insisting that he has “better affairs to attend to” than politics22 
—Thoreau recognizes the importance (and vulnerability) of a private space 
independent of state or society, and this makes him particularly sensitive 
to the fact that the planned communities and religious political theories of 
Garrison and his followers leave no room for a discernible private space or 
a nonpolitical identity. In the view of these reformers, the government of 
society is necessarily self-government, and vice versa. Thoreau, in contrast, 
accepts the need for a government mechanism in order to make his life less 
political. Leaving a minimal governmental machine to clink along relieves 
individuals of the responsibility of being involved in government at all.
The way Thoreau champions private life is unique even among his 
fellow transcendentalists, many of whom were unable to find a way out of 
the paradox that emerged from promoting individual freedom simultane-
ously with searching for a perfect community.23 Thoreau’s commitment to 
a methodologically individualist moral epistemology would be undercut if 
he followed either the Christian anarchists or the more socially minded 
transcendentalists in presuming to plan the social order. His organic vision 
of social and political harmony is more similar to emerson’s, but the same 
belief in the higher law that provoked such radical political ideas in his pro-
tégé amounted in emerson’s case to a kind of faith that things would right 
themselves.24 emerson did criticize democracy, but not on fundamental 
grounds. emerson’s concern is simply that democracy as it is now practiced 
does not penetrate the American consciousness as deeply nor motivate it 
as profoundly as it originally promised to do.25 Thoreau’s outlook is at once 
more militant and more morally centered. In criticizing the moral damage 
produced by the democratic process, Thoreau parts company with both 
contemporary social reformers and his mentor emerson. In what follows, 
I show that Thoreau’s political thought is best understood as an innovative 
and unique attempt to expose how democratic institutions inevitably and 
improperly conflate individual morality with political obligation.
Thoreau’s Criticisms
Thoreau’s belief in the moral importance of taking “action from principle” 
impels him to challenge any political order in which moral authority is 
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vested even partially in another group or individual.26 His criticisms carry 
special weight for democracy, since the decision-making prerogative and 
the moral authority that, according to his higher-law philosophy, rest ex-
clusively in the individual must give way to the expediency of voting and 
political representation, especially in democracy’s more “liberal” forms. 
Thoreau responds to this moral crisis by committing several acts of “civil 
disobedience,” and his explanations for these acts prompt us to investigate 
the degree to which the only duty Thoreau articulates—the duty to perceive 
and perform right—can support political obligations, especially those that 
representative democracy imposes.
The only government Thoreau recognizes “is that power which estab-
lishes justice in the land.” By his definition, the government’s acts must be 
consistent with justice, and its mechanism should be constructed to promote 
it actively. When the state, that organ ostensibly invested with such a power, 
fails to execute it properly, private citizens are forced to perform its offices. 
Thoreau in fact identifies the anti-slavery Vigilance Committee as serving 
just such a purpose.27 A proper government and the protection of justice are 
inseparable for Thoreau; one logically entails the other. Under a perfectly 
just state of the kind Thoreau envisions, acting according to principle would 
be functionally equivalent to obeying the law. This does not imply, however, 
that the government can or should determine the content of justice, what 
justice is, because we have already seen that such knowledge is accessible 
only to an individual through the conscientious study of higher law. In fact, 
to establish what justice is and to enact it through a “life of principle” are an 
individual’s only moral duties.28
In his political writings Thoreau contrasts this holistic ideal with the 
reality of the state: he identifies state authority with simple coercive force, 
which is effective in controlling only the corporeal, not the conscientious, 
element of the individuals subject to it.
The State never intentionally confronts a man’s sense, intellectual or moral, 
but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but 
with superior physical strength. I was not born to be forced. I will breathe 
after my own fashion. Let us see who is the strongest. They only can force 
me who obey a higher law than I. They force me to become like themselves. 
I do not hear of men being forced to live this way or that by masses of men. 
What sort of life were that to live? . . . I am not responsible for the successful 
working of the machinery of society.29
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Here Thoreau draws attention to the way the disparity between political 
and moral obligation is manifested as physical separation and moral dis-
placement. The unilateral use of physical coercion is both necessary and 
sufficient for the enforcement of political obligations, but this confused 
reliance on purely physical power is at odds with the holistically perceived 
higher law that grounds Thoreau’s moral duty. Thoreau confronts the reality 
of his imprisonment using language that indicates how jarring he finds the 
contrast to be: “I could not help but being struck with the foolishness of that 
institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, 
to be locked up.”30 On this point, Thoreau’s act can be interestingly and 
illuminatingly contrasted to the civil disobedience undertaken by Martin 
Luther King Jr. and his followers. To King, their protest was a “display”: 
“We would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case before the 
conscience of the local and national community.”31 For Thoreau, however, 
presenting only a body as an appeal to conscience is completely antithetical 
to maintaining the integrity of his moral code. In Thoreau’s act of civil dis-
obedience, bodily display is an unnatural consequence of a vicious political 
system, not a deliberate political statement.32
This theme of displacement and separation is replicated in Thoreau’s 
treatment of elections, which he points out intrinsically alienate moral ac-
tors both from their own conscientiously determined conception of what 
is right and from their responsibility for arriving at and implementing that 
conception.
All voting is a sort of gaming, like chequers or backgammon, with a slight 
moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and 
betting naturally accompanies it. The character of the voters is not staked. I 
cast my vote, perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that 
that right should prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, 
therefore, never exceeds that of expediency. even voting  for the right is doing 
nothing for it.33
Thoreau’s characterization of all voting as a betting game betrays a profound 
disgust with the participatory requirements constitutive of liberal democ-
racy. He recognizes that majority-determined outcomes wither the vitality 
of the private conscience because the individual’s compliance with rules 
and procedures he or she had no hand in formulating necessarily disrupts 
the ongoing process of committing oneself to doing what is right.34 even 
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those who actively disagree within the political system represent nothing 
more than nominal support for their cause, however justified: “A minority is 
powerless when it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then.” 
Its influence is completely undermined when it agrees to abide by the out-
come of a vote. Only when conscientious individuals in the minority choose 
to act as Thoreau has can they become an “irresistible” force by clogging 
the state mechanism with their true weight.35
His remarks go beyond a mere criticism of abuses of the system. 
Thoreau strikes at the very core principles of democracy, realizing that the 
sacrifice of an individual’s moral interests to the vagaries of representation 
and voting is moral tyranny. The representatives who make the laws, which, 
in a democracy, carry the authority of self-rule, are under no obligation to 
represent their constituents’ true interests.36 As such, the rules they agree 
on will not and cannot reflect the sense of right that, in Thoreau’s mind, is 
accessible and meaningful only to individuals themselves. “Whoever has 
discerned truth, has received his commission from a higher source than 
the chiefest justice in the world, who can discern only law. He finds himself 
constituted judge of the judge.”37
In his John Brown papers, Thoreau expands his criticism of democracy 
by taking the representative system to task for its incapacity to acquire any-
thing more than the externals of consent, man’s “bodies,” not “the noblest 
faculties of the mind, and the whole heart.”38 The distinguishing quality of 
individuals such as John Brown is precisely that which no system of repre-
sentation can capture. Thoreau praises him for being a true transcendental-
ist, “not yielding to whim or transient impulse, but carrying out the purpose 
of a life.”39 Thoreau’s comments point out more than just the violence done 
to a moral standard when majorities and their proxies are permitted to 
make binding decisions. For one, representative democracy fails to provide 
adequate methods of moral redress and frustrates the exercise of moral 
responsibility by legally prohibiting certain actions that are necessary to 
satisfy a personal sense of rectitude. But the more far-reaching criticism 
Thoreau makes with his praise of Brown is that representational democracy 
presumes to represent that which can never be represented: the most moral 
individuals among us and, by extension, the moral part of ourselves, “our 
noble hearts.”40 Brown’s act demonstrates even more clearly and definitively 
than Thoreau’s civil disobedience that the “political” obligation under scru-
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tiny here is not a matter of obligation to the polis; rather, it is an obligation 
to one’s moral self, which often implies conflict with political institutions.
Thoreau’s Argument
All of Thoreau’s political acts, especially his civil disobedience and his sup-
port of John Brown, draw sharp attention to the conflict of moral obliga-
tions with political ones. An exploration of the formal distinction between 
these two kinds of duties then may help by providing a vocabulary and a 
conceptual apparatus through which Thoreau’s moral position can be more 
systematically articulated. Thoreau himself, of course, did not use such 
formal language, but I hope this exercise sheds some light on exactly how 
Thoreau’s political criticisms are linked to his moral theory and provides a 
more complete explanation of how his criticisms can apply to democratic 
institutions in general, not only to nineteenth-century American democracy 
in particular.
Contemporary philosophical literature classifies political obligations 
under the larger heading of institutional (also called positional) duties. John 
Simmons, following Michael Stocker, identifies positional duties as those 
connected with a specific office, role, or station: they are tied to the specific 
requirements attendant to the occupation of a particular position, not to 
the individuals qua individuals who happen to fill those positions. Such 
duties, Simmons holds, are morally neutral and can never ground moral 
requirements. The fulfillment of these obligations is entailed merely by 
logical requirement.41 For example, the institutional obligation of promise-
keeping implies that one logically “has to” carry through with what has 
been promised because this is implied in the meaning of the term. It is very 
important to point out, however, that the actual decision whether to fulfill 
the promise is derived from an external and independent moral obligation 
(in Thoreau’s case, to realize the precepts of higher law). Thoreau points 
out the tension that exists between what one feels morally obliged to do and 
what is required by merely legal (i.e., institutional) obligations when he asks, 
“Are laws to be enforced simply because they were made? Or declared by 
any number of men to be good, if they are not good? . . . What right have 
you to enter into a compact with yourself that you will do thus or so, against 
the light within you?”42
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Moral duties or obligations, in contrast, exist to establish standards for 
conduct toward others, independently of any institutional setting or role 
(although it should be noted that the two duties, institutional and moral, 
are not always mutually exclusive).43 All legal and political obligations, then, 
can be articulated as institutional duties enforced on the populace in their 
role as citizens of that state, but as such, they carry no moral weight in the 
absence of a supporting moral obligation.44 This argument, however, does 
more than point out the conflict between conscience and law that any act of 
civil disobedience presumes. recognizing the limitations on the moral and 
political justificatory work of each kind of obligation makes Thoreau’s call 
for a better, just government more intelligible, even as he denies his obliga-
tion to obey the law and enthusiastically supports the anarchistic militancy 
of John Brown. Drawing such a distinction between the two kinds of obliga-
tions helps us see why Thoreau insists that only the rules of morality, not 
political institutions or laws, are capable of setting the terms of justice and 
consent.
For my purposes here, the most relevant insight the distinction be-
tween institutional and moral duties yields is this: although institutional 
obligations may not themselves generate any moral duty, they do condition 
how we expect certain moral duties to be carried out, and in doing so, they 
form a standard of behavior that must be followed if we wish to uphold 
certain moral requirements (of justness, fairness, and so forth). This is 
true because institutional obligations often provide the specifications—the 
socially accepted signals—for how to fulfill moral duties properly. Stocker 
uses the example of the accepted tradition of allowing the birthday boy 
or girl an extra piece of cake; violating that tradition on any one occasion 
would be unjust, because given such a tradition, it would be unfair to deny 
that particular birthday child his or her extra piece of cake.45 Bestowing 
that slice of cake is an institutional act performed “under the auspices” of 
a particular “constitutive convention,” which defines the establishment of 
that obligation to be (part of) what the act imports or amounts to (fairness, 
in this case).46
In other words, fulfilling the obligation incurred by an institutional 
act is simultaneously to acknowledge the meaning of the act as provided 
by the constitutive convention that governs it. This meaning, in turn, may 
carry with it particular moral obligations. The signification attached to an 
act of voting in a democracy exemplifies this kind of moral move. The per-
Thoreau’s Critique of Democracy 79
formance of this act signals a willingness—and logically entails a duty—to 
abide by the results of the election, but the act is also undertaken with the 
understanding that its performance constitutes “self-government,” which in 
turn embodies a particular idea of justice.
The state is in a very delicate position, then, because by enforcing 
particular institutional obligations in the name of protecting justice, it risks 
misrepresenting the pattern of conduct required to fulfill these institutional 
obligations as part of the individual’s moral obligation to serve justice. 
This explains why Thoreau believes that the government is, ideally, just 
an expedient;47 allowing it any more leeway gives it power to dictate the 
understandings that impart meaning to its institutional obligations, which 
may then overtake the moral values such institutions were originally meant 
to secure.
Democracy is an especially dangerous threat in this sense because the 
political obligations particular to it, such as voting and civic involvement, are 
in fact intended to embody a sense of justice: they begin to resemble (and 
some assert that they actually are) moral obligations.48 Using the vocabulary 
of institutional and moral duties, we can articulate Thoreau’s criticism of 
democracy as an indictment of a system that collapses the two kinds of 
obligations into one, making the intelligibility of “action from principle” 
impossible to sustain. He is pointing out how the institutional obligation 
of obedience to the laws democracy enforces has a necessary correlation 
neither to the constitutive conventions invoked (since, as noted earlier, “vot-
ing for the right is doing nothing for it,” and representation does not really 
represent what it should be representing) nor to the moral obligation to 
serve justice that democracy adopts as its goal. Indeed, democracy pretends 
that voting means consent and that representation means equality; by doing 
so, it presents as moral duties the institutional obligations that are meant 
only as expedients to facilitate the fulfillment of those moral duties. “What 
is the value of any political freedom, but as a means to moral freedom? 
Is it a freedom to be slaves, or a freedom to be free, of which we boast?” 
Thoreau asks.49 It is the disjunction between an action and its intended 
significance—especially the wide disparity between the way justice must 
be properly sustained and the democratic institutions meant to secure (and 
embody) it—to which Thoreau’s act of civil disobedience, his vehement op-
position to the Fugitive Slave Law, and his elegiac support of John Brown 
draw attention.
80  Leigh Kathryn Jenco
I further argue that Thoreau’s departure from the center of social and 
political life, documented in Walden, can be interpreted as a rejection of 
the legal and political obligations physically imposed through residence in a 
polity. While at Walden pond, Thoreau attempts to strip away institutional 
duty in a restatement of essentials that reinforces his commitment to and 
recognition of the bare fact of moral duty. His obsession with simplicity and 
his residence there, well outside of town, can be specifically interpreted as 
rejections of the convention that popular participation in democracy equals 
justice. Thus Thoreau is not maintaining, as rosenblum assumes he must, 
that “although the pretext of democracy is one cause of civil disobedience 
it is also what makes it possible to conceive of ‘civil’ disobedience in the 
first place.”50 rather, he denies that democracy can lend any legitimizing 
influence to his actions at all, however much it may seem that it makes them 
more convenient.
Consider Thoreau’s insistence that the constitutive element of any just 
regime is consent of the governed. In liberal regimes, consent is usually 
deduced in one of two ways: either through an assumed acceptance of a 
hypothetical social contract or through political participation in representa-
tive democracy. The former reconciles the fact of man’s moral autonomy 
with the compromises of public life by theoretically positing such autonomy 
in a “state of nature,” before the deliberate creation of society. After the 
contract takes effect, personal good is relegated to the private sphere and 
held inferior to the “public good,” which now serves as the basis for agree-
ment and therefore dominates political discourse. The logic of majoritarian 
or representative democracy allows issues of common political interest to 
be subjected to a tribunal of popular opinion, wherein participation in the 
voting process comes to stand for the consent of all those governed. The in-
dividuals within the polity—whether they voted or not, whether their views 
won out or not—are then bound by the decisions made by the collective 
political body.
In both cases, a sense of the common good and one’s obligation to 
promote it serve as the moral basis for the political obligations to which the 
citizen is subject. The assumption of a common good that morally supersedes 
all personal good is a central motivation for the construction of the state, 
and the degree to which the state serves the common good (i.e., is just) is 
the criterion of its legitimacy.51 Although disagreements exist over what the 
common good is and how it should be served, political considerations (i.e., 
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those concerns relevant to the actions and powers of government) must, by 
definition, reference the prevailing sentiments of common good and phrase 
its justification in those terms, since it is these (moral) commitments that 
ground political obligation in the first place. In fact, we can identify one 
of the primary constitutive conventions of a democracy as the idea that 
through participation in political decision making citizens serve a notion of 
the public interest or common good above their personal interests.52
Alternatively, George Kateb maintains that Thoreau’s call for consent 
of the governed can be answered by rearticulating democratic practices 
such as voting and representation not as true expressions of consent but as 
forms requisite to a legitimate government (which is a government entitled 
to make laws and policies binding on people in society). Legitimacy (and 
hence obligation to obey) is assured when the forms and procedures en-
shrined within the government are such as to provide as much certainty as 
possible that the state can achieve only those aims that justify its existence 
and that the governmental mechanism alone can achieve. This legitimation 
principle is coupled with Kateb’s understanding of the U.S. Constitution 
as a contract between individuals that simultaneously specifies the form, 
powers, procedures, and limitations of that government. Voting citizens 
“will” the system into being by the electoral procedure. It is a social con-
tract to which all Americans give (rather superfluous) tacit consent.53 This 
is a corollary of the argument that justifies democracy by pointing out that 
it contains the best and most efficient mechanisms available to ensure that 
a political regime remains responsive to the needs and concerns of its citi-
zens.54 In this reformulation, the justness of a regime is determined by the 
extent to which it retains its sensitivity to the true needs of the populace, 
who are held to “consent” to such a government because the government’s 
practices, presumably, remain within the boundaries of acceptable political 
and legal conduct.
It should be obvious, however, that Thoreau’s version of “consent” 
departs from all the aforementioned elaborations. Both his sense of justice 
and his declaration that he “do[es] not wish to be regarded as a member 
of any incorporated society which [he has] not joined” demand that any 
institutional obligations be grounded in a true, expressed consent.55 Simply 
assuming that a positive evaluation of justice would constitute an act of con-
sent gets the chain of causation backward.56 For Thoreau, consent, higher 
law, and acting justly form an identity such that the presence of any one 
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implies the other two: he tells us that a just government is one that has been 
consented to; one that has been consented to must, by definition, be in ac-
cordance with higher law, or else its citizens would not sanction it; and those 
who consent by reason of its accordance with higher law must, according to 
Thoreau’s double obligation to both perceive and perform right, be leading 
the just life that such a principle entails (i.e., to agree is to agree to obey). 
This tripartite identity makes an express act of consent seem superfluous, 
but it may be possible to lend some coherency to Thoreau’s argument here 
if we return to our discussion of the way constitutive conventions often 
produce contradictory or unexpected significations for particular acts. We 
know Thoreau has already rejected typical democratic practices for their 
demonstrated vulnerability to this kind of manipulation of meaning, but I 
would like to sketch out a way in which the voluntary assumption of a moral 
code like Thoreau’s may become evident in ways that are discernible as 
political consent—remembering, of course, that “expressed” consent need 
not be expressed openly, as long as the act is voluntarily undertaken and 
recognized as the deliberate assumption of a political obligation.
Because Thoreau criticizes democracy for its irresponsibility in enforc-
ing institutional obligations that are meant to embody justice but do not 
actually result in justice, he must understand “consent” to mean consent 
not just to a process but also to an outcome: consent must be given both 
to the performance of the institutional acts that generate the institutional 
obligations and to the recognized meaning that fulfillment of the obligation 
generates under the sanction of the appropriate constitutive convention.
This attitude is borne out by Thoreau’s belief that the concatenation of 
manifold personal interests in society will reflect the diversity-driven har-
monization found in nature, over the distortion or homogenization of mean-
ings that a political system must ascribe to the performance of particular 
acts. “Let everyone mind his own business, and endeavor to be what he 
was made,” he exhorts us in Walden.57 This suggests that, in a social system 
organized so that the constitutive conventions that govern the meaning of 
particular acts remain discernible and intelligible to the agents undertaking 
the pursuant obligations, fulfillment of an implied institutional obligation 
can be construed as an expression of consent. When the meaning that each 
act generates is stable and clearly discernible, the agent can evaluate each 
course of action to see whether the outcome accords with his understand-
ing of higher law. This evaluation is not possible when the meanings of the 
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acts are illegible or contradictory. Consent becomes possible only when one 
can take real responsibility for the ultimate meanings of institutional acts, 
and this condition cannot obtain when the outcomes of democratic decision 
making supplant the morally derived meanings an agent intends.
Thoreau’s Democratic Interpreters
recasting Thoreau’s political critique in this manner calls into question the 
strongest argument for his democratic status: namely, that the privacy af-
forded him by a liberal democracy prevents him from lodging any effective 
critique against it. Both Kateb and rosenblum interpret Thoreau’s embrace 
of values typically found in a liberal democracy as necessarily (if somewhat 
critically) supporting the system itself. Kateb positions Thoreau among his 
fellow transcendentalists, whose “democratic individualism” Kateb sees 
as both an outcome and an enrichment of representative democracy.58 He 
argues, in fact, that the great value of constitutional liberalism lies precisely 
in its ability to allow individuals to be less involved in political life, which 
is a goal Thoreau would ostensibly affirm. But when Kateb goes on to insist 
that the very process of constitutional representative democracy promotes 
and produces a conception of individual dignity and the sphere of action 
appropriate to that concept of dignity, the irony of Thoreau’s critique is 
obscured. Thoreau is pointing out that these institutions themselves—and 
the processes that buttress them—violate or render impossible the moral 
activity that makes private life intelligible to begin with. Kateb’s claim that 
things such as elections and due process contain intrinsic moral value, then, 
makes a point that Thoreau could not even recognize, much less see as 
legitimating democracy.59
Thoreau’s act of civil disobedience in refusing to pay the poll tax de-
serves careful consideration here, because it openly flaunts the means of 
redress democracy provides and thus provides a convenient counterexample 
to Kateb’s argument. At the same time, however, there is no denying the 
act’s implicit paradox: even as it aggressively protests the policies under-
taken by a democratic regime, it is crucially dependent on the values of free 
expression and tolerance, which find institutional culmination and security 
in the procedures of democracy. This tension animates rosenblum’s sophis-
ticated account of Thoreau’s political thought, which integrates his militant 
detachment with the project of liberal democracy. In linking Thoreau to the 
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contemporary romantic movement in europe, rosenblum champions him as 
one of the few romantics wise enough to integrate the personal compulsion 
to self-development with the needs and virtues of public (and democratic) 
life.60 Her argument develops from the conflict she sees in Thoreau’s simul-
taneous embodiment of both radical individualism and romantic sensibility: 
the former depends on values that, in rosenblum’s opinion, derive their 
meaning from liberal democracy, “where personal liberty, consent, and re-
sistance have recognized meanings,” while the latter “places a premium on 
noncomformity rather than on moral agreement.”61 The tension is resolved 
by a stance of “militancy,” outwardly manifest in a “heroic individualism” 
that is both aggressive toward others and detached from public life.62
rosenblum believes that Thoreau’s militancy is enough to motivate 
his political resistance, independent of considerations of conscience, so she 
ignores the way Thoreau’s moral imperatives shape his approach to politics. 
Because she, like Kateb, conceives of liberal freedoms and democratic 
institutions as conceptually implicated, rosenblum cannot account for the 
degree to which Thoreau sees a commitment to things such as freedom of 
expression and personal dignity as simply unintelligible when subjected to 
the vagaries of democratic opinion—even when its evils are diluted by a 
liberalism that secures what Thoreau most values. rosenblum insists that 
“detachment loses both its original temptation and its dramatic force if 
democracy is not Jacobin but liberal and instead of imposing obligations 
or demanding loyalties it leaves Thoreau alone.”63 We have already seen, 
however, that Thoreau indicts democracy—even its liberal variant—for 
the very reason that it does impose obligations, distorting the meaning 
of citizens’ conduct by helplessly implicating the discharge of their duty 
to obey justice in the outcome of elections or in the legislative choices of 
representatives. This confusion of meanings leads to a condition in which, 
ultimately, injustice comes to be called justice: when he is arrested, for 
example, Thoreau notes the implicit paradox of jail being the appropriate 
place for a just man in an unjust system.64 Thoreau goes on to praise John 
Brown’s raid for inspiring the North to go “behind the human law” and 
return to “original perceptions,” to see that “what was called order was 
confusion, what was called justice, injustice, and that the best was deemed 
the worst.”65 Thoreau’s commentary on this event foregrounds the kind of 
personal commitment to justice that need not, and should not, reference 
the distorted sense of justice produced within democratic institutions. 
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Thoreau’s act of state resistance is not a celebration of liberal democracy 
but rather one part of an ongoing process of challenging and giving new 
definitions to those terms usually employed to justify it.
Thoreau’s Alternative
Although Thoreau never gives a complete account of his alternative vision, 
he does suggest a few ways in which typical social practices can be adapted 
or reconceived to meet the rigorous standards of his moral commitments. 
I discuss them briefly here in conclusion because they are helpful in com-
prehending both the importance and the limits of Thoreau’s critique of 
democracy.
recalling Thoreau’s definition of government as “that which secures 
justice in the land,” we must conclude that his vision of justice requires a 
decentralization of political commitments so radical that they may no lon-
ger be recognizably “political” at all. For Thoreau, the proper interpersonal 
relationship is a form of neighborliness marked by a rhetoric not of com-
munity but of commonality66—a shared understanding that grounds the 
constitutive conventions that give sustainable, morally integrated meaning 
to the fulfillment of institutional obligations.
The distinction Thoreau implicitly draws between legal and moral ob-
ligations allows him to reject public life while preserving the private sphere 
as a domain of fruitful social intercourse. “I deal with men, not offices,” 
Thoreau declares during the narrative of his arrest. Thoreau is not jarred 
by the dissonance between the political-legal duties such “offices” attempt 
to discharge and the primacy of independent moral obligation. Any actions 
with political or other consequences for Thoreau derive exclusively from 
moral commitments and thus find articulation as obligations to people, not 
institutions. They are, in that sense, private.67 The institutional allegiance 
required by definition for any putative duty to obey the law, especially 
if such a duty is grounded in respect for democratic processes, is funda-
mentally incapable of finding support from Thoreau’s idea of moral duty. 
Simmons makes the interesting observation that if an absolute monarch 
makes sacrifices for his subjects, it is conceivable that the personal debts of 
gratitude owed him might be political obligations, because no separation of 
private and official capacities is evident.68 This is the probably the closest 
model one can find to explain Thoreau’s vision of political life: moral obliga-
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tions replace the legalities originally intended to produce political results, 
with the paradoxical effect that state-related activity must become personal 
activity.69
This reading turns Kateb’s claim about Thoreau’s project on its head. 
To Kateb, Thoreau aims to “politicize the nonpolitical relations of life and 
thus to democratize them.”70 I contend that Thoreau is engaged in the exact 
opposite task: depoliticizing many of the political relations of life to ac-
commodate his moral sensibility. regardless of what others may claim that 
liberal democracy promises (e.g., the legal and social capability to be left 
alone, the possibility for the articulation of public criticism, the fair negotia-
tion of political demands made by individuals and groups, legal guarantees 
of individual liberties), in Thoreau’s understanding, it is no less guilty than 
monarchy of promoting an authority it cannot morally justify to individuals. 
More than just a liberal fear of arbitrary power impels Thoreau to champion 
the private life.
The plea he makes in “resistance to Civil Government” for the state to 
treat him “as a neighbor” suggests that Thoreau thinks political actions can 
and should be advanced much the same as one neighbor appeals to another, 
trying to win his opinion through persuasion with the full endorsement of 
his conscience. To Thoreau, the neighborliness ethic seems to stand in for 
the legal obligations that are often meant to regulate interpersonal conduct. 
Any other kind of social or political involvement, Thoreau alleges, would 
be able merely to appropriate one’s body, not to establish moral author-
ity. rosenblum’s characterization of Thoreau as so militantly detached that 
“neighborliness becomes public agon” thus reveals itself to be an overstate-
ment, relying as it does on the premise that Thoreau is a mere exhibitionist, 
not a moral visionary.71
even those who, like Thoreau, temporarily choose to withdraw their 
residency still have a universal commitment to treat others and their pos-
sessions with this kind of neighborly respect. In Walden Thoreau makes a 
point to borrow a neighbor’s ax to fell the trees that would become his cabin 
on Walden pond, for the simple reason that “it is the most generous course 
thus to permit your fellow men to have an interest in your enterprise.” 
Throughout the book he maintains that the only kind of social cooperation 
possible is involved in this effort to “get our living together.”72 The reciproc-
ity of this relationship binds an individual to the community around him 
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without the sacrifice of his moral autonomy. After all, Thoreau explains his 
willingness to pay the highway tax and to support education in the village as 
an expression of his desire to be “a good neighbor.”73
But being neighborly does not necessarily mean maintaining a persis-
tent formal detachment.74 In addition to insisting on the privacy enjoyed 
vis-à-vis other people, neighborliness can accommodate social interaction 
on a personal level, which can secure the kind of privacy enjoyed vis-à-vis 
the state. The latter kind, of course, is of more direct relevance politically; 
it sometimes even entails the task of enjoining others to one’s cause, a pos-
sibility Thoreau took advantage of when he addressed his audience at the 
Concord Lyceum. The relationships guiding interpersonal behavior that 
Thoreau elaborates throughout his defense of John Brown are not, as some 
commentators have assumed, the necessarily alienating commitment to 
individual principles that Thoreau’s civil disobedience embodies.75 Instead, 
we again witness a convergence of conscientious interests that, in Thoreau’s 
mind, seems almost inevitable and impels his allegiance to Brown. Commit-
ment to principle does set him apart from the masses, but it also binds him 
together with the equally conscientious. H. D. Lewis observes that “while 
the individual must in the least analysis obey his own conscience, yet, as 
part of his duty to find out what is his duty, there is much in the meantime 
that he requires to do to correct the limitations of his private point of view,” 
which includes consulting with others who may have more experience or 
insight.76 Neighborliness can be seen as one such check on the downward 
spiral of subjective morality. This may be what Thoreau means by fulfilling 
“all the duties of neighbors and fellow-men.”77
In some senses, Thoreau would agree with Michael Walzer that liberal 
democracy alienates individuals from commonality. But Thoreau’s solution 
is unique in highlighting the dangers of too much political involvement. He 
calls not for an expansion of political space to accommodate the contesta-
tion and negotiation of the content of public good but for more privacy to 
find one’s own good, to reform oneself, to ascribe genuine significance and 
affect to social relationships—in other words, to more truly “get our living 
together.” The alternative to liberal democracy, Thoreau makes clear, is not 
communitarianism; social harmony and moral integrity are better sustained 
when we “succeed alone, that we may enjoy our success together.”78
It is true, of course, that Thoreau’s enthusiastic rhetoric glosses over 
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the sometimes prohibitive difficulty involved in reconciling the demands of 
political life with those of private morality—a goal already abandoned by 
many scholars as futile or misguided.79 But it would be a mistake to assume 
that the frequently tragic results of our efforts to do so can be unproblemati-
cally mitigated by democratic politics, and Thoreau’s critique is valuable for 
precisely its demonstration of democracy’s own inability to accommodate all 
necessary moral commitments. To misinterpret Thoreau’s political criticism 
as sympathetic to democracy, then, is to risk missing the unique contribu-
tion he makes to our understanding of political life. Thoreau is showing us 
what is at stake when democratic legitimacy goes unexamined: the complex 
relationship of moral loyalties to civic duties is obfuscated, and we remain 
unable to see or properly gauge democracy’s not insignificant side effects, 
including moral compromise and the elevation of expediency at the expense 
of justice.
By foregrounding the moral questions that ought to motivate politics, 
moreover, Thoreau directs our attention away from political institutions and 
toward the individuals these institutions are ostensibly in place to serve. 
Thoreau is actually making the surprising observation that, like monarchy 
or aristocracy, democracy too is a system in which one is unavoidably gov-
erned by others, and it is this realization that drives him to a nearly anarchic 
(but to him, more genuine) form of “self-rule.” That such a vision seems 
utopian does not mean it should not be taken seriously as a criticism of the 
assumption that democracy is the best we can do. even if we accept that 
democracy is the best realistic option at present for the just management of 
political life, it does not mean that it is unassailable or above criticism. Thus, 
Thoreau’s admission that the U.S. Constitution and the political system it 
undergirds are “very good” when “seen from a lower point of view” signals 
not a commitment to democracy but a warning to his readers that their 
complacency about democracy will inhibit the search for better (perhaps 
more liberal?) possibilities and foreclose any attempt to seek a higher moral 
ground. This is because these institutions, “seen from a point of view a little 
higher . . . are what I have described them; seen from a higher still, and the 
highest, who shall say what they are, or that they are worth looking at or 
thinking of at all?”80 Thoreau’s political writings are valuable for the very 
reason that they help us recognize the trade-offs between liberal freedoms 
and democratic commitments—moral costs that lie well concealed beneath 
a mask of practicality.
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I cannot bear to be told to wait for good results, I pine as much for good 
beginnings.
—Thoreau, “Reform and Reformers”
It is remarkable how closely the history of the apple-tree is connected with 
that of man.
—Thoreau, “Wild Apples”
In hIs “DIvInITy school Address,” Emerson declares, “The old is 
for slaves,”1 and in a talk delivered at Dartmouth college a month later, 
he claims that the “perpetual admonition of nature to us, is, ‘The world 
is new, untried. Do not believe the past. I give you the universe a virgin 
today.’”2 Emerson teaches us to turn away from what he sees as our confin-
ing traditions, customs, and histories; to make a clean break with the past; 
to invent a fresh, new, and free reality. This is the message of his first book, 
Nature, which concludes by encouraging the reader, “Build, therefore, 
your own world.”3 It is also a message of “self-Reliance,” where Emer-
son scolds us, saying, “I am ashamed to think how easily we capitulate to 
badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions.”4 The freedom 
Emerson seeks is a freedom beyond history because, in his view, history 
gives us only thoughtless prejudice and habit, both enemies of an authentic 
independence.
It is tempting to think that Thoreau shares this understanding of free-
dom with Emerson. In “Walking,” for example, Thoreau writes, “Above all, 
we cannot afford not to live in the present. he is blessed over all mortals 
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who loses no moment of the passing life in remembering the past.”5 here, 
as when he writes in his Journal that he wishes “to get the concord, the 
Massachusetts, the America, out of my head and be sane a part of every 
day,”6 nature appears to play the role suggested by Emerson: it is a refuge 
from society in the fullest sense of the word. nature allows us to escape our 
daily affairs and human contacts. Indeed, it allows us to escape the human 
world altogether, not only our contemporaries but also our predecessors and 
all the institutions, practices, and beliefs that bind the present to the past. 
The free individual who is ready for a walk is a solitary who escapes society 
in the shelter of nature.
Because Thoreau is commonly thought to subscribe to this Emerso-
nian perspective, interpreters of Thoreau’s political thought have predict-
ably observed that such an orientation is less than promising for thinking 
about social and political life. Jane Bennett worries that “Thoreau acts as if 
one could exempt oneself from public life.”7 In the same vein, John patrick 
Diggins writes, “obsessed with his own salvation, Thoreau called upon 
others to withdraw from society and thereby become oblivious to all that is 
general and public.”8 perhaps the most critical of all, c. Roland Wagner ac-
cuses Thoreau of a selfish childishness: “Thoreau’s uncompromising moral 
idealism, despite its occasional embodiment in sentences of supreme liter-
ary power, created an essentially child’s view of political and social reality. 
Because his moral principles were little more than expressions of his quest 
for purity and of hostility to any civilized interference with the absolute 
attainment of his wishes he was unable to discriminate between better and 
worse in the real world.”9 Bennett, Diggins, Wagner, and many others like 
them, are right to believe that if Thoreau holds an understanding of nature 
and freedom similar to that found in Emerson’s writings, we cannot expect 
a social and political commentary of any real sophistication or significance. 
In this event, it is easy to think that Thoreau is little more than a self-
absorbed egoist.
There are good reasons to believe, however, that Thoreau’s views are 
significantly different from Emerson’s on these matters. In fact, these dif-
ferences can be dramatically illustrated by looking at Thoreau’s first book, 
A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers. In this work Thoreau im-
merses himself in American colonial history, specifically investigating the 
relationship between Indian and European settlers. Far from encouraging 
us to escape our past, to cut ourselves off from our social legacies and the 
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determinative facts of our collective lives, Thoreau provides us with a tough, 
revealing look at the historical events and conditions and struggles that gave 
birth to contemporary American society. When Thoreau and his brother 
travel up the concord and Merrimack rivers, nature does not give them 
“the universe a virgin.” on the contrary, they find a social world within this 
nature that is filled with crime, violence, heroism, and the tragedy resulting 
from the conflict of dissimilar social orders.
A Week has rarely been taken seriously (or considered at all) by those 
interested in Thoreau’s political ideas. It is often viewed, by Thoreau’s 
admirers and critics alike, as a rather tedious series of seemingly unrelated 
observations, thoughts, and ideas all tied together by a young, preachy, 
self-preoccupied Thoreau. Melville, who thought it was a terrible and self-
indulgent book, wrote to hawthorne that he planned to satirize it with a 
work entitled “A Week on a Work-Bench in a Barn.”10 one of Thoreau’s 
friendliest biographers, henry s. salt, concludes that the book is “vague, 
disjointed, and discursive; and is, moreover, almost arrogant in its tran-
scendental egoism.”11 What could such an unbearably “transcendental” 
book have to do with politics? Even those (mainly literary) critics who are 
friendly toward the work describe it as concerned primarily with private 
issues, such as Thoreau’s response to his brother’s death.12
one recent biographer, Robert D. Richardson, breaks with these com-
mon views when he writes, “A Week has strong, if frequently overlooked, 
social themes: friendship, settlement, Indian life, oriental law.”13 I agree but 
would make the case even more forcefully: what is thought of as a painfully 
personal and apolitical book is actually a sophisticated meditation on the 
realities and consequences of the American founding. once we are in a po-
sition to appreciate the degree to which Thoreau, unlike Emerson, accepts 
the necessity of locating our choices and freedoms within social contexts 
and historical time, we have taken the first step toward a reevaluation of the 
quality and significance of Thoreau’s political thought as a whole.
Thoreau begins his book with the following sentence: “The Musketa-
quid, or Grass-ground River, though probably as old as the nile or Euphrates, 
did not begin to have a place in civilized history, until the fame of its grassy 
meadows and its fish attracted settlers out of England in 1635, when it re-
ceived the other but kindred name of concoRD from the first plantation 
on its banks, which appears to have been commenced in a spirit of peace 
and harmony.”14 out of respect for historical chronology, Thoreau presents 
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the Indian before the English name for the river. The river itself and, by 
implication, the native inhabitants are of ancient lineage, while “concord” 
and the people responsible for this name are relative newcomers.15 In the 
second sentence of text, Thoreau explains that the Indian name is actually 
superior to the English, since it will remain descriptively accurate as long as 
“grass grows and water runs here,” whereas “concord” will be accurate only 
“while men lead peaceable lives on its banks”—something obviously much 
less permanent than the grass and flowing water. In fact, the third sentence 
indicates that “concord” has already failed to live up to its name, since the 
Indians are now an “extinct race.”16 Thoreau wastes no time in pointing out 
that regardless of the “spirit of peace and harmony” that first moved the 
whites to establish a plantation on this river, relations between the natives 
and the settlers soon exhibited very little concord indeed.
In these opening sentences, Thoreau presents us with an indication of 
a primary motivation for his trip down the concord and Merrimack rivers: 
he hopes to probe the nature of the relationship between Indian and white 
societies and to consider the importance of this relationship for understand-
ing our America.17 Joan Burbick, one of the few to recognize the primacy 
of the political theme underlying Thoreau’s voyage, writes that in this book 
Thoreau “tries to forge the uncivil history of America.”18 We know the end 
of the story already: one “race” annihilates the other. part of Thoreau’s in-
tention is to not let us forget this critical truth about our society, to remind 
us that our founding was as bloody and unjust as any, try as we might to put 
this fact out of sight and tell alternative tales about our past. As the book 
progresses, however, we see that another intention is to explain the com-
plexity and ambiguity of the historical processes that led to and beyond this 
bloody founding. The history Thoreau presents is “uncivil” in two senses: 
first, and most obviously, it is about violent, brutal, uncivil acts; second, it 
is not the official or common self-understanding the nation wants to hold.19 
Thoreau’s journey is not aimed only at personal self-discovery, despite the 
obvious importance of that theme. on the contrary, the opening sentences 
and the problems they pose suggest that Thoreau is first and foremost in-
terested in a project of discovery for the nation as a whole, the success of 
which will depend on looking carefully at the relationship between settler 
and native. The project of self-discovery is to be accomplished within the 
context of this larger social history. Thoreau’s personal and more private 
ruminations are set quite literally between ongoing discussions of events 
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from the colonial life of new England. We are never allowed to forget for 
very long that our contemporary private lives are bounded by, and in some 
crucial sense defined within, the possibilities created by this earlier drama 
of Indian and colonist.
When Thoreau and his brother cast off from concord on saturday af-
ternoon, a number of friends are present along the riverbank to wish them 
well. The two brothers, however, refuse to return the waves and shouts: 
“We, having already performed those shore rites, with excusable reserve, 
as befits those who are embarked on unusual enterprises, who behold but 
speak not, silently glided past the firm lands of concord.”20 There is a no-
ticeable silence throughout this book, marked by the complete absence of 
dialogue. The narration is entirely reflective and contemplative, and when 
human interactions are recorded, even those between Thoreau and his 
brother, they are presented impersonally, as if by a detached observer. once 
on the river, Thoreau is not so much relaying a series of personal events and 
interpersonal interactions—such would best be conveyed by talk among 
individuals—as he is interested in gaining a distance from the intensely 
personal in order to assume the appropriate position from which to observe 
and tell the stories of the larger society. his is an “unusual enterprise” and an 
ambitious one, precisely because it requires a subordination of the intensely 
personal nature of his experience to a greater project of social discovery 
and evaluation. The brothers, in fact, immediately and symbolically assume 
the role of their forebears. Although they refuse to return the greetings of 
their friends, they “did unbend so far as to let our guns speak for us, when at 
length we had swept out of sight.”21 This military salute is only appropriate 
as they move from the established concord of their generation back in time 
to the original settlement of the region, in that they now let their guns do 
their speaking for them.22 
The first landmark they pass is the remains of the north Bridge, where 
the first battle of the Revolution was fought. Thoreau pauses long enough to 
give a poem or two and to remind the citizens of concord that the Revolu-
tion was fought and won by patriots of greater courage than is now routinely 
exhibited in concord.
Ah, ’t is in vain the peaceful din
That wakes the ignoble town,
not thus did braver spirits win
A patriot’s renown.23
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This, however, is not the end but the beginning of their journey of discov-
ery of America’s origins. The Revolution, with its heroes, principles, noble 
deeds, and ideals, is the story we like to tell of our founding. But Thoreau 
floats by the remains of this event, and he and his brother are off to more 
remote but more revealing regions and times.
It is not until the next day that they have enough distance from the 
America of the Revolution to return to the theme of the settlement of 
new England by Europeans. on sunday morning they find themselves in 
sparsely populated country: “For long reaches we could see neither house 
nor cultivated field, nor any sign of the vicinity of man.”24 They are now 
far enough from the world of contemporary America that it is possible for 
them to discover earlier times when the fate of the new civilization was 
still unsettled, when white settlements were themselves new, untested, and 
unsure of their future. Thoreau introduces these white incursions into the 
“howling wilderness” quite gently, much as the whites themselves might 
want them portrayed.25 he and his brother pass the village of Billerica, 
a town of “ancient” character that is “now in its dotage.”26 It is a living 
illustration of a European village that has experienced an almost complete 
life cycle and is thus useful as a representative of its kind. With the initial 
settlement came the bells to call the faithful to worship on the sabbath; 
these bells can still be heard, sometimes as far away as concord. Thoreau 
thus equates the founding and perpetuation of this colonial town with the 
attractive, pastoral symbol of church bells. But Thoreau refuses to move 
on without hinting at the very different reality these bells represent for the 
Indian. They ring so loud that it is “no wonder that such a sound startled 
the dreaming Indian, and frightened his game, when the first bells were 
swung on trees, and sounded through the forest beyond the plantations 
of the white man.”27 This comment is brief and understated, but Thoreau 
rightly suggests that even something as seemingly innocent and pious as 
the church bells of the white settlers represents an ominous development 
for the native. The noise is new to the landscape, unusual and startling. 
It apparently will have significant material consequences as well, since 
it is capable of “frightening” the Indian’s game and thus threatening the 
economic foundation of his mode of life. There has as yet been no overt 
violence nor, as far as we know, evil intention on the part of the new set-
tlers. But even if we grant that the first “plantation” along the river was 
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“commenced with a spirit of peace and harmony,” the seemingly innocuous 
religious habits of the white settlers will threaten the foundations of the 
Indian’s world.
We see, then, that the interaction between whites and Indians does 
not have to be self-consciously or overtly hostile for the consequences to be 
dramatic, harmful, even murderous to the Indians. The whites bring their 
religion and their economic institutions as well. The white “buys the Indian’s 
moccasins and baskets, then buys his hunting-grounds, and at length for-
gets where he is buried and ploughs up his bones.”28 Even if the economic 
transactions between white and Indian are “consensual” and contain no 
threats or fraud, the result is disastrous. The Indian’s entire social order is 
undermined through its contact with white forms of property ownership 
and commerce. The end is annihilation and, perhaps the worst consequence 
of such annihilation, the loss of memory. When the Indians die, we do not 
even remember, or care to remember, where they are buried.29
The compulsion of white society is to continually plow more and more 
of the land, and the memory of a dying people will not be allowed to intrude 
on economic progress. “The white man’s mullein soon reigned in Indian 
cornfields, and sweet-scented English grasses clothed the new soil. Where, 
then, could the Red Man set his foot?”30 nowhere, of course. It does not 
require individually and personally malicious behavior to threaten the sur-
vival of a people. What is at work here is the clash between dramatically 
different and incompatible modes of life. The forces are impersonal and 
deadly. “We talk of civilizing the Indian, but that is not the name for his 
improvement.” his “improvement” is possible only in his traditional life, in 
which he engages in an “intercourse with nature” that admits “of the greatest 
possible independence of each.”31 This life is simply not available once the 
wilderness has been tamed by European agriculture. “If we could listen but 
for an instant to the chant of the Indian muse, we should understand why he 
will not exchange his savageness for civilization. nations are not whimsical. 
steel and blankets are strong temptations; but the Indian does well to con-
tinue Indian.”32 But if he does remain Indian, where is he to “set his foot”? 
To retain his identity is to face a certain death. Thoreau’s observations here 
are similar to William cronon’s in his ecological history of new England: 
“A people who loved property little had been overwhelmed by a people 
who loved it much.”33 As agriculture replaces hunting, the hunter becomes 
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obsolete, irrelevant, extinct. As Thoreau writes in his Journal, “A race of 
hunters can never withstand the inroads of a race of husbandmen.”34
In the remainder of “sunday,” two significant passages address the 
relationship of white settlers and Indians. In the first, Thoreau quotes 
extensively from Gookin regarding John Eliot’s conversion of Indians at 
a place on the Merrimack where the natives traditionally gather to fish.35 
Eliot succeeds in converting a sachem named Wannalancet (about whom 
Thoreau has more to say later), among others. The final paragraph of this 
passage simply observes that “pawtucket and Wamesit, where the Indians 
resorted in the fishing season, are now lowell, the city of spindles and 
Manchester of America, which sends its cotton cloth round the globe.”36 For 
Thoreau, the conversion of these Indians is clearly just a step in the process 
of displacing and destroying them, replacing them with manufacturing 
towns and economic development.
The final discussion of white-Indian relations in “sunday” moves again 
from religion to economics. Thoreau tells the story of Wicasuck, a large 
and desirable island owned by the Indians. In or around 1663, the son of 
an Indian chief was jailed for a debt owed to one John Tinker. The jailed 
man’s brother, Wannalancet (who was not yet a christian), arranged for 
the sale of Wicasuck Island to raise the revenue needed to pay the debt. 
The General court, apparently feeling that the sale took place under some 
sort of duress or coercion, voided the transaction and returned the island 
to the Indians in 1665. later, Thoreau tells us, the land was granted to a 
white man, Jonathan Tyng, as a reward for maintaining a garrison against 
the Indians during King philip’s War. This took place “after the departure 
of the Indians in 1683.”37
There are a number of interesting elements in this story. First, it ap-
pears that the Indians were the recipients of something fairly close to justice 
when the General court returned the island to them. This alone gives a 
somewhat hopeful quality to the tale. yes, certain whites unscrupulously 
attempted to take the land from the Indians, but they were foiled, at least 
in this case, by the independence and integrity of the white judicial system. 
second, however, overt hostilities between Indians and colonists broke out 
in 1675 with King philip’s War. We learn later 38 that Wannalancet, on the 
advice of his father, pasaconaway, refused to participate in this war and 
withdrew from the region. Thoreau tells us that the Indians did not leave 
the island until 1683; this is important, since it suggests that when they did 
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leave, it was for reasons other than military hostilities, since King philip’s 
War was concluded by 1678. It apparently was not the overt threat of arms 
that drove the Indians from this land (land that quickly became a prize for 
a white Indian fighter). on the contrary, it appears that the social processes 
generated by the religious and economic differences Thoreau has discussed 
throughout the chapter made it impossible for the Indian to find a place 
to “set his foot.” Even though a certain kind of justice had been granted 
the Indians, they were still unable to retain their grip on the land. not 
even religious conversion (Wannalancet was converted by Eliot in 1674) was 
able to produce a lasting accommodation between the two communities. 
christians or not, Wannalancet and his people were forced from a favored 
place. “sunday” thus ends with a very pessimistic assessment of the compat-
ibility of two radically different ways of life and the conflict and misery that 
appear to be the inevitable result when such social orders crash against each 
other.39
Although these processes of conflict and struggle may begin, as it were, 
“on the sabbath” (and, Thoreau seems to be saying, let us assume for the 
sake of argument that they do)—in an environment where there are good 
intentions on the parts of all the players—it is just a matter of time before 
they spill over into overt acts of violence. And this is exactly what happens 
in the next chapter, “Monday,” which begins with an account of the “famous 
captain lovewell,” a man of mythic and heroic reputation who is said to 
be the son of “an ensign in the army of oliver cromwell.” he lived a life of 
biblical span, finally dying at the age of 120 at the hands of the Indians he 
fought throughout his life in the new World.40 In his final raid, lovewell 
leads a small group of men into a successful engagement with a far more 
numerous enemy, but the price of victory is very high. Most of Thoreau’s 
discussion of the event is a gruesome account of the fate and agonies of the 
wounded white survivors.
Although the details of the physical suffering experienced by these 
men as they attempt to find their way back home are horrific, Thoreau pres-
ents them in such a manner that we are not allowed to forget the context 
in which they suffered. he quotes a ballad, for example, that praises the 
“wounded good young Frye, Who was our English chaplin.” The ballad 
continues, “he many Indians slew, / And some of them he scalped while 
bullets round him flew.”41 Thoreau lets us know that Frye, who would be 
left by his fellows to die of his wounds alone in the wilderness,42 is a fierce, 
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even vicious character who risked his life to scalp his victims. Barbarism 
and savagery are certainly not absent from the colonists’ ranks. As Thoreau 
would write in his Journal years later, “savage meets savage, and the white 
man’s only distinction is that he is the chief.”43 similarly, after telling of 
the men’s ordeal after the battle, Thoreau observes that there is no record 
of the wounded Indians and how they suffered in their attempt to return 
home.44 The fight with the Indians has taken a terrible toll on these white 
men, but at least we have a memory of their suffering, unlike that of their 
native counterparts. Finally, Thoreau suggests that not only the bodies of 
these soldiers have been tormented and crippled. As the example of the 
scalping chaplain suggests, the soldiers’ hatred of Indians has disfigured 
their moral characters as well. Their leader, captain lovewell, is himself 
the embodiment of hatred for the Indian: “It is stated in the history of 
Dunstable, that just before his last march, lovewell was warned to beware 
of the ambuscades of the enemy, but he replied, ‘that he did not care for 
them,’ and bending down a small elm beside which he was standing into a 
bow, declared ‘that he would treat the Indians in the same way.’ This elm 
is still standing, a venerable and magnificent tree.”45 The ironically named 
lovewell is consumed by this hatred, while the elm flourishes.
Thoreau’s understanding of these events is complex and ambivalent. 
There is a good deal of dry criticism in his discussion, but there is real 
sympathy as well. We are left thinking, on the one hand, that these men 
get roughly what they deserve and, on the other, that no human beings 
deserve the torments they experience. But even more pointed is Thoreau’s 
contrast between these men of lovewell’s generation and Thoreau’s own 
contemporaries: “our brave forefathers have exterminated all the Indians, 
and their degenerate children no longer dwell in garrisoned houses nor 
hear any war-whoop in their path. It would be well, perchance, if many an 
‘English chaplin’ in these days could exhibit as unquestionable trophies 
of his valor as did ‘good young Frye.’”46 There are two crucial points here. 
First, although the hatred these men felt and the crimes they committed 
were enormous, it is simply not true that they were without moral virtues. 
They were loyal and brave to a degree that few of our contemporaries even 
aspire to. second, all the descendants of these white settlers enjoy a peace 
and stability that are taken for granted and are the direct result of the ac-
tions of these earlier colonists. Thoreau’s casual journey down the concord 
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and Merrimack rivers would be unimaginable in an earlier age, when peace 
was not possible between whites and Indians. Thoreau’s reflections, this 
very book, and the criticisms it includes of American society are utterly de-
pendent on these original murderous acts of founding. Far from exempting 
himself from the implications of the story he tells, Thoreau situates himself 
right in the middle of it. he is nothing if not the offspring of these “brave 
forefathers.”47
Thoreau returns to lovewell later in “Monday,” repeating the story of 
his long life.48 And if this is not enough, Thoreau explains that during the 
various Indian wars, the Indians spared him “on account of his kindness to 
them.”49 lovewell’s death in battle would not come until 1725, but prior to 
this, he apparently led a charmed life, the life of a noble soldier respected 
even by his enemies. Thoreau uses lovewell as the mythic thread to tie 
other stories and characters together. he mentions that it is lovewell’s 
house that Mrs. Dustan reaches when fleeing her Indian captors50—a 
story he does not tell in full until “Thursday,” late in the book. It is through 
lovewell that we first learn about Farwell (who was present at lovewell’s 
final battle), and it is to Farwell that Thoreau now turns. A year before his 
death, Farwell is involved in a campaign to rescue two settlers who were 
captured by Indians and taken to canada. soon after their capture, a party 
of ten rescuers rushes foolishly into an ambush. only one, Farwell—the 
only member of the rescue party to warn against this method of pursuit— 
survives.51 Farwell lives another year, only to die from wounds received 
while fighting with lovewell. 
Thoreau concludes this passage with the following comments:
These battles sound incredible to us. I think that posterity will doubt if such 
things ever were; if our bold ancestors who settled this land were not strug-
gling rather with the forest shadows, and not with a copper-colored race of 
men. They were vapors, fever and ague of the unsettled woods. now, only a 
few arrow-heads are turned up by the plough. In the pelasgic, the Etruscan, 
or the British story, there is nothing so shadowy and unreal.52
Again, Thoreau is contrasting our current reality with the historical realities 
on which it is built. The destruction of the Indians makes their original 
existence hard to imagine, and the deeds of the settlers in response to the 
presence of the Indians are thus equally incredible. But even though these 
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brutal facts seem shadowy and unreal to us, Thoreau reminds us that they 
are nonetheless the facts of our collective life. As distant as such fear, vio-
lence, and killing seem from our everyday experiences, Thoreau does not 
let us forget that they were once all present in plenty along the banks of our 
rivers.
In “sunday” Thoreau discusses some of the original sources of conflict 
between the Indians and the settlers, and in “Monday” we find these con-
flicts bursting into brutal, genocidal violence. There is violence in the stories 
Thoreau has yet to tell, but in the remaining days of the week, Thoreau will, 
on the whole, dwell less on it. Most of the remaining references to the rela-
tionship between Indian and settler are brief comments, intended primarily 
to reinforce what has already been detailed in “sunday” and “Monday.” Thus, 
for example, in “Tuesday” Thoreau points to a wood where Farwell escaped 
from Indians. Thoreau’s point is only to remind the reader of the contrast 
between the present and the past: “It did not look as if men had ever had to 
run for their lives on this now open and peaceful interval.”53 And again, at 
the beginning of “Wednesday,” Thoreau juxtaposes the success of the town 
of Bedford, famous for its “hops and for its fine domestic manufactures,” 
with “some graves of the aborigines.”54 In a longer and poignant passage 
in “Wednesday,” Thoreau contrasts the fate of pasaconaway and his son 
Wannalancet with that of a local white hero, John stark. Thoreau tells us 
that pasaconaway is believed to have lived 120 years, implying that he is 
as deserving of heroic status as the 120-year-old lovewell. Thoreau also 
praises stark, a hero in the French and Indian Wars as well as the Revolu-
tion, and suggests that he is deserving of the monument built for him in 
Manchester, overlooking the Merrimack: “Who is most dead,—a hero by 
whose monument you stand, or his descendants of whom you have never 
heard?” But Thoreau ends the passage by reminding us of pasaconaway and 
Wannalancet: “The graves of pasaconaway and Wannalancet are marked by 
no monument on the bank of their native river.”55 In passages like this, the 
discussion of the relationship between Indians and colonists is a reminder of 
issues Thoreau has already explored, ambivalence he has already expressed, 
rather than a presentation of new issues or ideas.
some of the remaining stories, however, introduce new complexities 
into our understanding of these relationships. In “Tuesday” Thoreau tells 
of three violent incidents between penacook and Mohawk Indians along 
the Merrimack, occurring between 1670 and 1685.56 It is clear that even 
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though the hostilities between these two tribes may or may not have ancient 
roots, these specific events take place in a context in which the penacooks 
are increasingly aligned with the colonists: we learn later that pasaconaway 
had advised his penacooks as early as 1660 to make peace with the white 
settlers.57 And two of these three confrontations, one of which is an assault 
on Wannalancet’s son by a group of Mohawks,58 occur after Wannalancet’s 
conversion to christianity. Thus, the white settlement of the land produces 
obvious conflicts with the native peoples, and the indigenous peoples are 
themselves increasingly divided by the white presence. And, lest we forget, 
the Indians are just as capable of fratricide as the whites are.
or consider the story of the relationship between Wawatam and henry 
the fur trader found in Thoreau’s long discourse on friendship in “Wednes-
day.” Thoreau uses this as an illustration of how friendship can transcend 
the barriers of tribe and culture. “If Wawatam would taste the ‘white man’s 
milk’ with his tribe, or take his bowl of human broth made of the trader’s 
fellow-countrymen, he first finds a place of safety for his Friend, whom he 
has rescued from a similar fate.”59 After escaping many dangers, henry and 
Wawatam eventually manage to spend a happy winter together. But henry 
is forced to leave his friend in the spring in order to “avoid his enemies,” that 
is, Indians who continue to hate him for being English and who wish to kill 
and consume him to gain courage for future battles with the colonists. The 
friends never meet again. so the message is clear: even this ideal friendship 
is limited by the broader sets of relationships within which these individuals 
live. Friendship may transcend the cultural gulf between Indian and white, 
but it is ultimately unable to overcome the contemporary context of warfare 
between the English and chipeway societies.
The last and perhaps most powerful of the major tales of Indians and 
colonists is the hannah Dustan odyssey in “Thursday.” Dustan is taken 
from childbed by attacking Indians, sees “her infant’s brains dashed out 
against an apple-tree,” and is held captive with her nurse, Mary neff, and 
an English boy, samuel lennardson. she is told that she and her nurse will 
be taken to an Indian settlement, where they will be forced to “run the 
gauntlet naked.” To avoid this fate, Dustan instructs the boy to ask one of 
the men how best to kill an enemy and take a scalp. The man obliges, and 
that night Dustan, neff, and lennardson use this information to kill all the 
Indians—two men, two women, and six children—except for a “favorite 
boy, and one squaw who fled wounded with him to the woods.” They then 
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scuttle all the canoes except the one needed for their escape. They flee, only 
to return soon thereafter to scalp the dead as proof of their ordeal. They 
then manage to paddle the sixty or so miles to John lovewell’s house and 
are rescued. The General court pays them fifty pounds as bounty for the 
ten scalps, and Dustan is reunited with her family, all of whom, except the 
infant, have survived the attack. Thoreau ends the story by telling us that 
“there have been many who in later times have lived to say that they had 
eaten of the fruit of that apple-tree,” the tree upon which Dustan’s child 
was murdered.60
striking as it is, many of the themes of this story are repetitive of what 
has come before; it is a powerful return to the material from the opening 
chapters, primarily the violence in “Monday.” Thus, Thoreau starkly con-
veys the grotesque violence on both sides of the conflict, and he concludes 
here, as he does earlier, that we are the beneficiaries, even the products, of 
theses terrible events—it is we, of course, who have “eaten of the fruit of 
that apple-tree.”
But this story is different, too. Most obviously, it is a story in which 
women and children, traditional noncombatants, play a crucial role. The 
brutality in the lovewell campaigns is between men who voluntarily as-
sume the roles of warrior and soldier. The brutality in the Dustan story 
is aimed primarily at those who are most innocent, children. And this 
brutality, like that among male combatants, is not confined to one side. 
The Indians murder Dustan’s infant, but she, in turn, methodically kills six 
children and attempts to kill the seventh (the “favorite boy” was a favorite 
within his own family, not to Dustan). In addition, this murder of children 
is conducted not only by men but also by women and children. The violence 
and hostility between Indian and settler have reached a point where all 
traditional restraints have vanished, where the weakest are fair game and 
all members of the community are combatants. here, not in the Revolution, 
is the climax of the American founding. In this climax all colonists and 
Indians, even women and children, are implicated, and the entire family of 
Indians, not just the male warriors, is systematically killed off. This frenzy 
of violence, of escalating atrocity and counteratrocity, of total war, is the 
natural culmination of the processes Thoreau has been describing through-
out the book. The Dustan story represents the victory of the colonists and 
the final destruction of the Indians. Thoreau is returning down the river to 
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his home, as Dustan had to hers 142 years earlier. his investigation into the 
nature of the American founding, his “uncivil history,” is mainly complete.
The image of the apple tree returns in “Friday” at two critical points. 
First, Thoreau tells of Elisha, a “friendly Indian” in the service of Jonathan 
Tyng (the recipient of Wicasuck Island), who was killed “by his own race in 
one of the Indian wars.”61 Although the exact location of his grave has been 
forgotten (like the graves of all the Indians Thoreau tells us of), a great 
flood in 1785 left an indentation in the earth that was believed to mark 
the spot. This place, too, has since been forgotten, but there is an apple 
tree—“Elisha’s apple tree”—that stands in the neighborhood of where the 
grave must be. Elisha, like Dustan’s infant, died at the foot of an apple tree 
and is remembered by the fruit the tree continues to bear. not only white 
blood has borne fruit.
second, Thoreau directs our attention back to these stories in the final 
sentences of the book, the last of which, describing the brothers’ landing 
at concord, reads: “And we leaped gladly on shore, drawing it up, and fas-
tening it to the wild apple-tree, whose stem still bore the mark which its 
chain had worn in the chafing of the spring freshets.”62 In case we need yet 
another reminder, the tree that has grown out of the violence and conflict 
described throughout the book is the tree in our own hometown, to which 
we anchor our own peaceful, mundane, and unheroic lives.
In november 1851, more than two years after the publication of A 
Week, Thoreau declares in his Journal, “And this is my home, my native 
soil; and I am a new-Englander.”63 Thoreau is acutely aware of his rooted-
ness in new England culture and society and the impossibility of separating 
his own battles and concerns from the human environment that produced 
him. This alone should make us skeptical of Quentin Anderson’s claim that 
Thoreau joins Emerson and Whitman in denying “the shaping character 
of the past,” that he, like they, does not wish to see his life as a story in 
which other people figure.64 Thoreau’s first book confirms this skepticism by 
clearly illustrating his break with the Emersonian understanding of moral 
self-reliance. Although Anderson’s claims about Emerson have a great deal 
of power, Thoreau, in contrast, is plainly insisting that we cannot escape our 
society and our past. In A Week, Thoreau is not so much a disciple of Em-
erson as he is assuming the decidedly un-Emersonian role of an American 
Machiavelli. he is unafraid to look honestly at the terror and inhumanity of 
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our political founding; he understands and conveys this terror clearly. But 
this does not lead him to a simple moral revulsion or paralysis or denial of 
the degree to which he too is implicated in this history. on the contrary, the 
point is made again and again that for better or worse, our collective fates 
are played out within the context of this founding drama: “our fates at least 
are social. our courses do not diverge; but as the web of destiny is woven it 
is fulled, and we are cast more and more into the centre.”65
consider Thoreau’s use of the hannah Dustan story as a climax of a 
historical process set in motion by the collision of incompatible societies. 
he is appalled by the events, but he also understands that they are the 
culmination of huge political conflicts that are greater than the individual 
players. It is instructive to contrast this analysis with cotton Mather’s simple 
praise of Dustan as a colonial heroine and with nathaniel hawthorne’s 
shrieking condemnation of her when he calls her “this awful woman,” “a 
raging tigress,” and “a bloody old hag” because her victims were primar-
ily children.66 Thoreau’s analysis is considerably more shrewd than either 
Mather’s or hawthorne’s, and Thoreau resists the temptation of either of 
these simpler and much less satisfactory moral responses.
Thoreau’s conclusions about our political interconnectedness are built 
on a hard-boiled and realistic political analysis combined with a notable 
moral subtlety. As we have seen, Thoreau believes that the forms of life rep-
resented by Indian and colonist are simply and irrevocably incompatible; the 
structure of each requires a mode of production and a social organization 
that make it impossible to accommodate the other. This argument is compel-
ling, but more importantly, it illustrates the degree to which critics such as 
Diggins are mistaken when they accuse Thoreau of being “innocent of the 
nature of power, ignorant of the realities of social change, and indifferent 
at times to the spectacle of human suffering.”67 Much of the story Thoreau 
tells in A Week is an impersonal and terrible one in which individuals are 
swept up by the much greater flow and brutality of history. There is room 
for heroism and virtue within this story, but the hero’s freedom is limited by 
the historical cards he or she has been dealt. pasaconaway is forced by the 
superiority of colonial power to seek peace with the whites, but he is also 
a heroic, inspired, and wise leader of his people. lovewell is a courageous 
soldier who rightly deserves our admiration for his martial heroism, but he 
is also a man twisted by the hatred engendered, nurtured, and inflamed 
by the struggle between white and Indian. Both these men are caught in 
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a whirlwind of conflict, hatred, and violence that eventually spins out of 
control (as represented in the frantic and indiscriminate violence of the 
Dustan story). But both retain an essential human freedom and dignity 
within this struggle that they do not control. Far from having, in Bennett’s 
phrase, an “aversion to thinking about power,”68 Thoreau presents in A Week 
a meditation on the nature, extent, and limitations of such power. Thoreau’s 
conclusions resist both a heroic denial of impersonal power and a fatalistic 
submission to it. Instead, he suggests a more sophisticated understanding of 
the possibilities and limitations of human freedom in the face of power.
Throughout his writings, Thoreau is committed to a view of human 
nature that transcends, in essential ways, the limitations of history. Thus, 
he is devoted to classical literature (as he argues in A Week, the Iliad is 
among the greatest books ever written),69 and he firmly believes that truth, 
heroism, and virtue are universal attributes found in great individuals in all 
historical settings. But we also know, in light of the conflict between Indian 
and colonist, that different social orders produce significant, sometimes 
unbridgeable, gulfs between people.70 Even when individuals are able to 
overcome cultural differences and experience each other as related and 
equal human beings, such as the friends henry and Wawatam, it is not 
surprising that great social pressures sometimes intervene to pull them 
apart.71 Despite such profound barriers, Thoreau succeeds in suggesting 
the common failures and virtues of the players in these stories. White set-
tlers can be as vicious as “savages,” and they frequently are (the only two 
episodes of scalping in A Week are performed by a white chaplain and by 
white women and a child). And just as there is an inclination toward evil in 
both communities, there is a common possibility for virtue. Thoreau insists 
on the heroic status of the Indian: lovewell is not the only hero to live, like 
Moses, 120 years, and pasaconaway is just as deserving of a monument as 
John stark. Despite the differences between the white and Indian ways 
of life, the virtues of courage, loyalty, and humanity are recognizable as 
“natural,” as containing essential qualities and potentials for members of 
both communities, the foundations of a universal humanity. “All men are 
children, and of one family. The same tale sends them all to bed, and wakes 
them in the morning.”72 Thoreau is committed to this overriding humanism 
and the moral freedom it implies, but in no way does this blind him to 
the power of culture and different modes of life and the complexities that 
cultural differences raise for his view.
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Rejecting any historical determinism that would deny our freedom 
and thus our moral responsibility, and also rejecting an extreme Emerso-
nian libertarianism that denies the realities of our history, Thoreau rightly 
promotes an understanding of our moral choice that is bounded and con-
strained by our social inheritance. In this context, Thoreau observes early 
in A Week that “conscience really does not, and ought not to monopolize 
the whole of our lives, any more than the heart or the head. It is as liable 
to disease as any other part.”73 This comment may be surprising to those 
who have looked for Thoreau’s political ideas only in “civil Disobedience,” 
where conscience appears to hold a privileged and solitary authority.74 But 
here Thoreau is well aware of the potential pitfalls of conscience, a radically 
individualized sensibility and will. An absolute and untempered appeal to 
conscience is just as dangerous as untempered appeals to love or reason, and 
any satisfactory morality will have to appeal to all three. The project of A 
Week is, in large part, to provide some of the knowledge we need to develop 
an appropriate moral relationship with our nation. such a relationship must 
be based on a love that is not blind to the harsh realities of our history. It 
must be based on a reasonable evaluation of the possibilities available to 
us.75 And we must not allow our consciences, in response to the evil we find 
in our own social—and personal—fabric, to prevent us from making a kind 
of peace with the world we are part of. “It is not worth the while to let our 
imperfections disturb us always.”76 This is not a call for moral blindness, 
fatalism, or disinterest. on the contrary, it is a call for a moral realism that 
nonetheless maintains a sharp and critical eye on the society around it. 
Thoreau’s argument is a rejection of any simplistic moralism that appeals 
to only one side of our understanding, one way of knowing. Instead, he is 
promoting a morality that appeals to our reason, our conscience, and our 
love and that critically embraces the world despite its flaws.
A number of passages in A Week are similar to those found in Thoreau’s 
more familiar political works. he alludes to his night in jail and says, “I 
do not wish, it happens, to be associated with Massachusetts, either in 
holding slaves or in conquering Mexico. I am a little better than herself 
in these respects.”77 he says that he loves mankind but hates the “institu-
tions of the dead un-kind.”78 he satirizes a soldier that he and his brother 
pass while hiking: “poor man! he actually shivered like a reed in his thin 
military pants, and by the time we had got up with him, all the sternness 
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that becomes the soldier had forsaken his face, and he skulked past as if 
he were driving his father’s sheep under a sword-proof helmet.”79 And, as 
noted earlier, he doubts the courage and heroism of his own generation, 
fearing that “generally speaking, the land is now . . . very barren of men.”80 
All these comments are similar to those found in “civil Disobedience” and 
elsewhere, but in the context of the rest of A Week, we are able to appreciate 
the degree to which they do not represent the simple moral arrogance of 
an antisocial egoist. Thoreau knows very well the limitations history places 
on us. But he also believes, as we have seen, that we are left a healthy 
space for moral freedom and action, and it is this freedom that he believes 
American citizens have abandoned. The soldiers he criticizes here and in 
“civil Disobedience” are morally repugnant not because they are soldiers 
but because they are soldiers who appear to have no martial virtue.81 such 
virtue has limits and moral blindness, but it at least has moral courage and 
commitment. likewise, the Indian and white men who struggled so terribly 
at the nation’s founding were, for all their excesses, individuals who took 
their moral characters seriously, unlike the increasingly complacent con-
temporary state and society on which it is built. Thoreau wants us to be both 
appalled and inspired by the history he tells. only then will we break the 
cycle of moral cowardice and lethargy from which he believes we suffer.82
In “concord River,” the first chapter of A Week, Thoreau says that along 
the banks of the concord you will find “greater men than homer, or chau-
cer, or shakespeare, only they never got time to say so; they never took to the 
way of writing.”83 The story he tells is both real and mythic, an attempt to 
capture in our American setting truths akin to those found in that greatest 
of books, the Iliad. Thoreau notes, “our own country furnishes antiquities 
as ancient and durable, and as useful, as any.”84 A Week is written to inspire 
us to two heroic tasks: to face up to the truths of our past, and to recapture 
a moral inspiration from that past on which we can build the courage and 
commitment to reform our contemporary society. It is not that we should 
become modern Indian fighters; rather, we must discover the moral resolve 
that inspired the founders and direct this resolve toward combating current 
moral evils, such as slavery and imperialism. The problem facing our nation, 
Thoreau suggests, is not primarily moral error. on the contrary, it is moral 
fear and indifference.85 our Iliad, the founding that Thoreau presents, is an 
attack on what he sees as our moral deterioration. “The past is only so heroic 
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as we see it.”86 Thoreau’s “uncivil history,” paradoxically, functions as both 
shocking revelation and moral inspiration.
nancy Rosenblum claims that “Thoreau declared his country lost.”87 
In reality, however, Thoreau is deeply involved in exploring what he sees 
as the possibilities before the nation. Far from abandoning hope, Thoreau 
is committed to considering the ways in which new England and all of 
America might be reformed to develop a more vigorous and respectable 
moral character. Thoreau’s investigation of the real American founding in A 
Week is only a first step in a critical analysis of the American political com-
munity. In Thoreau’s major mature writings, he continues to study what he 
understands to be America’s shaping environments, precedents, and values, 
with the aim of encouraging and directing the growth of a more legitimate 
and admirable polity and reclaiming what he takes to be the promise of 
American political life.
Notes
originally published as Bob pepperman Taylor, America’s Bachelor Uncle: Tho-
reau and the American Polity (lawrence: University press of Kansas, 1996), chap. 
2. copyright 1996 by the University press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reprinted 
by permission. Minor changes have been made.
 1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Divinity school Address,” in Essays and Lec-
tures, ed. Joel porte (new york: library of America, 1983), 88.
 2. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “literary Ethics,” ibid., 101.
 3. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature, ibid., 48.
 4. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “self-Reliance,” ibid., 262.
 5. henry David Thoreau, Excursions, ed. Joseph J. Moldenhauer (princeton, 
nJ: princeton University press, 2007), 220.
 6. henry D. Thoreau, The Journal of Henry D. Thoreau, ed. Bradford Tor-
rey and Francis h. Allen (Boston: houghton Mifflin, 1949), 9:208.
 7. Jane Bennett, Thoreau’s Nature (Thousand oaks, cA: sage, 1994), 132.
 8. John patrick Diggins, “Thoreau, Marx, and the ‘Riddle’ of Alienation,” 
Social Research 39 (winter 1972): 581.
 9. c. Roland Wagner, “lucky Fox at Walden,” in Thoreau in Our Season, ed. 
John h. hicks (Amherst: University of Massachusetts press, 1967), 130–31.
10. Walter harding, The Days of Henry Thoreau (new york: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1966), 253.
Thoreau’s American Founding 119
11. henry s. salt, The Life of Henry David Thoreau, ed. George hendrick, 
Wilene hendrick, and Fritz oehlschlaeger (Urbana: University of Illinois press, 
1993), 68.
12. “A Week is his [Thoreau’s] attempt to immerse himself in the river of time 
in order to recover from time his greatest loss.” h. Daniel peck, Thoreau’s Morning 
Work (new haven, cT: yale University press, 1990), 11. “The central concerns of 
A Week [are]—death and a brotherhood that transcends death.” linck c. Johnson, 
Thoreau’s Complex Weave (charlottesville: University press of virginia, 1986), 52. 
“The toughest, most disturbing problem with which Thoreau struggled to come 
to terms in A Week—frequently in an indirect, subterranean, unconscious man-
ner—centered around the painful loss of his brother.” Richard lebeaux, Thoreau’s 
Seasons (Amherst: University of Massachusetts press, 1984), 4.
13. Robert D. Richardson, Henry Thoreau (Berkeley: University of california 
press, 1986), 171.
14. henry David Thoreau, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, 
in A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers; Walden, or, Life in the Woods; 
The Maine Woods; Cape Cod (new york: library of America, 1985), 7.
15. Thoreau follows a similar strategy in his “huckleberries” lecture when 
he argues for use of the Indian rather than the latin names for huckleberries, out 
of respect for those who knew them first and best. “I think that it would be well 
if the Indian names, were as far as possible restored and applied to the numerous 
species of huckleberries, by our botanists—instead of the very inadequate—Greek 
and latin or English ones at present used.” henry David Thoreau, Huckleberries, 
ed. leo stoller (Iowa city: Windhover press of the University of Iowa and the new 
york public library, 1970), 5, 20.
16. “To an extinct race it was grass-ground, where they hunted and fished, and 
it is still perennial grass-ground to concord farmers, who own the Great Meadows, 
and get the hay from year to year.” Thoreau, A Week, 7.
17. linck Johnson, one of the foremost students of Thoreau’s composition of A 
Week, points out Thoreau’s deepening interest in the conflict between Indian and 
colonist as the book evolves. Johnson, Thoreau’s Complex Weave, 135.
18. Joan Burbick, Thoreau’s Alternative History (philadelphia: University of 
pennsylvania press, 1987), 33.
19. h. Daniel peck writes, “he [Thoreau] is sensitive to the way in which the 
historical record, through self-serving distortion and omission, can destroy vital 
elements of the past. he feels this with special force in relation to the American 
settlers’ treatment of the Indians” (Thoreau’s Morning Work, 17).
20. Thoreau, A Week, 15.
21. Ibid.
120  Bob Pepperman Taylor
22. peck (Thoreau’s Morning Work, 17) observes that Thoreau appears to 
be reluctant to cast off on this journey, and it is with some difficulty that he floats 
beyond the “familiar meadows” of concord. This is not surprising, since the “un-
usual enterprise” on which he is embarking will take him far from the safe and 
comforting moral ground of the histories we tell in our everyday lives. 
23. Thoreau, A Week, 16.
24. Ibid., 37.
25. Ibid., 41. Thoreau later notes that this “howling wilderness” was experi-
enced quite differently by the native inhabitants: “the primeval forest . . . ; to the 
white man a drear and howling wilderness, but to the Indian a home, adapted to 
his nature, and cheerful as the smile of the Great spirit” (264).
26. Ibid., 41.
27. Ibid., 42.
28. Ibid., 44.
29. As peck writes, “lacking a written history of their own, the Indians have in 
effect fallen out of human memory” (Thoreau’s Morning Work, 18).
30. Thoreau, A Week, 44.
31. Ibid., 46.
32. Ibid., 47.
33. William cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecol-
ogy of New England (new york: hill and Wang, 1983), 81. cronon has much to say 
about the incompatibility of the European and native American understandings of 
property, wealth, and production in this brilliant study; see especially chapter 4.
34. Thoreau, Journal, 1:445. Robert sattelmeyer points out that while writ-
ing A Week, Thoreau “conceived of the Indians largely as a race either extinct 
or on its way to extirpation.” Robert sattelmeyer, Thoreau’s Reading (princeton, 
nJ: princeton University press, 1988), 102. historian Robert Wiebe writes that 
it was common in the early nineteenth century for white Americans to think of 
the Indian as already vanished: “In the white mind’s eye, which saw the future in 
the present, native Americans slipped out of focus. ‘yet they have vanished from 
the face of the earth,’ one eastern gentleman sighed as early as 1825, ‘—their 
very names are blotted from the pages of history.’ Fated to die, dying, soon to die, 
already dead blurred into a single vision of native American elimination not just 
as inevitable but as natural.” Robert h. Wiebe, Self-Rule (chicago: University of 
chicago press, 1995), 87. Thoreau certainly believed that the Indian stood very 
little chance against the onslaught of white society, but it is precisely the blotting of 
“their very names . . . from the pages of history” that he protests in this work. 
35. Thoreau, A Week, 66–67.
36. Ibid., 68.
37. Ibid., 90.
Thoreau’s American Founding 121
38. In “Wednesday,” ibid., 206.
39. It is interesting to note that Tyng’s legacy fails to clarify the proper owner-
ship of Wicasuck Island. Thoreau comments that as they sail by the island on their 
return down the river, a boatman asks them about it, explains that it is currently 
disputed property, and suspects that Thoreau and his brother have a claim upon it 
(A Week, 291). Apparently, the history of the island will not allow for an unambigu-
ously just claim to it. As Thoreau observes in Cape Cod, “I know that if you hold 
a thing unjustly, there will surely be the devil to pay at last” (in A Week; Walden; 
Cape Cod, 878).
40. Thoreau, A Week, 96–97. see page 129 for a slightly different biographi-
cal sketch.
41. Ibid., 97.
42. A revisionist poet denies this abandonment and, as Thoreau says, “as-
signed him company in his last hours” (ibid., 98).
43. Thoreau, Journal, 12:124.
44. Thoreau, A Week, 99.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 97.
47. Discussing the passage in “civil Disobedience” in which Thoreau says he 
does “not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I 
have not joined,” stanley cavell makes the following observation: “The joke very 
quickly went sour. In particular, he could not name society or the government as 
such, because he knows he has somehow signed on.” Even though Thoreau finds 
association with the government shameful, he nevertheless “recognizes that he 
is associated with it, that his withdrawal has not ‘dissolved the Union’ between 
ourselves and the state, and hence that he is disgraced. Apparently, as things stand, 
one cannot but choose to serve the state; so he will ‘serve the state with [his con-
science] also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part.’” stanley cavell, The 
Senses of Walden (san Francisco: north point press, 1981), 83–84.
48. Thoreau, A Week, 129.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 130.
51. Ibid., 134–35.
52. Ibid., 136.
53. Ibid., 161; see also 179.
54. Ibid., 193.
55. Ibid., 206.
56. Thoreau also mentions open warfare between penacooks and Mohawks; 
see ibid., 201.
57. Ibid., 206.
122  Bob Pepperman Taylor
58. Ibid., 178–79.
59. Ibid., 224. henry’s story is quite extraordinary. As he tells it, he escaped 
death in a massacre of English by chipeway Indians at Michilimackinac, partly 
through his own efforts and good luck, and partly through the efforts of his friend 
Wawatam. henry says the Indians cooked and ate a broth made from their victims, 
which they believed would give them courage. After saving henry, Wawatam eats, 
in henry’s presence, a bowl of human broth containing a hand and a large piece of 
flesh—from men henry had just been held captive with. For a full account of this 
relationship, see Alexander henry, Travels and Adventures (Rutland, vT: charles 
E. Tuttle, 1969), 73–152.
60. Thoreau, A Week, 262–64.
61. Ibid., 290.
62. Ibid., 319.
63. Thoreau, Journal, 3:95.
64. Quentin Anderson, Making Americans (new york: harcourt Brace and 
Jovanovich, 1992), 182, 230.
65. Thoreau, A Week, 215.
66. see Robert F. sayre, Thoreau and the American Indians (princeton, nJ: 
princeton University press, 1977), 52. hawthorne tells the Dustan story in “The 
Dustan Family,” first published in 1836 and reprinted in nathaniel hawthorne, 
Hawthorne as Editor, ed. Arlin Turner (port Washington, ny: Kennikat press, 
1941), 131–37; see especially 136–37.
67. Diggins, “Thoreau, Marx, and the ‘Riddle’ of Alienation,” 582.
68. Bennett, Thoreau’s Nature, 89.
69. Thoreau, A Week, 75. The Iliad is the only book Thoreau keeps on his 
table at Walden. see Thoreau, Walden, in A Week; Walden; Cape Cod, 402.
70. Thoreau notes in his Journal (4:400) that Indians measure time by win-
ters and moons, while whites measure summers and days, suggesting significant 
differences in the thought and experience of these two cultures. 
71. henry’s account of his friendship with Wawatam suggests that even in 
this ideal relationship, seemingly sanctioned by the gods (the Great spirit told 
Wawatam of henry in a dream), there is a fair amount of room for ambiguity and 
inequality. For example, henry notes that Wawatam assumed the roles of both 
brother and father to him. see henry, Travels and Adventures, 73–76, 152. Tho-
reau is therefore well aware of both the possibilities for overcoming social barriers 
in discovering a common humanity and the complexities (even ignoring intrusions 
by other individuals or groups) of any such relationship.
72. Thoreau, A Week, 49. consider this more negative formulation of the 
same idea that nature is an equalizer across cultures and history: “There might 
be seen here on the bank of the Merrimack, near Goff’s Falls, in what is now the 
Thoreau’s American Founding 123
town off Bedford, famous ‘for hops and for its fine domestic manufactures,’ some 
graves of the aborigines. The land still bears this scar here, and time is slowly 
crumbling the bones of a race. yet, without fail, every spring, since they first fished 
and hunted here, the brown thrasher has heralded the morning from a birch or 
alder spray, and the undying race of reed-birds still rustles through the withering 
grass. But these bones rustle not. These mouldering elements are slowly preparing 
for another metamorphosis, to serve new masters, and what was the Indian’s will 
erelong be the white man’s sinew” (ibid., 193–94).
73. Ibid., 60.
74. “Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his con-
science to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we 
should be men first, and subjects afterward.” henry D. Thoreau, Reform Papers, 
ed. Wendell Glick (princeton, nJ: princeton University press, 1973), 65.
75. Robert sayre suggests that Thoreau’s discussion of reformers, and how 
they annoy him so, is based on what he takes to be their ignorance of “the true 
state of things.” (see A Week, 102–4, for Thoreau’s comments.) At least part of 
their ignorance is of the “uncivil history” presented in this book, and its implica-
tions for meaningful reform. sayre, Thoreau and the American Indians, 38.
76. Thoreau, A Week, 60.
77. Ibid., 105.
78. Ibid., 106.
79. Ibid., 256.
80. Ibid., 208.
81. “The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as ma-
chines, with their bodies. . . . In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the 
judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and 
earth and stones, and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve 
the purpose as well. such command no more respect than men of straw, or a lump 
of dirt.” Thoreau, “civil Disobedience,” in Reform Papers, 66.
82. “There is nothing to redeem the bigotry and moral cowardice of new-
Englanders in my eyes.” Thoreau, Journal, 11:326.
83. Thoreau, A Week, 9.
84. Ibid., 204.
85. “There are nine hundred and ninety-nine patrons of virtue to one virtu-
ous man.” Thoreau, “civil Disobedience,” 69.
86. Thoreau, A Week, 238.
87. nancy l. Rosenblum, “Thoreau’s Militant conscience,” Political Theory 
9 (February 1981): 92.
Thoreau, Prophecy, and Politics
124
The imaginaTion and practice of an “american nationhood” have 
been tightly bound both to ideas of democracy and to white supremacy, 
and political actors and theorists in american history have repeatedly used 
prophetic language to retie, or try to untie, this knot. on the one hand, 
racial domination and imperial power are still authorized in the name of 
redeeming a chosen people from a corruption linked to “alien” ways. But 
on the other hand, the great critical voices in american politics have used 
prophetic language to transform prevalent racial practices and enlarge the 
democratic imagination. my work treats prophecy as a distinctive genre of 
political theory and as a language that is especially important in american 
politics. This chapter examines the political dangers and resources of this 
language by focusing on henry Thoreau’s practice of prophecy.
Prophecy
To invoke prophecy is to face a problem of definition at the outset, for schol-
ars argue about how to define prophecy or what marks a prophet, and dif-
ferent views of prophecy yield different views of its relationship to politics. 
We can safely say that prophecy is a social practice that appears in many 
cultures. modern commentators link the practice to shamanism, ecstatic 
vision, charismatic authority, political demagoguery, and social criticism 
and depict prophets as those whose social role is to address a community by 
mediating the larger realities that condition its existence and choices. But 
prophecy is also a changeable and contested practice. after all, there was 
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profound conflict between those who worked for the royal house of israel 
(call them “house prophets”) and voiced a warrior god’s unconditional sup-
port for it and those now canonized as the prophets, who voiced a god of 
justice that holds the monarchy and nation to account. people revise the 
practice of prophecy and argue about whose and which words to endow 
with (or to recognize as having) authority. Simon and garfunkel sing “the 
words of the prophets are written on subway walls and tenement halls” to 
signal how prophecy still surrounds us, as we still count some voices while 
ignoring others—at our peril.
rather than assert a fixed definition, i treat prophecy both as an “office” 
whose practice is open to revision and as a language whose meaning has been 
and can be resignified. in the Bible and since, it is the office assumed by those 
“called” as messengers who announce, as witnesses who testify, as watchmen 
who forewarn to forestall, as singers who lament. in each regard, prophecy 
mediates between a community and powerful realities it does not understand 
or control; in each regard, prophets make claims about the difficulties and 
fateful decisions of a community they address and seek to redeem. european 
and american romantics (from Blake and Shelley to emerson and Whitman) 
thus enact a kind of secularization as they place “the poet” in the office of 
the prophet as one who announces, bears witness, warns, and redeems. But 
in cultures bearing biblical traces, prophecy also names a literary and po-
litical genre of speech, with characteristic—but not fixed—narrative forms 
and tropes, cadences of speech, registers of voice. William Blake, Friedrich 
nietzsche, and american literary artists and social critics—from Frederick 
douglass and henry Thoreau to allen ginsberg, martin Luther King, and 
James Baldwin—thus take on and revise not only an office but also a genre.1
What characterizes this genre? The substance of biblical prophecy is 
criticism of idolatry, social injustice, and monarchical power, but as a genre, 
prophecy tells a story about a chosen people who stray from their founding 
covenant and first principles, which once redeemed them from captivity in 
egypt. prophets thus seek what they call a turn, translated as repentance, 
by which hebrews can reconstitute themselves as a community. The genre 
inaugurates profoundly resonant tropes of captivity, founding, and corrup-
tion, of covenant and marriage, of fidelity, adultery, and recommitment, of 
repentance and purifying rebirth. in these terms, prophets (from amos, 
micah, and hosea to isaiah, Jeremiah, and then Jesus) frame and narrate 
the fateful choices that constitute, endanger, and redeem the community 
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they at once invoke and reenvision. From the perspective of political theory, 
biblical prophecy addresses the character and fate of the whole, as well as 
the constitutive power of choice and action. as martin Buber argues, before 
exile to Babylon, prophets do not “decree a fate” but “demand a decision” 
concerning the commitments and practices that constitute community. 
Their critique of “idolatry,” indeed, is that the worship of other gods is 
linked to imperial power, state centralization, priestly rule, and gross social 
inequality, whereas a people ruled only by god establish relations of relative 
social equality and nonrule amongst themselves. idolatry is a political re-
gime, not a philosophical mistake, and obeying god is not ritualized worship 
but attending to justice and resisting idolatry. Biblical prophecy thus stands 
in profound tension with the state, “religion,” and law; in contrast to these 
reified forms of worldly authority, prophecy enjoins what Weber calls “the 
ethical righteousness of the deed.”2
But the centrality of god’s sovereign authority, and hostility to other 
countervailing attachments, also entitles Carl Schmitt to draw from proph-
ecy the idea that “decision” is the constitutively political act, by defining 
both the sovereign and the enemy. The biblical genre thus bears a vexed 
relation to democratic politics: its populist and antinomian registers of voice 
are democratic resources, but dangerous, because prophecy lacks an aris-
totelian dimension, an explicit valuation of ongoing political life. after all, 
biblical prophets invoke god’s authority to provoke contest about pervasive 
practices long deemed legitimate, not to defend a pluralism of valid truths 
and worthy goods.
Prophecy in America
We can see this danger as american elites recurrently use prophetic lan-
guage to sacralize liberal origins, justify racial domination, and authorize 
imperial expansion. From the center, not the margins, prophecy voices the 
national or communitarian face of liberalism, linking the redemption of 
a special american promise to a politics that purifies the social body of 
impulses, practices, and peoples signifying corruption. For Sacvan Berco-
vitch, the problem with prophecy exceeds the exclusion it justifies, for the 
“jeremiad” is a “prescribed ritual form” that “contains” social criticism by 
always orienting it toward origins it continually reauthorizes. as jeremiads 
voice criticism in the name of founding values a people betray, critics enact 
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a “ritual of consensus” that only replenishes the hegemony of liberal prin-
ciples and a national frame for politics: “The dream that inspired them to 
defy the false americanism of their time compelled them to speak their 
defiance as keepers of the dream.” For Bercovitch, americans can confront 
the limits of liberalism and nationalism on democratic possibility only by 
relinquishing prophecy, to accept themselves as a profane nation among 
others, fated to politics.3
Bercovitch rightly recognizes the hegemonic weight of prophetic lan-
guage as it is often used, but he inadvertently repeats the very containment 
he denounces. as i argue here, Thoreau is one of several american critics 
who use prophecy in counterhegemonic ways. They attack white supremacy 
and the idea of race as an idolatrous system, and in relation to it, they are no 
more pluralist than biblical prophets; at issue for them is complicity in domi-
nation, not openness to difference. Seeing that liberal freedom is founded 
by a racial state of exception, and seeking to end it, these critics repeatedly 
draw on prophecy to voice aspects of politics occluded by a focus on rights, 
procedures, deliberation, or plurality. Forging a critical relationship toward 
the liberal axioms, national frame, and origin story dominating american 
politics, they use prophecy to advance an agonal, not a communitarian or 
consensual, view of politics and on behalf of democratic projects. Still, does 
the prophetic genre preclude advancing claims in a political way?4
This is not only a theoretical or a historical question: as prophetic lan-
guage joins Thoreau’s abolitionist civil disobedience to his later embrace of 
John Brown’s violence, so evangelical Christianity and post-9/11 crusades 
against terror turn political theorists away from “prophecy” to reaffirm 
liberal constitutionalism, varieties of pluralism, norms of deliberation, and 
the sanctity of private rights. Yet these genres of political theory always fail 
to address white supremacy or imperial violence, which recurrently compel 
critics toward prophecy as a genre, despite its risks. in the current crisis in 
the american republic, then, might counterprophecy be needful, despite 
being dangerous? With this question in mind, i turn to Thoreau’s practice 
of prophecy.
Thoreau and Prophecy
To link Thoreau and prophecy to politics goes against the grain of Thoreau 
scholarship. Thoreau himself asserts his overt hostility “to what is called 
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politics,” as he puts it. his anti-slavery lectures seem to invoke god and 
conscience to juxtapose “moral” (i.e., principled) and “political” (i.e., expe-
dient) responses to injustice. Likewise, Walden seems to respond to social 
imprisonment by devaluing political action for the sake of personal rebirth 
in nature and poetic apprehension of reality. as he moves from conscien-
tious personal resistance to escape into nature, and then to glorification 
of John Brown’s self-sacrificing violence, he seems trapped between with-
drawal from and solitary action to redeem a social world he always sees as 
essentially corrupt. his synergy of the moral and the aesthetic seems to 
underwrite a masculinized individualism and anti-politics that signal not 
nonconformity but hegemonic liberalism.5
in my alternative reading, Thoreau is hostile to “what is called politics” 
because being political, in the terms and channels provided by his regime, 
makes him an agent of slavery and imperial expansion. he is haunted by 
these “facts,” as he calls them, outraged that enfranchised men deny them, 
and worried about the “penalty” of domination and its disavowal. denounc-
ing complicity in this slaveholding and imperial regime, he seeks to recon-
stitute it. he “speaks practically and as a citizen” in “Civil disobedience” 
and addresses Walden to his “neighbors,” because he must believe, even as 
he despairs of believing, that a “wise minority” can serve a political role. 
What is that role?
my first claim is that Thoreau takes up and revises the idea that prophecy 
is the office of those who announce, bear witness, and warn, to address and 
incite the constitutive and fateful choices of a community they “serve” by their 
opposition. he uses prophetic tropes to announce “the facts” of injustice—of 
constitutive exclusion—that “those bred in the school of politics” disavow, and 
to warn of and forestall the (self) destructive consequences of this conduct. 
he thus speaks as a witness: partly, he says what he sees and stands against 
it; partly, he testifies to capacities for judgment and action he calls “action 
from principle” to show people they can act otherwise; and partly, he bears 
witness to the faith by which he cultivates the agency he models. Taking up 
the calling of one who announces, bears witness, and warns, he engages a 
political life he maligns but also dreams of transforming.
my second claim is that he crafts two registers of expression to perform 
a prophetic office: each bears witness against captivity by demonstrating a 
contrary practice of life, but the anti-slavery lectures bespeak puritan (and 
liberal) idioms of conscience and rights in a jeremiadic form, while Walden 
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bespeaks a romantic idiom of rebirth by experiments in nature. Thoreau’s 
speech and action thus reflect his investment in but also struggle with a 
protestant language that Kierkegaard calls a “religion for adult men.”6 Surely 
Thoreau’s anti-slavery lectures signal his indebtedness to a tradition— 
from Luther and Calvin to abolitionism, eugene debs, and martin Lu-
ther King Jr.—that entails a gendered language of theistic authority, moral 
autonomy, and personal conscience, of calling, service, and redemption. 
Joining personal identity and collective purpose, this idiom argues that we 
always serve authority; it depicts captivity and freedom in terms of which 
authority we choose to orient by, and it links individual conversion to collec-
tive redemption. Yet as Walden links protestantism to worldly asceticism, 
“the slavedriver within,” resentment, and racism, so his experiment in na-
ture seeks antidotes in nontheistic practices of poetic imagination. But how 
do these registers of prophecy engage the illiberal exclusions that enable 
liberal politics? how do they relate to one another? and does Thoreau’s 
prophetic practice malign (in moral and aesthetic terms) the impure actual-
ity of politics?7
Thoreau’s Anti-Slavery Jeremiads
“Civil disobedience” and “Slavery in massachusetts” frame in time the 
political context of Walden and reveal the protestant register of prophecy 
with which that text struggles. Both lectures are organized by prophetic 
questions: By what authority is our action oriented, and what purposes does 
it serve? With whom do we identify, and on what basis? What constitutes 
the redemption that can deliver us from captivity, atone for our crimes, and 
make good on our founding promises? Both lectures manifest a prophetic 
presumption that Thoreau’s peers need to be alerted and aroused. at their 
core is the claim that “they who have been bred in the school of politics fail 
now and always to face the facts.”8 What facts?
First, the United States is an ex-colonial and formally democratic but 
slaveholding and imperial republic. Second, enfranchised northern men 
support chattel slavery and war: “practically speaking, the opponents to 
a reform in massachusetts are not a hundred thousand politicians at the 
South, but a hundred thousand merchants and farmers here . . . i quarrel not 
with far-off foes, but with those who, near at home” sustain a slave system.9 
Third, those who are “in opinion opposed to slavery and to the war” are led 
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by “undue respect” for the authority of majorities and constitutional law to 
become the “most conscientious supporters” of the regime and the “most 
serious obstacles to reform” (“Civil disobedience,” 69, 65, 72). Since slavery 
and war are democratically authorized and protected by the authority of 
constitutionalism, he bears witness to a fourth fact: “Whatever the human 
law may be, neither an individual nor a nation can ever commit the least 
injustice against the obscurest individual without having to pay a penalty for 
it” (“Slavery,” 96). Those who “disapprove of the character and measures of 
a government” but “yield to it their allegiance” pay the “penalty” of another 
kind of servitude:
The mass of men serve the state . . . not as men mainly, but as machines, with 
their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables. 
. . . in most cases there is no free exercise of the judgment or of moral sense; 
but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones. . . . Yet 
such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. others, as most 
legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office holders, serve the State 
chiefly with their heads; and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they 
are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it, as god. a very few, as 
heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense . . . serve the State with 
their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they 
are commonly treated by it as enemies. (“Civil disobedience,” 72, 66)
What is commonly esteemed good citizenship is a conscientious rei-
fication by which people subordinate the “free exercise of judgment” and 
become thoughtless bodies. in puritan terms, citizenship severed from “the 
moral sense” is a covenant of works, a diabolical “outward service” by which 
people would save but in fact lose their souls. politically, a “common and 
natural result of undue respect for law” is a mass of men marching “to the 
wars against their wills, aye, against their common sense and consciences” 
(“Civil disobedience,” 65). in 1854, undue respect means that people invest 
authority in judges, not in themselves as citizens exercising judgment and 
acting in concert. They judge according to precedent rather than “establish 
a precedent for the future” (“Slavery,” 97): “it is to some extent fatal to the 
courts, when the people are compelled to go behind them . . . but think of 
leaving to it any court . . . to decide whether more than three millions of 
people, in this case, a sixth part of the nation, have the right to be freemen 
or not! (“Slavery,” 97–98).
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Thoreau seeks a political not a legal decision: “i would much rather 
trust to the sentiment of the people” (“Slavery,” 97). he seeks political dia-
logue and decision in public meetings he calls “a true congress” (“Slavery,” 
99), but majority rule remains an issue because it displaces responsibility: 
“When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be 
because they are indifferent to slavery, or because there is little slavery left 
to be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves” (“Civil dis-
obedience,” 70). To defer in time means to abdicate now: “if the majority 
vote the devil to be god, the minority will . . . obey the successful candidate, 
trusting that some time . . . they may reinstate god.” Serving that majority, 
the minority become “tools” rather than “men” (“Slavery,” 103).
To resist the servitude he attributes to undue respect for the authority 
of legal precedent, majority rule, and representative government, Thoreau 
invokes the authority his culture claims to lodge in god, conscience, and 
equality as a principle, as well as in the idea of active and embodied consent. 
his purpose is to unsettle—not simply reject—liberal constitutionalism and 
the broader filiopiety it bespeaks. That is why he goes after daniel Webster, 
who does not ask what “it behooves a man to do here in america to-day 
with regard to slavery” but accepts it as “part of the original compact”; he 
cannot say the compact is itself “the evil” because he is “not a leader but a 
follower. his leaders are the men of ’87” (“Civil disobedience,” 88, 74, 87). 
But “all men are partially buried in the grave of custom, and of some we see 
only the crown of the head above ground. Better are the physically dead, 
for they more lively rot.”10
in prophetic terms, Thoreau announces the captivity citizens impose 
on others, and he bears witness to its “penalty,” the political entombment 
they impose on themselves. he names the servitude he attributes to idolatry 
(or conscientious reification) as “undue respect,” but he also bears witness 
to the capacity for choice and action that might (re)animate deadened men 
and an entombed social body. This rebirth enacts an alternative filiopiety 
that goes behind the compact and fathers of 1787 to revolutionary fathers 
and to puritans cast as rebels, not founders.
he invokes and demonstrates the idea of active and embodied consent, 
which he links to making, not following, precedent. But since consent has 
authorized war and slavery, his return to origins also emphasizes a faculty of 
judgment he calls both a “moral sense” and a constitution “written in your 
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being” by god (“Slavery,” 103). a capacity to judge inheres in human beings 
and enables people to resist the constitution written by subjection to worldly 
authorities. To obey our “divine” constitution is to utter “sentences” that 
both name and “sentence” any “enactment or custom of men” (“Slavery,” 
98). Citizens must perform this office if they are not to become mechanical 
or inanimate. “But just in proportion as i regard this as not wholly a brute 
force, but partly a human force . . . i see that appeal is possible, first and 
instantaneously, from them to the maker of them, and secondly, from them 
to themselves” (“Civil disobedience,” 85). he denaturalizes the reification 
that makes relations among men become (like) relations among (brute and 
inanimate) things. in turn, to enact “the moral sense” is to exemplify “ac-
tion from principle”: “The perception and performance of right,—changes 
things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist 
wholly with anything which was. it not only divides states and churches, it 
divides families; aye, it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in 
him from the divine” (“Civil disobedience,” 72).11
as “all change for the better, like birth and death . . . convulse[s] the 
body,” so “the perception and performance of right” signifies the rebirth of 
adults and revolution in the social bodies they constitute (“Civil disobe-
dience,” 74, 72). Thoreau thus claims, paradoxically, to renew a cultural 
legacy, for he also appeals to men as bearers of a specific history in which 
theist faith, personal conscience, and political consent are avowedly linked 
to liberty. if self-declared sons emulate the creativity and initiative of puri-
tan and revolutionary fathers, they can re-member the judgment and action 
severed by constitutional piety, regenerate their own authority, and create 
rather than repeat precedent. Thoreau begins with himself as a minority of 
one, but his point is to create “corporation[s] of conscientious men” whose 
embodied action is a “counter friction” to the machinery of power. Such 
associations can be instrumentally effective: a “minority is powerless while 
it conforms to the majority” but “irresistible when it clogs [the machine] by 
its whole weight” (“Civil disobedience,” 65, 74, 76).12
We should name the danger in these arguments. it is not that Thoreau 
speaks a “moral” language to condemn slavery, for no self-evident politi-
cal action follows from the claim that slavery is “wrong,” as the difference 
between Lincoln and abolitionists attests. The question is how he conceives 
and practices his notion of “the right.” one obvious danger is his splitting 
of the subject into brute-diabolical or manly-divine aspects: by this mascu-
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linized individualism, “moral sense” names a pure “inside” threatened by 
contamination from culture “outside” it, and a higher authority threatened 
by lower passions related to material interest or expediency. Just as putting 
anything higher than this authority is to be unmanned, made a brute or 
slave, so obeying it redeems the human from the death-in-life of “life with-
out principle.” By this idealized image of integral moral agency, Thoreau 
would overcome his own sense of weakness and address the docility of his 
peers, but only after misconceiving interdependence and making “what is 
political” wholly ignoble. So he fumes, “We are not a religious people, but 
we are a nation of politicians” (“Slavery,” 99). hannah arendt thus sees 
him protecting the purity of self and principle, not the worldly freedom of 
citizens; to Lincoln, such abolitionism takes no account of historical circum-
stance or of a plurality of opinions and interests that requires “politicians” 
(or people in their capacity as citizens) to accept impurity because they 
must build consensus. The result of investing in (moral) purity is monologue 
and violence.13
But Thoreau claims to “speak practically and as a citizen” at the outset 
of “Civil disobedience.” he believes he is making a political argument 
when he declares that “this people must cease to hold slaves, and to make 
war on mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people,” for grievous 
injustice imposes great costs and risks (“Civil disobedience,” 64, 68). To 
those who fear that an anti-slavery politics invoking “the right” will ignite 
violence, he says, “But even suppose blood should flow. is there not a sort of 
blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man’s 
real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting 
death. i see this blood flowing now” (“Civil disobedience,” 77). Thoreau 
worries about spiritual death by self-betrayal and passivity; rectifying injus-
tice means risking mortal life and a mortal national existence. as Baldwin 
later reckons “the price of the ticket,”14 Thoreau warns that the “cost” of 
freedom is profound conflict if people do not agree about fundamental 
ideals or how to practice them. To dismiss conscientious politics because it 
risks violence is to enshrine the order founded by the last act of violence.
he can be said to speak as a citizen because he addresses neighbors 
who “in opinion” are opposed to slavery: what can be done now? he calls for 
“minority action” immediately because slavery is an egregious injustice and 
because its nationalization jeopardizes the freedom of northern citizens. 
indeed, their guilty passivity is a political fact his action must address: he 
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shows that they bear conflicting loyalties (to majority rule and conscience, 
for example) that cannot be reconciled but must be ranked; only a different 
ranking of authority will enable them to end both the wrong and the passiv-
ity they sustain. By demonstrating his own ranking, he politicizes the issue 
of authority at the center of prophecy and politics, and he displays the judg-
ment and minority action that, he claims, can make a worldly difference.
“Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we en-
deavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall 
we transgress them at once?” (“Civil disobedience,” 72–73). in most cases 
he agrees with Lincoln that we should follow constitutional procedure and 
electoral politics, but he depicts a crisis, a state of exception, and calls for 
a decision. men can “serve the devil, without intending it, as god,” and 
“obstinacy” is a danger, but he remains committed to “the perception and 
performance of right” by “corporations with a conscience” (“Civil disobedi-
ence,” 84, 72, 65). as arendt recognizes in Tocqueville but not Thoreau, 
“association” transforms conscience into public opinion and action oriented 
toward world building.15 addressing what action would be effective when 
the majority does not oppose slavery, Thoreau himself is trying to shift a 
northern consensus about what is right and what is practical.
he does not call “action from principle” political, but it addresses in-
justice, calculates the costs of loyalty to conflicting authorities, takes (and 
demands) responsibility for the consequence of private as well as public ac-
tions, and, by provoking neighbors to self-reflection and speech, both invites 
solidarity to create power and clears a space for dialogue where none had 
been. in puritan terms, he is refusing (not endorsing) the separation of grace 
and works. rooting the moral sense in a body acting in social space and his-
torical time, he demands the personal responsibility whose absence makes 
covenants the tomb of spirit, not its worldly testament. Call this a 1960s 
reading of Thoreau, whose joining of moral witness, personal autonomy, and 
embodied action made him an exemplar at a moment when imperial war 
and racial apartheid also compelled critics and citizens to relocate action in 
concert outside “what is called politics.” in the shadow of max Weber, who 
cast constitutionalism and popular sovereignty as ideologies that authorize 
violent and bureaucratic regimes, we should not so hastily dismiss Thoreau’s 
effort to embody antinomian critique in a beloved community.16
Conflict about the 1960s still fuels arguments about Thoreau. is the 
problem the regime he faces, or his unrealistic expectations, his moralistic 
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anger at neighbors who must fail him, and thus his self-imposed marginal-
ity? rather than inventing expectations and imposing them on others, i 
think, he affirms expectations they already profess as public truths. rather 
than making neighbors abject or guilty, he politicizes a despair they already 
voice in private. rather than showing inappropriate anger at a world that has 
failed him, perhaps he is right to be enraged about slavery and complicity 
in it, even as he binds his anger by faith in human capacities for judgment 
and action.
his voice is strident, and since he is holding others to account, they 
feel defensive; they accuse him of lacking the authority to judge them or 
unmask what seems to be his claim to a superior moral position. But his 
judgments are those of a peer and a witness, not a father. he does not invent 
the facts he laments, the standards he invokes, or the cross they constitute; 
he does intensify the contradiction others live, but only to show its penalty 
and how to resist it. he creates rhetorical distance, but he speaks words 
that are “common” in the sense of ordinary and shared, and he uses an 
everyday encounter with a tax collector to open and symbolize dialogue 
about personal and political responsibility.
peter euben’s view of Socrates is apt here: “By chastening fellow 
citizens for not living up to their own ideals, while subjecting those ideals 
to critique and reinterpretation,” he would “reestablish the conditions of 
political deliberation and moral discourse.” if Thoreau’s political practice 
is to bear witness—against injustice and to the generative power of action 
from principle, against what Stanley Cavell calls “conspiracies of silence” 
and to the transfiguring power of speech—his authority partly rests on his 
ability to honor the meaning of his words in his action, but it rests finally 
with those he calls neighbors and fellow citizens, who may not recognize 
themselves or their situation, language, or capacities in his testimony.17
he thus suffers the pathos of every prophetic witness: he stands here 
and can do no other, but he also must endure the freedom of those he 
addresses, who coauthor a fate he cannot control and from which he is not 
exempt. “if i could convince myself that i have any right to be satisfied with 
men as they are, and to treat them accordingly, and not according, in some 
respects, to my requisitions and expectations of what they and i ought to be, 
then . . . i should endeavor to be satisfied with things as they are and say it 
is the will of god” (“Civil disobedience,” 85).18 in some respects, Walden is 
the effort to become “satisfied with things as they are.” it offers the “high-
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est” perspective by which to resist the self-loathing, rage, and despair that 
Thoreau links to the office of prophecy in an unjust world.
Walden and Prophecy
drawing on the cultural idiom of militant protestantism, Thoreau’s anti-
slavery lectures radicalize jeremiadic dissent; he openly risks “the nation” 
to contest the slavery that has constituted american freedom. he does not 
philosophically justify his critique of slaveholding liberalism but cultivates 
resistance to it by his example. invoking origins both in racial violence and 
in the “action from principle” he calls “essentially revolutionary,” he depicts 
“freer and less desponding spirits” forging political bonds on “the more free 
and honorable ground” of the jail, standing with mexicans, indians, and fu-
gitive slaves against the state (“Civil disobedience,” 72, 76). The difference 
between his abolitionist prophecy and Walden, then, is not that he turns 
from militancy and jail to nature. rather, he develops a different register 
of cultivation to resist white supremacy and despairing docility among the 
enfranchised.19
partly, Thoreau believes his 1846 act of resistance and his 1848 lecture 
about it failed to foster neighbors who link citizenship to resistance rather 
than to subjection. Still committed to this goal, he takes up but revises the 
poetry of regeneration in nature that has justified liberal nationalism. his ex-
periment in cultivation and myth-making is readily—but mistakenly—seen 
as escaping from or merely mirroring the political world, as if he replenishes 
(not confronts) the imperial poetry of nature’s nation, to repeat (not over-
come) its devaluation of political bonds. indeed, his textual experiment is 
a parable of reconstituting citizens and community by redoing a history 
he depicts as a violent and self-destructive failure. Yet his Walden persona 
also revises the abolitionist register of his anti-slavery voice. moving from 
judgment of the world to participation in its creation through acts of poetic 
imagination, he seeks a supplement and antidote to prophecy as militant 
judgment, even while giving poesis a prophetic meaning.
Cavell’s The Senses of Walden persuasively shows Thoreau engaging 
rather than fleeing society and politics. To work through the “key words” 
in his culture—cost, spending, accounts, earning, consenting, choosing, 
civilized, savage, wild—he also assesses the practices in which they gain 
their meanings. Cavell’s Thoreau thereby redoes biblical prophecy in a non-
Thoreau, prophecy, and politics 137
theistic way: he shifts from the authority of god to the authority of language 
but still tells a story of voluntary imprisonment, self-betrayal, and despair 
overcome by mourning our losses and recommitting to our words and to 
one another.20
That story begins with “the outward condition” of those “said to live in 
new england.”21 Thoreau depicts those circumstances as created by their 
labors, which he casts as a form of slavery: “it is hard to have a southern 
overseer; it is worse to have a northern one; but worst of all is when you 
are the slave-driver of yourself” (Walden, 7). making protestant conscience 
the link between worldly slavery and worldly asceticism, Thoreau depicts 
his peers’ labors as self-mortifying forms of “penance,” sacrificial rituals 
that promise redemption but divide the self and entomb it in a world of 
deadened things (Walden, 4). addressing a nation haunted by specters of 
enslavement, he bears witness against captivities his peers do not count as 
real or name as experience. giving voice to the “quiet desperation” of those 
who believe they are trapped, who live by “fate” because they do not live 
by “faith,” he also bears witness to their capacity to live otherwise (Walden, 
8, 5, 9). Thoreau uses the example of building a house and growing beans 
to model other ways to “labor” and to “spend” their lives (Walden, 5–7). 
The beans signify how “men,” rather than “tobacco, slaves and operatives,” 
could be what they cultivate, the “staple production” of their labors; the 
house signifies rebuilding community as a dwelling and remaking citizens 
to inhabit it (“Life,” 176–77).
The question of authority remains crucial in this parable of refounding: 
What and whom do we endow with authority? how did Thoreau gain the 
sense of authority by which he now speaks? on the assumption that already 
formed adults require estrangement from convention to achieve their own 
authority, he positions himself at a rhetorical distance from those he calls his 
neighbors. But the sense of authority that makes him a stranger in relation 
to these neighbors, and a “sojourner” in relation to what they call civiliza-
tion, is achieved only by “fronting”—naming and assessing—the legacy and 
language, assumptions, practices, and stories he shares with them (Walden, 
3, 90). narrating his own experiment in judging what to affirm and reject 
from the legacy his neighbors also inherit and take inside, he confronts not 
only their criteria for making such decisions, not only their key words and 
practices, but also ingrained dispositions of despair or faith that project a 
world that is fated or open to possibility.
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his story of a personal “accounting” is thus a political parable of com-
ing to terms with their “constitution,” to clear “more free and honorable 
ground” and dispositions for acting otherwise (Walden, 91, 73; “Civil dis-
obedience,” 76). But how and why does Thoreau use an idea of poetry to 
revise the register of voice in his anti-slavery lectures? Surely, his epigraph 
shows him assuming a prophetic public office: “i do not mean to write an 
ode to dejection, but to brag as lustily as chanticleer in the morning, if only 
to wake my neighbors up.” But why take on the persona of chanticleer, and 
to what purpose would he awaken his neighbors?
For Thoreau, the cockerel signals his poetic transformation of proph-
ecy. prophets say what they see and stand against it by inhabiting, albeit 
never fully, a persona or office from which they utter divine sentences they 
do not author but make their own. in contrast, Thoreau emphasizes the 
experiential, imaginative, and formative elements in language: abolition-
ist witnessing becomes a poesis that recognizes the constitutive power of 
imagination to “instill and drench” reality with meaning. rejecting the plain 
speech of protestant literalism, he embraces the multivocality and “obscu-
rity” of what he calls “extra-vagant” language, while depicting a universe 
that answers our conceptions (Walden, 324–25). By crafting his prophetic 
persona as a cockerel, he also shifts from the “dejection” he associates with 
sin, judgment, and repentance to an arousal and natality he associates with 
dawn, which signals his faith that possibility is wired into (human) nature 
(Walden, 84).
The note of this once wild indian pheasant is certainly the most remarkable 
of any bird’s, and if they could be naturalized without being domesticated, 
it would soon become the most famous sound in our woods, surpassing the 
clangor of the goose and the hooting of the owl. . . . [To] hear the wild cock-
erels crow . . . drowning the feebler notes of the other birds,—think of it! it 
would put the nations on the alert. Who would not . . . rise earlier and earlier 
every successive day of his life, till he became unspeakably healthy, wealthy, 
and wise? This foreign bird’s note is celebrated by the poets of all countries 
along with the notes of their native songsters. all climates agree with brave 
Chanticleer. he is more indigenous even than the natives. his health is ever 
good . . . his spirits never flag. (Walden, 184)
here Thoreau links prophecy to poetry in a song that puts nations on alert, 
even as he plays with the ways such singers are both “native” and “foreign” to 
those they address. he contrasts cockerels to owls—the voice of philosophy 
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—whose wisdom is melancholy because belated and retrospective and 
whose “oh-o-o-o-o that I had never been born!” speaks the despairing 
lament of Silenus. “i rejoice that there are owls” to voice “the stark twilight 
and unsatisfied thoughts that all men have,” he states, but he imitates the 
cockerel, who acclaims “expectation of the dawn” (Walden, 124–25, 90).
There is something suggested by [the cockerel] that is a newer testament—the 
gospel according to this moment, a brag for all the world, healthiness as a 
spring burst forth. The merit of this bird’s strain is its freedom from all plain-
tiveness . . . when i hear a cockerel crow . . . i think to myself, there is one of 
us well, at any rate, and with a sudden gush return to my senses.22
To what reality does the cockerel awaken us? By announcing dawn he 
declares the passing of time, which means irreversible loss as each moment 
passes, and our life with it. To awake to time is to “return to my senses,” to the 
impressionable and willful particularity philip roth calls “human stain,”23 
and so to the carnal separateness that makes us at once strangers and “kin-
dred” (Walden, 62, 3). Since only by acknowledging this separateness can 
others be(come) real to us, the cockerel awakens us from utter loneliness 
(because no reality is outside) to the reality of others and our shared life 
in language. Thoreau imagines “words addressed to our condition exactly, 
which, if we could really hear and understand, would be more salutary than 
the morning or spring to our lives,” because the cockerel’s announcement of 
passing time includes not only loss but also dawn, symbolizing capacities in 
(human) nature to awaken and begin anew (Walden, 107). Since “morning 
is when i am awake and there is a dawn in me,” and “to be awake is to be 
alive,” so “moral reform is the effort to throw off sleep” (Walden, 90). To say 
“the present was my next experiment” is to experiment in becoming present 
to, or acknowledging, realities we have disavowed (Walden, 84).24
if you do not live in time, you are “said to live.” and if you are not 
in your acts and in your body, where are you? Like any prophet, Thoreau 
begins with loss and makes us wretched, provoking grief, eliciting mourn-
ing, but to enable change: “our moulting season, like that of the fowls, 
must be a crisis in our lives. The loon retires to solitary ponds to spend it. 
Thus also the snake casts its slough, and the caterpillar its wormy coat, by 
an internal industry and expansion” (Walden, 24). Shedding an old skin 
is partly the internal industry of counting as real what we have forgone, 
wasted, or disavowed. But mourning brings morning, renewed (faith in) 
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capacity to change. “We must learn to reawaken and keep ourselves awake 
. . . by an infinite expectation of the dawn,” for one “who does not believe 
that each day contains an earlier, more sacred, and auroral hour than he has 
yet profaned, has despaired of life” (Walden, 90, 89).
Thoreau is personally invested in the persona of the cockerel, but he 
also insists on the political importance of a prophecy without plaintiveness, 
because he links freedom to dawn, not to dusk. Unlike prior “prophets and 
redeemers,” whose “cast-off griefs” consoled only our fears, he trumpets “a 
simple and irrepressible satisfaction with the gift of life,” as symbolized by 
the dawn (Walden, 78, 77). By the image of the cockerel he identifies new-
ness and possibility with potency and generativity, “bragging lustily” about 
the gifts he bears. “it is not by compromise, it is not by a timid and feeble 
repentance that a man will save his soul and live at last. he must conquer 
a clear field, letting repentance & Co. go.”25 indeed, “the greater part of 
what my neighbors call good i believe in my soul to be bad, and if i repent 
of any thing it is very likely to be my good behavior” (Walden, 10). he thus 
“reverences” what he calls “the wild” as well as “the good,” suggesting a 
necessary tension between morality and life (Walden, 210).26
Thoreau’s narrator identifies with the cockerel to overcome (his own) 
melancholy, envy, propriety, and despair. he crafts a persona:
if i seem to boast more than is becoming, my excuse is that i brag for human-
ity rather than for myself; and my shortcomings and inconsistencies do not 
affect the truth of my statement. notwithstanding much cant and hypocrisy 
. . . for which i am sorry as any man . . . i am resolved that i will not through 
humility become the devil’s attorney. (Walden, 49–50)
he rhetorically distances himself from dejection and resentment to con-
front and relinquish them, not to enact or rationalize them. But like his 
prophetic forebears, he deploys appearances in a rhetorical project with 
political purposes: to demonstrate the “faith” by which people must live if 
they are to be(come) free.27
accordingly, the prophetic poet declares the dawn not just anywhere 
but to a specific political community whose self-declared errand into the 
wilderness has promised freedom while producing slavery and violent dis-
possession of native peoples. how can he not compose an ode to dejection? 
if he awakens his neighbors to this history and, like biblical forebears, in-
sists that it be remembered, not forgotten or disavowed, to what possibilities 
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does he awaken them? Whereas Cavell’s prophetic Thoreau refounds the 
conditions of language as such, by “returning” people to the authority not 
of god but of ordinary language, my Thoreau “roots” this project in “native” 
ground, an american ordinary of racialized violence and national myths 
about wild(er)ness.
identifying his voice with a “once wild indian pheasant” called chanti-
cleer, he uses the myth of wilderness to critically restage how declarations of 
independence have juxtaposed god and nature, civilized and savage, native 
and foreign, (european) heir and (nonwhite) outcast, domesticated settle-
ment and untamed wildness. his experiment does not occur in private or 
by finding a prediscursive nature but through the language he shares with 
those he calls his neighbors. he proceeds not alone but in the company of 
puritans, savages, and fugitive slaves he recovers in the woods; they haunt 
his neighbors but “people” his solitude and inspire his perspective on the 
purposes and labors by which his neighbors “are said to live.” By using the 
office of the poet to retell the stories his neighbors tell themselves about 
themselves, he at once revises prophecy and aspires to make what norman 
mailer calls “a myth sufficiently true to offer a life adequately large.”28
on the one hand, he redoes a history he depicts as a violent and self- 
destructive failure, but for those who must work this soil, “declaring 
independence” and withholding consent remain crucial tropes and first 
principles, a democratic practice to invoke and sustain or revive. By claim-
ing to begin “by accident” on July 4, he signals that personal and political 
identity are not divinely guaranteed but contingent on action (Walden, 84). 
identity is an accident and without meaning, unless we give it one. against 
imposed, passively inherited, or reified forms of identity, which he attributes 
to slavery or bad faith, he makes political community into a project. as ac-
cidents of birth, self and nation are artifacts created in action, contingent 
and mortal. Such an identity lives not in rest but only as enacted in time, 
subject to loss, failure, change.
on the other hand, to demonstrate this idea, he takes seriously the 
wilderness myth, to revise it. in prophetic (and puritan) terms, wilderness 
names a space of transformation and possibility—of betrothal, covenant, 
and new beginnings—so also one of contingency, decision, and terror. 
Thoreau thus says he goes to the woods to “front” the “essential facts of life” 
by an experiment in building a house and hoeing beans (Walden, 90). one 
experiments in housing rather than entombing the spirit, the other experi-
142  George Shulman
ments in relating the cultivated and the wild, and both signify citizenship as 
a practice of cultivation and world building. By retelling a myth of wilder-
ness, therefore, he is not escaping but reinhabiting a history of settlement 
and domination, to redeem it by redoing it.
if he uses dawn to signify capacities for renewal in (human) nature, he 
uses spring as a metaphor to embody culture by making form giving and 
shape shifting part of nature. Signifying on a muddy hillside in spring, he 
depicts recurring, grotesque, and violent transformation. awed by flowing 
mud and emerging foliage, he depicts the “creation of Cosmos out of Chaos” 
in the creative emergence of forms (Walden, 313). as “the lumpish grub in 
the earth” is transformed into the “airy and fluttering butterfly,” so the “very 
globe continually transcends and translates itself, and becomes winged in 
its orbit” (Walden, 306–7). inwardly driving all forms—including human 
institutions—are energies “somewhat excrementitious in [their] character,” 
which “suggest that nature has some bowels, and there again is the mother 
of humanity” (Walden, 308). Struck that man “is but a mass of thawing 
clay,” he announces, “there is nothing inorganic” (Walden, 307–8).
The earth is not a fragment of dead history . . . but living poetry like the leaves 
of a tree, which precede flowers and fruit,—not a fossil earth, but a living 
earth; compared with whose great central life all animal and vegetable life is 
merely parasitic. its throes will heave our exuviae from their graves. You may 
melt your metals and cast them into the most beautiful molds you can; they 
will never excite me like the forms which this molten earth flows out into. 
and not only it, but the institutions upon it, are plastic like clay in the hands 
of the potter. (Walden, 309)
Whereas the god of isaiah and Jeremiah declares himself the pot-
ter who is (therefore) entitled to smash his creations in frustration at their 
recalcitrant agency, Thoreau imagines mother earth generating forms from 
within and calls human beings to become “indwellers” who “build” self and 
world from inside out (Walden, 46–47). institutions and cultures could be 
such “forms,” produced by reverent “labors.” or rather, any faith, practice, 
or institution will fail to retain our assent if it is merely external or abstract; 
if dwellings become tombs, frozen like “winter,” we must initiate “the crisis 
in our lives,” which he depicts as a thawing spring, to undergo a moulting of 
dead skin. in such a crisis, Thoreau undertook the experiments by which he 
earned and fashioned the faith he now announces, a faith that a redemptive 
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capacity for renewal is part of nature—and in humans as “part and parcel 
of nature” (“Walking,” 49).
generative capacities for form giving and world building are “larval,” 
not unconditioned, so Thoreau concludes Walden by repeating the story of 
a “strong and beautiful bug which came out of the dry leaf of an old table” 
in a farmer’s kitchen. “Who does not feel his faith in a resurrection and 
immortality strengthened by hearing of this? Who knows what beautiful 
and winged life, whose egg has been buried under many concentric layers 
of woodenness in the dead dry life of society,” may gnaw its way out of this 
“well-seasoned tomb” to “enjoy its perfect summer life at last!” no mere 
lapse of time can assure this beginning, however. “only that day dawns to 
which we are awake.” But always, “there is more day to dawn. The sun is but 
a morning star” (Walden, 333).
By making a this-worldly prophecy through poetic imagination, Tho-
reau fashions a countercultural ethos, and models ideal readers, to resist 
worldly asceticism, the “staple production” of what Tocqueville rightly calls 
“a puritan and trading nation.”29 as emerson reads prophets as poets—“the 
religions of the world are the ejaculations of a few imaginative men”30—so 
Thoreau imagines a creative force within (human) nature; as prophecy 
becomes poesis, prophets become cockerels announcing not doctrine but 
dawn, not moral law and its penalty but capacities for renewal, not divine 
providence but the richness of life. The poet as prophet seeks not a personal 
god but a world (and body) made holy by poetic imagination. Casting life 
in such libidinal and aesthetic terms, he would temper the resentment and 
despair entailed by his intense attachment to justice. But his faith—that 
possibility is written into (human) nature—is vulnerable to charges of false 
prophecy, in the sense of projecting (not revealing) meaning, and so of giv-
ing false comfort.
melville could be referring to Thoreau when he says, “Say what some 
poets will, nature is not so much her own ever-sweet interpreter as the 
mere supplier of that cunning alphabet where by selecting and combining 
as he pleases, each man reads his own lesson.” melville refuses visions of 
universal innocence because human evil bespeaks depravity in nature: “all 
deified nature absolutely paints like the harlot, whose allurements cover 
nothing but the charnel-house within.” That is why ahab’s effort to get at 
the truth of reality—by striking through the “pasteboard mask” of visible 
appearances—results in apocalyptic self-destruction.31
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Like ahab, Thoreau does undertake a quest to experience the “truth” 
of reality, but to heal resentment and to restore trust in the appearances 
ahab devalues as mere pasteboard. Cavell thus reads Thoreau turning from 
despair, skepticism, and metaphysics to the ordinary. The redemption in 
that turning is symbolized by spring and enacted by experiments in build-
ing and cultivating. But surrendering to those experiences and undertaking 
those experiments require a kind of faith—which melville refuses, and 
whose real dangers he dramatizes. he thus writes a great novel warning 
against redemptive projects, whereas Thoreau’s Walden is a seminal effort 
to recast the myth of wilderness regeneration in politicizing ways.32
his critical retelling is seminal because it inaugurates a second regis-
ter of prophecy, an ecstatic, libidinal, and aesthetic voice that narrates not 
jeremiads about betrayed first principles but stories of rebirth from a death-
in-life. it does not reject but reworks myths of a “new” world, imagined both 
as an overcoming of white supremacy and as an overcoming of what William 
Carlos Williams calls “the spiritually withering plague” of duality.33 Tho-
reau believes the myth he revises is “sufficiently true,” because in it, racial 
domination, worldly asceticism, and political captivity—as well as human 
capacities for action and self-overcoming—become “facts” we deny at great 
cost. he hopes his myth “offers a life adequately large,” because experiments 
in “fronting” these facts open our purposes and practices to question and 
revision, because such experiments change participants and the world in 
ways not knowable in advance, because such changes put what people know 
and assume at risk, and because such risks ennoble their bearers.
But his mythic vision cannot bear the redemptive burden he invests 
in it. The cockerel announces the dawn, but Thoreau awakens every day to 
the slavery and violence authorized or allowed by his neighbors. delivered 
a month before Walden appeared in print, his “Slavery in massachusetts” 
lecture is no enraptured portrait of “somewhat excrementitious nature” but 
a denunciation of people dwelling “wholly within hell” because they have 
allowed the nationalization of slavery (“Slavery,” 106). nature, or poetic 
projects to cultivate “freer and less desponding spirits” who stand against 
slavery and the state, do not free him from or console him for political 
reality. “i am surprised to see men going about their business as if nothing 
had happened.” don’t they know that “all beneficent harvests fail as you 
approach the empire of hell?” (“Slavery,” 107). Undergoing a devaluation 
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of life that no person can escape and no enterprise can redeem, he rejects 
pastoral compensation. “i walk toward one of our ponds, but what signifies 
the beauty of nature when . . . both the rulers and the ruled are without 
principle?” politics is inescapable: “it is not an era of repose. We have used 
up all our inherited freedom.” To “save our lives, we must fight for them” 
(“Slavery,” 108).
Still, he concludes the lecture by meditating on the water lily: “it is the 
emblem of purity . . . as if to show us what purity . . . can be extracted from, 
the slime and muck of the earth. . . . i shall not so soon despair of the world 
for it, notwithstanding slavery, and the cowardice and want of principle of 
northern men.” The flower is “extracted” from the slime, but the lily also 
signifies how “the sweet, and pure, and innocent, are wholly sundered from 
the obscene and baleful” (“Slavery,” 108). indeed, “Slavery and servility 
have produced no sweet-scented flower . . . for they have no real life: they 
are merely a decaying and a death, offensive to all healthy nostrils. We do 
not complain that they live, but that they do not get buried. Let the living 
bury them; even they are good for manure” (“Slavery,” 109). in spring, the 
“bowels” of earth are a “somewhat excrementitious” womb of living forms, 
linking larval and winged life, joining what he “wholly sunders” in his slavery 
lecture. he cannot fold slavery into a poetry of rebirth in the way he folds 
excrement and death into his story of spring. Slavery (and servility) cannot 
be redeemed, for they produce no valuable fruit; they yield the blessing of 
more life only if and as we bury them.
Four years later, John Brown exemplifies the virtuous action that, by bury-
ing servility, enables Thoreau to appreciate the sweetness of the lily. against 
the advice of republican party activists and many abolitionists, he orga-
nizes several events to defend Brown. Voicing what he calls the “sublime” 
meaning of Brown’s deed, his speech so effectively refutes the prevailing 
view that Brown is a madman and fanatic that he initiates a transformation 
of northern opinion, which in turn leads southerners to infer the necessity 
of secession.34 it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze that speech 
and its impact, but key questions about it condense my view of Thoreau’s 
use of prophecy.
The key question is, how are we to relate Thoreau’s support of John 
Brown to the two registers of his prophecy? partly, Thoreau sees in Brown 
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the power in the democratic orthodoxy and abolitionist fundamentalism 
that he disrupts and troubles by his literary “experiment” but that remain 
crucial to his life and ongoing political labors. he feels a kinship to Brown 
because he has always worked around the flame of prophecy, we might say, 
and now he uses his artfulness to defend its value. indeed, it seems likely 
that prophetic conceptions of “action from principle” sustain his fear that 
literary art is “just words,” impotent to bury slavery, while despair about 
the power of language compels him to celebrate (in staggeringly artful and 
politically resonant words) Brown’s example. his reduction of literary art to 
passivity is enacted by idealization of Brown as a man of action, but years 
of literary labor “in the wilderness” have prepared him to write this eulogy. 
Still, by artfully defending Brown’s moral integrity as artless faith in action, 
he rejects—or betrays—Walden’s artfully ironic distancing from moralism. 
it is as if failure to embody his persona of masculinized heroism, so linked to 
slavery’s nationalization, drives him to embrace Brown, whose martyrdom 
appears to close the gap between art and life.
But Thoreau’s defense of Brown warrants political, not only psycho-
logical, analysis, for surely the political space for dialogue has closed down. 
as Frederick douglass also argues, the nationalization of slavery and the 
failure of party politics to resolve the conflict make insurrectionary violence 
necessary. african american commentary has always paralleled Thoreau’s 
view of necessity and principle: only war could and did end slavery, and 
Brown warrants praise not as a crazy martyr trying to free slaves but as a 
sober citizen risking himself to redeem a white republic from its constitutive 
origin in slavery. depictions of Brown—as fanatic fundamentalist or heroic 
citizen—still mirror the color line constituting “democracy in america.”
That generative and haunting division impels Thoreau to prophecy as a 
language of and for politics. assuming the office of prophecy to reconstitute 
a white republic, he sees the value and not only the risk in a democratic 
fundamentalism we are inclined only to fear. But he also dreams of trans-
forming prophecy—and thereby politics—by poetry. To be sure, he cannot 
sustain a poeticized prophecy under the pressure of circumstances that 
seem to render language impotent, and his politicized myth of wild(er)ness 
and transformation is not sufficiently true, now, to offer a life adequately 
large. But his idea of transforming prophecy by poetry, and politics by both, 
remains a legacy worth cultivating today.
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Harpers Ferry, 1859
On Sunday night, October 16, 1859, John Brown and eighteen of 
his followers invaded harpers Ferry, Virginia, and seized control of the 
federal armory.1 hoping to ignite a slave insurrection that would spread 
throughout the South, Brown intended to use the arsenal’s weapons to arm 
both mutinous slaves and dissident whites in a guerrilla war of liberation. 
When it came time for the raid, however, Brown both overestimated the 
support he would receive from slaves in northern Virginia and underesti-
mated the speed with which government authorities would mobilize against 
the insurrection. Local militia wrested control of the town from Brown 
by midday Monday. trapped in the armory, Brown tried to negotiate his 
way out. Colonel Robert E. Lee, commander of federal forces at the scene, 
refused all offers short of unconditional surrender. By tuesday morning, 
marines prepared to force their way in to take Brown, his sons, and their 
coconspirators dead or alive. One of Brown’s prisoners observed that in the 
face of the siege, “[Brown] was the coolest and firmest man i ever saw. . . . 
With one son dead by his side, and another shot through, he felt the pulse 
of his dying son with one hand and held his rifle with the other.”2 after 
Brown rejected Lee’s final order to surrender, the marines battered down 
the door and stormed the armory, killing two of Brown’s lieutenants but 
taking Brown alive.
in the ensuing weeks, Brown stood trial for murder, conspiracy to in-
cite the slaves to rebel, and treason against Virginia. as news of the drama 
spread, passions flared both north and south. although most northerners 
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condemned Brown, many expressed admiration for his anti-slavery convic-
tions and his extremity in living them. For southerners, however, Brown’s 
raid was the latest evidence of a “Black Republican” conspiracy against 
slavery.3 On October 31, the Virginia jury found Brown guilty of all charges; 
two days later, the judge sentenced him to hang. at his sentencing, Brown 
explained himself:
i see a book kissed here which i suppose to be the Bible, or at least the 
new testament. that teaches me that all things whatsoever i would that 
men should do to me, i should do even so to them. it teaches me, further, to 
“remember them that are in bonds as bound with them.” i endeavored to act 
up to that instruction. . . . i believe that to have interfered as i have done—as 
i have always freely admitted i have done—in behalf of his despised poor, 
was not wrong, but right. now, if it is deemed necessary that i should forfeit 
my life for the furtherance of the ends of justice, and mingle my blood further 
with the blood of my children and with the blood of millions in this slave 
country whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust enact-
ments—i submit; so let it be done!4
taking the golden Rule as his standard, Brown defended his right to “in-
terfere” with slavery. if such interference resulted in violence on either the 
slaveholders’ heads or his own, so be it. So long as slavery exists, it is just 
that the blood of the free mingle with the blood of the enslaved.5 Brown’s 
serenity in the face of execution evinces a certain Socratic virtue, albeit in 
a Calvinist guise: the choice of moral principle over mortal longevity, of 
moral right over mortal life.6
Concord, 1859
among the most vocal of Brown’s admirers in harpers Ferry’s wake was 
henry david thoreau. On October 30—one day before the jury’s verdict 
and three days before the judge’s sentence—thoreau mounted the platform 
in Concord town hall and delivered “a plea for Captain John Brown.”7 
Knowing, however, that Brown would be most valuable to the anti-slavery 
cause as its most recent martyr,8 thoreau’s plea was not for Brown’s life: “i 
almost fear that i may yet hear of his deliverance, doubting if a prolonged 
life, if any life, can do as much good as his death” (137). thoreau pleaded 
instead for Brown’s memory: “i am here to plead his cause with you. i 
thoreau and John Brown 153
plead . . . for his character,—his immortal life” (137). hauntingly, thoreau 
spoke of Brown throughout the “plea” in the past tense, as if the execu-
tion had already occurred.9 incensed that northern reformers had failed 
to rally to the old Calvinist’s side, thoreau worried that Brown would be 
lost to either infamy or oblivion after the trial ended and the execution 
was carried out.10 the memory of Brown, however, could have great value 
not only for the anti-slavery cause but also for american democracy gener-
ally. What distinguished Brown were not simply his principles, since others 
voiced and shared them, but rather his readiness to live those principles. in 
“Resistance to Civil government” (1849), thoreau wrote, “this american 
government,—what is it but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring 
to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instance losing some of 
its integrity? it has not the vitality and force of a single living man; for a 
single man can bend it to his will.”11 Brown’s willingness to confront slavery 
on its own violent terms, however, had bent the american government to 
his will. Even though his insurrection had failed, Brown’s actions and their 
aftermath were escalating the sectional conflict, making compromise less 
tenable and thus making disunion more likely. this is not to say that either 
thoreau or Brown could have predicted that the raid on harpers Ferry 
would precipitate both disunion and emancipation; it is to say, however, that 
both thoreau and Brown could perceive how one person’s actions could 
create an atmosphere of crisis conducive to slavery’s destruction. Brown 
possessed a force and vitality that thoreau believed the american govern-
ment and most of the american people lacked. in John Brown, thoreau saw 
a personification of principled action that american citizens would do well 
to emulate.12
Exploring the meaning of John Brown in thoreau’s moral imagination, 
this chapter also analyzes the relationship among conscience, character, 
and action in thoreau’s political thought. Because thoreau’s knowledge 
of Brown was imperfect, the distinction i draw between Brown himself 
and thoreau’s imagining of him is crucial. thoreau either did not know 
or did not trust the full story of Brown’s actions in “Bleeding Kansas” 
in 1856. as slave- and free-state settlers terrorized each other in the 
newly opened Kansas territory, Brown personally supervised the mas-
sacre of five southern sympathizers in retaliation for an earlier massacre 
of six free-state men.13 Walter harding insists that had thoreau known of 
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Brown’s participation in the massacre at pottawatomie, “he might never 
have endorsed him and might [even] have been convinced of his insanity.”14 
imperfect knowledge aside, thoreau’s imagining of Brown still sheds light 
on thoreau’s ideas of conscience, character, and action. thoreau’s public 
exaltation of Brown provides a window into thoreau’s thinking on action 
especially, for as it celebrates Brown’s actions, the “plea” itself constitutes a 
dramatic political act. political action by thoreau was not unprecedented. 
his refusal to pay his poll tax in 1846 and his willingness to go to jail as 
a result were incontestably political; his sojourn at Walden can also be 
viewed as a political performance.15 yet the “plea for Captain John Brown” 
is unique for two reasons: because of its bearing on the most immedi-
ate political issue of the day and because—unlike when the tax collector 
stepped in thoreau’s path—thoreau himself set the process of protest 
into motion. Biographer Robert Richardson recalls that in the aftermath 
of harpers Ferry, “public opinion [in Concord] began to harden against 
Brown, and thoreau . . . decided to make a public speech to right the 
imbalance. as Brown acted, so he must act now. . . . the selectmen would 
not have the town bell rung, so thoreau rang it himself.”16 the image of 
thoreau ringing the bell to gather the townspeople for his speech reveals 
the act’s self-initiated nature. More than any other action in his lifetime, 
thoreau’s public defense of John Brown was a premeditated projection of 
himself into political affairs.17
political action is a pivotal issue in thoreau’s philosophy because of 
how his theory of moral obligation implicates it. in “Resistance,” thoreau 
states:
it is not a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradica-
tion of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still properly have other 
concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, 
if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support. if i devote 
myself to other pursuits and contemplations, i must first see, at least, that i 
do not pursue them sitting upon another man’s shoulders. i must get off him 
first, that he may pursue his contemplations too. (71)
the passage seems to confirm hannah arendt’s denigration of thoreau as a 
philosopher of private conscience—one who refuses to dirty his hands with 
injustice but also with the politics needed to make the world more just.18 
thoreau allows individuals to dedicate themselves fully to private pursuits 
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even if great wrongs exist that admit of public remedy; so long as one is not 
complicit in public wrong, one may preserve one’s energies for oneself and 
withhold them from the world.19 at the same time, the negative duty to 
avoid complicity may entail a positive duty to take part in politics. Before 
one can enjoy private life unencumbered by public affairs, one must make 
sure that one’s freedom and self-cultivation are not parasitic on the freedom 
and self-cultivation of others.20 in an unjust world, this usually requires 
positive political action. Because Brown’s raid reminded thoreau of the 
ways his location in a slave-sanctioning polity implicated him in slavery, 
thoreau acted dramatically in the wake of harpers Ferry.
political theorists who have studied thoreau have traditionally denied 
that he has a positive politics.21 they emphasize his aversion to political par-
ties and organized reform movements and underscore the negativity of his 
politics of “no-saying.”22 in this chapter, i refute these theorists by bringing 
the “plea for Captain John Brown” into the interpretive foreground. the 
“plea” shows that thoreau has a positive politics—a politics of performing 
conscience. the performance of conscience before an audience transforms 
the invocation of conscience from a personally political act into a publicly 
political one. the aim of the performance is to provoke one’s neighbors into 
a process of individual self-reform that will make them capable of properly 
vigilant democratic citizenship and conscientious political agitation. Only 
by provoking self-reform in his fellow citizens can thoreau hope for the 
sole type of political incorporation he finds acceptable: “a corporation 
of conscientious men” (“Resistance,” 65). to an extent, i build on nancy 
Rosenblum’s suggestion that, for thoreau, “public life [is] life in public, a 
life of exhibitionism . . . a scene for ‘giving a strong dose of myself.’”23 at the 
same time, i enlarge her suggestion and illustrate the politics of performing 
conscience in greater detail.24 One advantage of performing conscience as 
a conceptualization of thoreau’s politics is that it encompasses both the 
negatively political and the positively political moments of his career. al-
lowing that even the most unmistakably negative political acts can possess 
positive performative political valence, performing conscience best cap-
tures thoreau’s ideal model of political action. through close analysis of 
the “plea,” we see why and how Brown’s deeds at harpers Ferry inspired 
thoreau’s words at Concord town hall, and gain a fuller view of the role of 
action in thoreau’s moral and political imagination.
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“The Most American of Us All”: Brown in Thoreau’s 
Moral Imagination
in henry thoreau’s eyes, John Brown was a consummate american citizen. 
Early in the “plea,” thoreau states: 
he was by descent and birth a new England farmer, a man of great com-
mon sense, deliberate and practical as that class is, and tenfold more so. he 
was like the best of those who stood at Concord Bridge once, on Lexington 
Common, and on Bunker hill, only he was firmer and higher principled than 
any that i have chanced to hear of as there. . . . they could bravely face their 
country’s foes, but he had the courage to face his country herself, when she 
was in the wrong. (112–13)
thoreau begins by emphasizing Brown’s agrarian roots. although this seems 
a morally neutral description, thoreau may be attributing to Brown the 
agrarian virtue and independence celebrated by both Locke and Jefferson. 
thoreau then compares Brown to the patriots of Lexington, Concord, and 
Bunker hill, as if to say that he retains the spirit of independent freeholding 
and the willingness to take up arms in defense of liberty that inspired the 
heroes of 1775 and 1776. in the end, however, thoreau places Brown on a 
higher moral plane than the original patriots. What thoreau most admires 
about Brown is his willingness to hold not simply america’s enemies to mor-
al account but america itself. in thoreau’s eyes, democratic citizens must 
have the capacity for self-criticism, both personal and national. though it 
would be wishful thinking to hold up the self-righteous Brown as a paragon 
of personal self-criticism, he nevertheless fulfills his role in the project of 
national self-criticism.
in his impressive capacity for critical citizenship, Brown ceases to be 
a mere american patriot to thoreau and earns an even higher appellation: 
“a transcendentalist above all, a man of ideas and principles. . . . not yield-
ing to a whim or transient impulse, but carrying out the purpose of a life” 
(“plea,” 115). in identifying Brown as a transcendentalist, thoreau places 
him alongside himself and Emerson in the effort to draw out the moral 
and intellectual implications of political independence.25 Brown’s contribu-
tion to this project, however, is not intellectual but active: he exemplifies 
the translation of moral commitment into political action and reminds his 
fellow citizens of the necessity of doing so. as Emerson said, “John Brown 
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was an idealist. he believed in ideas to that extent, that he existed to put 
them all into action. he did not believe in moral suasion;—he believed 
in putting the thing through.”26 in synchronizing commitment and action, 
Brown epitomizes “purposeful life,” the kind of life to which all democratic 
individuals should aspire. Later in the “plea,” thoreau insists:
i wish i could say that Brown was the representative of the north. he was a 
superior man. he did not value his bodily life in comparison with ideal things. 
he did not recognize unjust human laws, but resisted them as he was bid. For 
once we are lifted out of the trivialness and dust of politics into the region of 
truth and manhood. no man in america has ever stood up so persistently and 
effectively for the dignity of human nature, knowing himself for a man, and 
the equal of any and all governments. in that sense he was the most american 
of us all. (125)
thoreau’s identification of Brown as “the most american of us all” is a 
radical utterance, surely one that shocked his audience. Brown saw himself 
as a “passionate outsider,”27 and his state of alienation from the american 
polity exceeded even thoreau’s. Knowing this, however, thoreau aims to 
reduce his audience’s sense of distance from Brown. to make Brown’s radi-
calism intelligible and respectable, thoreau inserts him into a political lin-
eage that extends back from the present to the american Revolution to the 
puritan Revolution in the age of Cromwell (“plea,” 111–15).28 By showing 
Brown to be at bottom a genuine new Englander, an authentic american, 
thoreau encourages his audience to regard Brown as a fellow and not as an 
alien.29 yet thoreau’s identification of Brown as “the most american of us 
all” also works in a subversive second direction. Even though thoreau often 
derided america as a land of slavery, commercialism, Manifest destiny, 
moral numbness, and fear of freedom, he worked continuously in his writ-
ing to effect both a spiritual transformation of america as a polity and an 
interpretive transfiguration of america as an idea.30 in the “plea,” thoreau’s 
portrait of Brown progresses from a description of him as a patriot to an 
exaltation of him as a transcendentalist. the order of this progression and 
its consummation in thoreau’s designation of Brown as “the most american 
of us all” are not coincidental, for they track precisely the transformation 
of american citizenship thoreau wishes to effect. thoreau wants reflexive 
nationalism, a form of groupthink, to yield to liberal democratic idealism—
one against which citizens can evaluate both their own actions and those 
158  Jack Turner
of the state. thoreau’s redescription of americanism through the figure of 
Brown is a vehicle for encouraging this transformation in his fellow citizens’ 
political postures. if thoreau can convince his audience that Brown’s quali-
ties are consummately american, he will have persuaded them not only to 
view Brown with sympathy but also to enact their own patriotism through 
an embrace of Brown’s moral idealism.
if we examine the sentences leading up to thoreau’s identification of 
Brown as “the most american of us all,” we find four elements to Brown’s 
consummate americanism. First, Brown “did not value bodily life in com-
parison with ideal things.” Consummate americanism, in thoreau’s eyes, 
demands attachment to something beyond bodily life. Viewed in light of 
the history of liberalism, this is a controversial claim: the tradition of rights-
based individualism and toleration proceeds, in part, from the Levellers’ 
and hobbes’s commitment to protecting bodily life from arbitrary mon-
archs and civil war and Locke’s desire to protect bodily life from religious 
war and persecution. yet here thoreau suggests that there are times when 
it is appropriate to sacrifice bodily life for ideal things. if we can construe 
thoreau, as george Kateb does, as one of the last true inheritors of the 
american founding and thus of the rights-based individualist tradition, 
then the founding premise of rights-based individualism—the preservation 
of bodily life—exists only so that it can be transcended.31 in other words, 
rights-based individualism ultimately holds that life is valuable only insofar 
as it is a life of liberty.32 yet once life and liberty are secured, the life of the 
free intellect discloses truths worth dying for. Rights-based individualism 
can countenance the sacrifice of life for principle insofar as the sacrifice is 
reflective and voluntary. as opposed to the truths that motivate self-sacrifice 
in the era of religious war, these truths are individually arrived at and may be 
secular in character. although it is true that Brown’s ideology is ultimately 
Calvinist, thoreau believes his attachment to the ideal over the corporeal 
can still instruct an increasingly worldly and pluralist america.
the second element of Brown’s consummate americanism is his refusal 
to recognize “unjust human laws” and his resistance to them. here thoreau 
praises a certain moral perceptiveness that, when extricated from its reli-
gious context, displays a Socratic excellence. american citizenship requires 
resistance to the all-too-common conflation of legal and political authority 
with moral authority.33 in monarchical regimes that claimed divine sanc-
tion for the laws and justified themselves through the doctrine of divine 
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right, this precise conflation occurred in the minds of both the monarch 
and the populace. the rise of social-contract theory, however, demystified 
legal and political authority and separated them from moral authority. Still, 
postmonarchical peoples have not fully recovered from the habit of seeing 
laws as having their own morality by mere virtue of the fact that they are 
laws. yet Brown sees moral justice and earthly law as separate entities that 
frequently contradict each other. Moreover, Brown separates himself from 
idle abolitionists by taking the obligation to resist injustice so seriously that 
he resists it actively. in contrast to thoreau himself, whose resistance to 
the Mexican War took the form of noncooperation, Brown resists the slave 
regime by positively facilitating slavery’s destruction.
after praising Brown’s active resistance of unjust laws, thoreau writes, 
“For once we are lifted out of the trivialness and dust of politics into the 
region of truth and manhood.” at first it seems that thoreau is rebuking 
politics in favor of truth. But there is an alternative reading. Rather than 
rebuking politics carte blanche, thoreau is pointing out how the politics of 
slavery in the united States compromises truth’s pursuit. debate over the 
morality of slavery is resisted. Far too often, defenders of slavery preempt 
a discussion of its moral dimension by asserting its constitutionality. the 
truth-evading tendencies of the slave regime find their way into institutional 
practices: Congress’s gag rule on anti-slavery petitions, for instance, or the 
Fugitive Slave Law’s provision for twice the fee for federal commissioners 
who sent alleged runaways back into slavery instead of setting them free.34 
When politics evades the slavery question, when it postpones decision on 
slavery’s morality through compromise after compromise, politics becomes 
trivial. the trivialness of politics entails costs not only to morality but also 
to democratic character: moral evasion both necessitates and intensifies the 
dulling of the moral senses, the atrophy of the critical capacities neces-
sary for democratic citizenship. But notice that thoreau ascribes not only 
“trivialness” but also “dust” to current politics. is thoreau’s equation of 
politics and dust mere rhetorical flourish? Or is he saying something more 
substantive about politics in pre-emancipation america? Would it go too 
far to suggest that dust is a figure for death and that thoreau is portraying 
politics divorced from ideals and principles as a form of death?
Recall the significance of dust in the Bible. although god initially 
makes man from dust, dust takes on a fatal meaning when adam and Eve 
defy his authority. For “dust thou art,” god declares, “and unto dust shalt 
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thou return.”35 the trope recurs throughout the Old testament, especially 
dramatically in Ecclesiastes: “all go unto one place . . . all turn to dust 
again.”36 dust is time, mortality, and contingency, and it opposes eternity, 
immortality, and truth. perhaps we can interpret thoreau’s equation of 
amoral politics with death as an expression of his sense that amoral politics 
is a second Fall, an expression of power without principle that widens the 
gap between time and eternity.37
yet the equation of death and politics also operates on a more local 
register. indeed, the political sanction of slavery in the united States had 
mortal consequences. the slave who resisted his slavery risked physical 
death at the hands of his master, with no protection or redress from the 
state. the slave who submitted to his slavery risked spiritual death, a resig-
nation to suffering so great that he imperiled his capacity to assert freedom. 
any politics that refuses to confront the immorality of slavery is thus not 
only anemic but also complicit in the physical and spiritual death wrought 
by the slave system. nowhere does thoreau confront the relays between 
pre-emancipation politics and death more powerfully than in the following 
passage in which the slave ship stands for the ship of state:
the slave-ship is on her way, crowded with its dying victims; new cargoes 
are being added in mid ocean; a small crew of slaveholders, countenanced 
by a large body of passengers, is smothering four millions under the hatches, 
and yet the politician asserts that the only proper way by which deliverance 
is to be obtained, is by “the quiet diffusion of the sentiments of humanity,” 
without any “outbreak.” as if the sentiments of humanity were ever found 
unaccompanied by its deeds, and you could disperse them, all finished to 
order, the pure article, as easily as water with a watering-pot, and so lay the 
dust. What is that that i hear cast overboard? the bodies of the dead that 
have found deliverance. that is the way we are “diffusing” humanity, and its 
sentiments with it. (“plea,” 124)
thoreau suggests that whether its representatives will admit it or not, the 
american state contains four million slaves in the hull and countless others 
in the wake. although the small crew is most directly responsible for the 
ship’s course and operation, the large body of passengers has the power to 
overtake the crew, open the hatches, and let the slaves rise to the deck, yet 
it does not exercise it. One interesting aspect of the metaphor is that the 
liberation of the slaves requires activity and not merely passive resistance 
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on the part of the passengers. presumably the crew already controls the 
ship’s course, supplies, and rations, making passive resistance by the pas-
sengers insufficient to the task of freeing the slaves in the hold. yet the 
passage as a whole is unmistakably condemnatory, suggesting that thoreau 
now thinks passive resistance so inadequate to the evil of slavery as to be 
frivolously self-indulgent. passive resistance is no longer enough to eradicate 
complicity, and if the eradication of complicity is morally imperative, then 
action becomes the order of the day. insofar as americans postpone action, 
however, they facilitate the varieties of death that constitute racial slavery, 
silently assisting in the casting of humanity overboard.
thoreau thus calls on americans to recognize their own complicity in 
slavery and seize the moment for abolition. if one takes seriously the third 
element of Brown’s consummate americanism—a stance for the dignity 
of human nature—the recognition of such complicity should follow. a test 
of one’s respect for human dignity is the extent to which one interrogates 
oneself to see whether one is complicit in the suffering of others. a further 
and more important test is the extent to which one seeks to effect positive 
change after discovering one’s complicity. Respect for human dignity, by this 
view, entails not only sensitivity to the suffering of others and a cultivated 
disposition to relieve it but also the refusal to fool oneself, the determination 
to militate against those distancing mechanisms in the human psyche that 
allow us to evade moral responsibility for the bodies and souls of others.
But the sense of responsibility that follows from such self-interrogation 
has an outlet insofar as one realizes the fourth element of Brown’s consum-
mate americanism—the confidence that the individual is “the equal of 
any and all governments.” in realizing this, the individual’s moral agency 
becomes commensurate with her moral responsibility. to see oneself as 
“the equal of any and all governments” is to revive one’s sense of the funda-
mental role of individual consent and conscience in the life and legitimacy 
of democracy, to accept one’s part as an ultimate constituent of democratic 
governance and a final judge of state law, policy, and action. Brown’s consum-
mate americanism encourages political action by fostering an awareness of 
oneself as potentially and legitimately agent,38 a belief that one has the right 
to act against the government and not merely be acted upon. thoreau and 
Brown renew our sense that we are not only free to shape the future of the 
polity but sometimes obliged to do so.
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The Question of Violence
thoreau’s exaltation of Brown as a consummate american has its compli-
cations. Brown’s effort to liberate america’s slaves depended on violence, 
which raises the question of whether his effort to impose morality entailed 
immorality. Brown believed in Old testament justice and admired paul’s 
Epistle to the hebrews, which said, “almost all things are by the law purged 
with blood; and without shedding of blood [there] is no remission [of sin].”39 
Brown’s and thoreau’s comfort with the use of violence, however, may be 
more philosophically nuanced than its Old testament connotations sug-
gest. although Brown did not use the language of political theory to justify 
himself—that is, terms such as active resistance or revolutionary violence—
he used one term at his sentencing that may encapsulate a philosophical 
defense.
Recall that at his sentencing Brown said, “i believe that to have inter-
fered as i have done in behalf of [god’s] despised poor, was not wrong, but 
right.”40 the operative word is interfere. What does the use of this word im-
ply? perhaps it is the sense that it is not violence but interference that is the 
defining moment of slave liberation. More precisely, the defining moment is 
when the liberator—literally or figuratively—stands between the slave and 
his master and enables the slave to walk into freedom. the master then has 
the choice either to resist the liberation with violence or to let the slave go. 
From the liberator’s perspective, the slaveholder has no right to resist the 
slave’s liberation due to the evil of slavery itself. if, however, the slaveholder 
does resist, both the liberator and the slave have the right to use violence 
to ensure liberation; for the slave, it is tantamount to self-defense, and for 
the liberator, it is tantamount to aiding someone who acts in self-defense. 
Violence, therefore, is only consequential and is not itself integral to the act 
of liberation. and if violence is a consequence, it is a consequence brought 
on by the slaveholder himself.41
Whether or not this conjectured theory of interference accurately 
reconstructs Brown’s thinking on the matter, passages from the “plea” sug-
gest that it does accurately reconstruct thoreau’s: “it was [Brown’s] peculiar 
doctrine that a man has a perfect right to interfere by force with the slave-
holder, in order to rescue the slave. i agree with him” (132). Elsewhere in the 
“plea,” thoreau shows that he understands interference precisely to mean 
to “step” or “stand” between oppressor and oppressed, enabling the latter to 
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claim his rightful freedom (132, 129).42 thoreau also explicitly defends one 
of the theory’s essential presuppositions—that one must judge the moral 
acceptability of violence by a standard of natural morality and not positive 
law. Scathingly he derides those who object to Brown’s raid out of reflexive 
alarm at the idea of men employing violence without law’s sanction, those 
who “think that the only righteous use that can be made of Sharps’ rifles 
and revolvers is . . . to hunt indians, or shoot fugitive slaves” (133). to those 
repulsed by the killing of slaveholders, thoreau remarks, “they who are 
continually shocked by slavery have some right to be shocked by the violent 
death of the slaveholder, but no others. Such will be more shocked by his 
life than by his death” (132–33).
May liberators use violence to occasion interference? in other words, 
may liberators use violence in the course of standing between the slave-
holder and the slave? Like most moral matters, it depends on specifics. a 
liberator may use violence, for example, to overcome an overseer guarding 
a slave quarters. in this case, the overseer is guarding against both the 
slaves’ escape and the liberator’s interference and thus is preemptively using 
violence or the threat of violence to maintain an injustice. in such cases, 
the liberator may use violence preemptively, but only if he can confidently 
assume his interference would be violently resisted.
May liberators wound or kill the guards at a federal armory to seize 
weapons for a slave insurrection? Strictly speaking, the theory of interfer-
ence would not justify this. the guards of the armory keep government 
weapons, not slaves, and thus are too far removed from the actual captivity 
of slaves for their killing to be easily justified. But what if a liberator could 
confidently assume that the armory’s weapons would be used to put down 
a legitimate insurrection against slavery? One could interpret the theory 
of interference as justifying an attack on the armory in this instance, for it 
would be a case of liberators “standing between” the slaves’ fight for free-
dom and the political apparatus that enforces the slaveholders’ alleged right 
to property in men and women. the theory of interference blends into a 
right to revolution. as thoreau says in the “plea”:
When a government puts forth its strength on the side of injustice, as ours to 
maintain Slavery and kill the liberators of the slave, it reveals itself a merely 
brute force, or worse, a demoniacal force. . . . it is more manifest than ever 
that tyranny rules. . . . there sits a tyrant holding fettered four millions of 
slaves; here comes their heroic liberator. this most hypocritical and diabolical 
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government looks up from its seat on the gasping four millions, and inquires 
with an assumption of innocence: “What do you assault me for? am i not an 
honest man? Cease agitation on this subject, or i will make a slave of you, too, 
or else hang you.” (129)
When a government “puts forth its strength on the side of injustice,” it 
diminishes its claim to recognition. thoreau denounces the u.S. govern-
ment as a tyranny precisely because it puts the force of, say, the arsenal at 
harpers Ferry on the side of the slaveholder instead of the slave. thoreau 
pronounces his view of the right to revolution in “Resistance”:
all men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance 
to and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great 
and unendurable. . . . if one were to tell me that this was a bad government 
because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most 
probable that i should not make an ado about it. . . . all machines have their 
friction. . . . But when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression 
and robbery are organized, i say, let us not have a machine any longer. in 
other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken 
to be the refuge of liberty are slaves . . . i think that it is not too soon for 
honest men to rebel and revolutionize. (67)
When the government becomes a gross abettor of injustice—when it or-
ganizes rather than outlaws the “oppression and robbery” that are racial 
slavery—it loses its claim to respect.43
thoreau states his final analysis on the question of violence toward 
the end of the “plea”: “i do not wish to kill nor to be killed, but i can 
foresee circumstances in which both would be by me unavoidable. We 
preserve the so-called ‘peace’ of our community by deeds of petty violence 
every day” (133). thoreau sees violence as deeply interwoven in the fabric 
of american society, perhaps even all societies. the proof lies in everyday 
sights: “the policeman’s billy . . . the jail . . . the gallows . . . the chaplain 
of the regiment” (“plea,” 133). yet in the american polity these everyday 
sights of violence are doubly significant: they point to a larger violence that 
constitutes the national polity. the so-called peace between the north and 
South is preserved by the former’s acquiescence in the maintenance of the 
latter’s slave system.44 the white north guarantees military assistance to 
the white South in cases of slave insurrection and agrees to capture and 
return all fugitive slaves; in return, the South promises union, tranquility, 
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and commerce. the price of peace is therefore northern agreement to act 
violently against slaves on occasions of rebellion or escape.45 “the united 
States have a coffle of four millions of slaves . . . and Massachusetts is one 
of the confederated overseers,” thoreau declares (“plea,” 130). he refuses, 
however, to comply with this violence just by virtue of its political constitu-
tionality. as a citizen not of the nation but of the world, he will judge the ap-
propriateness of government action. if the government’s violence threatens 
his life and liberty or the life and liberty of others, he will resist, violently if 
necessary. thus thoreau implies a contingent willingness to kill or be killed 
when forced by his government to assist, for example, in the suppression of 
a slave insurrection.
thoreau’s views on violence demonstrate the vigor of his conceptions of 
individual judgment and agency. Because they upend conventional reform-
ist inhibitions—such as the need to work within established institutions 
and the commitment to nonviolence—he expands the scope of conceivable 
human action and equalizes the power of the individual with that of the 
state by ending the latter’s monopoly on legitimate violence. Confrontation 
with institutional injustice becomes viable, not only because the people 
have legitimate recourse to violent means but also because such recourse 
weakens the state’s ability to intimidate the public and make its own power 
seem inexorable. democratizing the power to judge the legitimacy of 
violent resistance is inescapably hazardous, but it is also a cornerstone of 
liberal self-government, for it limits the state’s ability to impose itself on the 
citizenry without adequate justification and therefore chastens the state to 
stay within its bounds.
Knowing How to Die
decrying the united States as a tyranny, thoreau shows outrage toward 
his government’s pretensions of innocence. Mockingly, he imagines and 
impersonates the government’s response to Brown, his followers, and his 
sympathizers: “‘What do you assault me for? am i not an honest man?’” 
(“plea,” 129). part of what enrages thoreau is the willful self-deceit he sees 
not only in individual political leaders but also among his fellow citizens. 
We all bear some measure of responsibility for the suffering of the slave, he 
suggests, for we all tolerate the government that enforces the slaveholders’ 
“right.” the “plea for Captain John Brown” is thus a natural continuation 
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of his earlier anti-slavery works “Resistance to Civil government” and 
“Slavery in Massachusetts” (1854).46 the “plea,” however, goes to new and 
more powerful extremes. Like the earlier works, “plea” reminds its readers 
that insofar as they tolerate an immoral institution for the sake of political 
unity and civil peace, they enslave their consciences and thus themselves. 
thoreau nicely captures this idea when, in his impersonation of the govern-
ment, he says, “Cease agitation on this subject, or i will make a slave of you, 
too, or else hang you” (“plea,” 129). What is ironic about the government’s 
ultimatum is that the choice it offers is barely a choice: individuals must 
choose between the enslavement of their bodies and the enslavement of 
their minds. how is it possible not to be a slave in these circumstances? the 
answer, says thoreau, is by knowing how to die.
When the government issues its ultimatum to the individual, it offers 
not two but three choices: (1) cease agitation, (2) become a slave, or (3) 
be hung. in choosing among mental enslavement, bodily enslavement, and 
death, most people consider the first two alternatives the only viable ones, 
and most of the time, they choose the first to avoid the humiliation that 
comes with the second. But for thoreau, enslavement of the mind is even 
less becoming the democratic individual than enslavement of the body. 
at the same time, he does not urge his fellow citizens to choose physical 
slavery over mental slavery but rather to reject both. When faced with the 
ultimatum—an ultimatum that in many ways encapsulates the idea of sov-
ereignty to which rights-based individualism is hostile—thoreau urges his 
fellow citizens to follow John Brown and choose death over enslavement of 
either kind. Of Brown’s raid, he says:
this event advertises me that there is such a fact as death,—the possibility of 
a man’s dying. it seems as if no man had ever died in america before, for in 
order to die you must first have lived. i don’t believe in the hearses and palls 
and funerals that they have had. there was no death in the case, because 
there had been no life. . . . i hear a good many pretend that they are going 
to die;—or that they have died. . . . nonsense! i’ll defy them to do it. they 
haven’t got life enough in them. . . . Only a half dozen or so have died since the 
world began. . . . But be sure you do die, nevertheless. do your work, and fin-
ish it.47 if you know how to begin, you will know when to end. (“plea,” 134)
here thoreau relates the task of dying to the task of leading a purposeful 
life. in his eyes, Brown led such a life because he chose intellectual and 
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moral integrity over mortal longevity. thoreau appreciates the extent to 
which the choice of moral principle over mortal life shakes the foundations 
of the state, for it denies the state the basic means of instilling docility 
in subjects: the threat of death. thus Socrates, Jesus, and John Brown— 
three men whose integrity and moral vision their polities could not safely 
countenance—all have to count in thoreau’s unnamed “half dozen or so 
[that] have died since the world began,” for all three suffered public deaths 
that were part and parcel of their public lives. in thoreau’s words, they 
were men who “in teaching us how to die, have at the same time taught us 
how to live” (“plea,” 134).
thoreau’s idea of “purposeful death” enhances his conceptions of hu-
man agency and action. thus he bids his neighbors, “be sure you do die, 
nevertheless. do your work and finish it. if you know how to begin, you will 
know when to end.” this rhetorical conflation of endings and beginnings 
subtly suggests that a mortal ending can constitute an ethical or political 
beginning. thoreau suspects that the end of Brown’s life has the potential 
to spawn a new american beginning—of intensified national discussion of 
slavery and its hostility to democracy, of escalated conflict between the sec-
tions and within them, of a public enlivened with renewed moral seriousness 
and passion. Brown’s actions could initiate a national political awakening. 
What americans will do with their newfound wakefulness is unknown, but 
the possibilities are interesting. arendt is better known than thoreau for 
equating action with beginning: through action, she says, humans interrupt 
the natural process of mortality, the inevitable course of biological decay, 
and remind themselves that “though they must die, [humans] are not born 
in order to die but in order to begin.”48 When death is but the result of decay, 
the individual succumbs to the biological life process, failing to transcend 
it. But when the individual dies in the active pursuit of a public good and 
ideal end, she rises above the biological process onto the stage of human 
affairs and opens the possibility that her end—through its purposefulness, 
publicity, and potentially inspirational quality—can be a beginning.49
thoreau’s call to purposeful death and purposeful life is thus both ex-
istential and moral. it is also political insofar as it enables the only form of 
political incorporation thoreau finds morally acceptable—a “corporation of 
conscientious men” (“Resistance,” 65). although Socrates, Jesus, and Brown 
are the exemplars of purposeful life culminating in purposeful death, it is 
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unfair to say that thoreau expects each of his fellow citizens to act in kind. 
thoreau’s humbler and more abiding hope is to loosen the human attach-
ment to the mortal and the material and to inspire his fellow citizens to take 
themselves seriously enough to place the ethical at the center of their lives. 
thoreau states his moral and political aim in desperate terms when he says, 
“We aspire to be something more than stupid and timid chattels, pretending 
to read history and our bibles, but desecrating every house and every day 
we breathe in” (“plea,” 117). Or, as he writes more exaltedly in “Resistance 
to Civil government,” “action from principle,—the perception and perfor-
mance of right,—changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary, 
and does not consist wholly with anything which was. it not only divides 
states and churches, it divides families; ay, it divides the individual, separat-
ing the diabolical in him from the divine” (72). Moral action is the pinnacle 
of conscious living because it requires the successful exercise of one’s ability 
to perceive right, the formation of an intention to act accordingly, and the 
successful translation of that intention into action over and against one’s baser 
instincts. Moral action consummates self-mastery in one particular worldly 
moment and leaves a mark—thus its quality of being “essentially revolution-
ary.” the revolution occurs in the individual who grows stronger each time 
she triumphs (to paraphrase Lincoln) over the lesser angels of her nature. 
the revolution also occurs in the world, since moral action defies commonly 
accepted but essentially immoral conventions. in moral action one can “im-
prove the nick of time, and notch it on [one’s] stick . . . [one can] stand on 
the meeting of two eternities, the past and the future, which is precisely the 
present moment.”50 Moral action marks the present by departing from the 
habits of the past as well as by excluding crude calculations of future utility.51 
to live by any precept other than “action from principle,—the perception 
and performance of right” is thus to forgo one’s chance and renounce one’s 
ability to act on the world in the noblest and most definitively human way. 
Morally consequential action from anything other than moral principle 
desecrates the human condition, thoreau insists. But does his vindication of 
action from principle open into a vindication of politics?
Performing Conscience
thoreau values and encourages public acts that take a stand for moral right 
against immoral law and spark wonder in their audience at the powers of 
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individual agency, especially moral agency. thoreau himself felt moral awe 
at Brown’s words and deeds and despaired when his neighbors did not feel 
the same. But insofar as his neighbors felt an aesthetic awe in the face of 
Brown’s actions, hope was not lost for their conversion to a morally apprecia-
tive view of him. What i mean by aesthetic awe is the sense of having one’s 
imagination captured by a story, spectacle, or scene, notwithstanding one’s 
negative or positive judgment of its moral nature. aesthetic awe is the state 
of having one’s attention held by an object. the moral and political value of 
Brown’s act derived not simply from its aim of liberating the slaves, which 
it ultimately failed to achieve, but additionally from the spectacular way it 
demonstrated conscientious moral commitment. the act’s aesthetic quality 
enabled it to hold the attention of the public even in the face of reflexive 
condemnation by political authority and majority opinion. But because it 
remained a focal point of public consideration—precisely because the act 
was vivid and gripping—it enabled thinkers like thoreau to use it as a pivot 
for public moral conversation. thoreau could seize upon the aesthetic awe 
Brown’s action provoked and attempt to transform it into moral apprecia-
tion. throughout the “plea” thoreau translates what appear to be Brown’s 
madness and vanity into evidence of virtue, and through his comparison 
of Brown to Christ, he suggests that the practice of virtue always appears 
vain and mad in the eyes of a corrupt society (“plea,” 129–30, 136–37). 
thoreau works in the “plea” to make Brown morally comprehensible, and 
he believes that if his audience can see through Brown’s initial strangeness 
and recognize his moral qualities, this very act of reinterpretation will both 
signal and accelerate a transformation of their moral natures.
the primary value of Brown’s action in thoreau’s mind was therefore 
not instrumental but instructional.52 in “the Last days of John Brown” 
(1860), a lecture read nine months after the “plea,” thoreau insists that 
the memory of Brown instructed americans how to be transcendentalists, 
how to live for principle.53 “he has liberated many thousands of slaves, both 
north and South,” thoreau declared. “they seem to have known nothing 
about living or dying for a principle,” but now they have witnessed it in 
spectacular form (149). describing the effect the last six weeks of John 
Brown’s life had on the north, thoreau said:
the north, i mean the living north, was suddenly all transcendental. it went 
behind the human law . . . and recognized eternal justice and glory. Com-
monly, men live according to a formula, and are satisfied if the order of the 
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law is observed, but in this instance they, to some extent, returned to original 
perceptions. . . . they saw that what was called order was confusion, what was 
called justice, injustice, and that the best was deemed the worst. this attitude 
suggested a more intelligent and generous spirit than that which actuated our 
forefathers, and the possibility, in the course of ages, of a revolution in behalf 
of another and an oppressed people. (“Last days,” 147)
Forcing americans to consider the difference between earthly law and 
eternal justice, Brown catalyzed americans into critical thinking and com-
pelled them to consider the various ways that injustice masquerades as law 
and justice is made illegal.54 despite Brown’s neo-Calvinist faith and his 
conception of himself as an instrument of god, his example educated his 
countrymen in mature moral agency, in the readiness to brave moral choice 
and live according to educated moral perception rather than inherited legal 
formula. Moreover, Brown showed america how it could transcend the 
greatness of its founding generation and thus cease living in abject wor-
ship of it: whereas the Republic’s founders defended liberty and principle 
only on their own behalf, Brown defended them on behalf of a despised 
people. in so doing, he achieved a freedom greater than political freedom; 
he achieved moral freedom. he transcended the egoistic impulse to defend 
principle only when one’s own interests are at stake.
public action that expresses and inspires an individual’s recovery of 
moral agency is the form of political action thoreau admires most. it may 
be the only form of positive political action he would gladly endorse. there-
fore, it seems that for politics to be worthwhile, it must be politics in theatri-
cal form on a grand scale, politics as democratic morality tale, politics that 
puts individualist virtues on display.55 at the same time, the performance 
of conscience need not always be as preconceived as either Brown’s raid or 
thoreau’s “plea.” although thoreau did not initially intend his act of civil 
disobedience in 1846 to be a political performance, his decision to lecture 
and write about it converted this personal act of no-saying into a positively 
political act of self-exhibition; the self-exhibition became political as soon as 
thoreau sought to use his experience to influence the ethical and political 
dispositions of his fellow citizens.56 Conscientious refusal became public 
statement through the artistic re-creation of the act of refusal and public 
meditation on its significance. through art, thoreau converted conscience 
into politics. artists may feel reluctance about the politicization of their 
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endeavors, but insofar as art affects self and the constitution of self affects 
democratic politics, art inevitably contains political potential.57
Critics may argue that artistic and performative forms of public en-
gagement are not properly political because they precede the legislative 
processes and democratic institutions wherein policies are set and laws 
are made. Moreover, the violent form of Brown’s action flouted both the 
rule of law and the essential constitutional purpose of “insuring domestic 
tranquility,” making thoreau’s endorsement of a politics of spectacular 
performance suspect. yet thoreau believed that in a democracy, what man-
ner of selves we are ultimately determines the laws and policies we make 
(“Resistance,” 65, 89; “Slavery,” 98). Self-formation is therefore a political 
activity, and our humdrum civic spaces—town halls, town squares, the free 
press—are politically most powerful when they are venues for performa-
tive conscientious expression and thus potential sites for self-reformation. 
as for the hesitation we rightly feel about taking Brown’s raid as our text 
for determining the meaning of conscientious democratic citizenship, it is 
crucial to note that violence itself is not essential to any of the four elements 
of Brown’s consummate americanism: (1) valuation of the ideal over the 
corporeal, (2) the ability to perceive unjust laws and resistance to them, (3) 
a stance for the dignity of human nature, and (4) a belief that the individual 
is “the equal of any and all governments.” notwithstanding the fact that 
the first element overturns the hobbesian belief that the preservation of 
biological life is paramount, this does not have to lead to a devaluation of 
the lives of one’s political opponents; when joined with the third element, 
it can, in fact, promote a willingness to risk one’s life on behalf of others. 
Martin Luther King Jr. possessed all four elements of Brown’s consummate 
americanism, yet the devaluation of the corporeal encouraged him only to 
“lay his body down” for the rights of others.58 What is more, King sponsored 
a politics of performing conscience that provoked moral and aesthetic awe 
in his audiences while promoting the principle of nonviolence.59 although 
thoreau’s politics of performing conscience does not exclude violence, it 
does not need violence to be effective. the question of whether violence is 
permissible depends on whether all other means to defend the rights of oth-
ers have been exhausted. in thoreau’s judgment, John Brown’s raid came 
at a time when there was no hope of destroying american slavery except by 
bloodshed. Brown’s clear-eyed recognition of this fact, and of the obligation 
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it imposed on him to delay action no longer, won him thoreau’s admira-
tion. Brown’s performance of conscience with arms chastened thoreau into 
performing his with words; thoreau, in turn, hoped that words could make 
Brown into a model of liberal democratic idealism.60
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Thoreau is The paTron saint of the american tradition of civil dis­
obedience. i speak of an american tradition because this nation was born 
in virtue of what we all hold to be a legitimate rebellion against established 
authority—a rebellion legitimate according to the “laws of nature and of 
nature’s God.” “They only can force me,” writes Thoreau—referring to 
moral force as distinct from physical force—“who obey a higher law than 
i.” so saying, he invokes a tradition older even than the american, calling 
to mind the words of socrates to the court of athens in plato’s Apology of 
Socrates:
i should have done something terrible, o men of athens, if when the com­
manders whom you chose to command me, both at potidaea and at amphipo­
lis and at Delium, had stationed me, and i remained there like anybody else, 
and ran the risk of death, but when the God gave me a station, as i believed 
and supposed, commanding me to spend my life philosophizing, and examin­
ing myself and others, then i were to desert my post, whether through fear of 
death or anything else whatever.1
political philosophy, from socrates to Jefferson, taught that there is a prin­
ciple of obligation higher than that of the human authorities of political com­
munities and that in a conflict between the higher and the lower, the higher 
takes precedence. The american revolution was fought on the premise that 
such a precedence dissolved the obligations the rebellious colonists once 
owed to the British Crown and that the very right by which they withdrew 
their allegiance enfranchised them to institute a new government that “to 
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.” But is not 
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the same dissatisfaction the founding fathers of the american government 
felt with the British Crown a source of legitimacy for revolt against the gov­
ernment they founded, when dissatisfaction against it burgeons? Thoreau, 
like socrates, confronts what he believes to be an unjust democracy. Those 
who would abolish slavery ought not “wait till they constitute a majority of 
one,” he says. “i think it is enough if they have God on their side, without 
waiting for that other one.”2
Many americans today take pride in the fact that Thoreau was the 
acknowledged teacher of Gandhi and that the lessons learned by Martin 
Luther King from Gandhi are, in a sense, lessons come home to the land of 
their birth. Thoreau writes: 
Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. 
a minority is powerless when it conforms to the majority; it is not even a 
minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. if the 
alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the 
state will not hesitate which to choose.3
it is not difficult to discern in these words the inspiration of Montgomery 
and Birmingham and, ultimately, of the Civil rights acts of the 1960s. nor 
is it unlikely that these same words inspired many of the protesters against 
the Vietnam War. Thoreau has contributed phrases of undying eloquence 
to the cause of resistance to oppression, as well as a device of immeasurable 
political power in the technique of passive resistance. it is the work of this 
chapter to examine the import of some of these phrases, and of the tech­
nique, within the context of Thoreau’s thought. i also attempt to deepen 
our understanding of that thought by placing it within the context of the 
american political tradition from which it derives so much of its meaning. 
is “resistance to civil government,” as Thoreau propounds it, an instrument 
more likely to be serviceable to good causes than to bad? There is no good 
thing that cannot be misused, but how good a thing is Thoreau’s teaching in 
“Civil Disobedience”?
The essay begins by Thoreau “heartily” accepting the motto, “That govern­
ment is best which governs least.” “Carried out,” he continues, “it finally 
amounts to this, which also i believe,—‘That government is best which 
governs not at all.’”4 But a little later, Thoreau says he speaks “practically, 
and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no­government men.” 
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in that capacity he asks for “not at once no government, but at once a bet­
ter government.” “Let every man,” he continues, “make known what kind of 
government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward 
obtaining it.”5 is Thoreau an anarchist? if so, in what sense? Does he think of 
anarchy as the best condition of human society, but to be obtained only at the 
end of a kind of evolutionary process, as did many other nineteenth­century 
thinkers, including Karl Marx? or does he think of anarchy as an ever­present 
positive force, always existing side by side with government and from time to 
time interfering with government to compel the abandonment of some of its 
evils? There can be no question but that the best human condition, according 
to Thoreau, is one in which there is no coercive power of man over man and 
the work of society is carried on by voluntary cooperation. That is the kind of 
“government” men will have “when they are prepared for it.”
There is a similarity between Thoreau’s attitude toward government 
and st. paul’s toward marriage: both institutions are seen as lesser evils 
necessitated by the blind strength of human passions. (Thoreau, inciden­
tally, remained celibate throughout his life; one wonders whether the views 
expressed in Walden could have been held by a man for whom the mar­
ried state was a vocation.) one might address a similar question to paul 
and Thoreau: is the Kingdom of heaven—or the best government which 
governs not at all—only within each man, as a higher standard by which the 
superior are to govern themselves and judge and admonish others? or is it 
something objectively to be fulfilled here, in a messianic era yet to come?
in the peroration of abraham Lincoln’s “Temperance address,” given 
on Washington’s birthday 1842, we can see the extent to which the pauline 
conception of the Kingdom of heaven had entered the utopian thought 
of the time and had made utopian ends the direct aim of political reform 
movements:
and what a noble ally is this [the temperance revolution], to the cause of 
political freedom. With such an aid, its march cannot fail to be on and on, till 
every son of earth shall drink in rich fruition, the sorrow­quenching draughts 
of perfect liberty. happy day, when, all appetites controlled, all passions sub­
dued, all matters subjected, mind, all conquering mind, shall live and move 
the monarch of the world.6
Lincoln himself privately mocked this utopianism and was distressed at the 
fanaticism it implied. But there can be no doubt that such utopianism and 
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fanaticism motivated much of the nineteenth­century reform movements, 
radical abolitionism and temperance prominent among them. nor can there 
be much doubt that Thoreau was among those who believed that such a 
vision of the absolutely best human condition constituted the true principle 
of political action. Walden is above all a political work, devoted to showing 
how the life according to nature is a life of emancipation from superfluous 
desires (and hence from government) and therefore one that eliminates the 
causes both of war and of slavery.
James Madison in Federalist no. 51, when he considers that such 
constitutional devices as separation of powers rely on base human motives, 
observes: 
it may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary 
to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the 
greatest of all reflections on human nature? if men were angels, no govern­
ment would be necessary. if angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary.7
We thus see a kind of agreement between Thoreau and Madison (as well as 
with Marx) that government is an evil. But for Madison, it must always be a 
necessary evil, while for Thoreau (as for Marx), it is an evil that the progress 
of mankind must eventually make superfluous. Thoreau’s man of conscience 
leads the way toward “no government,” no less than Marx’s proletariat leads 
the way toward the classless society and the withering away of the state.
having exhorted every man to make known what kind of government 
would command his respect—a strange exhortation, considering the high 
respect in which slavery was held by so many of his fellow citizens—Thoreau 
proceeds to let it be known that the government commanding his respect 
is one in which not majorities but conscience decides. “Can there not,” he 
asks, “be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and 
wrong, but conscience? . . . Must the citizen ever for a moment . . . resign 
his conscience to the legislator?”8 Thoreau here strangely confuses the ac­
ceptance of majority rule with the abdication of conscience—a confusion 
made plausible by his belief that it is the function of majorities (or, a fortiori, 
any government) to decide right and wrong. But the function of government 
in the american political tradition has always been that of deciding how 
to secure (or implement) certain rights—to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. The existence of these rights, as we all know, is regarded as a 
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self­evident truth, so there can be no question whether one is conscientious 
in seeking their fulfillment.
it is widely held, moreover, that matters of conscience, properly so 
called, are beyond the province of government. Jefferson, in Query XVii of 
Notes on Virginia, writes: 
The error seems not sufficiently eradicated, that the operations of the mind, 
as well as the acts of the body, are subject to the coercion of the laws. But our 
rulers can have no authority over such natural rights, only as we have submit­
ted to them. The rights of conscience we have never submitted, we could not 
submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of 
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.9
Thus the traditional understanding of conscience refers primarily, though 
not exclusively, to opinions as distinct from actions and to our relations with 
God rather than with men. Government, from this perspective, is first of all 
a means whereby we provide ourselves with security against injury, whether 
from enemies abroad or criminals at home. For this there must be collective 
action and, therefore, government.
The anarchist, of course, denies that collective self­defense is a true 
necessity of human life. For him, the motives that cause men to commit 
aggression against other men are themselves caused, directly or indirectly, 
by government. To abolish the need for police and armed forces, one must 
abolish police and armed forces. This is certainly the inference to be drawn 
from the famous lines on soldiers in “Civil Disobedience”:
now what are they? Men at all? or small moveable forts and magazines, at 
the service of some unscrupulous man in power? . . . such command no more 
respect than men of straw, or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth 
only as horses and dogs.10
There is no suggestion here that armed force is sometimes necessary to 
protect the innocent from malefactors. The view that government—and its 
ultimate expression in armed force—is dehumanizing has as its corollary 
the view that man by nature, man apart from government, is good. But 
for those who believe that the requirement of armed protection is a conse­
quence of human nature, the adoption of such protection cannot be intrin­
sically hostile to the demands of conscience, however grave the problems of 
conscience that arise because of it.
To abide by majority rule does not mean resigning our consciences. it 
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means, rather, that we have, as citizens, surrendered our natural freedom 
to act independently so that we may have the cooperation of other men 
who have equally surrendered their natural freedom to act independently. 
We have made a bargain with others, and as honest men, we have a duty to 
keep that bargain—so long as good faith is kept with us. Jefferson, in the 
Declaration of independence, in his indictment of the British Crown, gives 
a detailed argument why the american people are conscientious in dissolv­
ing their political bonds with Great Britain. Whether good faith is indeed 
being kept with us—whether the “us” be a majority or a minority—seems a 
large enough political sphere for conscience, without conscience usurping 
the whole province of law and government, as Thoreau demands.
But why, it may be asked, should the majority principle be the one to 
decide the common concerns of fellow citizens? The answer is that unanim­
ity is impossible, and the majority principle is the only direct reflection of 
the original equality of natural rights of the members of the political asso­
ciation. it is not the case that the majority are permitted to rule because, as 
Thoreau says, “they are physically the strongest.” That would be necessarily 
true only if all men were equal in physical strength, which they are not. 
it is the equality of natural right that supplies the moral ground of the 
majority principle. in the last paragraph of the essay, Thoreau says, “There 
will never be a really free and enlightened state, until the state comes to 
recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all 
its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly.” But 
the principle of the equality of all men and its corollary, the requirement 
of the consent of the governed, affirmed in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, mean precisely that. however imperfectly the united states may 
have implemented these principles, their recognition constituted an epoch 
in the history of the world, and Thoreau seems not to appreciate that fact at 
all. What Thoreau seems to want is a “state” in which nothing is ever done 
without the concurrence of every single member. But were such a state pos­
sible, it would be unnecessary. such agreement could prevail only among 
angels—and were men angels, government would be unnecessary.
Majority rule is a necessary but by no means a sufficient substitute for 
unanimity. The Constitution is a massive device for instilling qualitative 
safeguards into the practical operation of the quantitative rule of the major­
ity. Thoreau’s strictures against majority rule are related to his greater scorn 
for the Constitution.
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Thoreau denies that there is any general duty to obey law. “The only 
obligation which i have a right to assume,” he says, “is to do at any time what 
i think right.”11 in one sense, of course, that is a mere truism. But most of 
us think it is usually right to obey the law, without considering in every 
instance whether the law squares with the dictates of conscience apart from 
law. For example, one might read the transcript of a criminal trial and con­
scientiously disagree with the verdict of the jury, but this does not impose 
a duty to do violence to that verdict or to overthrow the jury system. one 
might still think, as most of us do, that the jury system, with all its faults, is 
the best system possible, in an imperfect world, for administering criminal 
justice. Moreover, the view that there is a general obligation of obedience 
to law does not forbid us to participate in revolution against an established 
government, nor does it forbid us to disobey a particular lawful enactment 
even in a regime we regard as just. according to Thoreau, however, the 
very presence of conscience requires the disavowal of every presumption in 
favor of law as a guide to human behavior. Conscience and law, as used by 
Thoreau, are simply incompatible.
“it is truly enough said,” declares Thoreau, “that a corporation has no 
conscience; but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation with 
a conscience. Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of 
their respect for it, even the well disposed are daily made agents of injus­
tice.”12 in his desire to have conscience abolish both law and government 
from a good society, Thoreau distinguishes a corporation of conscientious 
men, a corporation with a conscience, from a corporate conscience. But is 
it a distinction that corresponds with any real difference? For example, if 
men engage their faith to each other—as fellow citizens are supposed to 
do—that if one is attacked the others will come to his defense, do they not, 
for certain purposes, thereby constitute a corporation? and is it not a suf­
ficiently conscientious corporation by the mere fact that it exists (if it really 
does) to implement the natural right of every man to defend himself? Do 
we not properly distinguish the principle of such a corporation from that of 
one like a pirate ship or a pirate nation, which associates for the sake of col­
lective aggression on the rights of others? Does not respect for law, in the 
first instance, imply respect for civil society, properly so called, as distinct 
from a band of robbers? although we may call by the name of “law” the 
collective rules of any regime, it belongs of right to those regimes that are 
directed, however imperfectly, to lawful ends. Thoreau’s characterization 
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of the “state” as a kind of abstract entity, indifferent to the different ends 
among men and among collectivities of men, is an unreal abstraction from 
political life as we know it.
if there may be men who are conscientious, in the sense of being 
committed to one another for the lawful end of mutual protection, must 
they not have means to implement their agreement? how shall they decide 
each one’s contributions in money and in personal service to the cause of 
their common defense? Let us suppose their government is, for reasons 
already suggested, based on majority rule. Would it not be wrong to decide 
separately what each man—for example, henry David Thoreau—should 
pay? Might not even conscientious men in an assembly be influenced by 
Thoreau’s eccentricities to assess him more than his fair share? is it not bet­
ter to employ laws rather than decrees to levy taxes on classes rather than 
persons? is it not better, for example, to levy a sales tax to be paid by anyone 
who purchases, or an income tax to be paid at preestablished rates by any­
one with taxable income? similarly, is it not better that men be drafted into 
the armed services by rules laid down in advance, so far as possible, rather 
than at the pleasure even of a majority? Laws may not be perfect, and their 
practical administration may require some discretionary judgment, but the 
principle of law is that it is not a respecter of persons, and it thereby takes on 
an attribute of justice. The rule of the majority by law is better than major­
ity rule by discretion or decree. This connection between law and justice, 
and hence between law and conscience, seems never to be recognized by 
Thoreau. Thoreau’s doctrine of the supreme right of conscience not only is 
impractical, it also undermines the morality it purports to invoke.
Thoreau is far from being the isolated individualist his eloquence some­
times conjures. his teaching is, notwithstanding its exaggerations, in the 
main current of the popular political opinions of his day. The secret of his 
power may be explored in relation to the motto with which the essay “Civil 
Disobedience” begins. “That government is best which governs least” has 
echoed through the corridors of american history. When president John 
F. Kennedy, in his inaugural address in 1961, said that we should ask not 
what our country can do for us but what we can do for our country, he was 
evoking one implication of that aphorism. richard M. nixon more evidently 
evoked another when, in his speech accepting the republican nomination 
for the presidency in 1968, he said that america had grown great not be­
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cause of what government had done for the people but because of what the 
people had done for themselves. and so Thoreau writes: 
This government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the alacrity 
with which it got out of its way. It does not settle the West. It does not educate. 
The character inherent in the american people has done all that has been 
accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had 
not sometimes got in its way. . . . Trade and commerce, if they were not made 
of india rubber, would never manage to bounce over the obstacles which 
legislators are continually putting in their way.13
Thus we see Thoreau lending authority to those today regarded as being 
on the “right” of the political spectrum in their opposition to government 
interference with business or education, as we have seen him in a similar 
relationship to those regarded as being on the “left” in their opposition to 
the government’s use of armed force.
“That government is best which governs least” is commonly thought 
to have originated with Jefferson, although no one has ever found it among 
his writings. it seems to have first appeared as the motto of the United 
States Magazine and Democratic Review, a journal founded in 1837 at the 
very apogee of the Jacksonian movement and designed to strengthen and 
perpetuate the fighting faith of the party, now that the retirement of the 
hero was at hand. The first issue of the Review contains an essay explaining 
the principles of the editors and incorporating an extended explanation of 
the famous slogan. The main thrust of the essay is to strengthen faith in the 
mass of the people for self­government, while acknowledging that minori­
ties have rights that are not always recognized by majorities “flushed with 
triumph and impelled with strong interests.” But the conflict between the 
majority and minority rights is not, the essayist holds, intrinsic to democ­
racy; the conflict arises from an imperfect understanding of its true theory. 
Democratic republics have hitherto, he says, been
administered on ideas and in a spirit borrowed from strong governments of 
the other forms. . . . it is under the word government that the subtle danger 
lurks. understood as a central consolidated power, managing and directing 
the various interests of the society, all government is evil, and the parent of 
evil. a strong and active government . . . is an evil, differing only in degree 
and mode of operation, and not in nature from a strong despotism.14
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Then he declares, “The best government is that which governs least.” The 
grand reason is that “no human depositaries can, with safety, be trusted 
with the power of legislation upon the general interests of society.”15 But if 
no human depositaries can be entrusted, how are the general interests of 
society to be attended to? The solution to this riddle can be found in a thesis 
closely resembling that of the famous “invisible hand” of adam smith. But 
now it has been generalized to include not only the marketplace but also 
society at large. indeed, the laws governing man in society are now seen as 
but particular applications of more general, universal laws. The principle 
of inertia in physics has its parallel in the voluntary principle of society. 
The sole necessary connection between the internal polity of society and of 
government is the administration of justice.
afford but [this] single nucleus . . . and, under the sure operation of this prin­
ciple, the floating atoms will distribute and combine themselves, as we see in 
the beautiful natural processes of crystallization, into a far more perfect and 
harmonious result than if government, with its “fostering hand” undertake to 
disturb, under the plea of directing, the process.16
it is apparent that Thoreau’s belief in the beneficence of human nature 
apart from government is a particular instance of a widespread nineteenth­
century conviction of the beneficence of nature in general, whose laws the 
progress of science was steadily revealing. The enlightened adaptation of 
man to nature will result from the diffusion of the knowledge of nature, 
and this diffusion will explode the superstitions that have so long enslaved 
men—among them the superstition that government has to organize and 
direct the general interests of society and coerce men to do what it is in 
their interest to do.
The eighteenth­century antecedent of this view may be seen in Thomas 
paine’s Rights of Man, published in 1791 with Jefferson’s endorsement. in 
chapter 1 of book 2, paine says:
Great part of that order which reigns among mankind is not the effect of 
Government, and would exist if the formality of Government was abolished. 
[it is the] mutual dependence and reciprocal interest which man has upon 
man, and all the parts of a civilized community upon each other. . . . The 
landholder, the farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant, the tradesman, and 
every occupation, prospers by the aid which each receives from the other, 
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and from the whole. . . . in fine, society performs for itself almost everything 
which is ascribed to Government.17
and again, “The more perfect civilization is, the less occasion it has for 
Government, because the more it does regulate its own affairs and govern 
itself.” one can reformulate paine’s thought into the Jacksonian dogma of 
Thoreau’s day by saying that civilization perfects itself in direct proportion 
to government’s being prevented from interfering with it; that the incentive 
to perfection is weakened or corrupted by the presence of government and 
strengthened in its absence.
The affinity of paine and Jefferson—at least as far as abstract theories 
are concerned—is well known. The struggle occasioned by the alien and 
sedition acts led to the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, which laid down 
the political dogmas that were to dominate american party rhetoric for the 
next two generations. “it would be a dangerous delusion,” wrote Jefferson 
in the Kentucky resolutions of 1798, “were a confidence in the men of our 
choice to silence our fears for the safety of our rights; that confidence is ev­
erywhere the parent of despotism—free government is founded in jealousy, 
and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes 
limited constitutions, to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with 
power.” With reference to the obnoxious alien act, Jefferson declaimed, 
“Let him say what the government is, if it be not a tyranny, which the men 
of our choice have conferred on our president, and the president of our 
choice assented to.”18 Thus is expressed in its classic form the Jeffersonian 
and Jacksonian creed that combines faith in the people with distrust of 
their representatives, especially in the government of the united states. 
after the victory of the republicans in 1800, this was further expressed 
in the memorable lines of Jefferson’s inaugural address, when he said that 
the “one thing more” needed to make us a happy and prosperous people 
was “a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring 
one another [and] shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own 
pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth 
of labor the bread it has earned.” “This,” said Jefferson, “is the sum of good 
government.”19
To this point, it might appear that Thoreau merely represents an ec­
centric radicalization of the Jeffersonian viewpoint that government is at 
best a necessary evil and that it is usually a great deal less necessary than 
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commonly supposed. But Jefferson, and Jackson after him, saw in the Con­
stitution the great ark of the covenant that restricts government as much as 
possible to its proper sphere. Thoreau, in contrast, holds the Constitution 
in contempt, as the very symbol of the law that causes men to abandon 
conscience. But even this difference is less in substance than in appearance. 
Jefferson and Jackson expressed their reverence not simply for the Constitu­
tion but for the Constitution very strictly construed, the Constitution as a 
device for limiting the sphere of government.
Jefferson and Jackson are today considered strong presidents, but they 
were strong presidents opposed in principle to active government. They 
saw themselves as tribunes of the people, protecting the people from the 
aristocratic corruptions of government. in his purchase of Louisiana, the 
crowning achievement of his presidency, Jefferson himself believed he had 
performed an action unauthorized by the Constitution. But he believed it 
to be something critically necessary to the safety of that severely limited 
form of government in which he so believed. Thus he confided not in the 
Constitution but in the people, who would ratify what he had done after 
the fact.
similarly, Jackson saw in his vetoes of bills for internal improvements 
and of the bill to recharter the Bank of the united states a vindication of 
the people against those who, equally with himself, were their constitutional 
representatives. Thus did the tribune, or the people’s champion, theory of 
the presidency originate, a conception of an office in some sense outside 
the Constitution whose exercise, even if in conflict with the letter of the 
Constitution, would enable the true Constitution to prevail.
Thus Thoreau’s call to civil disobedience is, at the least, an apolitical 
or anti­political analogue to Jefferson’s and Jackson’s supraconstitutional 
constitutionalism. Thoreau summons the phalanxes of the conscientious, 
enjoining the righteous to clog the machinery of government, to compel the 
“state” to give up war and slavery, even as Jefferson and Jackson acted in 
crises ultra vires, in defense of, and in the name of the people.
in the secularized radical protestantism of his day—the quasi­religious 
protestantism of unitarianism and transcendentalism—Thoreau’s individu­ 
alism, like emerson’s, is a species of antinomianism, seeing the individual 
under the grace of conscience emancipated from the lower law of the 
merely political order, and helping to elevate that order by defying it. it 
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is, i have argued, a kind of eccentric coordinate of the Jacksonian hero 
worship (Thoreau himself was an admirer of Carlyle), which saw its idol 
slaying the dragons of oligarchy and aristocracy. it was in full accord with 
the popular opinion of the day—and appealed to the prejudice in favor 
of that opinion—that government is something evil, while the people are 
essentially good.
Yet there was—and is—within the american political tradition another 
opinion, both popular and philosophical, that holds nearly the opposite. it is 
perhaps an oversimplification to say that the leading doctrines of the Federal­
ist papers were governed by the assumption that people are evil and govern­
ment is good. Both hamilton and Madison saw man apart from government 
as not in society or civilization but in a state of nature very like that described 
by hobbes. although the government they recommended differed widely 
from the monarchy preferred by hobbes, it was nonetheless conceived, like 
hobbes’s, mainly in terms of overcoming the ills of human nature, for which 
society, apart from good government, possessed no remedy.
Yet despite the formal opposition of these two great theses—the one 
insisting on human depravity by nature and the goodness of government, 
the other insisting on human goodness by nature and the inherent depravity 
of government—there is a point of agreement. i have already alluded to it in 
citing Madison’s aphorism that if men were angels, no government would be 
necessary. notwithstanding the Madisonian assumption that men cannot 
be angelic, there is a tacit admission that, in the best case imaginable—even 
if that case be impossible—there is no government. Madison thus makes a 
concession to human desire or aspiration going back at least as far as plato’s 
Republic. There, socrates, in constructing in speech the perfect city, asks 
to be excused from proving that what he proposes is possible and invites his 
interlocutors to consider, at first, only whether it is desirable.
Whether the Republic intends to set forth the human condition that 
is most desirable, even if impossible, or whether it intends to set forth the 
condition that is both most desirable and possible, we need not here inquire. 
suffice it to say that it has been taken in both senses within the tradition 
of the Christian West, and a form of platonism has motivated messianic 
reform movements within that tradition. Lincoln’s apocalyptic vision, in the 
“Temperance address,” of the perfect (albeit passionate) conquest of passion 
by reason is at once an evocation of the rule of philosopher­kings and of the 
rule of the Kingdom of God. it is curious that Lincoln refers to this perfect 
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regime as both the culmination of the political revolution based on equal 
human rights and the monarchy of all­conquering mind. This monarchy 
resembles that of the heavenly City promised by divine revelation, since it 
implies what is at once the perfection and the extinction of authority. The 
rule of love or pure reason or both transcends authority because it directs 
men toward what they above all desire. By abolishing all impediments to 
consummation, it is the perfection of liberty. But a state of perfect liberty, 
even if in accord with the dictates of authority, can no longer be understood 
as a state under authority. hence it must be a state of “no­government.”
in plato’s Republic, justice is defined as everyone doing only that work 
for which they are by nature best fitted. By doing that one work, one may 
carry to perfection the art of doing it well. one’s capacity for one’s work 
and one’s devotion to it may then be fully equal to each other. although the 
guardians, the ruling class, will be set over the shoemakers, they will not 
tell the shoemakers how to cobble. The Republic is essentially a community 
of craftsmen in perfect harmony because each craftsman abstains from the 
other’s craft. This abstention is assured by the very thing that makes each a 
craftsman: since the free practice of his own craft is the consuming passion 
of his soul, perfect cooperation is secured not by coercion but by the form 
of consciousness that makes one a craftsman. The harmony of the workman 
and his work ends the tension between private ends and the common good, 
thus ending everything today called “alienation.” The Republic, in this 
respect, is the ultimate source of those anarchist­syndicalist theories of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries that see in the voluntary cooperation of 
workers (or craftsmen or guilds) the solution to the problem of authority in 
society. This is the Republic seen as the perfection of its communism and 
egalitarianism of the sexes, prior to the introduction of the philosopher­
kings.
But in the Republic, one may recall, the rule of philosopher­kings is 
introduced not as an end but as a means of bringing into actual existence 
the perfect communist regime already sketched. By the nineteenth century, 
however, it seemed to many who had (however indirectly) accepted plato’s 
premise of the desirability of such a regime that its actualization might 
be easier than he had supposed and that, indeed, the abolition of private 
property and the introduction of equality of rights would be a sufficient 
condition for that actualization. implicit in this judgment, however, was the 
taking over of the role of philosophy by different aspects of modern science. 
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Modern craftsmanship has scientific know­how infused into it; philosophy 
in the form of modern science has descended from the clouds of sterile 
metaphysics and entered the cities as fruitful technology. Craftsmanship 
has indeed been subdivided now into capital and labor—capital embodying 
technology, as distinct from mere tools. The improvement on plato con­
cerning the feasibility of the best regime arises from the perception that, 
in the Republic, the perfect cooperation of the craftsmen is assumed rather 
than demonstrated and that, in point of fact, it is not spontaneous because 
it is not intrinsic to their craftsmanship. That a man’s whole soul can by 
nature be absorbed in cobbling (or restricted to any other single function) is 
a myth. The shoemakers and all the other artisans are, in the final analysis, 
kept in their places by lies, noble and not so noble.
But the knowledge of nature that informs the modern machinery of 
shoemaking is the same as that which underlies all other forms of efficient 
material production, including that by which the universe itself has come 
to be. The world is now unmediated by myth, and all stand in the same 
relationship to it; there can be no permanent basis for class distinctions. all 
may be freed by communism from an invidious alienation from the means 
of production, all may be freed by technology from an invidious alienation 
from the means of consumption, all may be freed by science from an invidi­
ous alienation from nature. slavery, intemperance, otherworldly religion, 
coercive government—all become superfluous when society becomes 
thoroughly rational. This, i believe, conveys the outline of that transforma­
tion in the radical political thought of the nineteenth century by virtue of 
which Madison’s hypothetical preference for a society of “angels” became 
the nonhypothetical ground for demanding that such a society be made 
actual. one can easily understand why, once the conviction arose that such 
a society was possible, there should be a belief in a categorical imperative to 
bring it into actual existence.
The foregoing has been intended as a characterization not of any par­
ticular thought of Thoreau’s but rather of the milieu in which it flourished. 
it was the same milieu in which the numerous communist societies of mid­
nineteenth­century america flourished, along with numerous radical re­
form movements—to abolish slavery, to abolish strong drink, to reform the 
prison system, to bring about full equality of rights for women, to abolish 
war, and many others. no one reading the Communist Manifesto of Marx 
and engels together with “Civil Disobedience,” both of them composed 
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at about the same time, can fail to perceive the same temper—a temper 
indicating that the total reform of society is, or should be, near at hand. 
This milieu is still the ground of the politics of the revolutionary “new 
Left,” a Left that is actually more than a century old, as we realize when we 
understand that Thoreau, perhaps even more than Marx and engels, is one 
of its authentic heroes.
The tradition of obedience to law in the united states is at best an ambigu­
ous one. The most obvious reason for this was given at the outset of this 
chapter: the united states annually celebrates its revolutionary origins, its 
withdrawal of allegiance from a system of law on the grounds of natural 
right. These grounds indicate that the laws of nature and nature’s God take 
precedence over any positive human law. The sense of obligation to law 
has long focused on the Constitution, most obviously because the Constitu­
tion is the supreme law of the land, and it invites respect because of this 
supremacy.
Yet the very circumstance that makes the Constitution supreme en­
courages certain tendencies toward civil disobedience. The supremacy of 
the Constitution is a supremacy over all public officials, state or national, 
legislative, executive, or judicial. in theory, any act in conflict with the Con­
stitution is null and void. To challenge a public act, however, it is frequently 
necessary to violate it in order to secure a test of its legality in the courts. 
hence disobedience to lawfully constituted authorities may be an act of 
respect for the Constitution.
The supremacy of the Constitution is a very practical matter: the na­
ture of american federalism—the diversity of its political jurisdictions and 
their overlapping character—is such that american public law would tend 
toward chaos if there were no final arbiter, no final authority. The final 
arbiter of american public law is usually the supreme Court of the united 
states. The qualification usually is in recognition of the fact that questions 
regarding the law cannot always be tried in the courts. The word arbiter is 
in recognition that, at any given time, the supreme Court is the deciding 
body. But the authority of the Court is the authority of the Constitution, 
and if the sense of the political community of the united states differs with 
the supreme Court as to the meaning of the Constitution, the authority of 
the Court will not stand, and future Courts will interpret the Constitution 
in a manner more consistent with the sense of the community.
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But suppose the community itself is divided? it is, of course, normal 
that any community should be divided into majority and minority. however, 
the acceptance of majority rule by the minority (or minorities), on the one 
hand, and the acceptance by the majority of the minority’s right not to be 
coerced in certain matters, on the other hand, depend on a prior understand­
ing of the relationship of majority rule to minority rights. “all too will bear 
in mind this sacred principle,” said Jefferson in his first inaugural address, 
“that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be 
rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess equal rights, which 
equal laws must protect, and to violate which would be oppression.”20
The Constitution, as every schoolboy knows, is in certain respects a 
bundle of compromises. To interpret the Constitution, one must make a 
judgment as to what are mere expedients and what are dictates of principle. 
For example, if the Warren Court was correct in its opinions on the sub­
ject of apportionment, the u.s. senate must be the most malapportioned 
legislative body in the country, and its existence can be justified only as 
the merest expedient. in contrast, if one sees the senate as an institution 
designed to secure a certain equality of the states within the union, to the 
end that national majorities be distributed as well as amassed, the senate 
can be viewed as a wise or principled expedient. it may be seen as one of 
those expedients designed to induce reasonableness in the majority and to 
protect those equal rights the minority possesses, the violation of which 
would be oppression.
The most fundamental of all the compromises the Constitution of 1787 
exhibited, and the source of the most undoubted mere expedients, was that 
which treated the negro slaves both as persons and as things. The popula­
tion that determined the representation of each state in the lower house of 
Congress was arrived at by adding to the whole number of white persons 
three­fifths of all others, exclusive of indians. There is an anomaly in the 
very idea of a three­fifths person. But in the so­called fugitive slave clause 
(the words slave, slavery, and Negro do not occur in the original Constitu­
tion), it is said that all persons held to labor or service under the laws of any 
of the states, escaping into another state, shall not be discharged from such 
service or labor, but shall be returned to the person to whom the service 
or labor is due. By this clause, the government of the united states was 
committed to assisting in enforcing the laws of the slave states. These laws 
treated negro slaves as chattels—that is, mere movable property—although 
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in certain respects, such as responsibility for most felonies, they were also 
regarded as human persons. By its indirect incorporation of state law, the 
u.s. Constitution undoubtedly treated negro slaves as both human persons 
and nonhuman chattels.
Therefore, when the Fifth amendment commanded that no person 
should be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of 
law, the Constitution commanded two absolutely contradictory things: that 
no slave owner be arbitrarily deprived of his chattel, and that no negro be 
arbitrarily deprived of his liberty. But when conflict arose, which of these 
two conflicting imperatives represented the “real” Constitution?
it is against this background of difficulty that respect for law—above all, 
the supreme law, the law of the Constitution—must be examined. everyone 
knows that the greatest cause of social and civil conflict, and hence of law­
lessness, in the united states has been racial difference. But this is not mere 
racial difference such as that which has existed in many times and many 
places. This is racial difference in the presence of the great commitment to 
the proposition “that all men are created equal.”
Thoreau saw no problem: if the Constitution sanctions slavery, disobey 
it. if the union includes slave states, secede. But abraham Lincoln, in his 
springfield Lyceum speech of 1838, saw the matter differently. The turmoil 
racking the country then was similar to that of the 1960s. Then the question 
concerned the american negro’s transition from slavery to legal freedom. 
in the 1960s it concerned his transition from legal freedom to social and 
political equality. Lincoln foresaw even then that terrible forfeits might be 
exacted for the abolition of slavery.
The first quality of the Lyceum speech that immediately sets it in a 
different genre from Thoreau’s essay is that it is political. it is an oration by a 
rising young Whig member of the illinois legislature. it deals with a matter 
deeply agitating the country at large, and it displays a special sensitivity to 
the impact of that matter on the south­central illinois city of springfield. 
That community, like most others in southern ohio, indiana, and illinois, 
was populated by families, like the Lincolns, who had migrated across the 
ohio river from slave states. such families usually preferred to live on 
free soil, to get away from slavery. But it was more often the degrading 
competition of negro slave labor, rather than the moral obliquity of slavery 
itself, to which they objected. Many still had family ties southward, and 
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they resented any condemnations of slavery that implicated their kinsmen. 
Moreover, they feared abolitionism as much as they feared the extension 
of slavery, and for much the same reason: either would bring them into 
unwanted contact with negroes.
The rise of abolitionist agitation in the 1830s led the illinois legisla­
ture, in January 1837, just a year before the Lyceum speech, to pass resolu­
tions denouncing abolitionism. six weeks after these resolutions, a protest 
against them appeared in the journal of the house, signed by Dan stone 
and a. Lincoln, representatives of sangamon County. it declared that “the 
institution of slavery is founded in both injustice and bad policy, but that 
the promulgation of abolition doctrines tends rather to increase than abate 
its evils.”21 it is of some interest that those six weeks between the time the 
majority resolutions passed and the time Lincoln and stone entered their 
dissenting views was the same period when the two representatives of 
sangamon County brought to a climax their successful maneuvers to re­
move the state capital from Vandalia to springfield—a logrolling operation 
that was perhaps the high point of Lincoln’s career in the state legislature. 
politicians are certainly permitted to have convictions of their own, but the 
expression of those convictions must not be deeply offensive to the people 
they represent. Lincoln’s rhetorical maxim was that a drop of honey catches 
more flies than a gallon of gall. Certainly, the abolitionists at this time were 
profoundly galling, even to most shades of anti­slavery opinion.
some six weeks before the Lyceum speech, on november 7, 1837, the 
lynching of abolitionist editor elijah Lovejoy had occurred at nearby alton, 
illinois. This event hung like a pall over both Lincoln and his audience. The 
extraordinary tact with which Lincoln treated his own and his audience’s 
complex reaction to this ambiguous event accounts for much of the com­
plexity of the speech.22
Today the tendency is to regard Lovejoy, like John Brown, as a genuine 
witness to the cause of freedom. Yet Lincoln had no great sympathy for 
either man. Brown he regarded as a mere fanatic who brooded over slavery 
until he became demented with the notion that he had a divine mission to 
extirpate it. To Lincoln, Brown accomplished little—after the murder of a 
number of innocents—besides his own destruction and that of his follow­
ers. To Thoreau, in contrast, John Brown was an authentic Carlylean hero, a 
prophet, a martyr, and a saint. an ultimate judgment on the wisdom of Lin­
coln and Thoreau would require judgments on the respective contributions 
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of Lincoln and Brown to the ultimate emancipation of the slaves. Lincoln’s 
attitude toward the murder of Lovejoy must have been influenced not only 
by his belief that Lovejoy’s denunciations of slavery and slave owners were 
doing more to strengthen pro­slavery than anti­slavery feelings but also by 
the fact that Lovejoy was as violently anti­Catholic as he was anti­slavery.
The abolitionist movement had its roots in the evangelical protes­
tantism of the day. in today’s parlance, it was emphatically “waspish.” The 
same roots produced the temperance movement, which also was mainly 
protestant. The irish were objects of antagonism both for their supposed 
addiction to whiskey and for their popery (not to mention their tendency 
to march down the gangplanks directly to the polls, under the guidance of 
Democratic politicians), and Lovejoy was against them for both reasons. But 
the irish were also violently anti­negro, for they, as the lowest class of white 
labor, were in competition with negroes. it was the negroes who, before 
the Civil War, built the southern railroads, as it was the irish who built the 
railroads of the north. But the problem of civil liberty in the antebellum 
united states was not a problem of negro slavery alone—it was a problem 
of discrimination based on race, religion, and nationality together.
in the period between 1854 and 1860, the anti­slavery movement was 
muddled by the fact that the Know­nothings flourished side by side with 
the republicans, and both movements were, to a great extent, competing 
for the same votes. in 1856 the anti­Democratic vote was divided between 
Frémont, the republican candidate, and Fillmore, who was nominated both 
by the Know­nothing (or american) party and by the remnant of the Whig 
party. it was this division of the Free­soil vote that enabled Buchanan to be 
elected. in 1855 Lincoln gave his private opinion of the Know­nothings to 
his old friend Joshua speed, who had moved to Kentucky:
i am not a Know­nothing. That is certain. how could i be? how can any 
one who abhors the oppression of negroes, be in favor of degrading classes of 
white people? our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. 
as a nation, we began by declaring that “all men are created equal.” We now 
practically read it “all men are created equal, except negroes.” When the 
Know­nothings get control, it will read “all men are created equal, except 
negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics.” When it comes to this i should 
prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretence of loving 
liberty—to russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure and 
without the base alloy of hypocrisy.23
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Yet in 1860, so important was the Know­nothing vote to the repub­
licans that Lincoln refused to make any public denial of association with 
them. in considering the letter to speed, one must be struck not only by 
the vehemence of Lincoln’s views but also by the fact that he felt compelled 
to make such a disavowal. so close was the affinity of Know­nothingism 
and the anti­slavery movement that even such a close personal friend as 
speed could not be certain where Lincoln stood. There is a remarkable 
resemblance between the political currents that carried the anti­slavery 
movement forward in the 1850s—currents that included some of the no­
blest and some of the basest passions american politics exhibits—and those 
that brought “law and order” to the fore in the latter 1960s. The good and 
the bad are closely intertwined politically, making the problem of political 
persuasion a delicate one.
Lincoln sympathized with Lovejoy’s anti­slavery feelings, but he dis­
agreed strongly with his anti­Catholicism and anti­foreignism. he certainly 
believed in Lovejoy’s constitutional right to freedom of speech, but he did 
not believe that one could properly claim the protection of the Constitution 
in one respect and then disregard the Constitution in other respects. This 
is what the abolitionists did when they denied the validity of the provisions 
for the rendition of fugitive slaves or when they denied the limitations on 
federal power to interfere with slavery in the states. in the Lyceum speech, 
Lincoln is not making a bid for partisan electoral support, as he would do 
in 1858 and 1860. But he provides a remarkable example of his capacity 
for leadership in his diagnosis of a grave problem and in the manner in 
which he discriminates the point on which conscience and prudence might 
agree.
The Lyceum speech begins by announcing as its subject “the perpetu­
ation of our political institutions.”24 This would also be the theme of the 
Gettysburg address twenty­five years later. Lincoln then goes on to remind 
his listeners of their great good fortune to be citizens of the united states: 
of their material prosperity, of their comparative immunity from foreign 
dangers, of the fact that they have inherited nearly all these blessings, hav­
ing “toiled not in the acquirement or establishment of them.” at the heart 
of these blessings, however, is a “government . . . conducing more essentially 
to the ends of civil and religious liberty, than any of which the history of for­
mer times tells us.” Thus, whereas Thoreau looks forward to an apocalyptic 
vision of uncoerced men of conscience freely associating in a regime of pure 
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virtue, Lincoln looks back toward the despotism and religious persecution 
from which “a political edifice of liberty and equal rights” has freed us, 
and rejoices. Whereas Thoreau feels the intolerableness of a system that 
permits slavery and unjust war, Lincoln warns against the spirit of lawless­
ness abroad in the land, a spirit that may in time lead to the overthrow of 
these free institutions. as we have seen, Lincoln is keenly aware of the fact 
that the fear and hatred engendered by slavery and racial difference are the 
principal causes of the mob violence sweeping the land, but he makes little 
direct reference to the fact, preferring to find neutral ground on which he 
can unite his audience in the contemplation of the dangers into which their 
own conflicting passions might be leading them. after reviewing the terrible 
scenes of mob violence, Lincoln comments, “its direct consequences are, 
comparatively speaking, but a small evil; and much of its danger consists, in 
the proneness of our minds, to regard its direct, as its only consequences.” 
The lynching of gamblers or of murderers is in itself no matter of necessary 
regret. But once the habit of taking the direct way with the guilty is adopted, 
what is to prevent its being extended to the innocent? presently, the lawless 
in spirit, encouraged by the example of those who smugly believe they can 
dispense with the forms of law in dealing with malefactors, “make a jubilee” 
of the suspension of the operations of legal government.
Lincoln deals subtly and elaborately with the distinction between the 
direct and indirect consequences of what might be called, somewhat inaccu­
rately, “innocuous lawlessness.” There is the obvious point that those who, in 
their self­righteous indignation, lynch undoubted malefactors cannot easily 
be made to believe they are endangering the innocent. To persuade the in­
dividuals in a lynch mob (whether at the moment they form part of the mob 
or at some other time) that they might be mistaken in their victims is not 
easy. Lincoln makes this point but lays more stress on the next one, namely, 
that toleration of “justifiable” lynchings eventually supplies the pretext for 
general assaults on personal safety and property. The distance from this 
to the death of constitutional liberty is not so great as might be supposed, 
and most of the Lyceum speech is directed at warning against this danger. 
When “good men . . . who love tranquility, who desire to abide by the laws, 
and enjoy their benefits . . . seeing their property destroyed; their families 
insulted . . . become tired of, and disgusted with, a Government that offers 
them no protection,” the turning point is at hand. it is at this juncture that 
the danger of the demagogue becomes acute.
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Lincoln cites the three great destroyers of republics according to the 
tradition of his day: alexander, Caesar, and napoleon. But we cannot help 
thinking of hitler and Mussolini, both of whom induced street rioting to pre­
cipitate the crises that brought them to power. in the crunch, they used the 
middle­class fear of lawlessness as a means of installing regimes from which 
the very idea of law was rooted out in favor of the iron fist of dictatorship. 
and this fist was brought down without discrimination on erstwhile sup­
porters as well as former foes. Lincoln, it seems, anticipated with something 
like clairvoyance the typology of the process by which twentieth­century 
dictatorships were established on the ruins of constitutional government.
Lincoln is, in the Lyceum speech, directly addressing the very people 
whose unwitting defection from the forms of law might bring about consti­
tutional crisis. in the most remarkable passage of the speech, he warns that 
the demagogic destroyer who “thirsts and burns for distinction . . . will have 
it, whether at the expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen.” 
Lincoln here, as elsewhere, appears to display a curious neutrality between 
pro­slavery and anti­slavery positions. in part, this reflects the ambiguity in 
the feelings of his audience. Yet the select committee of the illinois legisla­
ture that had reported the anti­abolitionism resolutions the year before also 
deeply deplored “the unfortunate condition of our fellow­men, whose lots 
are cast in thraldom in a land of liberty and peace.” But it is also true that, 
throughout his life and until the very moment he issued the final emancipa­
tion proclamation, Lincoln was profoundly opposed to the uncompensated 
emancipation of the slaves. and that is what the abolitionists (as distinct 
from Free­soilers) stood for—Thoreau among them.
abolition at a stroke would destroy a vast body of invested capital. it 
would throw the economic cost of emancipating the slaves entirely on those 
who, by the accident of the moment, held title to the slaves. it would un­
necessarily exacerbate the feelings of those whose goodwill and assistance 
would, of necessity, be integral to the process of social reconstruction that 
would follow emancipation. slavery was woven into the economic life of 
the entire nation, and the guilt for its presence must be allocated among 
all, north and south, who were implicated in it. That was always Lincoln’s 
conviction. northern ship owners had made fortunes in the foreign slave 
trade before 1809. Their descendants were carrying slave­produced cotton 
to europe now. The mills of the north were spinning it and weaving it; 
railroads were moving it; banks were financing it; stores were selling it; 
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and every household in the land was consuming it. Many a northern free 
state that had arranged for the emancipation of slaves within its boundaries 
had allowed owners to sell their slaves in the south rather than actually 
emancipate them. Were those who bought so much more guilty than those 
who sold that the entire burden should fall on the buyers alone? not a man, 
woman, or child who was free in the antebellum united states did not share 
in the product of the unrequited toil of the slaves. The injustice of uncompen­
sated emancipation, Lincoln thought, was of the kind practiced throughout 
history by designing demagogues who would set class against class by offer­
ing to despoil one for the benefit of the other, and end up destroying the 
liberties of all. The zeal of the reformer may well be indistinguishable from 
that of the would­be tyrant. Lincoln’s thesis is that our tendency to regard 
direct consequences as if they were the only consequences provides the 
opportunity for tyranny by both the mob and the demagogue. 
The Lyceum speech does not, in any programmatic sense, provide a 
solution to the problem it describes. The only solution mentioned by Lin­
coln is that reverence for the Constitution and the laws become the political 
religion of the nation. Lincoln is well aware of the defects in the american 
political system—above all, those connected with slavery and the negro. 
he is careful to mention that bad laws may exist and that grievances may 
be intolerable. Yet the alternative to the constitutional means for rectifying 
evils is unconstitutional. This would mean adopting a remedy that may in 
the end be as bad as, if not worse than, the disease. a free society that toler­
ates slavery is under a reproach from its own principles and may undertake 
to make freedmen of slaves. a society in which no man is free, and from 
which the principle of freedom has been banished, offers no reproach to 
slavery and has no principle of reform.
Thoreau and Lincoln both consider the question of unjust laws. Lin­
coln says they should be obeyed until they can be changed by legal means, 
“if not too intolerable.” With this exception, Lincoln’s argument touches 
Thoreau’s thesis. however, Lincoln continues, “There is no grievance that 
is a fit object of mob law.” The question becomes, does the justification for 
civil disobedience in extreme cases also justify the organization of a minor­
ity to clog and, by its whole weight, force the majority to bow to its will?
Thoreau calls on the government—by which he means the constitu­
tional majority—to “cherish its wise minority.” of course, in substance, this 
is what representative government, as distinct from direct democracy, is 
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supposed to do. But why should a self­appointed “wise minority” outside of 
government be entitled to an obedience that Thoreau denies to the minor­
ity chosen constitutionally by the majority? as for the ways provided by law, 
says Thoreau, “They take too much time, and a man’s life will be gone.”25 
But the time required for constitutional decisions reflects the inborn dif­
ficulty of infusing rationality into political decisions and then securing 
widespread consent. on the one hand, Thoreau wishes to have no decisions 
by society to which everyone has not consented—that is the essence of his 
anarchism—but on the other hand, he demands that society bow to its wise 
minority.
Lincoln’s call for a “political religion” is a recognition that, as aristotle 
says, law itself has no power to persuade other than the power of habit. it 
is habit that forms character, and the rule of law presupposes the character 
of law­abidingness. a regime in which law rules becomes more lawful by 
reason of its legality; this may sound like a tautology, but it is founded on 
the perception that every habit grows by repetition of the activity from 
which the habit first arose. Lincoln recognizes the possibility of intolerable 
grievances even under a good government. But he believes that the more 
the rule of law takes effect, the less the possibility that such grievances will 
exist, because the more people will respect the processes by which reform 
takes place. Thoreau’s approach, setting conscience against law rather than 
enlisting it on the side of law, corrupts the very process by which reason 
replaces force in arbitrating human differences.
Lincoln’s call to make reverence for the Constitution and the laws the politi­
cal religion of the nation is a recognition that a merely utilitarian view of the 
value of freedom and free institutions can never induce the sacrifices neces­
sary for their preservation. The crucial sacrifices are not those required by 
war—of blood and treasure. The dearest sacrifices are those of self­love and 
obstinate opinion, which tend to dominate a free society at peace. Lincoln 
begins the Lyceum speech by indicating the relationship between a relative 
immunity to foreign danger and the violence sweeping the country in 1838. 
he is aware, as is Madison in Federalist no. 10, that human nature embodies 
a propensity to violent faction, which is particularly manifest when that na­
ture is emancipated from arbitrary government and from myths that induce 
in everyone the same opinions and passions. Lincoln agrees with aristotle 
(as does Madison) that man separated from law is not divine but bestial. Yet 
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he disagrees with the opinion to which Madison gives countenance, that 
government is a reproach to human nature. as aristotle and Lincoln see it, 
government is required not only to overcome the ills of human nature but 
also to give scope to the good. however rhetorical Madison’s concession to 
the superiority of a state of anarchy, he implies there is a human condition 
imaginable better than that of the best regime imaginable. But government 
is needed not only to prevent harm but also to achieve good. Friendship, 
says aristotle, is better than justice. But friendship does not arise in a 
vacuum. The conditions under which men become friends are those that 
the political community provides. outside the political community, there is 
neither the leisure nor the activity for men to discover friendship.
Thoreau demands life according to principle. But principle, as he sees 
it, is something asocial, something that is as inconsistent with friendship 
as with justice under law. “action from principle . . . changes things and 
relations,” he writes. “it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist 
wholly with any thing which was. it not only divides states and churches, it 
divides families; aye, it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in 
him from the divine.”26
But the question must be asked, does the separation of the diabolical 
from the divine send the diabolical or the divine forth to rule the world? 
Thoreau’s strictures against law and constitutional majority rule can only 
lead to rule not by a “wise minority” but to lawless tyranny. Lincoln’s solu­
tion is to subject the diabolical to the divine, by moral education and the 
rule of law, in a regime dedicated not to any minority, wise or unwise, but 
to the proposition that all men are created equal.
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As for taking Thoreau’s arm, I should as soon take the arm of an elm tree.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journals
To undERsTAnd ThoREAu’s impact on contemporary environmen-
talism, it helps to recognize that when the Earth day greens found him, 
Thoreau’s reputation as a literary and political figure was still in flux. other 
famous writers in the canon of American literature are sometimes under-
stood in terms of their early, middle, or late periods—reflecting the detailed 
sense of a writer’s thought that emerges after decades or even centuries of 
examination. But with Thoreau, we find no important distinctions between 
his early and late writings. What we do find, however, are distinctive chan-
nels his influence traveled on its way to contemporary environmentalism. 
This is not Thoreau’s fault; it is an artifact of the historical path his legacy 
took.
There have been several Thoreaus—a shifting cast of characters made 
multiple not by any error or indecision on Thoreau’s part or by a discern-
ible maturation of his thought but by the historically contingent way those 
several Thoreaus emerged. It would be erroneous to say that he anticipated 
an environmental movement; he was more than a little ambivalent about 
“movements.” still, contemporary American environmentalism constitutes 
one of Thoreau’s most important recent audiences, both in the sense that 
the greens renewed interest in Thoreau and in terms of the remarkable 
influence his work had on the movement.
Environmentalism emerged in the context of the proliferation of 
movements that followed the civil rights and anti–Vietnam War efforts. 
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Environmentalism was as distinct from its conservationist roots as feminism 
was from the suffragettes. The green mixture was unprecedented—at one 
moment radical, then conservative; indebted to science and nature but also 
capable of a particular spiritualism; deeply engaged in the public world but 
ambivalent about politics. In each of these ways, the Thoreau the environ-
mentalists discovered seemed to speak directly to them.
What the greens found in Thoreau was an ethical gesture and a roman-
ticism that deeply satisfied them. The Earth day generation was drawn to 
Thoreau by his wilderness values and a spiritualism propelled by landscapes. 
As Earth day greens responded to Thoreau’s integrity, independence, and 
attentiveness to nature, they were also willing to embrace a predecessor 
who had rejected the American polity and whose political views were often 
immature and even contradictory. several choices and conditions eventu-
ally blocked environmentalism from the explicit conversation about politics 
that, in retrospect, dearly needed to happen. Whereas green commitments 
could be expressed by gestural protests, conscientious consumerism, and 
a fairly narrow approach to lobbying and litigating, larger questions of the 
movement’s position toward long-term and large-scale structural change 
seemed beyond its grasp. In this respect, among others, the movement 
reflected Thoreau’s influence when it should have worked to overcome it.
This chapter first examines the several Thoreaus available to the Earth 
day generation and then analyzes the fateful symbolic and political choices 
the greens made at the outset of their movement. Later sections examine 
the consequences of the greens’ appropriation of Thoreau—consequences 
that have often worked to the movement’s disadvantage.
The Several Thoreaus
Thoreau’s work had little impact during his lifetime. As influential as his 
mentor Emerson became, the transcendentalists hardly constituted a nation-
ally significant intellectual or political movement. despite sponsors such as 
Emerson, hawthorne, and Greeley, Thoreau’s career as a speaker and writer 
remained on a surprisingly small scale, and it sustained him only because 
his need for money was legendarily slim. Emerson understood the lack of 
ambition or even social skills in his protégé: “Thoreau wants a little ambition 
in his mixture. . . . Instead of being the head of American engineers, he is 
captain of a huckleberry party.”1
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Thoreau’s reputation waned after his death. In Thoreau’s Ecstatic 
Witness, Alan hodder traces the trajectory of that reputation.2 Although 
Thoreau’s death was widely reported, the demise of his legacy began im-
mediately, with Emerson’s eulogy, which was published in the Atlantic 
Monthly in August 1862. While acknowledging Thoreau’s great gifts, 
Emerson stressed his friend’s apparent eccentricities. A couple of years 
later, the influential critic James Russell Lowell characterized Thoreau “as 
a man with so high a conceit of himself that he accepted . . . his defects 
and weaknesses of character as virtues and powers peculiar to himself.”3 
Lowell is still quoted on Thoreau’s character, sometimes even by Thoreau’s 
advocates.4 As hodder summarizes, although “friends rallied to Thoreau’s 
defense, it would be decades before the damage done by Lowell’s salvos 
could be entirely repaired.”5 In short, despite famous literary friends and 
a substantial body of work, Thoreau’s influence emerged later and in an 
idiosyncratic fashion that resonates with his own character.
Later in the nineteenth century, houghton Mifflin (the successor to 
Thoreau’s original publisher) released Thoreau’s journal and generally pro-
moted his importance, but its approach, as hodder explains, domesticated 
Thoreau as a nature writer, “effectively sidelin[ing] the political dimension 
of his writings in the united states for almost a generation.”6 As the twen-
tieth century began, John Macy and Vernon Louis parrington embraced 
what they saw as Thoreau’s critique of capitalism’s voracious expansionism 
and nascent consumerism, setting the stage for subsequent appropriations 
of Thoreau by the Left.7 not until 1941, however, did Thoreau secure a 
place in the nineteenth-century canon of literary figures, with his treatment 
in F. o. Matthiessen’s American Renaissance. 8
Matthiessen, a central new Criticism figure, set the tone of America’s 
understanding of Thoreau for a quarter century. Matthiessen argued 
against limiting Thoreau to his nature writing: “Thoreau has not ordinarily 
been approached primarily as an artist. his first disciples tended to think 
of him as a naturalist, with the result that later scientists have criticized 
him for his want of severe method and his crotchety inaccuracies. he gave 
enough warnings against this interpretation. he said that he did not want 
too exact knowledge: the poet and the botanist look very differently at the 
same object.”9 Matthiessen appreciated Thoreau’s ability to function within 
a contradiction, but he clearly wanted to push Thoreau’s legacy in the po-
litical direction: “Though he often talked in paradoxes, he was still more 
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explicit in warning readers against taking Walden as a reformer’s manual. 
Yet his vitality as a revolutionary is still unexhausted.”10
Quickly dispensing with Emerson’s apolitical or conservative reading 
(“Thoreau was in his own person a practical answer, almost a refutation, to 
the theories of the socialists”11), Matthiessen credited Thoreau as a “chief 
basis” for Gandhi’s passive resistance and identified Thoreau’s “natural 
direction” as “left-wing individualism.”12 Matthiessen did not address the 
obvious paradox of “left-wing individualism” in his early-twentieth-century 
context; not until the emergence of the new Left a quarter of a century 
later did leftists begin to see individualism and Marxism as compatible. 
Matthiessen also may have given Thoreau too much credit for political 
approaches Gandhi developed. still, Matthiessen identified Thoreau as a 
critic with a somewhat narrow but crucial target: “Thoreau’s radical value 
does not lie in his gestures of protest, the shock of [which] was cushioned 
by his circumstances. . . . his contribution to our social thought lies in his 
thoroughgoing criticism of the narrow materialism of his day.”13
In short, Matthiessen promoted Thoreau’s voluntary simplicity as his 
work’s core, ignoring that Thoreau based this claim more on his love of 
natural settings, his stoic critique of materialism, and his crabby complaints 
about bourgeois Concord than on anything faintly resembling Marxism. 
This was how Matthiessen, writing from the secular Left, appropriated 
Thoreau without being troubled by the latter’s obvious spiritualism and in-
dividualism. It is a generous reading: when Matthiessen praised Thoreau for 
“not want[ing] that freedom [of life without encumbrances] for his private 
self alone,” he conflated Thoreau’s hope for social transformation via tran-
scendental spiritualism with an emergent political position, despite ample 
evidence of Thoreau’s reluctance to engage politically.14 These are thin 
reeds on which to base a political reading of a canonical figure. Matthiessen 
put Thoreau into the American canon but left room for other Thoreaus to 
emerge.
While Matthiessen was refining Thoreau’s meaning for scholars and 
intellectuals, New Yorker writer E. B. White revived Thoreau for a broader 
(if still elite) audience.15 White’s reading of Thoreau was deliberately so-
phisticated: “There is hardly a paragraph of Walden which does not seem 
humorous to me.”16 White brought Thoreau to a specific American audi-
ence, one characterized more by the New Yorker’s recreational woodsiness 
than by anything as raw as Thoreauvian wilderness. White’s Thoreau was 
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an explicitly literary figure: “henry Thoreau has probably been more wildly 
misconstrued than any other person of comparable literary stature. he got 
a reputation for being a naturalist, and he was not much of a naturalist. he 
got a reputation for being a hermit, and he was no hermit. he was a writer, 
is what he was.”17
White understood the limits of the uses others were beginning to find 
for Thoreau’s writings in the 1940s (Matthiessen is not mentioned but seems 
to be the referent):
Because of a few crotchety remarks [Thoreau] made about the factory system 
and because of his essay on civil disobedience, he is one of the early Americans 
now being taken up by Marxists. But not even these hard-working Johnnies-
come-lately can pin him down; he subscribed to no economic system and his 
convictions were strong but disorderly. What seemed so wrong to him was less 
man’s economy than man’s puny spirit and man’s strained relationship with 
nature—which he regarded as a public scandal. Most of the time he didn’t 
want to do anything about anything—he wanted to observe and to feel.18
White understood that Thoreau’s accomplishment was specifically literary, 
even gestural. If there was any plane of transformation at play in White’s 
Thoreau, it was spiritual or perhaps cultural. But White’s strong voice 
did more than simply recapture Thoreau from the leftists; perhaps more 
important, he gave his Thoreau a cultural position and sensibility, albeit a 
somewhat ironic one, given Thoreau’s own antipathy for bourgeois society. 
White’s Thoreau has an elite new Englander’s sense of class and love of 
natural retreat. Although the New Yorker would be important to the emer-
gence of American environmentalism (specifically by publishing Rachel 
Carson), this was hardly Earth day environmentalism’s political base.
White and Matthiessen deployed somewhat different Thoreaus, even 
though they both contributed to his canonical status. Ironically, they both 
recognized yet another Thoreau, one that would emerge even more force-
fully with the rise of contemporary environmentalism. Matthiessen was 
closest to White in his acute observation that Thoreau’s engagement with 
nature was most powerful when it addressed landscape. This may have 
been Matthiessen’s attempt to discount Thoreau’s transcendentalism, but 
it also foreshadowed an important subsequent reading. Commenting on A 
Week on the Concord, Matthiessen read Thoreau’s aim as neither spiritual 
nor primarily naturalist: that aim was “not just to suggest the diffused radi-
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ance that stimulated him, but to present by minute notations the record 
of a whole scene.”19 Matthiessen noted that Thoreau understood that “we 
are not wholly involved in nature,” as a naturalist might argue.20 Instead, 
Thoreau’s best insights involved landscape, “most akin to the tradition of 
the pioneer settlers, who had regarded the lonely wilderness with awe that 
could mount to terror.”21
Long before the Earth day era, Americans had accorded nearly mythical 
status to the pastoral, agrarian origins of the national character. Matthiessen 
understood that Thoreau’s sense of the moral value of landscape shifted the 
American pastoral so that it could inspire terror as well as positive versions 
of awe. The transformation of the pastoral ideal that Thoreau initiated and 
John Muir elaborated actually had much in common with the landscape 
painting of the nineteenth century. historian Roderick nash—whose pro-
motion of wilderness was enormously important to contemporary environ-
mentalism—drew this connection, citing landscape painter Thomas Cole’s 
The Oxbow: “Cole’s divided canvas implied the idea henry david Thoreau 
accepted as axiomatic: man’s optimum environment is a blend of wilderness 
and civilization.”22
nash proposed that Thoreau was not writing about nature as much as 
wildness and that Thoreau’s project (consistent with the landscape painter’s 
own, separate project) intended to alter the moral narrative associated with 
the American landscape: “previously most Americans had revered the rural, 
agrarian condition as a release both from wilderness and from high civiliza-
tion. They stood, so to speak, with both feet in the center of the spectrum of 
environments. Thoreau, on the other hand, arrived at the middle by strad-
dling. he rejoiced in the extremes, and, but keeping a foot in each, believed 
he could extract the best of both worlds.” 23 In short, Thoreau was not simply 
promoting nature as an issue or a cause. his project was to reanimate the 
American pastoral origin myth with a moralistic drive and a broader, more 
dynamic narrative. As nash explained, this was the Thoreau that inspired 
Muir and then the modern wilderness movement. In this way and others, 
Thoreau’s moralism reflected his century’s moralism.
In the post–World War II era, yet another Thoreau emerged. As the 
success of Gandhi’s and Martin Luther King’s application of nonviolent civil 
disobedience became more widely understood and appreciated, the Left’s 
deployment of Thoreau shifted dramatically from the path Matthiessen had 
charted. Mulford Q. sibley’s seminal The Quiet Battle, published in 1963, 
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called “Civil disobedience” “one of the great classics of non-violent civil 
disobedience.”24 Writing about the Montgomery bus boycott, King recalled 
having read and “reread . . . several times” Thoreau’s “on Civil disobedi-
ence” in the 1940s as a student at Morehouse.25 The actions of the civil 
rights movement “are outgrowths of Thoreau’s insistence that evil must be 
resisted.”26 King also reported that he “began to think about Thoreau’s” es-
say when planning the Montgomery bus boycott: “What we were preparing 
to do in Montgomery was related to what Thoreau had expressed. We were 
simply saying to the white community, ‘We can no longer lend our coopera-
tion to an evil system.’”27 King’s praise of Thoreau was careful and narrow, 
crediting him with the idea of noncooperation with evil, but not going as 
far as sibley. With his appeal to conscience and distinction between just 
and unjust laws, King moved beyond Thoreau’s anarchism. King’s narrow 
endorsement nevertheless informed post–Earth day readings of Thoreau.
Matthiessen had managed to elevate Thoreau to the literary canon, 
but his political reading could not really persist, other than to help put 
Thoreau vaguely on the Left. With the emergence of the new Left and 
a new “humanist” reading of Marx, American intellectuals and scholars 
no longer needed to find “stand-ins” for Marx in their attempt to evade 
McCarthyist attacks. At the same time, sibley’s disobedient Thoreau was 
thin, summoned out of a need to give practitioners of this new mode of 
political action a venerable heritage. Even the complaints about Thoreau’s 
character by Emerson and others had been largely forgotten by the 1960s. 
That era’s encounter with Thoreau could therefore be remarkably fresh. 
Accordingly, the various elements of American society found different Tho-
reaus, with little resistance to their readings. The interaction of Thoreau 
and American environmentalism, to which I turn next, was not tempered by 
a lengthy tradition of Thoreau readings or even a dominant reading against 
which contemporary environmentalists could rebel.
The Earth Day Generation
In the usual origin story of contemporary environmentalism, Earth day 
was supposed to rescue the conservation movement from its debilitating 
elitism. In 1970, while some of the most radical aspects of the 1960s had 
begun to experience setbacks and frustrations, still other components were 
spinning off from the core civil rights and anti-war nexus. Radical and 
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populist feminist and gay rights movements emerged. Earth day signaled a 
similar emergence of an environmental movement clearly distinct from its 
predecessors. Whereas the Wilderness society (which led the way in passing 
the Wilderness Act in 1964) was still benefiting from the endowment left 
by its founder, Bob Marshall, and whereas John Muir pursued a specifically 
elite strategy (inviting luminaries to visit Yosemite, since they could afford 
such a sojourn and might help with preservation), Earth day was supposed 
to be populist. Enter the green multitude.
of course, it did not work out that way. Even though environmental 
concerns captured public attention as never before, a few short years later, 
William Tucker branded the environmentalists as elitist, white, and ame-
nity driven.28 Tucker’s critique stuck like glue.29 Environmentalists found it 
surprisingly hard to deflect that critique, which grew as their critics learned 
the refined art of resentment politics that would eventually become the 
core strategy of the emerging new conservatism.
The post–Earth day environmentalists were baffled and offended by 
criticisms such as Tucker’s. These activists knew that their origins and sym-
pathies resided with the 1960s movements. It proved hard for the movement 
to acknowledge that whereas other movements were thoroughly progressive, 
the environmentalists had at least a whiff of the conservative about them. 
As an emerging social movement (along with the civil rights, feminist, and 
gay liberation movements), environmentalism seemed to be part of a leftist 
phalanx. But the new movement’s interaction with their Thoreau’s anti-
industrialism, pastoralism, and cultural nervousness about the American 
middle class all encouraged a cultural conservatism embedded within the 
ostensibly progressive green identity. Although this issue of ideology was 
largely ignored, signs of it emerged now and then. Environmentalists such 
as EarthFirst! founder dave Foreman would slyly suggest that they were 
conservatives, since they were pursuing conservation.30
Green nervousness about middle-class culture and the economic life of 
the industrial age sounded like traditional European conservatism. several 
green cultural themes were borrowed from the Right. Conservation was 
often an elite concern; “health food” was associated with cultural conserva-
tives, including the Mormons; and opposition to additives such as fluoride 
was originally a conservative issue. (stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove 
is probably now remembered as much for the ultraconservative General 
Ripper’s concern about pollutants as for its fictionalization of henry Kiss-
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inger.) Muir was a nemesis of progressive leader Gifford pinchot, and elite 
conservationists such as Teddy Roosevelt and Bob Marshall, if not ideologi-
cally conservative, were more closely aligned with Republicans than with 
the liberals or leftists of their day. Characteristically, concern about the 
negative aspects of change has been a conservative position in Western 
cultures.
Consider the rift between greens and labor, fought almost continuously 
since Earth day. The American Left had always positioned itself as “pro-
gressive,” confident about prospects for the future and eager to incorporate 
the American middle class (or, in the case of organized labor, to have its 
membership join that middle class). Factory life was a problem to be fixed, 
not a moral evil. The same was true of pollution and ugly neighborhoods. 
The city mattered more than the countryside. pinchot was the progressives’ 
“environmentalist.” Muir, far closer to Thoreau, was something else. If not 
for the political Right’s need to make alliances with the corporate world, 
Thoreau could have been perceived as a conservative, with his gestural 
anti-government stance, ruralism, individualism, and pastoralism. he could 
have been Rush Limbaugh’s hero rather than david Brower’s.
The environmental movement’s reluctance to confront its own elite, 
conservative, moralist, pastoral, and white composition contributed to the 
odd political history environmentalism has compiled. As greens developed 
a political position, they established themselves as advocates for nature. 
speaking for nature inured greens to the sort of political debate that might 
have dealt with the contradictory—radical and conservative—impulses 
implied by post–Earth day environmentalism. Nature is such a powerful 
term in Western political discourse that it seemed to settle too many po-
litical discussions prematurely. skirting the difficult questions politics can 
raise, environmentalists reenacted their Thoreau’s trajectory. In doing so, 
contemporary greens set themselves up for a resentful counterattack that 
has been massively successful. Environmentalists largely settled for what 
they could get in enclave localities or in court, living off elaborations of laws 
passed in a mad rush after Earth day—a rush that was over by the early 
1970s. 
The Earth day generation’s encounter with Thoreau drew heavily from 
the transcendental Thoreau, who found inspiration in the new England 
landscape but was exasperated by politics. Earth day culture was similarly 
exasperated by politics, and many of those in the movement thought they 
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could skip over the political phase by claiming to channel the voice of 
nature. That movement learned its disdain for politics from its hero. The 
transcendentalist Thoreau had a thorough disdain for the political world, 
even though he worried terribly about some political issues, especially slav-
ery. his spiritualism and his writing—a clearly social act—sought to resolve 
that tension, promising a transformation that would circumvent the political 
world he found so hopeless.
Thoreau’s rejection of politics was intentional. Although he was ac-
tive in Concord’s underground Railroad and spoke out—sometimes quite 
dramatically—on the issue of slavery, Thoreau never joined an anti-slavery 
organization.31 The reluctance to embrace social reform was not incidental 
but carefully theorized. As Thoreau biographer Walter harding summa-
rized it:
so far as Thoreau was concerned, [reformers] went at things backwards. 
They believed that if they succeeded in reforming society, society would then 
reform the individual. Thoreau, true Transcendentalist that he was, believed 
that all reforms must begin with the individual. so long as the individual 
was corrupt he would find ways and means of corrupting even the most ideal 
society, but if the individual were truly reformed from within, he would lead 
the good life in society.32
As early as 1844, Thoreau put his individualism—even on the in-
tensely political topic of slavery—into print, praising abolitionist nathaniel 
p. Rogers over the better-known William Lloyd Garrison for the former’s 
individualistic approach to the struggle over slavery. Rogers advocated dis-
solving anti-slavery societies as impediments to the actions of individual 
abolitionists.33 According to harding, Rogers “believed the only possible 
solution was the reformation of mankind” and “feared that Garrison’s plans 
would lead to the institutionalizing of the anti-slavery societies themselves 
and argued that a utopian society could be achieved only through self- 
reformation of each individual in a society.”34
Considering the institutional cataclysm the fight over slavery produced, 
Thoreau’s thoughtful and deliberate pursuit of such a position makes him 
either a mystic (as he called himself in a note to the American Association 
for the Advancement of science, declining consideration for member-
ship)35 or an anarchist, a possibility obvious enough in his proclamation, 
“My thoughts are murder to the state.”36 some notion of social and political 
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change inheres in each of these possibilities, to be sure. At one level, Tho-
reau’s unquestionable commitment to transcendentalism answers the mystic 
or anarchist question; he thought individual ethical transformation must 
precede political progress, so he combined the two. post–Earth day greens 
absorbed Thoreau’s individualism completely; private acts of consumption 
(buying healthy foods or a solar water heater or a bicycle) were presumed to 
be political acts. of course, that could be the case, but as an unquestioned 
assumption, green individualism posed great political risks.
Thoreau’s approach to civil disobedience forms part of his political 
argument as well, both because it informed a culture of protest in the 
1960s and because any such position involves insights into ethics, public 
life, government, and myriad other political questions. But Gandhi and 
King understood that civil disobedience is not decisive on its own as an 
individualist, ethical action detached from politics (except for its impact on 
individuals). Their movements elaborated a notion of campaign—with its 
incumbent sense of goals, constituencies, and so forth. As Thomas dumm 
has noted, Gandhi elaborated the notion of accepting punishment as an 
element of his ethical politics, but Thoreau did not get far enough into the 
topic to decide whether his night in the Concord jail was punishment.37
At the start of “Civil disobedience,” Thoreau takes his hard stance in 
vividly polemical terms: “‘That government is best which governs not at 
all’; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government 
which they will have.”38 But as usefully polemical as that gesture is, it is 
unsatisfying as political argument. What sense are we to make of a govern-
ment that aspires not to govern? And what prepares citizens for that situa-
tion, if not some collective endeavor? Thoreau’s point is that government’s 
role is predictably pernicious: “Witness the present Mexican war, the work 
of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their 
tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this mea-
sure.”39 so government will wither away when we are prepared for it, but in 
the meantime, government can positively block our preparations.
As has often been noted, there is a maturity here, as Thoreau distances 
himself from the standard American hymn of deference to institutions that 
govern in the name of the popular will: “The government itself, which is 
only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally 
liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it.”40 
Thoreau anticipates the critique of government that would emerge with 
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the development of the social sciences a half century later: “The people 
must have some complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy 
that idea of government which they have.”41 But we are soon disappointed. 
Thoreau has rushed to give government such a fixed identity and function 
that his political analysis veers toward confusion: “Governments show . . . 
how successfully men can be imposed on, even impose on themselves, for 
their own advantage.”42 At this point, readers might well find themselves 
wishing that Thoreau had spent fewer hours with the classical poets and a 
few more hours with, say, his fellow romantic Rousseau, whose analysis of 
the tensions faced by governments that rule on behalf of the popular will is 
deservedly canonical.
soon enough, of course, Thoreau relaxes back into something not so 
distant from liberalism. he asks for “a better government” and is clear about 
how such an improvement would emerge: “Let every man make known what 
kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step 
toward obtaining it.”43 he invokes the well-known tensions among majority 
rule, conscience, and justice. Then he skips along, insulting the very people 
he hopes will rise above their inherent limitations: “The mass of men serve 
the state . . . , not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies.”44 such 
persons lack judgment and moral sense, putting “themselves on a level with 
wood and earth and stones. . . . They have the same sort of worth only as 
horses and dogs.”45 so, in political terms, it is not only the state that has a 
rigidly fixed identity; so too do the citizens on whom hopes for changing the 
state depend. Exasperated with both organized politics and the capacity of 
individual humans, Thoreau has nowhere to go except toward assertion of 
his own moral position.
of course, much of “Civil disobedience” is straightforwardly polemical. 
Appealing to “honest men,” Thoreau complains about the excuses deployed 
by those who, at some level, know that slavery is wrong. For some, solving 
the moral problem seems too expensive or too damaging to commerce or 
too complicated, compared with other policy debates of the day. or it seems 
impossible, since voting is futile, given the power of those forces that resist 
change.46 Given this complexity, how is one to act?
As for himself, Thoreau simply has better things to do than to solve 
this difficult puzzle. In the paragraph after he memorably advises, “let 
your life be a counter friction to stop the machine,” Thoreau simply jumps 
over an opportunity to elaborate how civil disobedience might work when 
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he addresses what efforts at redress through legal channels are required 
before one is justified in breaking an unjust law. Later elaborations of civil 
disobedience have been emphatic on this point: it is an integral and routine 
part of the justification for righteous lawbreaking that one first exhaust the 
ostensibly available opportunities for redress. not so for Thoreau: “As for 
adopting the ways which the state has provided for remedying the evil, I 
know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man’s life will be 
gone. I have other affairs to attend to.”47
Political Culture
Two of the best recent studies of Thoreau address his cultural-political im-
portance for Americans and reroute his politics. Toward the end of America’s 
Bachelor Uncle: Thoreau and the American Polity, which attempts (and 
accomplishes) a reclamation of Thoreau, Bob pepperman Taylor argues 
that the principal weakness of Thoreau’s views is his naturalism—which is 
precisely what contemporary environmentalism admires in him and inherits 
from him:
The true weakness of Thoreau’s views is . . . his naturalism, his belief that 
the American landscape can provide an alternative source of inspiration, can 
teach a way of life that encourages the moral independence required by dem-
ocratic citizens. . . . For Thoreau, nature first teaches us our independence, 
then controls and moderates this independence within proper boundaries. 
There is no reason for us to believe, however, that our experience of nature 
will necessarily function in the way Thoreau hopes it will.48
Taylor also points out that we can see from Thoreau’s own arrogance “that 
the moral autonomy he seeks is not always or necessarily compatible with 
the sense of reverence and humility he also desires.”49
Taylor wants Americans to understand Thoreau as an important po-
litical theorist, and he is explicit about what he wants his Thoreau to do. 
Taylor’s Thoreau deploys nature-related arguments to intervene in Ameri-
can culture: “The role of nature in Walden is essentially political: it is the 
means by which Thoreau proposes to break the chain of conventional wis-
dom that prevents us, in his view, from seriously doubting the necessity or 
the desirability of the status quo, or imagining an alternative.50 For Taylor, 
Thoreau’s notion of nature should play a rather confined role; it helps shock 
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us out of the conventional wisdom without necessarily legitimizing a cadre 
of believers who would hope to govern in its name.
In Thoreau’s Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild, Jane Bennett also 
tries to find a niche for Thoreau in the canon of American political thought. 
Bennett’s Thoreau crafts “the self as a nonconformist” in genuinely political 
ways and directs it toward a nature far more heterogeneous and relational 
than has usually been understood.51 This reading of Thoreau is not alien 
to the environmental movement’s treatment of him. Influential New York 
Times environmental reporter phillip shabecoff published a widely read 
history of the contemporary environmental movement in 1993. shabecoff 
credits Thoreau with sounding “many of the leitmotifs of modern environ-
mentalism,” specifically, “as the spiritual founder of the modern crusade to 
preserve what is left of our wilderness.”52 he accurately identifies Thoreau’s 
role in putting wilderness at the center of contemporary environmentalism, 
an emphasis that is still sometimes controversial. In political terms, shabe-
coff seems most interested in Thoreau’s anticipation of “some of the causes 
and methods of today’s radical environmentalists,” citing A Week on the 
Concord on the protection of animals and as presenting “what may be the 
first reference to the possibility of ecosabotage” when Thoreau urges the 
use of “a crowbar against that Billerica dam” due to its interference with 
local aquatic life.53 nonetheless, having surveyed the range of ideas that 
might be traced back to Thoreau, shabecoff identifies a different central 
contribution: 
The central issue addressed by Thoreau . . . was embodied in the question of 
how life ought to be lived and what gives meaning to life. These are funda-
mental themes of environmentalism, although today’s environmental lead-
ers tend to shunt them aside in the heat and tumult of their endless trench 
warfare against the powerful forces that threaten both human health and the 
natural world.54
Culture is a central if ambivalent feature of American environmental-
ism. on the one hand, the movement’s scope is extraordinary and probably 
contributes to the durability of green commitments. perhaps more than 
any other contemporary American movement, environmentalism identifies 
positions on a wide range of activities: food, recreation, procreation, health, 
work, transportation, energy, aesthetics, attitudes toward animals, a range 
of ideological positions on commerce, rights, progress, technology, and 
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more. on the other hand, the heavy reliance on nature-related arguments 
and a tendency toward moralism make environmentalism universalist and 
thus inhospitable to identity politics, with its inherent pluralism. Identity 
initiatives have worked better for the movement’s adversaries, who cite their 
identity as miners or loggers, for example, and taunt their green adversaries 
as “owl lovers” or “granolas.”
In a way, Thoreau anticipates the politicization of identity; resisting 
the society that prevents one from enacting one’s vision of “the good life” 
is an appropriate—and perhaps the best—political activity. Thoreau is the 
prototypical ethical actor, in the best sense of that term. But there is a 
risk inherent in this position, and Thoreau demonstrates that danger. While 
arguing for a “care for the self” (to appropriate Michel Foucault’s phrase), 
Thoreau also advances a moralism that undermines his ambition to promote 
ethical transformation. As historian Robert dorman reminds us, “As a boy 
his schoolmates called Thoreau by the nickname ‘Judge,’ a reflection (ac-
cording to his biographers) of his innate stoicism and solemnity. [Thoreau] 
seemed a born moralizer.”55
Nature
A movement that speaks for nature, that hears its voice, would be expected 
to have a coherent and systematic canon. And, as expected, environmental-
ism has waged few internal battles over “the correct line” or the appropri-
ate epistemological or ethical basis of the movement. Instead, the internal 
green battles tend to be tactical, between, say, big green and the grass roots. 
But at the core, strategic level, greens have built a unanimity that aspires to 
Thoreau’s level of self-certainty, to his level of adamance. To speak convinc-
ingly for nature, greens needed a clean and compelling “origin story.” The 
movement needed a history that got around the fact that Western politics 
was formed largely by a struggle over the political control of the authority-
granting legitimacy nature could lend, a struggle that has continued more 
or less throughout Western civilization.
Environmentalism was hardly the first to claim nature’s voice, but with 
some help from Thoreau, the movement actually managed to maneuver 
itself into a position to make that claim. oddly enough, to meet the need for 
a distinctive origin story, the green solution (again, learned from Thoreau) 
was to separate humans from nature, based on the unique ability of hu-
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man civilization to alter nature. people threaten nature but can also save it. 
nature might inspire a person, but that person is separate from nature. This 
perilous position then doubled back to grant authority from nature to those 
people who claim the green perspective.
Given that intellectual setting, greens sought a strong naturalist voice. 
That role was only indirectly or unsatisfactorily filled by most of the canoni-
cal figures, who pointed toward unalloyed elitism and romanticism (Muir 
and Marshall), biochemistry (Carson), and updated woodsy mysticism (Aldo 
Leopold). In Thoreau, the movement found a figure from the American lit-
erary canon who—due to the awkward trajectory of his literary legacy—was 
available for a fresh, green reading. As I suggested at the start of this chapter, 
post–Earth day greens found a Thoreau little related to the Thoreaus iden-
tified earlier by Emerson and White. Even the civil disobedient Thoreau 
claimed by King and Gandhi was not really the same as the environmental-
ists’ Thoreau. Matthiessen’s urge to push Thoreau leftward resonated with 
participants in the new environmental movement, but they did not rush, as 
Matthiessen had, to impose a politics on the apolitical Thoreau.
As I discussed earlier, there were ample warnings against a naturalist 
reading; Thoreau resisted the naturalist label and seems better described 
as engaging landscapes and pastoralism. still, Walden encouraged greens 
to read Thoreau for his naturalism (rather than in a cultural or political 
context). The transitional environmentalism that emerged at Earth day 
found precisely what it needed in Thoreau: a cranky yet often sociable and 
charismatic invitation to hit the trail and announce an affinity for nature. 
Thoreau’s civil disobedience was a political plan for the hopeless, and even 
though most Earth day constituents exhibited a rather speculative optimism, 
they were not, in fact, a particularly hopeful lot after the disappointments 
of the anti-war movement and before the elaboration of identity politics. 
The environmental movement tended toward absolutism and utopianism, 
and in both respects, Thoreau’s moralism was helpful. But whereas Gan-
dhi and King built a political strategy on Thoreau’s apolitical gesture, the 
environmental movement eschewed those helpful correctives and veered 
from dismal jeremiad to a huge ambition—the very reconfiguration of the 
contemporary world—fueled by the appropriation of nature, long one of the 
West’s most potent political figurations. The lack of political argument that 
charmed White perfectly matched the contradictory, conflicted, and still 
powerful new environmental movement.
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Thoreau’s spiritualism also cut another way in the hands of a counter-
culture prone to a dismal sense of foreboding and powerlessness, as well as 
a spiritualism that sometimes veered toward resentful moralism. As critical 
as Thoreau was of the American bourgeoisie, his spiritualism was closer 
to middling American Christianity than he would admit. It is composed 
by the moralism of the new England jeremiad, reworked for transcenden-
talism, underscored by a dose of scientism. As influential environmental 
philosopher J. Baird Callicott summarizes, “While Thoreau’s philosophy is 
hardly Calvinist or even Christian, his temperament is thoroughly puritan. 
he was celibate, vegetarian, abstemious, ascetic, self-righteous, judgmental. 
At points it seems that wild nature serves Thoreau more as a bearing for 
criticizing his fellow citizens than as something valuable in itself.”56
some environmentalists focused more on Thoreau as a defender of lo-
calism—of the importance of a commitment to a specific “place” as a locale 
for political activity in a rapidly changing world. “place” had the advantage 
of being less global and absolute, with an appeal to the notion of commu-
nity that, in the Earth day era, had not yet been conceded to the political 
Right. Environmentalists adopted the slogan “Think globally, act locally,” 
emphasizing the importance of appreciating and protecting important local 
sites. But “place” had its limits, too. It was susceptible to the nIMBY (not in 
my backyard) mentality, as well as the related charge that environmental-
ism was merely advocating a class-based amenity program. Critics such as 
geography theorist david harvey also complained about the intellectual 
incoherence of place-related claims. “The intimacy of many place-based 
accounts—Thoreau’s famous and influential exploration of Walden being 
an exemplary case—yields only limited natural knowledge embedded in 
ecological processes operating at a small scale.”57
In short, the romantic association with place, often featured in the 
bioregionalist wing of environmentalism, depends on an unhealthy green 
reliance on a rhetoric of nature—an overly romantic nature confused about 
scientific ecology and other markers of the “real.” Even worse, “place” risks 
conflating environmentalism with its recreational component. once these 
risks were noticed (and environmentalism’s critics were quick to notice), 
complaints about special pleading and frivolous romanticism were sure to 
follow.
Compared with other proponents of the ethical, Thoreau leaves him-
self unprotected from potential collapse into the role of moralizer. Too 
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often, Thoreau seems to present an ethical model primarily for the purpose 
of generating an opportunity to moralize. This is the source of the rigid-
ity that, eventually, so annoyed Emerson. And the tension persists: with 
their commitment to universality, scientism, and arguments from nature, 
contemporary environmentalists continually risk arrogance, moralism, and 
charges of authoritarianism. sanctimonious scolding is a perilous political 
posture. Although it certainly presents a focused, ethical model, it always 
risks offending its audience with its judgmental superiority. As King and 
Gandhi understood, taking this position while also hoping for positive po-
litical change requires adept and careful attention to politics.
The way to negotiate a way through this set of risks is explicitly po-
litical. here again, contemporary greens wrestle with Thoreau’s legacy, 
which does not provide happy political precedents, unless one borrows civil 
disobedience and swiftly flees from Thoreau to build a political apparatus 
around it, which is what Gandhi and King did. Thoreau cannot be blamed 
for the greens’ problem with politics, but the Thoreau the greens found 
did nothing to discourage an apolitical approach. Blame must be shared; 
the greens found a Thoreau who helped them avoid solving the problems 
inherent in his position—problems the greens were susceptible to, whether 
or not they ever found Thoreau. Thoreau gave contemporary environmen-
talism a promising ethical model, but one fraught with the risk that it would 
collapse into moralism, in ways that were potentially disastrous in social and 
political terms.
ultimately, Thoreau’s “strong but disorderly” convictions found their audi-
ence. disoriented by politics, Earth day–era environmentalists tended 
toward the grand gesture on behalf of claims powerful enough to seriously 
engage the world. Those early greens did not fit in their world any better 
than Thoreau did in his, and they appreciated him for what they shared. 
Environmentalists were blocked from an effective politicization of their 
movement: blocked by the very enormity of the reforms they habitually pro-
posed; blocked by their own elitism, which took a while to process; blocked 
by their own combination (shared with Thoreau) of science and mysticism. 
The flood of theory that emerged in the decade around Earth day—by 
Arne naess, Murray Bookchin, Barry Commoner, the Club of Rome (the 
Meadowses et al.), paul Ehrlich, and others—did not solve this puzzle.58
The present dilemma of American environmentalism might well be 
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understood as the long-delayed consequence of having been founded on 
such an odd and, finally, deficient political model. The payback was long 
delayed for several reasons. There was much to do in the interim, fight-
ing wilderness and wildlife issues, articulating the pollution model into a 
concern about toxic waste and then global warming, arranging a culture of 
healthiness, and so on. All of this was done on an ad hoc basis, with much 
more effort given to science than to political thought. The very breadth 
of the environmental claim ensures that there will never be a shortage of 
work to do. But there was also the remarkable and confounding backlash 
that wound from Reagan to Bush II. That development, at least, should 
have reminded greens that there was unfinished work, that some political 
dimension had to be added to the actual legacy inherited from Thoreau. 
Alas, a movement thus founded was hardly prepared to respond.
Although the multiple Thoreaus that made it to Earth day probably 
caused some political trouble for the greens, they also attested to Thoreau’s 
vivid literary accomplishment. The multiple Thoreaus left room for other 
theorists to rescue Thoreau from the environmentalists and to find in him 
the potential for a new kind of American political thought, which describes 
Bennett’s and Taylor’s projects. Environmentalists no longer need the natu-
ralist and moralist Thoreau; in the decades since Earth day, they have been 
creating their own contemporary models. The crucial turn is one away from 
naturalism, with its attendant risks, and toward politics, with the poten-
tial for negotiations around the political sense the movement still needs 
to make of itself.59 Environmentalists have political work to do, figuring 
out what to do about the profound backlash that leaves the united states, 
a century after the scopes monkey trial, with perhaps less confidence in 
natural science than it had when Clarence darrow strode the earth. An 
environmental movement that understands Thoreau’s legacy as decidedly 
mixed could yet confront its political situation.
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There was never yet philosopher
That could endure the toothache patiently.
—William Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing
Henry DaviD THoreau was plagued by bad teeth. They started fall-
ing out when he was twenty-one years old, and they occupy a considerable 
place in his journals. “Here i have swallowed an indispensable tooth,” he 
reports on august 27, 1838, “and so am no whole man, but a lame and 
halting piece of manhood.” Thoreau writes that the loss of the tooth has left 
him paralyzed—“i believe if i were called at this moment to rush into the 
thickest of the fight, i should halt for lack of so insignificant a piece of armor 
as a tooth”—and his frustration is palpable:
i am conscious of no gap in my soul, but it would seem that now the en-
trance to the oracle has been enlarged, the more rare and commonplace the 
responses that issue from it. i have felt cheap, and hardly dared hold up my 
head among men, ever since this accident happened. nothing can i do as well 
and freely as before; nothing do i undertake but i am hindered and balked by 
this circumstance. . . . one does not need that the earth quake for the sake of 
excitement—when so slight a crack—produces an impassable moat.
“verily,” Thoreau concludes, “i am the creature of circumstances.” Still, 
he adds, one must sometimes proceed in spite of circumstances. “Let the 
lame man shake his leg, and match himself with the fleetest in the race,” 
and “if you are toothless . . . open your mouth wide and gabble never so 
resolutely.”1
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in this reflection, written almost a decade before he took to the shores 
of Walden pond, Thoreau’s preoccupation with the human self—an em-
bodied mind, a mindful body—is already evident. indeed, questions about 
body and soul recur throughout Thoreau’s corpus, in both his published 
and unpublished writings. They are central questions for Thoreau because 
contemplation of the human self must precede, or underlie, a contempla-
tion of the possibilities of human self-governance. and the issue of human 
self-governance, as so many have observed, lies at the heart of Thoreau’s 
enterprise.
ultimately, Thoreau’s conception of the self, and therefore Thoreau’s 
conception of self-governance, turns on a complicated sense of human 
“doubleness.” Humans are “double-edged blades,” self-conscious creatures 
of body and soul.2 This notion of doubleness harks back to the ancient 
tradition of seeing humans as dual—and thus as flawed—creatures who 
resist philosophical integration. He thus resists certain modern views of the 
self, such as Hobbes’s rational man or Locke’s enlightenment man, which 
presume a unified human animal.3
yet Thoreau’s doubleness rests on more than a strict dualist framework, 
for he also believes that “the outward and the inward life correspond.”4 
Certain labors of the body may invigorate the spirit; certain spiritual con-
templations may elevate the body. and it is the truly successful man—albeit 
“the rarest success”—who learns to support his body and his spirit “by one 
& the same means,” who recognizes that both the body and the soul have 
moral status.5 Said differently, Thoreau conceives of a human being who, 
through disciplined exploration and contemplation of his own nature, dis-
covers himself to be the site of a harmonious, mysterious interplay between 
matter and spirit. Toward that end, human beings have a certain degree of 
transcendent power; following emerson, Thoreau sees a “lurking divinity 
of nature”—in George Kateb’s words—in the human animal.6 But self- 
reflection reveals that we must always remain at least partly mysterious to 
ourselves. “i do not know why we should be styled ‘misters’ or ‘masters,’” 
Thoreau writes. “We come so near to being anything or nothing” and are 
inwardly “indefinite.”7 The pursuit of self-knowledge—the kind of pursuit 
in which Thoreau engages in Walden—ultimately begets awareness of self-
mystery.8 So although on the surface the pursuit of self-knowledge seems to 
resemble a project of mastery, since both involve aspirational rejections of 
the status quo, they are radically opposed endeavors. projects of mastery, 
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for Thoreau, are predicated on a fundamental illusion: the illusion that 
humans can change or ignore the troublesome nature of the self.
Thus, for Thoreau, self-government lies within human capacity, but its 
realization is tricky and embattled, for self-government depends on individ-
uals committed to the pursuit of a certain kind of truth, individuals willing 
to honestly investigate themselves. These individuals must recognize, along 
with Thoreau, that “our whole life is startlingly moral” yet still not fully 
within our grasp. in human life, “there is never an instant’s truce between 
virtue and vice.”9 politics, as a conventional human form, is caught in the 
same battle, tempted by vice in the same way individuals are. and Thoreau 
sees a modern political world in which the pursuit of truth is often com-
promised by the embrace of projects of mastery, a political world in which 
the fundamental truths of human mystery and human morality are readily 
obscured.10 Modern political life, then, tends toward a politics of vice. For 
Thoreau, the only way to mitigate this tendency is to reinvigorate ancient 
understandings of the human animal, to point people back to wonder at 
human mystery and thus undermine modern conceits about the human 
condition. Thoreau’s plea for a revolution in government is no less than a 
plea for a revolution in his fellows’ understanding of their selves. “There are 
various tough problems yet to solve,” he writes, “and we must make shift to 
live, betwixt spirit and matter, such a human life as we can.”11
Double(ness) trouble
Thirteen years after his first mandibular meditation, Thoreau asserts, “if i 
have got false teeth, i trust that i have not got a false conscience.”12 Through-
out his corpus, Thoreau makes recourse to such a notion of human double-
ness, in which the spirit stands apart from the body. “However intense my 
experience,” he writes, “i am conscious of the presence and criticism of 
a part of me, which, as it were, is not a part of me, but spectator, sharing 
no experience, but taking note of it; and that is no more i than it is you.”13 
Human thought seems distinct from human action, for one can contemplate 
one’s physical doings—even one’s physical being—from a distance:
See how i can play with my fingers! They are the funniest companions i have 
ever found. Where did they come from? What strange control i have over 
them! Who am i? What are they?—those little peaks—call them Madison, 
Jefferson, Lafayette. What is the matter? My fingers ten, i say.14
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The spirit and the body may stand not just in positions of difference but also 
in positions of estrangement. “i stand in awe of my body,” Thoreau writes 
on Mount Ktaadn, “this matter to which i am bound has become so strange 
to me.”15
Moreover, both the spirit and the body have claims on the human 
animal; one does not necessarily govern the other. “i found in myself, and 
still find, an instinct toward a higher, or, as it is named, spiritual life, as do 
most men, and another toward a primitive rank and savage one,” Thoreau 
writes, having just felt the “thrill of savage delight” as he considered seizing 
a woodchuck and sinking his teeth into it. “i reverence them both. i love 
the wild not less than the good.”16 This is a fascinating statement, since if 
his wildness is worthy of Thoreau’s reverence and love, it has a kind of good-
ness as well. But Thoreau refuses to collapse the distinction between the 
unreflective bodily exertions that constitute “wildness,” in this case, and the 
reflective judgment that constitutes “good.” even if the “wild” or the bodily 
has a claim on human life—which means that sometimes one yearns to rip 
apart a woodland creature, and sometimes one actually does so—and even 
if those impulses are worthy of reverence by virtue of being part of the self, 
they are separate from a more thoughtful, spiritual good. “a true human-
ity, or account of human experience” encompasses both unreflective action 
and active reflection.17 at different times one trumps the other. (although 
Thoreau is known for his articulation of conscience-based resistance and ac-
tion, he is disarmingly honest about the fact that his wild desires sometimes 
dominate his hours: “Sometimes i like to spend my day more as the animals 
do,” hunting and fishing and rolling about in the woods.)18 This is part of 
what it means to be human; both are necessary components of human life 
and experience. But one should not collapse the two, for in collapsing the 
wild and the good, the body and the soul, one loses a sense of the conflicts 
and tensions that define human life and experience. and someone who col-
lapses that distinction is likely to act with little goodness at all.
indeed, central to Thoreau’s critique of his own civilization is that it 
has an enervating way of collapsing the body and the soul. “We think that 
that is which appears to be.”19 The social preoccupation with fashion, for 
instance, suggests the belief that a change in outfits is equivalent to a change 
in purpose. “We don garment after garment, as if we grew like exogenous 
plants by addition without.”20 His tailor, he says, “does not measure my 
character, but only the breadth of my shoulders, as it were a peg to hang 
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the coat on.”21 in such an environment, men learn to behave less like men 
and more like coat racks. in such a society, a scarecrow could have power; if 
dressed according to the fashion of the day, “who would not soonest address 
the scarecrow and salute it?”22 in such an environment, humans become 
habituated to the delusion that new enterprises “require new clothes, and 
not rather a new wearer of clothes.”23 in such an environment, any transfor-
mation or change in human life becomes nearly impossible; only the illusion 
of transformation or change exists. This is a critique that takes a central role 
in Walden’s final paragraphs:
We think that we can change our clothes only. it is said that the British em-
pire is very large and respectable, and that the united States are a first-rate 
power. We do not believe that a tide rises and falls behind every man which 
can float the British empire like a chip, if he should ever harbor it in his 
mind. Who knows what sort of seventeen-year locust will next come out of 
the ground?24
Before any true improvement in human life or governance is viable, humans 
must understand themselves to be creatures of both outward matter and 
inward spirit, where one cannot be neglected in favor of the other.
But if thinking is distinct from doing, and both thought and action have 
trumping rights in human life, the human condition may in fact be a kind 
of “tragedy.”25 That human beings are creatures of this kind of doubleness 
means that “we are double-edged blades.” as such, “every time we whet our 
virtue the return stroke straps our vice.” “Where,” wonders Thoreau, “is the 
skilful swordsman who can give clean wounds, and not rip up his work with 
the other edge?” Human life is a story of “incessant tragedies.”26 in fact, 
the tragic condition is a definitively human one, one that proceeds from 
the possibility—the necessity—of acting against our intellectual or spiritual 
judgment. Humans have a hand in their own fate, which makes human fate 
tragic, as Walter Hesford has explained, “whereas the hard fate of dumb 
creatures is more pathetic than tragic.”27 each human has the ability to be 
complicit in his or her own fall.
Humans may also be complicit—and more than complicit—in the falls 
of others. Thoreau’s comment on the “incessant tragedies” of human life 
comes between two stories about animals he and his brother John have 
killed: the pigeon they just killed for lunch, and the squirrels they killed for 
dinner the night before. Humans regularly do violence to nonhuman ani-
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mals, and casually so. Thoreau and his brother had watched as those squir-
rels “frisked so merrily in the morning,” then “skinned and embowelled” 
them. That would have been criminal enough—“who could commit so great 
a crime against a poor animal, who is fed only by the herbs which grow 
wild in the woods?”—but then they decide that eating the squirrels would 
be disgusting, so they throw away the bodies and boil some rice instead. 
Thoreau laments, “o me miserable!”28 Though he knows that all animal 
life ends in a fall, Thoreau sees in man’s flesh eating a carnality that deems 
souls separate from—or secondary to—bodies. in fact, he jokes that men 
tend to choose not to eat squirrels but to eat sheep or oxen, “whose souls 
perchance are not so large in proportion to their bodies.”29 of course, since 
the soul-to-body ratio is not a standard calculation in the human choice of 
what to eat, Thoreau underscores the extent to which humans are capable 
of making (almost literally!) soulless judgments.
The tragic nature of doubleness is perhaps best or most strikingly made 
manifest in humans’ relations with one another. as Thoreau puts it, “This 
doubleness may easily make us poor neighbors and friends sometimes.”30 
For human creatures, it is simple to behave with aloofness or apathy toward 
others, even when those others demonstrate a need for immediate action 
or help. “i may be affected by a theatrical exhibition; on the other hand, i 
may not be affected by an actual event which appears to concern me much 
more.” Because body and soul have their separations, and because we hu-
mans can effectively stand “beside” ourselves, we are capable of acting as if 
we have great concern for matters that are relatively distant from us, while 
acting with neglect for those things closest to us. “By a conscious effort of 
the mind we can stand aloof from actions and their consequences; and all 
things, good, and bad, go by us like a torrent.”31 arising from an internal dis-
connection of body and soul, doubleness allows for broader disconnection 
in human affairs. For Thoreau, as Lawrence Buell describes, “the possibility 
of drawing back at any moment from the experience to an immense critical 
and emotional distance remains.”32
Thoreau’s political speeches and writings, particularly on the question 
of slavery, tend to reflect his frustration with the detached doubleness of his 
fellows along these lines. When, in 1854, Thoreau perceives ambivalence 
among citizens in Massachusetts about the forced return of anthony Burns, 
a fugitive slave from virginia, he lambastes them for action unaffected by 
actual and proximate events:
Thoreau on Body and Soul 235
i had thought that the house was on fire, and not the prairie; but though 
several of the citizens of Massachusetts are now in prison for attempting to 
rescue a slave from her own clutches, not one of the speakers at that meeting 
expressed regret for it, not one even referred to it. it was only the disposition 
of some wild lands a thousand miles off, which appeared to concern them.33
Thoreau goes on to say that he is “surprised to see men going about their 
business as if nothing had happened.”34 “Talk of a divinity in man!”35 That 
his fellows are going about their business can mean one of two things. First, 
they might know that something disturbing has happened, and they choose 
to go about their business as if it had not, thus illustrating the possibil-
ity of detaching thought from action. Second, they might not know that 
something disturbing has happened—they might not recognize the moral 
import of the Burns case—thus demonstrating the possibility of acting 
without thinking at all, the possibility of moral dumbness. Thoreau sees 
in the human animal a pervasive tendency toward detachment between 
thought and deed, between knowledge and action. This is a central problem 
of conventional political life.
Given that assessment of human doubleness and its effects, it is reason-
able for Thoreau to argue in “resistance to Civil Government” that “it is not 
a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of 
any, even the most enormous wrong.”36 if, as a matter of course, one cannot 
expect action to reflect better judgment, one cannot argue that men have a 
“duty” to function otherwise; one can only argue, as Thoreau does, that if 
men are going to wash their hands of concern for a great wrong, they should 
try not to be complicit in it. it may be desirable for men to act against what 
they know to be a great wrong, and it may be frustrating when they do not. 
But given that the human constitution begins in savagery, and given that 
man “never completely over[comes] this part of his nature,” with its “ten-
dencies toward self-indulgence, self-centeredness, pride, and complacency,” 
it would be futile to attempt to derive a morally sensitive version of human 
nature from the notion of duty.37 To do so would be to ignore the basic 
difficulty of political life. “Compassion is a very untenable ground.”38 (as 
Thoreau puts it elsewhere, “i warn you, mothers, that my sympathies do not 
always make the usual phil-anthropic distinctions.”)39
Thoreau’s conception of the human as dual thus rejects modern 
theoretical conceptions of a well-formed, unified individual. For Thoreau, 
within a single moment in a single body, you may “experience an interval 
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as between one life and another—a greater space than you ever traveled.”40 
it therefore becomes untenable or inadequate to speak as if “the self is 
not a problem,” to join in the basic assumptions of the Cartesian model. 
(as peter McCormick has pointed out, “Descartes’ system of radical doubt, 
culminating in the famous cogito ergo sum, may have shocked the devout 
by questioning the existence of God, but it never questioned the existence 
or identity of the self that thought.”)41 Thoreau can make no such confident 
assumptions about the human animal; in fact, his meditations on doubleness 
often culminate in radical and stark self-questioning: “Contact! Contact! 
Who are we? where are we?”42 “Who am i?”43
Thoreau thus challenges political theories predicated on unproblematic, 
unified models of the individual. His conception of the self contains an im-
plicit critique of the social-contract model, which depends on the notion of 
rational individuals who are not only aware of their desires but also inclined 
to act on them with some degree of purposefulness. This is not Hobbes’s 
rational man, whose action is, by definition, always directed toward what is 
desired, toward one’s internally perceived good.44 nor is it Locke’s “natural” 
individual, whose actions derive from the desire to control one’s destiny 
through the exercise of reason.45 (in part, this explains why Thoreau has a 
famously more difficult relationship with government than do individuals in 
Hobbes’s or Locke’s formulations, although something superficially similar 
to a social-contract theory underwrites his argument in “resistance to Civil 
Government.”)46
also for Thoreau, it would be senseless to develop a political theory 
dependent on “rational and mutually disinterested” actors even as an ideal 
type, as in John rawls’s formulation.47 To formulate an “ideal human” in 
this way is to formulate a creature who is not recognizably human, whose 
conditions do not speak to the central truth—and the central problem—of 
human life, particularly at the relational or political level.48
Thoreau’s basic apprehension of the human animal, then, harks back to 
certain ancient understandings of human beings as resisting philosophical 
integration. That there are ancient overtones in Thoreau’s thought should 
not be surprising; certain classical writings seem to have dominated his 
intellectual life. in fact, Thoreau—the same Thoreau who regards sugar 
as a luxury—brings with him to Walden pond a copy of the Iliad, one of 
a set of classical works that he turns to time and again.49 He values those 
ancient texts, he told a Concord audience in 1851, because of their embrace 
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of wildness in humanity. The ancients, he believes, rightly portrayed human 
greatness as deriving from a primordial vitality that cannot be categorized, 
rationalized, or constrained.50
along those lines, Thoreau accepts the pre-Socratic formulation that 
“mind, nous, is separate from all of the things of which it also is a part,” 
a view that develops into a vision of the mind conflicting with the body.51 
as such, the human condition veers toward tragic outcomes. Thoreau sub-
scribes to the view of the ancient tragedians, as peter euben formulates 
it, that human nature is twofold in this way: “This man of unparalleled 
intelligence is a creature of the wild.” Doubleness defines human action 
and makes it problematic.52 Just as for the Greeks, Thoreau demands an 
“account of man in conflict with himself.”53
You Can’t Spell Globe without Lobe
But critically, Thoreau’s concept of human doubleness is not a concept of 
strict or unmitigated duality. Body and soul are not perfectly distinct. “The 
outward and the inward life correspond,” he writes to H. G. o. Blake. “The 
outward is only the outside of that which is within.”54 put another way: 
“packed in my mind lie all the clothes / which outward nature wears.”55 
Though Thoreau takes doubleness to be the human estate, he does not ig-
nore the fact that, in Jonathan Lear’s formulation, “minds must be embod-
ied.”56 in other words, though mind and body have their separations, they 
are still tangibly connected. as such, Thoreau extends his investigation to 
the character of the relationship between human matter and human spirit.
it is nature that suggests to Thoreau the ways in which the physical and 
extraphysical dimensions of life are fungible, if not coextensive. on a hillside 
next to Walden pond, Thoreau describes a stirring scene: “i am affected as 
if in a peculiar sense i stood in the laboratory of the artist who made the 
world and me,—had come to where he was still at work, sporting on this 
bank, and with excess of energy strewing his fresh designs about.” after 
this arresting introduction, in which he carefully places humans and the 
natural world on equal ground, Thoreau describes the dripping and shifting 
and thawing of streams in the morning. The whole process “is somewhat 
excrementitious in its character, and there is no end to the heaps of liver 
lights and bowels, as if the globe were turned wrong side outward.” To Tho-
reau, “this suggests at least that nature has some bowels, and there again is 
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mother of humanity.”57 The globe is like an animal body, internally “a moist 
thick lobe, a word especially applicable to the liver and lungs and the leaves 
of fat.” in the gooey physicality of the phenomenon, he draws parallels to 
the human form: the watery paths form like blood vessels, and its channels 
are arteries; the softened sand is “like the ball of the finger”; “in the silicious 
matter which the water deposits is perhaps the bony system, and in the still 
finer soil and organic matter the fleshy fibre or cellular tissue.”
What is man but a mass of thawing clay? The ball of the human finger is but 
a drop congealed. The fingers and toes flow to their extent from the thawing 
mass of the body. . . . is not the hand a spreading palm leaf with its lobes 
and veins? The ear may be regarded, fancifully, as a lichen, umbilicaria, on 
the side of the head, with its lobe or drop. The lip (labium, from labor (?)) 
laps or lapses from the sides of the cavernous mouth. The nose is a manifest 
congealed drop or stalactite. The chin is a still larger drop, the confluent 
dripping of the face. The cheeks are a slide from the brows into the valley of 
the face, opposed and diffused by the cheek bones.
The relation between the human body and the body of the world demon-
strates itself not only in a physical similarity but also in the whole language 
of nature: internally, it is “λειβω, labor, lapsus, to flow or slip downward, 
a lapsing; λοβος, globus, lobe, globe; also lap, flap and many other words,” 
while “externally, a dry thin leaf, even as the f and v are a pressed and dried 
b.”58 in this rendering of the connection between man and earth, as philip 
Gura has said, “the deepest layers of language, of man’s very articulation, 
reinforce this knowledge.”59 “What is man,” Thoreau asks, “but a mass of 
thawing clay?”
yet if the globe is a laboring bodily mass, in its most viscous and gluti-
nous processes like a human body, it is still something more. The leaves of 
fat are the prototype for “the overhanging leaf” and for “the feathers and 
wings of birds,” which “are still drier and thinner leaves.” So, by the labors 
of the globe, “you pass from the lumpish grub in the earth to the airy and 
fluttering butterfly. The very globe continually transcends and translates 
itself, and becomes winged in its orbit.”60
What is perhaps most crucial about this passage is Thoreau’s com-
plication of the relationship between matter and spirit. in it, animal mat-
ter—animal matter of the lowest or most earthbound sort—comes to have 
a kind of spiritual dimension. “Heaven is under our feet as well as over our 
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heads.”61 in its living processes, “the spontaneous language of nature,” to 
use Leo Marx’s formulation, supplies “value and meaning.”62
The implication for human life is apparent. if the globe, a thawing 
and oozing animal body, is capable of transcending and translating itself 
through physical action, then the human, a nearly identical thawing and 
oozing animal body, is capable of transcending and translating itself by the 
same actions. The “common vital impulse” that is shared in human and 
other natural forms points toward the possibility of self-generated change 
or elevation.63 “The body, then, for Thoreau, is a conduit between spirit and 
matter.”64 nature teaches that bodies themselves may be the vehicles for 
transcendence.
There may be an even more striking political implication born in this 
moment. after Thoreau speaks of the globe’s own transformation, he con-
cludes that “the whole tree itself is but one leaf, and rivers are still vaster 
leaves whose pulp is intervening earth, and towns and cities are the ova of 
insects in their axils.”65 He suggests, in doing so, that civilized human soci-
ety has a place in the natural formulation of self-cultivating transcendence. 
as John pipkin notes, this is the “closest that Thoreau ever comes . . . to 
subsuming the human and natural landscapes under one model.”66 in other 
words, it is not just humans as individual beings or bodies that contain the 
capacity for higher change; human “towns and cities” are also latent with 
this possibility.
accordingly, Thoreau marvels at “the unquestionable ability of man to 
elevate his life by a conscious endeavor.”67 This conscious endeavor takes 
two primary forms, both of which proceed from assumptions that blur the 
line between body and soul. First is the notion that through certain types 
of cultivation of his bodily life, a human may elevate his spiritual or moral 
state. Second is the notion that the contemplation of one’s own bodily na-
ture may lead to a kind of spiritual redemption.68
“Who knows but if men constructed their dwellings with their own 
hands, and provided food for themselves and families simply and honestly 
enough, the poetic faculty would be universally developed?”69 Thoreau 
believes he knows the answer to this question; in well-acknowledged ways, 
Walden is a “pattern-book of practices” designed to connect seemingly 
banal physical exertions to experiences of greater meaning.70 But more 
specifically, Thoreau is interested in the cultivation of a particular kind of 
physical exertion: artful and purposeful work. Work is “in the higher sense 
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a discipline,” one that might “be elevating a ladder, the means by which we 
are translated”:
How admirably the artist is made to accomplish his self-culture by devotion 
to his art! The wood-sawyer, through his effort to do his work well, becomes 
not merely a better wood-sawyer, but measurably a better man. Few are the 
men that can work on their navels,—only some Brahmins that i have heard 
of. To the painter is given some paint and canvas instead; to the irishman 
a hog, typical of himself. in a thousand apparently humble ways men busy 
themselves to make some right take the place of some wrong, if it is only to 
make a better paste-blacking,—and they are themselves so much the better 
morally for it.71
Here, Thoreau draws a connection between the purposeful cultivation of 
one’s physical labors and the development of a higher spiritual state. The art 
of labor and the labor of art are superior to intellectualism, for both their 
inputs and their outcomes are tangible. “We are all sculptors and paint-
ers, and our material is our own flesh and blood and bones,” he writes.72 a 
painter can take a blank canvas and some jars of oil and transform them 
into a picture of enduring beauty that affects other human souls. So would 
Thoreau have us envision our lives: take the materials you are given and 
transform them; in doing so, you will be transformed by them. Such a life of 
work and commitment, reminiscent of emerson’s notion of “vocation,” is not 
a static endeavor but rather an “unfolding,” a process of discovery.73
Thoreau’s radical reconception of work as art, or as cultivation, leads 
him to suggest that in all parts of human life, to proceed with bodily pur-
pose is to invoke a spiritual purpose; “every walk is a sort of crusade.”74 
one learns by developing an “art of life” in which tangible practice informs 
the spirit or intellect.75 if a scholar is wise, he says, “he will confine the 
observations of his mind as closely as possible to the experience or life of 
his senses,” and “his thought must live with and be inspired with the life of 
the body.”76 Thus, for Thoreau, the most troubling kind of men are those 
“of ideas instead of legs, a sort of intellectual centipede that made you 
crawl all over”; in other words, traditional intellectuals have the equation 
backward.77 “our resolution is taking root or hold on the earth then, as 
seeds first send a shoot downward which is fed by their own albumen, ere 
they send one upward to the light.”78 Mind and soul are enhanced through 
cultivated engagement with the world; thought should not proceed without 
reference to experience, without something to hold on to.
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at the same time, Thoreau argues that the contemplation of one’s 
bodily nature is a vital component of self-cultivation. one’s intellectual en-
ergies are properly directed to one’s tangible aspects. He lauds the “Hindoo 
lawgiver” who “teaches how to eat, drink, cohabit, void excrement and urine, 
and the like, elevating what is mean.”79 To take one’s embodiment seriously 
is to take oneself seriously—one’s whole self, warts and liver and excrement 
and all. Contemplating matter gives that matter a spiritual status. it also 
complicates one’s understanding of that matter. as Brian Walker has noted, 
Thoreau’s love of physical cultivation is not unconditional; by contemplation, 
he wants people to “put the work of cultivation in perspective” and “see it as 
more morally complicated than we at first would think.”80 Thoreau, writes 
Buell, is not “about ascending to a spiritual state in which the body is left 
behind, but about reforming the bodily life . . . so that even the seemingly 
ignobler functions are purified.”81 it is something for a man, says Thoreau, 
“to practise some new austerity, to let his mind descend into his body and 
redeem it, and treat himself with ever increasing respect.”82
all these endeavors point, ultimately, to the possibility that the hu-
man individual can develop ever more refined harmonies of body and 
soul. This is the standard set by nature. “What nature is to the mind she 
is also to the body,” he writes. “as she feeds my imagination, she will feed 
my body.”83 Following the model of nature, humans can aspire to be that 
“rarest success” who supports body and soul “by one & the same means,” 
who achieves self-synchronization.84 That is, Thoreau conceives of a human 
being who, through disciplined exploration and contemplation of his own 
nature, discovers himself to be the site of a harmonious interplay between 
matter and spirit. Toward that end, human beings have a certain degree of 
transcendent power.
The ancient overtones of Thoreau’s thought—the notion that “a good 
body [is] the necessary correlative of the good soul”—ring through this 
trajectory of thought as well.85 Here, though, Thoreau’s turn toward ancient 
political thought bears a decidedly Stoic influence. The Stoics were ever 
present in Thoreau’s mind; he had decided as a young man that the Sto-
ics, particularly Zeno, apprehended the world as he did.86 and though he 
seems to have had little systematic or formal training in Stoic thought, as 
robert Sattelmeyer notes, “Thoreau’s notion of the ideal relation between 
philosophy and life is perhaps best represented by the Stoics,” about whom 
he always commented approvingly.87
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Like the Stoics, Thoreau wants to resist a strict or impenetrable dual-
ism while preserving the basic insights of the dualist model. He too turns to 
the corporeality of nature as a model for thinking about human possibility 
and asserts, along Stoic lines, that “the capacity to act and be acted upon” is 
possessed only by what is corporeal in nature.88 Thus, Thoreau ascribes to 
the human body a moral standing in which actions of the body can them-
selves be spiritually transformative. But whereas the Stoics would proceed 
to use this understanding as a means to collapse the distinction between 
body and soul altogether—the Stoics moved toward the conclusion that the 
soul itself is matter—Thoreau continues to assert that the body is merely 
a channel for the spirit. Human bodies are worthy of reverence—each is 
a “temple” where worship may happen, and for that, each has value—but 
they themselves are not the objects of worship.89
Body Building(s)
Thoreau understands that bodies, like temples and other material things, 
set limits on spirit and thought. “Thinking about the body is both exhila-
rating and sobering for the thinker,” Leon Kass reminds us. it is exhilarat-
ing for the thinker “because it shows the possibility of a more integrated 
account of his own psychosomatic being”—demonstrating how the body 
prepares him for “the active life of thought and communication.” But it is 
sobering “because it shows him the limits on the power of thought to free 
him from embodiment, setting limits on thought understood as a tool for 
mastery.”90
To a degree, Thoreau’s plea for self-development and the pursuit of 
truth through the cultivation of labor and the contemplation of body looks 
suspiciously like a project of progress or mastery. Both, after all, are aspira-
tional models posited against the status quo. Both promise transformation. 
But Thoreau ultimately aims to teach humans to come to terms with their 
own embodiment and thus the limits of human transformation. Some of 
his most shocking formulations of the relationship between mind and mat-
ter—“Shall i not have intelligence with the earth? am i not partly leaves 
and vegetable mould myself?”—deflate the hubristic human aspiration 
to transcend the corporeal.91 one must try to harmonize body and soul 
because the soul has its home in the body. The body is the human circum-
stance, the contingent set of material facts within which intellect and spirit 
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operate. one must pay attention to the possibilities offered within a given 
material circumstance, but one must also pay attention to the fundamental 
limitations of that circumstance. Bodily limitation is definitive. Humans are 
mortal, after all, as Thoreau says almost cheekily in Cape Cod: “it is hard to 
part with one’s body, but no doubt, it is easy enough to do without it when 
once it is gone.”92
Thoreau strips away the illusion that we can completely master or go 
beyond certain bodily limits. our bodies preclude us from operating in all 
spaces at all times; for three months out of every year in new england, for 
example, “the human destiny is wrapped in furs.”93 When he proclaims that 
“no dominion of nature is quite closed to man at all times,” he is also sug-
gesting that no dominion of nature is ever completely open to man, either.94 
Likewise, when he asserts, “my head is hands and feet,” he intimates not 
only that his head is the location for his exploratory capacity but also that his 
head is inextricably subsumed within his body.95 embodiment constrains 
human action; there is a limit to the transcendentalist notion of always 
being able to transcend boundaries. For Thoreau, there is no emersonian 
vision of a “kingdom of man over nature” in which an “advancing spirit” 
forges a path to a world in which “evil is no more seen.”96
Thoreau’s model of self-cultivation also underscores the extent to which 
we human beings must remain at least partly mysterious to ourselves, and 
the permanence of this mystery is perhaps the enduring human truth. “at 
the same time that we are earnest to explore and learn all things, we require 
that all things be mysterious and unexplorable.”97 This is nowhere more true 
than in the region of the self. “Direct your eye sight inward, and you’ll find / 
a thousand regions in your mind / yet undiscovered.”98 For Thoreau, this 
remains true no matter how much inward attention one has already paid.
in fact, it seems that the more a human reflects on his nature, the more 
he comes to sense its mysteries. it is no coincidence that Thoreau ends 
Walden with the notion that “the life in us is like the water in the river.”99 
This sentiment echoes one of Thoreau’s unpublished poems: “i was born 
upon the banks, river, / My blood flows in thy stream, / and thou meander-
est forever / as the bottom of my dream.” For Thoreau, identification with 
the water is identification with a “mystical entity,” as allen Beecher Hovey 
has noted.100 The water in a river is something we can possess only in infini-
tesimally small bits. Water falls through our hands, resisting our best efforts 
to contain it. it is always moving, so that no single snapshot or image of it is 
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like another. even when one considers a river from a fixed point, the river 
itself shifts, restricting and limiting the possibilities of sustained examina-
tion.101 although contemplation of the water in a river provides moments of 
solace, it forces us to ask a continual stream of questions. Where does the 
water come from? Will it ever stop flowing? How high or low might it get? 
Having come to the end of his many experiments, Thoreau’s apprehension 
of human life is that it is fundamentally mysterious, eluding a perfect grasp. 
The attempt at self-mastery begets awareness of self-mystery.
accordingly, Thoreau posits his own experiments as not only distinct 
from but also opposed to projects of human mastery. “i do not know why 
we should be styled ‘misters’ or ‘masters,’” Thoreau writes; “we come so 
near to being anything or nothing” and are inwardly “indefinite.”102 as 
emerson would reflect, “The meaning of nature was never attempted to 
be defined by him.”103 Thoreau defends the reality of an “undetermined, 
if poetic, existence” in which there is always an underlying “uncertainty” 
about humanity.104 our ultimate truth is an ultimate mystery.
Thoreau thus finds much to criticize in the civilization of which he is 
a part. He has deep suspicions about scientific enterprises and claims of 
progress precisely because they tend to downplay the mystery of existence 
that is also its most fundamental truth. as David robinson writes, although 
Thoreau “understood and used science with increasing sophistication, he 
remained alert to its potential power to obscure the very thing that is pre-
sumably illuminated”:
“The mystery of the life of plants is kindred with that of our own lives,” he 
wrote in 1859, adding this cautionary proviso: “The physiologist must not 
presume to explain their growth according to mechanical laws, or as he might 
explain some machinery of his own making. We must not expect to prove with 
our fingers the sanctuary of any life, whether animal or vegetable. if we do, 
we shall discover nothing but surface still.”105
Science, for Thoreau, is involved only at the apparent level of things. The 
more it attempts to explain and thus control, the less it in fact knows. 
Thoreau sees this kind of misguided pursuit of mastery not just in 
scientific pursuits but also in the fabric of daily american habits. robert 
Kuhn McGregor recalls:
people had deluded themselves into believing themselves separate from the 
rest. . . . By domesticating plants and animals, humankind had set itself up as 
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“the lord of the fowl and the brute.” But there was a price for this domination: 
“Birds certainly are afraid of man. They [allow] all other creatures—cows 
and horses, etc.—excepting only one or two kinds, birds or beasts of prey, to 
come near them, but not man. What does this fact signify? Does it not signify 
that man too, is a beast of prey to them? is he, then, a true lord of creation, 
whose subjects are afraid of him, and with reason? They know very well that 
he is not human, as he pretends to be.”106
This appetite for domination and mastery, which Thoreau sees evidenced 
not only in the domestication of animals but also in the destruction of new 
england’s forests and the wanton slaughter of wild creatures, demonstrates 
a society that is lost in surface and appearance.
But nowhere is Thoreau’s hostility toward the modern project more 
evident than in his biting criticisms of technophilia and its underlying per-
fectionist assumptions. reviewing J. a. etzler’s The Paradise within the 
Reach of All Men, without Labour, by Powers of Nature and Machinery, 
Thoreau laments the present science, which thinks “not that man will al-
ways be the victim of circumstance” but that someday man “shall indeed 
be the lord of creation.” Through the development of machinery, “thus is 
paradise to be regained, and that old and stern decree at length reversed. 
Man shall no more earn his living by the sweat of his brow.” To that notion, 
Thoreau replies:
in fact no work can be shirked. it may be postponed indefinitely, but not in-
finitely. nor can any really important work be made easier by co-operation or 
machinery. not one particle of labor now threatening any man can be routed 
without being performed. it cannot be hunted out of the vicinity like jackals 
and hyenas. it will not run. you may begin by sawing the little sticks, or you 
may saw the great sticks first, but sooner or later you must saw them both.107
as H. Daniel peck has observed, “The ‘restless, nervous, bustling, trivial 
nineteenth Century’ had obscured . . . nature’s centrality to human life.” 
Therefore, “what was needed was a reorientation, or repositioning, of the 
self toward the world.”108 at the heart of Thoreau’s project is an attempt at 
that reorientation.
The skeleton of Thoreau’s enterprise, the framework on which all else 
hangs, is his rejection of modern notions of the human self and a return 
to more classical understandings. The failure of modern politics lies in the 
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modern habit of neglecting and obscuring human self-knowledge. That 
self-knowledge—the knowledge that we each are constrained and mysteri-
ous—remains unapprehended by a culture won over by the illusion of its 
own mastery. So moderns mistake apparent changes for substantive ones 
and technological improvement for human improvement. Thoreau’s fellows, 
he thinks, are doing so much rearranging of the furniture.
Modern citizens have been lured, via a habituated faith in the possibil-
ity of dominion and mastery, into the notion that change can be sudden and 
radical, that within short periods of time, “the whole face of nature shall be 
changed”—or can be changed.109 against such seductive fantasies, Thoreau 
cautions: “revolutions are never sudden.”110 revolutions and other trans-
formations depend first on a kind of moral reform that is not apparent. it is 
inward, and even if it is cataclysmic on the inside, it may not seem so on the 
outside. (Contrary to Shakespeare’s assertion, Thoreau is a philosopher who 
cultivates patience with a toothache.) For Thoreau, true revolution does not 
depend on the dramatic and apparent changes that science or technology 
offers; rather, true revolution depends on a kind of humane progress that 
happens through the transformation of individual souls over time, who then 
subtly or dramatically transform their broader environs.111 as richard Groff 
writes:
Could new external patterns bring about a change of heart in man, or make 
him happier, or in any important sense better off? Thoreau doubted it. He 
believed that only a spiritual rebirth in the individual could bring this about. 
. . . an essential difference between the social reformer or political agita-
tor and the prophet is that the former, in looking for his first convert, starts 
off eagerly down the road, while the latter sits down quietly to confront— 
himself.112
Such change does not have the appeal of being glamorous or easy, but it has 
the advantage of being truly transformative in the long term. “it is men who 
have got to make the law free,” Thoreau instructs, by freeing themselves 
from even their cherished and instituted illusions.113 Thoreau’s is not a call 
to retreat from political life but rather a call to reform it from within by 
grappling with the hard facts of body and soul: the fact that embodiment 
imposes constraints on human possibility and that an unfathomable mystery 
of existence imposes constraints on human knowledge. Thoreau counsels:
look inward first, and learn. We humans cannot be perfect masters, even 
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of ourselves. Still, “there are various tough problems yet to solve, and we 
must make shift to live, betwixt spirit and matter, such a human life as we 
can.”114
We humans must make do with a series of imperfect possibilities de-
fined by our constraints. ultimately, humans are limited by time. Thoreau 
says that when contemplating Jesus’ teaching that “heaven and earth shall 
pass away, but my words shall not pass away,” he “draw[s] near to him.”115 
The greatest possibility for human transcendence, perhaps, lies in the one 
method by which human minds and spirits can find each other, uncon-
strained by bodies: in written form. as Stanley Cavell argues, in Walden, 
Thoreau is invested in the possibility of creating “sacred text,” in the pos-
sibility that writing can take him “just far enough” away from others “to be 
seen clearly.” Thoreau recognizes that “writing is a labor of the hands,” the 
kind of labor that yields a material crop.116
Consider Thoreau’s statement: “if we would enjoy the most intimate 
society with that in each of us which is without, or above, being spoken 
to, we must not only be silent, but commonly so far apart bodily that we 
cannot possibly hear each other’s voice in any case.” By this standard, as he 
notes, the spoken word is insufficient.117 The written word, however, may be 
sufficient:
There is a memorable interval between the spoken and the written language, 
the language heard and the language read. The one is commonly transitory, 
a sound, a tongue, a dialect merely, almost brutish, and we learn it uncon-
sciously, like the brutes, of our mothers. The other is maturity and experience 
of that; if that is our mother tongue, this is our father tongue, a reserved and 
select expression, too significant to be heard by the ear, which we must be 
born again in order to speak.118
if moral reform, and therefore political reform, is silent and inward and 
patient, it depends on written words for the sustenance and nourishment 
of camaraderie. Descending inward into the cave of the self is only the 
first step in the pursuit of knowledge, and it is a solitary one. Committing 
that pursuit to the page is how we begin to help others ascend, slowly and 
haltingly and with all our imperfections, toward a better life.
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For most men, it seems to me, are in a strange uncertainty about [life], whether 
it is of the devil or of God, and have somewhat hastily concluded that it is the 
chief end of man here to “glorify God and enjoy him forever.”
—Thoreau, Walden
Through a Glass Darkly
“EnvironmEnTal sainT,” “pastoral hermit,” “pantheistic philosopher 
and religious contemplative”—these are only a few of the labels applied to 
Thoreau that suggest he was a religious thinker. among Thoreau’s contem-
poraries, Emerson was not alone in insisting that although he “used in his 
writings a certain petulance of remark in reference to churches and church-
men,” he was actually “a person of . . . absolute religion.”1 more recent com-
mentators have arrived at the same conclusion. lawrence Buell describes 
“the religiocentric inquest into the correspondence between the natural and 
the spiritual” as central to Thoreau’s environmental projects.2 For Buell and 
others, any understanding of Thoreau as a naturalist, literary artist, or social 
critic must also take account of the “devotional” calling without which he 
thought “nothing great was ever accomplished.”3 Thus, while granting that 
Thoreau was “a highly accomplished and ambitious writer,” alan Hodder 
echoes Emerson in asserting that “a dispassionate reader of his journals, his 
letters, Walden, or A Week can hardly deny that he was an irreclaimably 
religious person as well.”4
These very texts should move us to consider, however, whether such a 
conclusion is (as Thoreau says) “somewhat hastily” reached. The question 
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itself may be hastily posed. in his journal entry for June 23, 1840, Thoreau 
remarks, “We Yankees are not so far from right, who answer one question 
by asking another. . . . a true answer will not aim to establish anything, but 
rather to set all well afloat.”5 in posing the question of Thoreau’s religion, 
one could proceed by settling on the meaning of terms and showing that 
his thought satisfies those definitions (one could “establish” his religiosity), 
or one could allow his writing to do what it does so effectively: “to set all 
well afloat.” Emerson famously observed that although Thoreau’s life was 
intimately connected with nature, “the meaning of nature was never at-
tempted to be defined by him.”6 This did not prevent Thoreau from “speak-
ing a word” for it. His unwillingness to define nature followed from the 
meaning he saw it as having. The same may be said, i believe, of Thoreau’s 
religion. He himself says as much in the concluding chapter of Walden: 
“The words which express our faith and piety are not definite; yet they are 
significant and fragrant like frankincense to superior natures.”7
in what follows, i argue that Thoreau’s vision is fundamentally theologi-
cal. This is not to say that his thinking is positively theistic. in approaching 
the question of Thoreau’s religiosity, i am not primarily concerned with 
establishing his position on the existence of a transcendent or personal God. 
Thoreau is no more a positivist about religion than he is about anything 
else. indeed, this very point is crucial to understanding his religiosity. “The 
wisest man,” he writes, “preaches no doctrines; he has no scheme; he sees 
no rafter, not even a cobweb, against the heavens. it is clear sky.”8 Thoreau’s 
religious view sits within his overall vision of nature. This does not mean 
that he reduces the divine to the natural, nor does it make him a pantheist. 
Those who read Thoreau as either replacing God with nature or locating 
the divine entirely within it are themselves somewhat hasty in treating 
nature as conceptually solid ground. They overlook the indefinite nature of 
Thoreau’s nature.
Given the difficulty of coming to terms with Thoreau’s religiosity, it is 
tempting to interpret the religious expressions used by and about him as 
mere metaphors or rhetorical gestures. We know that terms such as proph-
ecy or pilgrimage, reverence or redemption, can be detached from their 
strictly religious meaning. But we may overlook the fact that when these 
terms are being used in the conventionally religious sense, they are already 
being used as metaphors. an original meaning underlies their conventional 
appropriation—one that is more experientially concrete. instead of using 
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religious language in a way that is less strictly religious, a departure from 
the conventional meaning might serve to reconnect such language to its 
original source. although Thoreau may seek to express his faith in terms 
that are not definite, he never uses words loosely. on the contrary: “He 
would be a poet . . . who nailed words to their primitive senses . . . who 
derived his words as often as he used them” and “transplanted them to his 
page with earth adhering to their roots.”9
This is not to say that Thoreau’s etymologically faithful use of language 
necessarily expresses a distinctly religious faith. in the “sunday” chapter 
of A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, he performs just such a 
derivation, nailing down a sense of the religious that provides the basis for 
what sounds like a critique:
in the latter part of the seventeenth century, according to the historian of 
Dunstable, “Towns were directed to erect ‘a cage’ near the meeting-house, 
and in this all offenders against the sanctity of the sabbath were confined.” 
society has relaxed a little from its strictness, one would say, but i presume 
that there is not less religion than formerly. if the ligature is found to be 
loosened in one part, it is only drawn the tighter in another.10
in making this observation, Thoreau places himself among the “offenders 
against the sanctity of the sabbath”: “as we passed under the last bridge 
over the canal . . . the people coming out of church paused to look at us 
from above, and apparently, so strong is custom, indulged in some heathen-
ish comparisons; but we were the truest observers of this sunny day.”11 if 
Thoreau is “observant,” this passage suggests, it is from a standpoint outside 
the religious. He is in no way caged, but rather set afloat.
it is this critical voice that is most prominent in readings such as those of 
robert D. richardson Jr. on richardson’s reading, although “Walking” may 
begin and end with a movement toward the Holy land (and is underwrit-
ten by a religious derivation of the verb to saunter), it remains a “pointedly 
secular” essay.12 Thoreau’s invocation of “wildness” as a source of salvation is, 
for richardson, a parodic statement of faith (“i believe in the forest, and in 
the meadow, and in the night in which corn grows”) or a call to conversion 
from the “religion of God” to the “religion of nature.”13 Thoreau’s outlook, 
focused as it is on that “great awakening light” to which the final passage 
of “Walking” looks forward, is (for richardson) that of a “secular luminist,” 
concerned with the wonders not of the invisible but of the visible world.14
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With regard to the theme of awakening that figures so prominently in 
Walden, richardson argues that although the experience Thoreau describes 
may be a “spiritual” one, it incorporates no theological elements. it is reli-
gious only “in the broadest sense of the word.”15 When Thoreau says that he 
“got up early and bathed in the pond” and calls this “a religious exercise, and 
one of the best things [he] did,” he means it.16 He is, as he says, “a sincere 
worshipper of aurora,” and he bathes, as we sometimes say, “religiously” (as 
a regular practice). What this signifies for richardson, however, is nothing 
like baptism; it is “an awakening to daily renewal, not to eternal redemp-
tion.”17 in richardson’s view, Thoreau “was not interested in a religion that 
strove to redeem man from this world, or to raise him above it.” if anything, 
Thoreau strove to reverse the sort of dualism—between the visible and the 
invisible, this world and the next—that Christianity seems (to richardson) 
to presuppose. The foundation for Thoreau’s sense of reverence was “his 
recognition that the divine is to be found in the natural world,” as opposed 
to the “supernatural.”18
all this demonstrates how variously Thoreau can be interpreted. it 
is not just the interpreters who are responsible. Thoreau’s own role in his 
enigmatic self-presentation is widely recognized.19 But even if the experi-
ence of reading Thoreau is always that of seeing through a glass darkly, 
these refracted interpretations help focus the question: what is the nature 
of that “one true vision” Thoreau seeks to communicate, which he likens to 
a communication “with the gods”?20
Thoreau’s religion, i argue, is rooted in a way of seeing.21 This way of 
seeing is essentially a form a communion. The communion Thoreau seeks 
through his engagement with the natural world is a realization of (what he 
calls) “moral freedom.” it is reverential and redemptive in ways that we fail 
to understand if we think such notions presuppose a dualistic conception 
of reality. Thoreau’s vision of nature points beyond nature, to a divinely 
creative source. as such, it incorporates a form of religious transcendence 
that is seldom recognized. as Thoreau sees it, nature points beyond itself, to 
a transcendent ground that is neither separable from nor reducible to it.
Faithfulness to the Earth: One Day Out of A Week
richardson’s claim that the language Thoreau uses to express his religious 
ideas “turns to Hindu, Chinese, and above all Greek religion to the pointed 
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exclusion of Christianity”—that he “does not use or suggest the language 
of redemption”—is not entirely accurate.22 Thoreau’s use of such language 
should not be overlooked. at the same time, we cannot overlook the proto-
nietzschean strain in Thoreau’s rejection of all life-denying ideals.23 as 
Zarathustra exhorts, “i beseech you! remain faithful to the earth, and do 
not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes! . . . To sin against 
the earth is now the most dreadful thing, and to esteem the entrails of the 
unknowable higher than the meaning of the earth.”24 Thoreau’s declaration 
that he “went to the woods because [he] wished to live deliberately” and 
that he “did not wish to live what was not life” can be read in this light. The 
aim of Thoreau’s experiment is, as he professes, “to live deep and suck out 
all the marrow of life, to live so sturdily and spartan-like as to put to rout 
all that was not life . . . to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its lowest 
terms, and, if it proved to be mean, why then to get the whole and genuine 
meanness of it.”25 such rhetoric seems to steer us not toward but away from 
transcendent realities or a heavenly realm of meaning and value. This, it 
seems, is the conclusion Thoreau reaches in his reflections on Walden pond: 
“nature has no human inhabitant who appreciates her. . . . Talk of heaven! 
Ye disgrace earth.”26
However “deliberate” these sayings may appear, they are not disposi-
tive.27 Thoreau’s statements of or about religious faith are often dialectical, 
in that what is said or suggested in one place is seemingly canceled or ne-
gated in another. Thus, in Walden’s opening chapter, Thoreau complains 
that “we now no longer camp as for a night, but have settled down on earth 
and forgotten heaven. . . . We have built for this world a family mansion and 
for the next a family tomb.”28 one might be overly hasty in relying on pas-
sages in which Thoreau expresses his thoughts in explicitly religious terms. 
But then, one might also be overly hasty in citing passages such as this from 
his journal (october 1842): “i feel that i draw nearest to understanding 
the great secret of my life in my closest intercourse with nature. There is 
a reality and health in (present) nature; which is not to be found in any 
religion. . . . i suppose that what in other men is religion is in me love 
of nature.” nature, it appears, can furnish something religion cannot—the 
kind of “health” that nietzsche associates with faithfulness to the earth, as 
opposed to those “otherworldly hopes” that would sicken us and it. Thus, 
we might conclude that Thoreau simply rejects religion in favor of a return 
to nature. What Thoreau actually says, however, is not that simple. nature 
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offers not just reality and health but also illumination, the understanding 
of a “great secret” that Thoreau approaches only in his “closest intercourse” 
with nature—that is, when nature is “present” to him, and he to it. Even 
in that moment of presence, however, the promise is not entirely fulfilled; 
the great secret remains a secret, for even then, Thoreau does not arrive at 
this understanding but draws “nearest to” it. nature’s promise, moreover, is 
not strictly opposed to the religious, for what “in other men is religion” is 
not necessarily (and perhaps not at all) the religious as such. The critique 
keeps the promise of an authentic religiosity alive. it is this that is “not to be 
found” in “any religion.”
What exactly is missing? The precise focus of Thoreau’s complaints 
about religion, and about Christianity in particular, is hard to determine. in 
the opening chapter of Walden, Thoreau laments:
our manners have been corrupted by communication with the saints. our 
hymn-books resound with a melodious cursing of God and enduring him 
forever. one would say that even the prophets and redeemers had rather con-
soled the fears than confirmed the hopes of man. There is nowhere recorded 
a simple and irrepressible satisfaction with the gift of life, any memorable 
praise of God.29
What is missing is not just a greater love for nature but a more memorable 
praise of God. Just as the “next world” deserves better than the building of 
a tomb, the religious should do more than simply console our worldly fears. 
Here again, Thoreau wants to see a greater hope confirmed—an “irrepress-
ible satisfaction” with “the gift of life” and its “secret.”
it is not the religious as such, Thoreau suggests, but our conventional 
adherence to it that is corruptive. our “communication with the saints” 
is not a true communion. any religion is corrupt when it is disconnected 
from life. restoring that connection involves more than simply returning 
to nature, for as Thoreau constantly reminds us, our communication with 
nature is as prone to corruption as our communication with the saints:
men nowhere, east or west, live yet a natural life, round which the vine clings, 
and which the elm willingly shadows. man would desecrate it by his touch, 
and so the beauty of the world remains veiled to him. He needs not only to 
be spiritualized, but naturalized, on the soil of the earth. . . . We need to be 
earth-born as well as heaven-born.30
Thoreau’s “natural” life is not set against the religious as the only authentic 
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alternative. The question of an authentic naturality mirrors the question of 
an authentic religiosity. We can experience both the natural and the religious 
in detachment from life. To separate either from its source—the “gift,” or 
“secret”—is to “desecrate” it. such desecration is associated with a “veiled” 
or impoverished vision, with a failure to see. But then, it is the same source 
to which the viewer of nature and the religiously observant person is called 
to return. in this way, Thoreau suggests, life itself might be reconsecrated. 
This requires that we be earth-born as well as heaven-born—naturalized 
and spiritualized “on the soil of the earth.” Thoreau’s point is not that we 
should forsake our heavenly aspirations but that heavenly aspirations not 
bound to the earth are not heavenly enough: “What is this heaven which 
they expect, if it is no better than they expect? are they prepared for a 
better than they can now imagine?”31
recall Thoreau’s own sunday observances in A Week, where he seems 
to set himself adrift from the religious rather than allow himself to be bound 
by it. although the latin religens does suggest a kind of bondage, Thoreau 
does not simply reject this but tries to restore it to its original sense. strictly 
speaking, the opposite of religious (religens) is negligent (negligens), and 
Thoreau is not negligent. He is a diligent observer. of what? The answer 
to this question emerges most clearly in Walden. The latin religens is 
closely tied to the Greek alegein—“to reverence”—and it is in Walden 
that Thoreau’s reverential vision is most fully developed. it is in A Week, 
however, that Thoreau’s struggle with the religious comes to the surface. 
What is expressed there is not simply the repudiation of religion in favor of 
a return to nature but a hope that religion itself can be religiously as well 
as naturally redeemed. The sense of the religious that Thoreau hopes to re-
store is not merely etymological. Where religion is concerned, the linguistic 
root itself—the very source of the word—suggests a kind of rootedness that 
conventional usage tends to neglect. The corruption Thoreau senses in our 
“communication with the saints” can be traced to our ignorance of that to 
which the religious ought to attach us—of the living source the etymologi-
cal source intimates.
The people Thoreau sees coming out of church are not neglecting 
nature in favor of the divine. They are neglecting both: “it seems to me 
that the god that is commonly worshipped in civilized countries is not at all 
divine, though he bears a divine name, but is the overwhelming authority 
and respectability of mankind combined. men reverence one another, not 
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yet God.”32 The fundamental problem with “most men’s religion” is not the 
“ligature,” Thoreau goes on to say, or the sense in which it is binding. The 
problem lies in their vision of that to which they are bound and in the nature 
of their attachment. That which “should be its umbilical cord connecting 
them with divinity” is instead “like the thread which the accomplices of Cy-
lon held in their hands when they went abroad from the temple of minerva, 
the other end being attached to the statue of the goddess. But frequently, 
as in their case, the thread breaks, and they are left without an asylum.”33 
The thread that binds us to our religious idols offers the same material (and 
mechanical) assurance as the mansion, the tomb, and the cage. This form of 
attachment is tenuous at best and ultimately false, since it does not attach us 
to the divine. This is the kind of bondage, with its essentially false promise, 
that Thoreau rejects. The metaphor of the umbilical cord (from the latin 
umbilicus, referring to the navel, but also to the center or “middle” of our 
bodies) is no less physical, but here the connection is organic. it draws us 
toward something—like the “great secret” to which Thoreau refers—but 
also draws upon it. it is in this way, Thoreau suggests, that religion should 
bind us. The religious should not merely secure us to one another or to the 
world, where such security serves merely to console our fears rather than 
confirm our hopes. it should connect us with the very sources of life. it 
should attach us, centrally, to that “gift.”
The idea that religion should draw us closer to a “great secret” illumi-
nates what Thoreau sees as irreligious about positive religious doctrine. The 
religious should derive from the same source as the natural. Cut off at the 
root, it is essentially lifeless, a mere “scheme”: “most people with whom i talk 
. . . have their scheme of the universe all cut and dried,—very dry, i assure 
you, to hear, dry enough to burn, dry-rotted and powder-post, methinks 
. . . an ancient frame with all its boards blown off.”34 The people Thoreau is 
addressing here are those for whom “Father, son, and Holy Ghost, and the 
like” are “everlastingly settled.” When called to “examine [their] authority,” 
they will see not that there is no basis for religious belief but that its true 
authority, or source, has been underrated. When positive doctrine frames 
our faith, the religious itself suffers a fall:
Your scheme must be the frame-work of the universe; all other schemes will 
soon be in ruins. The perfect God in his revelations of himself has never 
got to the length of one such proposition as you, his prophets, state. Have 
you learned the alphabet of heaven, and can count three? Do you know the 
264  Christopher A. Dustin
number of God’s family? Can you put mysteries into words? Do you presume 
to fable of the ineffable? pray, what geographer are you, that speak of heaven’s 
topography? Whose friend are you that speak of God’s personality?35
Thoreauvian religiosity does not bind us to an ascetic ideal, or what 
nietzsche would describe as the “idols” of Christianity. To enframe the 
“frame-work of the universe”—to render an account of God’s self-revelation 
—is to underestimate its perfection. When we presume to speak authorita-
tively of a “personal” God, we neglect the very transcendence that makes 
divine revelation worthy of reverence. The “propositions” that express our 
faith and piety are definite, whereas God’s sayings are essentially indefinite. 
To frame the divine in these terms—to believe that we can comprehend it 
with our “schemes”—is to put our own authority in place of God’s. This is 
what moves Thoreau to say that “the god that is commonly worshipped . . . 
is not at all divine,” or that, in adhering to conventional dogmas, “men rever-
ence one another, not yet God.” although Thoreau’s repudiation of religious 
doctrine may lead some to conclude that he was a spiritual rather than 
an essentially religious thinker, such a conclusion is premature. Thoreau’s 
critique of religious doctrine is that it is not properly religious. The mystery 
“put into words”—or “framed” as positive doctrine—is no longer seen, or 
truly revered, as a mystery.36
Fabling the Ineffable: Thoreauvian Communion
a truly religious author, Thoreau suggests, would put mysteries into words 
without betraying their mystery. By expressing his faith and piety in terms 
that are “not definite,” Thoreau presents himself as such an author. He 
strives to remain faithful to what he sees, even as he seeks to communicate 
it. if Thoreau is a better theographer than those who presume to know the 
number of God’s family, it is because he is also a better geographer. His 
earthly experience organizes his theological vision. The latter is inscribed 
within the former:
God did not make this world in jest, no, nor in indifference. . . . i love the 
birds and the beasts because they are mythologically in earnest. i see that 
the sparrow cheeps, and flits, and sings adequately to the great design of the 
universe, that man does not communicate with it, understand its language, 
because he is not at one with nature.37
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To see the world as divine creation, one must communicate with that cre-
ation. one must commune, or be “at one,” with nature. only then can one 
communicate, or put into words, what one sees (and hears). Just as we can-
not comprehend the divine with our schemes, we cannot understand “the 
great design of the universe” by distancing ourselves from or enframing 
it in objective terms. in the same way that the sparrow sings to a divine 
source, our fables must acknowledge, and express, nature’s ineffability. our 
language must keep faith with the language we seek to understand. it is not 
enough to speak “about” the mysteries of nature. if our mythologizing is to 
be as earnest as that of the birds and the beasts, we must participate in the 
mystery their language bespeaks.
The idea of a Thoreauvian “communion” with nature is one that must be 
handled with care. Here again, his expressions seem to work against them-
selves. The “solitude” chapter of Walden begins with Thoreau’s description 
of that “delicious evening, when the whole body is one sense, and imbibes 
delight through every pore.”38 shortly thereafter, however, he describes what 
sounds like a radically different mode of experience:
With thinking we may be beside ourselves in a sane sense. . . . We are not 
wholly involved in nature. i may be either driftwood in the stream, or indra 
in the sky looking down on it. i . . . am sensible of a certain doubleness by 
which i can stand as remote from myself as from another. However intense 
my experience, i am conscious of the presence and criticism of a part of me, 
which, as it were, is not a part of me, but spectator.39
Focusing on passages such as this, Hodder points to a “dissociative” vision 
as the defining feature of Thoreau’s religious experience. on his reading, 
such episodes of “contemplative detachment and disjunctive perception” 
are key to an understanding of Thoreauvian religiosity.40
Hodder’s contention that “the religious philosopher” is one who assumes 
“the detached position of . . . witness and onlooker” is, however, one that 
Thoreau himself calls into question.41 Though “with thinking” he may be 
“beside” himself, he also yearns for those moments when his “whole body” 
becomes “one sense”—moments when what he sees is thoroughly “imbibed.” 
such experiences move him to declare: “i go and come with a strange liberty 
in nature, a part of herself.”42
are Thoreau’s religious “ecstasies” a matter of contemplative detach-
ment or of sensory participation? Here again, we must read him dialectically. 
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Thoreau’s ode to “solitude” is not simply a declaration of independence. it 
points to a tension that relates freedom to a deeper form of dependence. 
The “doubleness” Hodder emphasizes may be linked to an experience of 
freedom. But it is grounded in a moment of absorption—an immersion in, 
or oneness with, nature and with oneself—that Thoreau associates with 
freedom of a stranger sort.43 This stranger freedom is the aim of Thoreau’s 
“Walking”:
of course it is of no use to direct our steps to the woods, if they do not carry 
us thither. i am alarmed when it happens that i have walked a mile into the 
woods bodily, without getting there in spirit. . . . it sometimes happens that i 
cannot easily shake off the village. The thought of some work will run in my 
head and i am not where my body is,—i am out of my senses. in my walks i 
would fain return to my senses.44
Here, Thoreau refers to a kind of “thinking” that drives us out of our senses 
and thereby prevents us from reaching our goal. We are not where our bod-
ies are. What is it, then, that Thoreau seeks? not a dissociative vision but 
a freedom that reunites him, both physically and spiritually, with himself 
and the natural world. This is not an experience that just happens, Thoreau 
suggests. it takes work—a kind of work that differs from the alienated labor 
of the village. This is what Thoreau describes as the original “business” of 
walking. His “sauntering” toward the “Holy land” is no mere rhetorical 
gesture. it involves an engagement with the earth that is missing from the 
mystical detachment Hodder describes.
Thoreau’s communion with nature is both an engaged seeing and a 
realization of freedom. But if such communion is freeing, is the nature of 
the religious not essentially binding, even for Thoreau? The language of 
“Walking” suggests a communion Thoreau would celebrate both bodily and 
“in spirit,” but does the experience that draws him into the woods neces-
sarily entail the divine? Whether it points to a transcendent ground is a 
question Thoreau himself is frequently moved to ask:
What is that other kind of life to which i am continually allured? which alone 
i love? is it a life for this world? . . . are our serene moments mere foretastes 
of heavenly joys gratuitously vouchsafed to us as a consolation? or simply a 
transient realization of what might be the whole tenor of our lives? . . . some-
times we are clarified and calmed healthily . . . not by an opiate, but by some 
unconscious obedience to the all-just laws, so that we become like a still lake 
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of purest crystal, and . . . our depths are revealed to ourselves. all the world 
goes by us and is reflected in our depth. such clarity! . . . We live and rejoice. 
i awoke to a music which no one about me heard. Whom shall i thank for it? 
. . . i feel my maker blessing me.45
is “that other kind of life” a heavenly or a natural one? is it “a life for this 
world” as opposed to some other world? as i hope to show, Thoreau’s ac-
count of the communion he experiences reflects not an agnosticism but a 
vision of nature and the divine that neither a dualistic scheme nor a collapse 
of one into the other can articulate. The freedom he experiences in nature 
and the binding nature of the religious appear to be at odds only insofar as 
we fail to appreciate what he sees as the strangeness of both.
The Religious Sources of Moral Freedom
Thoreau characterizes the freedom to which he would “fain return”—the 
freedom realized through communion—as a “strange” liberty. in “life 
without principle,” he poses the question, “What is the value of any politi-
cal freedom, but as a means to moral freedom? is it a freedom to be slaves, 
or a freedom to be free, of which we boast? We are a nation of politicians, 
concerned about the outermost defenses only of freedom. . . . We tax our-
selves unjustly. There is a part of us which is not represented.”46 Whereas 
“political” freedom is more commonly understood and more commonly 
achieved, “moral” freedom is strange, Thoreau suggests, as is the part of us 
that remains unrepresented even when our liberties are outwardly secured. 
although much of Thoreau’s writing constitutes a critique of the (merely) po-
litically free life, Walden explores freedom’s stranger dimensions. Thoreau’s 
stay at Walden pond has been described as an “experiment in freedom.”47 
But the question remains: what makes it an experiment in moral freedom? 
a large part of the freedom Thoreau seeks to achieve by moving to Walden 
can and should be represented in “political” terms. The return to nature, 
as a removal from culture, is not necessarily a transcendence of the politi-
cal.48 it is political freedom taken to the extreme, perhaps, but not to what 
Thoreau sees as its true end.
With what kind of liberty does Thoreau “go and come” in nature, if it 
is not merely political? What is the ground, or source, of the moral freedom 
for which political freedom is but a means? a comparison with Kant is 
helpful here. The Kantian distinction between heteronomy and autonomy 
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seems to correspond to Thoreau’s distinction between a “freedom to be 
slaves” (where freedom is governed by self-interest) and a “freedom to be 
free” (where freedom is genuine self-determination). The latter is possible, 
Kant argues, only through obedience to the moral law. For Kant, however, 
the moral law is determined by reason as opposed to nature. nature cannot 
constitute the grounds of moral freedom. it is only through conformity to 
the laws of reason that one’s autonomy is established.49
There is a part of us, Thoreau says, that is not represented by a free-
dom that is merely political. although political participation can secure a 
kind of autonomy, such freedom is still heteronomous. Though outwardly 
unconstrained and politically self-determined, inwardly we are not fully 
ourselves. “our sills are rotten,” as Thoreau puts it: “We select granite for 
the underpinning of our houses and barns; we build fences of stone; but 
we do not ourselves rest on an underpinning of granitic truth, the lowest 
primitive rock.”50
such foundational imagery suggests a further comparison with Kant. But 
it is on this point that crucial differences emerge. For Thoreau, this “primitive 
rock” is not supplied by a reason that functions in opposition to or frees us 
from nature. nature itself provides the stuff of which moral freedom is made. 
Thoreau’s metaphor suggests not only that moral freedom rests on something 
other than a purely rational foundation but that it is ultimately grounded 
in something deeper than any foundation we ourselves set down. We may 
cut and lay the sills for our houses, but the “underpinning of granitic truth” 
on which Thoreau would have us establish our autonomy is not among the 
things we “build.” The lowest primitive rock is not a foundation that a moral 
agent furnishes for himself. Thoreauvian moral freedom draws on a source 
outside the self. But it is not heteronomous in the Kantian sense. neither is it 
autonomous, in the sense of the will’s being “a law to itself.” To rest ourselves 
on this underpinning is to make ourselves whole, but it is not a purely self-
determining act. This is what makes it strange. We owe our wholeness—our 
being fully ourselves—to something that is and is not other than us.
The strangeness goes even deeper than this. one could draw an im-
portant contrast between Kant’s foundational moral reason and Thoreau’s 
appeal to “conscience.”51 it is on the latter, one might argue, that moral 
freedom properly rests. one could further argue that the language Tho-
reau uses, in appealing to conscience, introduces a religious orientation 
that Kantian morality seems to exclude.52 George Kateb is right to observe 
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that Thoreauvian conscience is not a purely individual or self-determining 
standard.53 But neither does it take the place of that “lowest primitive rock.” 
Thoreau’s discussion of conscience in “resistance to Civil Government” 
forgoes foundational imagery in favor of a different metaphor:
They who know of no purer sources of truth, who have traced up its stream 
no higher, stand, and wisely stand, by the Bible and the Constitution, and 
drink at it there with reverence and humility; but they who behold where it 
comes trickling into this lake or that pool, gird up their loins once more, and 
continue their pilgrimage toward its fountain-head.54
The metaphor of the “source,” in the way Thoreau invokes it, is as physi-
cal as the foundational one. Their philosophical implications, however, are 
very different. in this passage, Thoreau suggests that conscience is not a basis 
on which moral freedom “rests.” appealing to conscience is not a matter of 
“standing” but of “tracing”—as in tracing a river to its source. one might 
still regard conscience as supplying the content of moral freedom, in the 
same way that the source supplies water to the stream. But Thoreau does 
not explicitly identify conscience with those “purer sources of truth.” What is 
philosophically significant about the experience of tracing a river to its source 
is that such sources cannot finally be identified. Those who arrive at “this lake 
or that pool” might mistake these for the source, until they discover where 
a stream comes “trickling into” them, at which point they must “continue 
their pilgrimage.” The appeal to conscience involves a search for what must 
ultimately constitute the sources of conscience itself. The object of this search 
is, as Thoreau would say, “indefinite.” such sources are metaphysically (as 
well as physically) elusive, or strange. We no sooner point to them than they 
point beyond themselves to their own mysterious source.
although Walden plays extensively with foundational imagery, a pre-
occupation with “sources” lies at the heart of it. This preoccupation is itself 
the source of Thoreau’s theological vision. What Kant finds in reason alone, 
Thoreau discovers in a redemptive vision of “wildness”—a vision realized 
through participation in or communion with the natural world.
Revering Nature: Thoreau’s Redemptive Vision
“i found in myself,” Thoreau tells us in Walden, “and still find, an instinct 
toward a higher, or, as it is named, a spiritual life, as do most men, and an-
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other toward a primitive rank and savage one, and i reverence them both.”55 
Thoreau seems to point to a kind of dualism here, between a “higher life” 
and the freedom associated with “wildness and adventure.” But while he 
marks the difference between them, it is not their separateness that he em-
phasizes. as he says, he reverences them both. “i love the wild not less than 
the good,” he goes on to say. Does he love it more? What is truly worthy 
of reverence, he suggests, is the interpenetration between them. For thus 
spoke the “notes of the flute” to John Farmer:
Why do you stay here and live this mean moiling life, when a glorious ex-
istence is possible for you? Those same stars twinkle over other fields than 
these.—But how to come out of this condition and actually migrate thither? 
all that he could think of was to practise some new austerity, to let his mind 
descend into his body and redeem it.56
We might read this alongside a passage from “Walking,” where Thoreau 
laments our tendency to “hug the earth:” “How rarely we mount! methinks 
we might elevate ourselves a little more. We might climb a tree, at least.”57 
While Thoreau draws a contrast between heaven and earth, the distance 
we must cover in “elevating” ourselves is not a distance that separates them. 
To climb a tree (the revelatory experience Thoreau goes on to describe, 
for which he says he was “well paid”58) is not to leave the earth behind. To 
mount successfully, one must “hug”—or hold tight to—the tree. so it is 
that Thoreau would “take rank hold on life and spend [his] day more as the 
animals do,” yet the “true harvest” of his daily life is “somewhat intangible 
and indescribable as the tints of morning or evening.”59 it is an “intangible” 
harvest, but like any real harvest, it is drawn from the earth. This is what 
Thoreauvian communion promises to yield: “nature is reported,” he notes 
in his journal, “not by him who goes forth [merely] as an observer, but in 
the fullness of life. To such a one she rushes to make her report.”60 it is one 
thing for us to direct our steps to the woods, Thoreau warns, and another 
for them to “carry us thither.” all too often, we are not where our bodies 
are.61 as Thoreau “returns to his senses,” the mind descends while the body 
is raised up. Here again, our earthly experience (the “rank and savage” life) 
is not left behind; nor is heaven (that “higher” life) simply brought down to 
earth. To “migrate thither” (toward the heavenly) is to see the earth itself as 
“elevating.” it is in this way, Thoreau suggests, that both body and mind are 
“redeemed.” To “go forth . . . in the fullness of life” is to be fully ourselves.
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in theological terms, redemption seems to presuppose a fallenness of 
some kind—of human beings or nature or both. redemption is restoration 
or “atonement”—reconciliation or, literally, a “setting at one.” redemp-
tion can also refer to a kind of exchange (from the latin redemire, “to buy 
back”). in what sense does Thoreau seek redemption? To what, exactly, 
are our bodies (and souls) restored? if the point is simply that we must 
return to nature to restore the fullness of our being, then it is unclear why 
Thoreauvian redemption would refer us to any sort of divine ground.
For Thoreau, it is never a question of “simply” returning to nature. 
He sees a parallel between nature’s aspirations and our own: “The soil, 
it appears, is suited to the seed, for it has sent its radicle downward, and 
it may now send its shoot upward with confidence. Why has man rooted 
himself thus firmly on the earth, but that he may rise in the same propor-
tion into the heavens above?”62 Thoreau’s vision is often characterized by 
simultaneous upward and downward movements. What he describes is not 
just the coming together of minds and bodies but an orientation toward 
heaven and earth that is, or ought to be, “radical” in both directions. nature 
is not simply what is “earth-bound.” like the seed, it penetrates (sends its 
roots) more deeply into the earth, and on that basis rises above it. neither 
of these movements is “exchanged” for the other. They must, rather, be “set 
at one.” our fallenness consists in our failure to see this—not merely to 
observe it, but to live that vision in the realization that we shall rise to the 
same extent that (or “in the same proportion” as) we are rooted. But then 
nature’s aspirations are not merely parallel with or symbolic of our own. 
Thoreauvian communion celebrates the coincidence between them. When 
nature is observed “in the fullness of life,” it is restored to itself and its own 
transcendent ground. it is then, Thoreau says, that nature is truly “reported.” 
Thoreau comes to this realization in A Week: “The eyes were not made for 
such grovelling uses as they are now put to and worn out by, but to behold 
beauty now invisible. may we not see God?” To see God, Thoreau suggests, 
our eyes must penetrate all the more deeply into the visible world:
There is only necessary a moment’s sanity and sound senses, to teach us that 
there is a nature beyond the ordinary. . . . We live on the outskirts of that 
region. . . . let us wait a little, and not purchase any clearing here, trusting 
that richer bottoms will soon be put up. it is but thin soil where we stand; i 
have felt my roots in a richer ere this.63
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To “return to our senses” is not merely to observe nature and to stop thinking 
about our business in town. Even then, we may fail to see what is before 
our eyes: though we reach the deepest part of the forest, we remain on the 
outskirts. “it is but thin soil” that we see. To behold nature in its richness— 
to participate in the fullness of life—is to see “a nature beyond the ordi-
nary.” To see in this way is not to look beyond nature, nor is it merely to 
look at it. There is a sense of the beyond, Thoreau suggests, that is part and 
parcel of nature itself.
“To such a one” who stands on or is rooted in this richer ground, Tho-
reau suggests, nature herself “rushes to make her report.” Thoreau’s daily 
harvest is, as he says, “somewhat indescribable.” For Kant, the grounds of 
moral freedom are rationally determined and can be articulated in the form 
of a principle. Thoreau’s declaration that he went to the woods because he 
wished to live deliberately sounds like a call to a more principled way of 
living. But again, the Thoreauvian imperative to “simplify” our lives is less 
simple than it sounds, for we must also address the question of what we 
are simplifying. as he originally puts it (in the journal entry from which 
the passage in Walden is drawn): “i wish to meet the facts of life—the 
vital facts, which were the phenomena or actuality the Gods meant to show 
us—face to face. and so i came down here. life! who knows what it is?”64
This is a question one might hope to answer in a determinate way. Tho-
reau himself seems to express such a hope. Kant speaks of a fundamental 
“respect” for the moral law. Thoreau often voices a respect for the lawful reg-
ularities of nature as sources of moral as well as scientific truth.65 richardson 
identifies this as one of the primary lessons Thoreau learns from his Walden 
experiment. moved by the discovery that law pervades nature, Thoreau 
recognizes the wholeness underlying seemingly isolated phenomena. The 
way natural phenomena respect certain laws brings forth a corresponding 
respect from the attentive observer of them. in accepting the laws of nature, 
richardson suggests, Thoreau “accepted nature.” in accepting nature, “he 
accepted not only himself, but things beyond himself.”66
on this reading, the laws of nature turn out to be moral laws, displac-
ing conventional obligations, on the one hand, and lifeless principles, on the 
other. Thoreau’s awareness of them brings him to an attitude he expresses 
in religious terms. The freedom he describes is grounded not merely on 
a “respect” for the laws of nature, however, but on a reverence for them. 
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Kantian respect (in German, Achtung) involves attention to or observance 
of the kind of law that ought to govern our conduct. Having respect for the 
moral law is like respecting a limit or boundary. But Thoreau does not merely 
“attend” to the lawful regularities he observes in nature or accept the limits 
they impose. The lawfulness of nature points to something deeper—not to 
a determinate principle that must be observed but to a source for which he 
is fundamentally thankful:
There can be no very black melancholy to him who lives in the midst of 
nature and has his senses still. There was never yet such a storm but it was 
aeolian music to a healthy and innocent ear. . . . While i enjoy the friendship 
of the seasons i trust that nothing can make life a burden to me. The gentle 
rain which waters my beans and keeps me in the house to-day is not drear 
and melancholy, but good for me too. Though it prevents my hoeing them, it 
is of far more worth than my hoeing. if it should continue so long as to cause 
the seeds to rot in the ground and destroy the potatoes in the low lands, it 
would still be good for the grass in the uplands, and, being good for the grass, 
it would be good for me.67
The goodness of the storm that nourishes the grass but causes the seeds to 
rot is a goodness (or “worth”) that transcends utility. although the incon-
venience of the gentle rain is ultimately beneficial, the storm is not, since 
in watering the beans it has destroyed them. But to assume that the rain’s 
benefit to the upland grasses may yet ensure a profitable harvest is to miss 
the point. observing this, Thoreau writes: 
sometimes, when i compare myself with other men, it seems as if i were 
more favored by the gods than they, beyond any deserts that i am conscious 
of; as if i had a warrant and surety at their hands which my fellows have not, 
and were especially guided and guarded. i do not flatter myself, but if it be 
possible they flatter me.68
Thoreau sees that, in being good for the grass, the rain may yet be good 
for him. in what sense? not in the sense that it may benefit his neighbors too, 
making them all equally blessed (by an abundant crop of hay, for example). 
if the benefit is his alone, this is because it is drawn not from whatever 
else the grass might be good for but from what he “senses”—or sees—as 
the underlying goodness of nature itself. Thoreau says that he seems to be 
divinely favored, and the fact that he is not positive is important. if he is 
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divinely favored, that favor takes the form not of outward security but of 
the guidance offered only to one who takes joy in “the friendship of the 
seasons” and the ineluctable cycle of growth and decay—one whose joy 
remains undiminished even as the gentle rain becomes a destructive flood. 
The sense of guardedness such guidance provides (the sense of being fa-
vored “beyond any deserts”) is very different from the “outermost defenses” 
that mark the distinction between political and moral freedom. a belief in 
the ultimacy of such security is what Thoreau’s divine guidance (or “surety”) 
guards against. if Thoreau is “guided and guarded,” it is not by a defensive 
boundary, or limit. He is inwardly guarded—his autonomy is secured—by 
an openness to what nature promises. only insofar as the rain is good for 
the grass, Thoreau says, is it good for him. it is by identifying with nature 
that he is able to recognize its underlying goodness.
There is more to Thoreau’s “acceptance” of nature than an awareness 
of the lawful regularities and interconnectedness of natural phenomena. 
The enlightenment he describes does not come to one who merely observes 
and records; it comes to one who “lives in the midst of Nature and has his 
senses still.” To “live in the midst of nature” is not merely to respect but to 
participate in what one sees. although Thoreau sees nature as regular and 
lawful, specific laws of nature cannot furnish the grounds of moral freedom, 
for he ultimately sees through them to something else—to a deeper ground 
that they only partially reveal.69
This is where Thoreau’s reverence for the laws of nature takes on its 
religious meaning. it is drawn from precisely that which guards against his 
being positively assured of divine favor. in etymological terms, the meaning 
of reverence derives from an experience of awe (the latin re-ueriri means 
“to feel fear again”) and is allied to the English wary. The wariness that is 
akin to awe is not just a form of skepticism. nature’s laws can be observed 
and recorded, Thoreau thinks. much of his work at Walden pond consists 
in doing just that. But it is not their objective determinacy that makes them 
objects of reverence, for they are determinable only in light of an absolute 
wholeness of things, the grounds for which remain essentially indetermi-
nate. any laws we record can only intimate these grounds; they can never 
supply them: 
if we knew all the laws of nature, we should need only one fact, or the de-
scription of one actual phenomenon, to infer all the particular results at that 
point. now we know only a few laws, and our result is vitiated, not, of course, 
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by any confusion or irregularity in nature, but by our ignorance of essential 
elements in the calculation.70
no known law can reveal the sense in which nature as whole is ultimately 
lawful or harmonious. such a vision lies beyond the horizon of any natural 
or moral science:
our notions of law and harmony are commonly confined to those instances 
which we can detect. . . . The particular laws are as our points of view, as, to 
the traveler, a mountain outline varies with every step, and it has an infinite 
number of profiles, though absolutely one form. Even when cleft or bored 
through it is not comprehended in its entireness. . . . What i have observed of 
the pond is no less true in ethics.71
For Thoreau, the laws of nature do not furnish models for the conduct 
of life so much as intimations of the sources of life itself. They do not point 
directly upward (to some higher application of them) so much as downward, 
to a terrestrial or even subterranean light that shows through them and 
ultimately reflects the divine. The grounds of moral freedom are here on 
earth, or, rather, they issue from the earth—just as the “thawing sand and 
clay” flow out of the “deep cut” through which Thoreau passes on his way 
to the village: “Thus it seemed that this one hillside illustrated the principle 
of all the operations of nature.”72 Thoreau traces “the gift of life” neither to 
a supernatural source, in richardson’s sense, nor to a source that is purely 
natural. His search does not simply lead him back to the earth, nor does it 
lead directly to an idea of God as the intelligent author of the “all-just laws” 
to which he confesses his “unconscious obedience.” it leads to a source that 
is both deeper and higher than either of these.
“Even when cleft or bored through,” Thoreau says, nature “is not com-
prehended in its entireness.” Wildness is the word Thoreau uses to refer not 
to nature in its entirety, for that would imply a static conception, but to the 
creative source within it. Just as it is a mistake to confuse Thoreau’s wildness 
with wilderness, it is also a mistake to identify wildness with the natural. 
Thoreau refers to the wild less frequently and more exclusively than he does 
to nature. Wildness, for Thoreau, is a quality or essence within nature. To 
understand wildness by identifying it with nature is to risk objectifying 
both. For the same reason, we should beware of distinguishing between 
wildness “out there” (in the natural world) and a wildness “internal” to the 
self.73 To do so means that we fail to understand the participatory nature of 
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Thoreau’s vision. For Thoreau, wildness is never simply “out there” in nature 
(any more than nature itself is simply “out there”). Wildness is nature’s own 
inwardness. Wildness is what the self communes with.
Jane Bennett is right when she characterizes Thoreauvian wildness 
as both indestructible and indefinable—as the unstable ground of nature’s 
“indeterminacy and excessiveness.” But something is missing from the view 
of wildness she goes on to develop. Wildness is not just a “remainder” or 
“surplus” that always escapes our attempts to conceptualize or domesticate 
nature.74 on Bennett’s reading, wildness is that “element of heterogeneity” 
—of plurality and immanent antagonism—that Thoreau is (supposedly) 
seeking in nature. as that which “eludes human reckoning,” it runs counter 
to our expectation that nature can be seen as a complete, harmonious, or 
self-sufficient whole. it is “an ideal that articulates the experience of being 
‘part and parcel’ of one’s surroundings even as those surroundings exceed 
full comprehension.” Bennett’s Thoreau lives in this tension: he “idealizes 
living in intimacy with one’s surroundings [but] also loves the Wild, that 
which makes complete intimacy impossible.”75
it is not as clear to me as it is to Bennett that Thoreau’s invocation of 
wildness stands in the way of his seeing the world as divine creation. nor is 
it antithetical to the wholeness he seeks. Thoreau looks at nature, Bennett 
writes, “and for moments finds himself . . . inextricably enmeshed within a 
vast web of life extending beyond his powers of cognition and imagination.”76 
it is precisely this, i argue, that furnishes the grounds for his communion 
with it.77 as he writes in his journal for June 22, 1853, “i long for wildness, 
a nature which i cannot put my foot through . . . where the hours are early 
morning ones, and there is dew on the grass, and the day is forever unproved, 
where i might have a fertile unknown for a soil about me.” There is more to 
wildness, or to the fundamental indeterminacy of nature, than an epistemo-
logically disruptive otherness. The question remains: what is it about nature 
that “exceeds” or places it “beyond” our comprehensive schemes? The point 
is not that nature must have a determinate essence that accounts for its 
excessive quality but that its wildness (in Thoreau’s view) cannot ultimately 
depend on us and our ability, or inability, to comprehend it. Wildness points 
to what is unaccountable in nature—not just to its (negative) potential to 
resist understanding but to a positive potentiality, or power. There is more 
to it than what is “left over” from any given account. its very excessive-
ness argues against its being reduced to a mere remainder. Wildness—as 
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manifest in nature’s superabundance—is not simply that which lies outside 
of or is resistant to our explanatory systems. it is more than what we cannot 
understand. To “long for wildness,” in Thoreau’s terms, is to approach (or 
draw nearer to) the source of nature’s excessiveness—“a fertile unknown.” 
in “Walking,” Thoreau says that “life consists with wildness. The most alive 
is the wildest.”78 Wildness is not simply life. it points to that from which life 
springs. and this is neither fully comprehensible nor fully communicable. 
To see nature as wild is to see it, fundamentally, as creation. This is what 
Thoreau longs to participate in, or commune with.
on my reading, we must interpret Thoreauvian wildness in metaphysi-
cal and not just epistemological terms. The very physical way Thoreau pres-
ents it demands this interpretation. Bennett is right in saying that wildness 
is not a “foundation” for Thoreau. The reason he cannot put his foot through 
it is not because of its firmness but because of its excessive depth. it is 
not “thin soil” but “impermeable and unfathomable,” like the swamps to 
which Thoreau is drawn.79 But if wildness is not a foundation, it does not 
follow that nature must dissolve into (what Bennett calls) a “heteroverse.” 
The mountain that “varies with every step” has, in reality, “absolutely one 
form.” Though it may exhibit “an infinite number of profiles” to the de-
tached observer, it has an “entireness” the true seer, or communicant, can 
discern. its oneness cannot be grasped “even when cleft or bored through.” 
if nature is not a self-sufficient whole for Thoreau, it is because the source 
of its unity—the source of creation—does not lie entirely within it. it is as 
transcendent as it is immanent.
This moment of transcendence is an essential component of Thoreau’s 
vision of nature. Wildness is not a replacement for God, in Thoreau’s view. 
as a revelation of nature’s own indeterminate ground, it becomes his point 
of contact with the divine.
Fathoming the Infinite: Reflective Transcendence
in winter, Thoreau’s “morning work” consists, first and foremost, not of 
bathing but of finding water, though, “after a cold and snowy night it needed 
a divining rod to find it.”
i cut my way first through a foot of snow, and then through a foot of ice, and 
open a window under my feet, where, kneeling to drink, i look down into the 
quiet parlor of the fishes, pervaded by a softened light as through a window 
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of ground glass, with its bright sanded floor the same as in summer; there a 
perennial waveless serenity reigns as in the amber twilight sky, corresponding 
to the cool and even temperament of the inhabitants. Heaven is under our 
feet as well as over our heads.80
We should not overlook Thoreau’s figurative reliance on a “divining” rod 
and the kneeling attitude he is so careful to describe. more significant, 
though, is the nature of his looking—the structure of his vision and what it 
takes in. Were he to be more precise, Thoreau might have said that heaven 
is under what is under our feet. What is directly under his feet is a firm but 
ephemeral foundation of ice that allows him to see into the pond in a way he 
otherwise could not. To see what there is to see, however (to “imbibe” these 
waters), he must penetrate the ice, cutting through the foundation to reveal 
what is beneath it. in seeing more deeply, he discovers a “waveless serenity” 
that transcends seasonal change. He sees a vision of heaven.
it is no accident that such revelations—or tangible reflections of the 
divine—occur most often in those settings where water mediates between 
earth and sky. Whether on a greater or lesser scale, Thoreau is struck by 
their luminosity. But it is not just the play of light that makes water more 
than a metaphysical symbol for Thoreau. in its very substance, water makes 
visible the mysteriousness of the source he seeks.81 Water is not just a source 
of life. There is life in it. at the same time, bodies of water (like all living 
bodies) have a source that can be traced but never ultimately fathomed. 
Walden pond, too, issues from the earth. But where, exactly, does it come 
from? This, together with the pond’s precise depth, is something Thoreau 
enthusiastically seeks to determine. He “was desirous to recover the long 
lost bottom of Walden pond,” and so he “surveyed it carefully” and me-
thodically, arriving at a formula for calculating the deepest point in any 
pond: “it is remarkable how long men will believe in the bottomlessness of 
a pond without taking the trouble to sound it. But i can assure my readers 
that Walden has a reasonably tight bottom at a not unreasonable, though at 
an unusual, depth. i fathomed it easily.”82
What, exactly, has he “fathomed”? “i am thankful,” he says, “that this 
pond was made deep and pure. . . . While men believe in the infinite some 
ponds will be thought to be bottomless.”83 Having measured the depth, 
does he no longer “believe”? Walden has no inlet or outlet, no stream run-
ning into or out of it. Being spring fed, its waters flow from the bottom of 
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the pond itself. its source lies within it. The pond itself seems “free” or 
autonomous in a way that moves Thoreau ceaselessly to wonder. although 
he succeeds in locating its bottom, he cannot really fathom its source, which 
lies deeper than any depth he can “reasonably” measure. it is this belief in 
the infinite that Thoreau has taken the trouble to sound:
at the same time that we are earnest to explore and learn all things, we 
require that all things be mysterious and unexplorable, that land and sea be 
infinitely wild, unsurveyed and unfathomed by us because unfathomable. We 
can never have enough of nature.84
“We can never have enough of nature,” he says, but not in the sense 
that we are never satisfied with the resources nature provides and are 
therefore bent on using it up (though that is certainly true). For Thoreau, 
we can never have enough of nature because nature itself is “bottomless.” 
our earnestness to explore it and the requirement that it be “unexplorable” 
do not stand in opposition, as we might picture reason in relation to its 
limits or to faith. it is the earnestness to explore that deepens our belief in 
the infinite, for it is in the infinite that the sources of natural phenomena 
are ultimately seen to lie.
For Thoreau, the “requirement” that nature be grounded in something 
like a divine mystery does not follow merely from our being infinitely desirous 
of it. The sense in which our “belief in the infinite” might be mistaken is 
different from that in which any of our calculations might be wrong. insofar 
as every pond must have a physical bottom, its depth can be measured. But 
no such bottom is absolutely firm. it is, Thoreau says, but “reasonably tight.” it 
has its own depth. This is what our desire to get to the bottom of nature can 
and should reveal. it is important that Thoreau’s earnest desire to determine 
Walden’s precise depth is linked to the question of its source. Those who do 
not “take the trouble to sound” this are negligent. Their “belief in the infinite” 
falls short of religious belief. Thoreau’s explorations reveal the sense in which 
any reasonable measurement can never determine the source of what we are 
trying to measure. Walden’s source cannot be identified with its (reasonably 
tight) bottom. But the same is true of any “bottom” we may arrive at. To mea-
sure the depth is never to fathom the source. The source of the requirement 
that nature be unfathomable lies within nature itself. This is what Thoreau 
discovers, in sounding the depths of what others merely believe.
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We cannot fathom the source of Walden’s or of our own autonomy, 
because nature always points beyond itself. moral freedom does not involve 
a mere “acceptance” of nature as lawfully determined, any more than it 
involves the acceptance of a rationally (or naturally) determined self. its 
grounds cannot be measured or surveyed; its bounds cannot be set. But al-
though the sources of life cannot be comprehended, or merely “respected” 
as a limit, such wildness can and ought to be revered. Here again, Thoreau 
expresses an attitude of faith:
We need to witness our own limits transgressed, and some life pasturing freely 
where we never wander. . . . i love to see that nature is so rife with life that 
myriads can be afforded to be sacrificed and suffered to prey on one another; 
that tender organizations can be so serenely squashed out of existence like 
pulp,—tadpoles which herons gobble up, and tortoises and toads run over in 
the road; and that sometimes it has rained flesh and blood! . . . The impression 
made on a wise man is that of universal innocence. poison is not poisonous 
after all, nor are any wounds fatal.85
How does this differ from a nietzschean faithfulness to the earth? The 
nietzschean vision (or one interpretation of it ) would have us live and die 
only for the earth, renouncing the idea that there can be any grounds for 
salvation beyond this endless sacrifice of “flesh and blood.” such “natural” 
processes are, in this view, all there is. our autonomy and their “innocence” 
are secured only by our willing acceptance of them and by our renunciation 
of all transcendent ideals. it is on these earthly grounds that life is suppos-
edly affirmed.
Thoreau’s vision is “higher” because it penetrates more deeply into 
these earthly grounds. “We need the tonic of wildness,” he writes, “to wade 
. . . in marshes where the bittern and the meadow-hen lurk.”86 What Thoreau 
loves to see in nature—wildness—is not just a universal cycle of sacrifice 
and suffering by which it is riven but the superabundance of life with which 
it is “rife.” “Where do we want most to dwell near to?” he asks. not to the 
meetinghouse or any of the places “where most men congregate,” but rather 
“to the perennial source of our life, whence in all experience we have found 
that to issue, as the willow stands near the water and sends out its roots in 
that direction.”87 For the very reason that “we can never have enough of 
nature,” natural processes are not all there is. life is truly affirmed when 
we are moved to wonder about its source. This is what casts the whole of 
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nature in a redemptive light. precisely where we dwell matters little, for 
“nearest to all things is that power which fashions their being. Next to us the 
grandest laws are continually being executed. Next to us is not the workman 
whom we have hired, with whom we love so well to talk, but the workman 
whose work we are.”88
in urging us to dwell in closest proximity to “the perennial source of 
our life”—to commune with wildness by “wading” in it—Thoreau expresses 
more than a mere acknowledgment or acceptance of nature’s essential in-
determinacy. it is tempting to think that when Thoreau speaks a word for 
nature, “wildness” has the last word—that, in his view, this is all nature 
ultimately is. But his expressions typically reach beyond this. The “power” 
in nature is, for him, the intimation of a source that lies deeper even than 
the wildness of the swamps. These intimations of a divine being—“the 
workman whose work we are”—are expressed in ways that are not definite, 
to be sure, but are nonetheless expressions of faith. For Thoreau, this is the 
form of expression that genuine faith requires.
Thoreau’s Horizonal Eschatology
so far as i know, Thoreau’s vision has never been described as eschatologi-
cal.89 many of his “visions” are, however, surrounded by an eschatological 
horizon that is more than just rhetorical. Eschatological visions need not be 
sharply dualistic or otherworldly. They may describe transcendent realities 
continuous with yet distant from our own, offering redemptive possibili-
ties within our present experience. an eschatology is, in the original sense, 
a logos of the eschata—of what is “outermost,” “utmost,” “farthest,” or 
“remotest,” of that which lies at the edges of space and time as they are 
commonly experienced, or the “end” of life as we know it.90 as fables of the 
ineffable, eschatological accounts look to “the beyond.” They may point to 
what lies “on the other side” (to a reality separate from this one), or they 
may describe regions of being that are vitally linked to those we inhabit, 
regions to which we might conceivably journey or that we might even see 
from where stand.
For Thoreau, such visions do not detach us from ourselves. They return 
us to our senses. They transfigure and transform. They point not to separate 
regions but to transcendent dimensions of being. although they do suggest a 
kind of doubling, their structure is not so much dualistic as horizonal. Their 
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luminosity is like that of the visible horizon. They do not mark a definite 
limit beyond which we may eventually pass; they reflect a limitlessness we 
can never fully grasp.
Thoreau’s “morning work” is conducted within such a horizon. “The 
morning,” Thoreau says, “is the awakening hour.” But we do not simply 
awaken “in” the morning (for then the true morning is past), nor does the 
morning simply follow the night. Each morning, Thoreau suggests, points 
to its own awakening and hence to a morning that preceded it, not as a 
separate point in time but as a source from which we may continue to draw. 
This is what gives Thoreau’s work (of body and of mind) its sacramental 
quality:
That man who does not believe that each day contains an earlier, more sa-
cred, and auroral hour than he has yet profaned, has despaired of life. . . . To 
him whose elastic and vigorous thought keeps pace with the sun, the day is 
a perpetual morning. it matters not what the clocks say or the attitudes and 
labors of men. morning is when i am awake and there is dawn in me.91
in contrast to the man who does not see that every sunrise originally arises 
from a source deeper than the material exchange of night and day (the man 
who has “despaired of life”), he who rejoices in that immeasurable morning 
of all mornings (who does his work at this time, which is not a time at all but 
is eternal) will dwell nearer to that “perennial source” that transfigures his 
daily life and work.
For Thoreau, Walden itself becomes the primary source of these re-
flective revelations. in a passage that recalls the “myth of the true earth” 
from plato’s Phaedo, he arrives at the following observation:
a field of water betrays the spirit that is in the air. it is continually receiving 
new life and motion from above. it is intermediate in its nature between land 
and sky. on land only the grass and trees wave, but the water itself is rippled 
by the wind. i see where the breeze dashes across it by the streaks or flakes of 
light. it is remarkable that we can look down on its surface. We shall, perhaps, 
look down thus on the surface of the air at length, and mark where a still 
subtler spirit sweeps over it.92
Unlike plato, whose myth appeals to the appearance of stability (the perma-
nence of earthly beings compared with the fluctuating nature of undersea 
life), for Thoreau, it is the changeable nature of the pond’s surface—its 
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very naturalness, or animation—that intimates a “new life and motion” that 
all of nature (and he himself) receives “from above.” like the ripples that 
Thoreau so carefully observes, it is a “subtler” spirit that he sees. it sweeps 
over the whole of creation, not with the metaphysical force of a platonic 
form or of a God whose being is rationally posited, but with a penumbral 
presence that makes it all the more visible.93
“The life in us is like the water in the river,” Thoreau writes in Walden’s 
penultimate paragraph. “it may rise this year higher than man has ever 
known it, and flood the parched uplands. . . . it was not always dry land 
where we dwell.”94 The rain that destroyed the lowland crops has now con-
sumed the entire earth (it is a flood, one might say, of biblical proportions). 
so it is that “the life in us” is ultimately affirmed. The prospect of its rising, 
however, is not deferred to some last Day when this life (or this world) is 
exchanged for the next. “it may rise this year.” The redemptive moment 
consists not in the redirection of our vision from one region of being to an-
other (from the natural to the supernatural) but in our seeing more deeply 
into that which is dawning in the present.95 Walden’s last words are, in this 
sense, eschatological: “i do not say that John or Jonathan will realize all 
this; but such is the character of that morrow which mere lapse of time can 
never make to dawn. The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us. 
only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn. 
The sun is but a morning star.”96
Seeing God in a Sandbank 
Thoreau’s writings are replete with visions like the ones i have described. 
They are often highly particularized, stemming from a subtlety of obser-
vation that distinguishes Thoreau’s insights from those of his fellow tran-
scendentalists. There is a redemptive yearning in Thoreau. it is a yearning, 
first and foremost, for presence. This moment of presence, however, is at 
the same time a moment of transcendence—just as “each day” is seen to 
derive from, and share in, a “more sacred” and eternal source: “We should 
be blessed if we lived in the present always, and took advantage of every 
accident that befell us, like the grass which confesses the influence of the 
slightest dew that falls on it. . . . in a pleasant spring morning all men’s sins 
are forgiven.”97 “While such a sun holds out to burn, the vilest sinner may 
return,” Thoreau is moved to sing. “Through our own recovered innocence, 
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we discern the innocence of our neighbors.” To participate in the presence 
of nature—to experience it in the fullness of life, and to experience the 
fullness of life in it—is to keep pace with the “perpetual morning” that 
makes every hour an “awakening” hour or a renewal of life. To “confess 
the influence” of nature’s “every accident” is to draw on the indeterminate 
source that invites us to be born again at every present moment.
if the sun alone can redeem us—if a spring morning is sufficient for 
“recreating the world”—what distinguishes Thoreauvian presence from the 
pantheism commonly ascribed to him? The forgiveness he mentions seems 
to come as a natural gift. our innocence is recovered—the “savor of holi-
ness” is discerned—when divinity is seen as immanent in nature. This, it 
seems, is Thoreau’s version of grace.
Divine immanence, however, is only half the story. if “the jailer does 
not leave open his prison doors” on such a morning, Thoreau says, it is not 
because he has failed to see that the morning is itself divine. it is because he 
does not “obey the hint which God gives” him.98 The return to innocence is 
not achieved by simply opening one’s eyes to what is present in nature, nor is 
divinity as readily available as Thoreau’s alleged pantheism would suggest. 
Thoreau’s vision of God as immanent in nature is incomplete without the 
moment of transcendence that relates the natural and the human to a source 
lying beyond both. To “take advantage of every accident that befell us”—to 
experience the spring morning as a “re-creation”—one must participate in a 
revelation that transcends the here and now. one has to become “completely 
lost,” Thoreau suggests, or rather “turned around,” without ceasing to be 
where one is. only then does one “appreciate the vastness and strangeness 
of nature” and come to recognize, in the utter contingency of those ac-
cidents, the “solid” but immeasurable bottom that is their source.99 “not til 
we are lost,” in this sense, “do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where 
we are and the infinite extent of our relations.”100
“To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful thing,” Zarathustra 
says, “and to esteem the entrails of the unknowable higher than the mean-
ing of the earth.” Thoreau locates the entrails of the unknowable in the 
meaning of the earth and thus esteems or “reverences” them both. But this 
does not make him a pantheist. His theological vision is more sophisticated. 
nietzsche would have us “remain faithful to the earth” and “not believe 
those who speak of otherwordly hopes.” in Thoreauvian terms, one cannot 
remain faithful to the earth without entertaining a hope in the mystery that 
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surrounds the sources of life. Without this redemptive horizon, our faith 
in the earth (our very affirmation of life) is superficial. Conversely, without 
faith in the earth, our religiosity is cut off from life. Thoreau renounces the 
otherworldly—in its dualistic version—and thereby professes his faith in 
the eternal presence of the divine:
men esteem truth remote, in the outskirts of the system, behind the farthest 
star, before adam and after the last man. in eternity there is indeed some-
thing true and sublime. But all these times and places and occasions are now 
and here. God himself culminates in the present moment, and will never be 
more divine in the lapse of all the ages. and we are enabled to apprehend at 
all what is sublime and noble only by the perpetual instilling and drenching 
of the reality that surrounds us.101
God is not present in nature such that the divine is simply what is “now and 
here.” What Thoreau calls the “gift” of life is a form of grace, but the recov-
ery of innocence calls for a kind of redemptive work in which we and nature 
participate together. it is not without effort that Thoreau would “return to 
his senses.” it is only by a “perpetual instilling and drenching of the reality 
that surrounds us” that we apprehend the divine.
as he walked on the railroad, Thoreau says, he would “wonder at the 
halo of light” around his shadow and “would fain fancy [himself] one of 
the elect.”102 The penumbra that surrounds our shadows may go unseen 
by us. Though “constant,” Thoreau observes, “it is not commonly noticed.” 
a penumbra issues from a sunlike body, recalling plato’s (indirect) vision 
of the form of the Good. in Thoreau’s vision, the sunlike body is also our 
own. We share in a divine light. as it did for plato, this light issues from a 
transcendent source—not a transcendent “being” but something that, as 
plato suggests, is beyond being.103 For Thoreau too, the signs of our “elec-
tion” point to a source that is ontologically indeterminate. But whereas plato 
would forsake the shadows for the sun, Thoreau’s penumbral vision holds 
them together. We do not “apprehend” it by looking directly toward the 
sun. The penumbra is a revelation we participate in only by “drenching” 
ourselves in the reality that surrounds us.
spring is overflowing with these moments of active communion, where 
the full presence of nature points to a transcendent source of light and of life:
i have penetrated to those meadows on the morning of many a first spring 
day . . . when the wild river valley and the woods were bathed in so pure and 
286  Christopher A. Dustin
bright a light as would have waked the dead, if they had been slumbering in 
their graves, as some suppose. There needs no stronger proof of immortality. 
all things must live in such a light. o Death, where was thy sting? o Grave, 
where was thy victory, then?104
Here again, such a vision—such faith—is given only to one who “penetrates” 
what is seen. of course, there is at least one instance when, rather than 
penetrating nature’s inwardness, Thoreau finds that it miraculously comes 
to meet him. in that sudden “springing into existence” in the thawing sand 
and clay, he feels the presence of “the artist who made the world and me,” 
who is “still at work . . . with excess of energy strewing his fresh designs 
about.”105 it is, he says, “as if the globe were turned inside outward.” What 
flows from this portion of earth is nature as a whole, the unfolding of leaves, 
the formation of blood vessels, the “sources of rivers.” Caught up in this vi-
sion, Thoreau is moved to ask: “What is man but a mass of thawing clay?”106 
This is not a rhetorical question (as if it were clear to Thoreau that our own 
sources can be reduced to the basic laws of matter). What, after all, is a 
mass of thawing clay? if we “look closely,” he says, and think more deeply, 
we shall see that it is not fundamentally material or fully determinate. in 
exhibiting “the principle of all the operations of nature,” the thawing clay 
provides evidence, once again, of an unfathomable source—evidence, we 
might say, of “things unseen.”107 This vision of wildness does not merely 
relate us to the earth; it shows how “the very globe continually transcends 
. . . itself.”108 it is the kind of vision, Thoreau suggests, in which we realize 
“the infinite extent” of our relations.
so it is that as nature points back ever more deeply into itself, to a 
source that transcends it, “the life in us” is seen, by Thoreau, as inherently 
resurrectional. This is what “the first sparrow of spring” announces:
The year beginning with younger hope than ever! . . . What at such a time 
are histories, chronologies, traditions, and all written revelations? The brooks 
sing carols and glees to the spring . . . the grass-blade . . . streams from the 
sod into the summer, checked indeed by the frost, but anon pushing on again, 
lifting its spear of last year’s hay with the fresh life below. it grows as steadily 
as the rill oozes out of the ground. it is almost identical with that, for in the 
growing days of June, when the rills are dry, the grass blades are their chan-
nels, and from year to year the herds drink at this perennial green stream, 
and the mower draws from it betimes their winter supply. so our human life 
but dies down to its root, and still puts forth its green blade to eternity.109
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Every man is the builder of a temple . . . to the god he worships. . . . We are 
all sculptors and painters, and our material is our own flesh and blood and 
bones.
—Thoreau, Walden
When I ask for a garment of a particular form, my tailoress tells me gravely, 
“They do not make them so now.” . . . When I hear this oracular sentence, 
I am for a moment absorbed in thought, emphasizing to myself each word 
separately that I may come at the meaning of it, that I may find out by what 
degree of consanguity They are related to me, and what authority they may 
have in an affair which affects me so nearly.
—Thoreau, Walden
The They
In ThIs chapTEr I examine Thoreau’s project of self-fashioning, a proj-
ect designed to weaken the voice of the They within him. Thoreau admits to 
an initial attraction to this voice, which announces what is normal, though he 
considers this an ignoble attraction and works hard to overcome it. The first 
step in this process is to become alienated from this internalized voice and 
to make it an object of suspicion; the second step is to mark the specific oc-
casions during which one’s susceptibility to it is greatest. For Thoreau, these 
occasions are political ones, times when he is called on to be a good citizen. 
In “resistance to civil Government,” he notes this special vulnerability to 
the They when it speaks on behalf of the respectable, taxpaying public:
chapTEr 11
Jane Bennett
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I do not wish to . . . set myself up as better than my neighbors. I seek rather, 
I may say, even an excuse for conforming to the laws of the land. I am but 
too ready to conform to them. Indeed I have reason to suspect myself on this 
head; and each year, as the tax-gatherer comes round, I find myself disposed 
to review the acts and position of the general and state governments, and the 
spirit of the people, to discover a pretext for conformity.1
There are many reasons why the They is so seductive. human action 
must proceed without the benefit of foresight: to obey the They is to diffuse 
some of the anxiety generated by this fact. Fears about the wisdom or ef-
ficacy of one’s action are soothed by the great body of convention: They do it 
this way, and so shall I. social and intellectual conformity, that vertiginous 
fall into the norm, also provides a sense of closure: it answers the question 
What ought I to do? quickly and definitively.
But it is only under conditions of uncertainty, Thoreau believes, that 
individuality forms. Only in a setting that surprises and is in some signifi-
cant way unfamiliar can Thoreau live deliberately, with full consciousness 
of “Where I Lived and What I Lived For.” Describing his experience on the 
lecture circuit, Thoreau notes that “ordinarily, the inquiry is, Where did 
you come from? or, Where are you going?” But there “was a more pertinent 
question which I overheard one of my auditors put to another once—‘What 
does he lecture for?’ It made me quake in my shoes” (Reform Papers, 168). 
Only an examined life is worth living; only a periodically shaken self is 
worth being.
If a deliberate life is the richest and most noble,2 and if conformity is 
both attractive to mortal americans and fatal to an intensely experienced 
life that is one’s own and none other, then the most pressing project becomes 
finding ways to be caught off guard, to be quaked, surprised, and estranged 
from one’s usual psychological, intellectual, and social landscapes. Extraor-
dinary measures must be taken to disrupt the state of dependence on oth-
ers, to jar oneself away from the They. “We need to be provoked,—goaded, 
like oxen, as we are, into a trot.” The task is to locate and then regularly 
expose oneself to wild sites and sights, to maximize opportunities for shock 
and disorientation, for “not till we have lost the world, do we begin to find 
ourselves.”3 as a substitute for the dulling comfort provided by a conven-
tional identity, Thoreau seeks the sublime experience of a “universe,” of a 
self capable of fleeting moments of unity with nature: “Would it not be 
worthwhile,” wonders Thoreau, “[to] be native to the universe?”4
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I describe Thoreau’s quest as a series of eight techniques: moving 
inward, idealizing a friend, keeping quiet, going outside, microvisioning, 
living doubly, hoeing beans, and eating with care. These exercises are to 
be practiced daily until they become second nature. Taken as a group, they 
display how Thoreau’s art of the self combines bodily discipline with relax-
ation of intellect, and how it mixes intellectual rigor with flight of fancy.
Moving Inward
Like Thoreau, hegel is fascinated by the process through which a self be-
comes an “I.” his Phenomenology of Spirit is presented as a virtual replica 
of that process. a brief account of hegel’s discussion of “Lordship and 
Bondage” serves to introduce the first of Thoreau’s techniques of self, a 
mental exercise one might call “moving inward.”
hegel argues that lordship, or a social order of domination, is a fa-
tally flawed strategy for developing individual self-consciousness because 
it precludes what is implicitly sought by every struggling “I”: recognition 
by another whose own struggle qualifies him to confirm one’s own prog-
ress toward subjectivity. Though neither master nor slave can articulate 
this, mutual recognition is fundamental to an identity as a free and self- 
determining being: “self-consciousness exists . . . when, and by the fact that 
it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”5
The slave, though hardly to be envied, does have a small advantage 
when it comes to self-consciousness: in the product of his labor he glimpses 
his (reflected) subjectivity. The master, in contrast, does not work; what 
is worse, he insists on surrounding himself with beings who are, by his 
own definition, mere slaves, unfit to confirm him as a reflective being. The 
master’s “victory” over the slave fails to afford the master the possibility of 
mutual affirmation or reciprocal recognition of personhood. The master is 
thus unable to define and refine thoughts that are peculiarly his own. For 
hegel, to become an individual is to be psychologically, intellectually, and 
morally interdependent with others; subjectivity and intersubjectivity are 
coterminous.
Thoreau presupposes much of what hegel says about mutual recogni-
tion, but Thoreau’s version of the story emphasizes its conformist implica-
tions. Intersubjectivity is a condition of possibility of the I and the They. 
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neighbors, acquaintances, and fellow citizens are functionaries—of gossip, 
moralism, prejudice, and platitude. They are not only carriers of the They-
world; they also activate and strengthen the They in oneself. Too often, 
Thoreau fears, to relate to others is to latch on to what is familiar in them; 
too often, the feeling of satisfaction accompanying mutual recognition is 
the ignoble pleasure of closure: the They in them smoothly gliding toward 
and finally merging with the They in oneself.
“I love society as much as most,” says Thoreau, “and am ready enough 
to fasten myself like a bloodsucker for the time to any full-blooded man 
that comes in my way” (Walden, 140). sociality, although a powerful hu-
man predisposition, is also the way of parasites. Thoreau seeks only “full-
blooded”—that is, strong and independent—hosts, but even these are “in 
[his] way.” One’s fellows too easily function as neighbors—close by, they 
close in and intrude. “Exclude such trespassers from the only ground which 
can be sacred to you,” warns Thoreau (Reform Papers, 172).6
That “ground” is inward, with its rivers of past experience, hills of 
desire, fields of imagination. Thoreau’s remedy for the gold fever plaguing 
his contemporaries is to turn the spade inward (“is not our native soil au-
riferous?”), to “separate . . . from the multitude,” and to journey not to the 
West but to the center: “Inward is a direction which no traveller has taken. 
Inward is the bourne which all travellers seek and from which none desire 
to return” (Reform Papers, 165, 164, 193). This personal interior is a rich 
mix of the familiar and the Wild: beloved memories, concrete desires, and 
vivid dreams exist alongside half-forgotten events, indeterminate longings, 
and obscure or protean images.
Wild versus domestic, like I versus They, is an animating contrast for 
Thoreau. Domesticity is a state of mind appropriate to and evoked by ordi-
nary social intercourse, civilized manners, civic or political organization. all 
that is conventional, standard, and predictable is “domestic.” Domesticity, 
dwelling with the They, is necessary, and Thoreau aims not to eradicate it 
but to avoid an existence wholly dominated by it.
The wildness of anything consists in its capacity to inspire extraordi-
nary experiences, startling metaphors, unsettling thoughts. “The most alive 
is the wildest. not yet subdued to man, its presence refreshes him.”7 Wild-
ness is the unexplored, unexpected, and inexplicably foreign dimension of 
anything. It is more easily “fronted” out-of-doors, but it resides even within 
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the self: “It is vain to dream of a wilderness distant from ourselves. There 
is none such. It is the bog in our brain and bowels, the primitive vigor of 
nature in us, that inspires that dream.”8 
The terrain of other selves too is diverse and Wild, but the magnetic 
force of the They makes others tend to function as trespassers (who run in 
packs and flatten the landscape):
In proportion as our inward life fails, we go more constantly and desperately 
to the post office. You may depend on it, that the poor fellow who walks away 
with the greatest number of letters . . . has not heard from himself this long 
while. (Reform Papers, 169)
so look not to the hegelian other but to the wildness and roughness within, for 
one’s self can be less familiar than another’s. “Follow your genius closely enough 
and it will not fail to show you a fresh prospect every hour” (Walden, 112).
Genius is one of Thoreau’s terms of art. he uses it to point to those 
thoughts that come unannounced, those that we do not have because they 
have us—we are struck by them.9 Our Genius is “winged thoughts” and “like 
birds . . . will not be handled” (A Week, 339). such thoughts are “free” and 
“awake”; they are not reducible to something we have learned or heard from 
another. They are thoughts that engage instead in “celestial relations”:
When I am stimulated by reading the biographies of literary men to adopt 
some method of educating myself . . . —I can only resolve to keep unimpaired 
the freedom and wakefulness of my genius. I will not seek to accomplish 
much in breadth and bulk and loose my self in industry but keep my celestial 
relations fresh. (Journal, 2:357)
Dreams, too, are an internal source of the Wild. They offer a counter-
reality, they go beyond the limits of acceptable or decent behavior, and 
they have the power to challenge or make strange the formations of the 
waking world. In dreams “we have a more liberal and juster apprehension of 
things, unconstrained by habit, which is then in some measure put off, and 
divested of memory, which we call history” (A Week, 58). Thoreau writes 
of one such dream in his journal, of a “mountain in the easterly part of our 
town (where no high hill actually is).” he does not remember its contents 
very clearly, only that he “shuddered” on his way up the mountain, that it 
was “unhandselled, awful, grand,” and that “you are lost the moment you 
set foot there . . . thrilled” (Journal of HDT, 10:141–42).
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Idealizing a Friend
The typical effect of human interaction, then, is to “give each other a new 
taste of that old musty cheese that we are”(Walden, 136). On rare occasions, 
however, other humans—those who are not “spoiled by being so civil and 
well disposed”—can have an inoculative effect against the They. To enter 
into a relationship with those possessing “some provoking strangeness” is to 
engage in “Friendship,” the second technique of self (Journal, 3:322).10
a friend can foster individuality not only as a source of wildness but also 
as a locus for one’s most divine thoughts. In friendship each party becomes 
the site in which the other invests his or her highest aspirations. a friend is 
the actual object around which one may spin the threads of one’s ideals; it 
is the person to whom one might write:
I love thee not as something private and personal, which is your own, but as 
something universal and worthy of love, which I have found. O how I think of 
you! You are purely good,—you are infinitely good. (A Week, 271)
a “Friend is that one whom I can associate my choicest thought” (A Week, 
271), one “who could bear to be so wonderfully and beautifully exaggerated 
every day.”11 
The choice of a friend is not something one deliberately plans. It is, 
rather, the spontaneous identification of one in whom it is possible to invest 
one’s ideals. One has a nose for friends; one is instinctively drawn to them. 
The example Thoreau gives is Wawatam, who befriends henry the fur 
trader after affirming that henry is “the white brother whom he saw in his 
dream” (A Week, 274–75).
Thoreau describes this investment of one’s own ideals in another as 
simultaneously treating the other as what he or she, the other, aspires to be 
(A Week, 259). This is the case even if the two friends do not share the same 
set of ideals. Thoreau’s point, I think, is that this act of idealization is con-
tagious: putting a friend on an ethical pedestal inspires the friend to refine 
and perfect his or her own thoughts and to raise his or her own expectations 
from the actual to the ideal. Friends interact (or opt to postpone or forgo 
interaction) to elevate the expectations each has about the other and about 
the self. Friends can add nothing to each other; they can, however, help 
each other look inward in the right way, to become “two solitary stars” (A 
Week, 288).
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Thoreau prefers not to elaborate the attributes of this “stardom,” and he 
usually eludes the question of what makes “higher” thoughts higher, privi-
leging the act of idealization over the content of the ideals (as his own ideal 
of individuality demands). But of course, standards of value permeate his 
texts: individuality over sociality, the heroic over the conventional, the Wild 
over the domestic, a deliberate life over one asleep, valor over politeness, 
nobility over the common, an expansive outlook over a parochial one.12 Tho-
reau is such a wonderful rhetorician, his use of exaggeration, puns, parody, 
strained metaphors, oxymoron, paradox, and indirection is so artful that it 
is tempting to focus exclusively on him as a literary figure. henry Golemba, 
who compares Thoreau’s approach to deconstruction, does this when he 
argues that “reform, along with the theme of nature, provides fine material 
to weave into his text. nature is not distinct from civilization, nor is reform 
possible, but they can make a fine story, can supply a good read.”13 But my 
Thoreau is interested in more than a good read. he is also an artist of the 
self. his rhetorical devices, even when they have the effect of displaying the 
ambiguity and indeterminateness of language, are part of this endeavor.
Take, for example, Thoreau’s claim that friends are “solitary stars.” 
readers of this discussion in A Week will find that “stardom” is not any-
thing an individual chooses it to be. When another functions as the locus 
of one’s noblest and most “refined” thoughts, it is not only the process of 
idealization that Thoreau values but also the experience of spirituality, ma-
terial simplicity, utopian imagination, and social skepticism that this process 
enables. Thoreau does not wish to deflate the high, the good, the elevated, 
the divine by specifying too closely their content, but the semantic content 
of these terms is not completely fluid.
Friends tap into or insert into (this too Thoreau leaves unspecified) the 
extraordinary or “divine” in each other, so their bond is not really personal 
or exclusive. The “very superfluity and dispersed love” involved in friendship 
is, says Thoreau, “the humanity which sweetens society, and sympathizes 
with foreign nations; for though its foundations are private, it is in effect, a 
public affair and a public advantage, and the Friend, more than the father of 
a family, deserves well of the state” (A Week, 277). Friendship is Thoreau’s 
alternative to neighborliness and citizenship as models for intersubjective 
relations.
The friendship of which Thoreau speaks is, however, a peculiar kind of 
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union: the mingling of one’s ideals with the perceived persona of another. 
Thoreau notes that this union is unlikely: “perhaps there are none chari-
table, none disinterested, none wise, noble, and heroic enough, for a true 
and lasting Friendship” (A Week, 277). The “perhaps” is Thoreau’s public 
act of encouragement, for privately he admits that friendship, as the union 
of two souls, as the “annexing [of] another world to mine,” never actually oc-
curs (Journal, 3:18). In deed it is absent. Friendship exists only as an ideal; 
its home is the imagination. Thoreau comes closest to it with his sister, “the 
stream of whose being unites with your own without a ripple or a murmur.” 
But he dares not speak of this to her and can mention his love at all only 
with a nervous coda: “O Do not disappoint me” (Journal, 3:17, 18).
Thoreau sees only “too plainly—that if I degraded my ideal to an 
identity with any actual mortal whose hand is to be grasped there would 
be an end to our fine relations” (Journal, 3:19). actual friendship is always 
a “vestige,” “flitting like a summer cloud,” “a rumor,” a “mirage,” a “fabled 
shore none ever reach, no mariner has found our beach” (A Week, 261, 262). 
William Bronk argues that this elusive quality derives from the fact that 
Thoreauvian friendship is always after the fact, retroactively constituted:
To embody friendship without losing its essential quality was extremely dif-
ficult. . . . sometimes it seemed best not to attempt at all to express one’s love 
but to depend upon it to express itself in some unexpected way. . . . Thoreau 
knew how some distant gesture or unconscious behavior that we remember 
will suddenly speak to us. . . . Friendship was often, then, a remembered 
thing. . . . It was therefore not to be thought of as defined in time and place by 
the presence of a friend or even by a particular relationship.14
Both to be a friend and to be challenged by one requires that one is al-
ready somewhat inured to the call of the They. The other practices by which 
one crafts oneself into a sojourner (we have so far considered only one of 
these—looking inward) must be established or must at least have taken root 
prior to friendship, for friends approach each other as “continent,” that is, 
disciplined, individuals:
The Friend is some fair floating isle of palms eluding the mariner in pacific 
seas. Many are the dangers to be encountered, equinoctial gales and coral 
reefs. . . . But who would not sail through mutiny and storm . . . to reach the 
fabulous retreating shores of some continent man? (A Week, 262)
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Keeping Quiet
another shift in emphasis from hegel’s tale of self-consciousness to Thore-
au’s story concerns the role of discourse. according to hegel, an I is made 
in the course of mutual discussion, where both those terms are coequal in 
value. Mutuality: I acknowledge your subjectivity by responding to you in 
ways that you recognize as partly your own, and you do the same for me; 
I then adjust my self-conception in response to the picture of me that you 
have presented, and you do the same; I then respond to the new version of 
you that confronts me, and you do the same. Discussion: these acknowledg-
ments, recognitions, and responses are linguistic; by articulating or express-
ing thoughts (simultaneously one’s own and those born from the words of 
another), one helps bring them more fully into existence.
although Thoreau has very little good to say about mutuality, he shares 
hegel’s belief in the constitutive or productive power of linguistic expres-
sion: the act of writing is one of the means by which Thoreau inculcates in 
himself a sense of independent individuality. and writing about nature can 
do this as well as induce in the writer a certain experience of wholeness 
with a “universe.” This is not to say that linguistic expression is, for Thoreau, 
a specially privileged technique of self. More exclusively somatic prac-
tices—walking, hoeing, surveying, and so forth—are equally important to 
him. One might say that while discourse is an element in Thoreau’s project 
of creating a sojourner, the relationship of discourse to this self is somewhat 
more tenuous and more attenuated than it is in hegel’s account. The very 
act of expressing one’s thoughts to another is fraught with the danger of 
conformity; language lends itself more readily to “the generalized voice of 
convention, of one’s region or circumstance,” than to new or wild ideas.15
Thoreau prefers writing to speech because it affords more distance 
between persons,16 but silent reflection is even better:
The Friend responds silently through his nature and life. . . . The language 
of Friendship is not words but meanings. It is an intelligence above language. 
(A Week, 273)
There are times when we have had enough even of our Friends, when we 
begin inevitably to profane one another, and must withdraw religiously into 
solitude and silence, the better to prepare ourselves for a loftier intimacy. 
silence is the ambrosial night in the intercourse of Friends. (A Week, 272)
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note that solitude and silence are an “intelligence above language” and 
offer a “loftier intimacy” than mutual discourse. But what would such a 
nonlinguistic experience be like? Bronk describes this silence as a “way 
toward knowing because it cuts us off from the safely usual patterns of 
thought and behavior” and puts us where there is “nothing known and no 
way to know. . . . silence is the world of potentialities and meanings beyond 
the actual and expressed, which the meanness of our actions and the inter-
pretations put upon them threatens to conceal.”17 Thoreau alludes to some 
spiritual feeling, a tranquillity or sense of fullness perhaps.
Linguistic expression is worrisome to Thoreau because language is an 
indiscriminate transmitter: it lets through what is “hostile or indifferent” to 
friendship (gossip, prejudice, platitudes) as easily as what is “kindred and 
harmonious” (eccentric ideas, one’s genius, wildness, the particularity of the 
self). Despite the perpetual possibility of misunderstood words, discourse is 
still an all-too-clear conduit for the They.
silence and reserve are keys to friendship, as is the willingness to sur-
round oneself with a layer of sheer space. “I have found it a singular luxury 
to talk across the pond to a companion on the opposite side. In my house 
we were so near that we could not begin to hear” (Walden, 141). physical 
distance allows thoughts to emerge and to be sent and received, somewhat 
removed from the fray of conventional truths as well as biological desires. 
“If we speak reservedly and thoughtfully, we want to be further apart, that 
all animal heat and moisture may have a chance to evaporate” (Walden, 
141).18 Emerson sees Thoreau as a cold man, observing that he, Emerson, 
would just as soon think of taking the arm of an elm tree as think of taking 
Thoreau’s arm. Bronk notes that Thoreau would have been pleased at this 
comparison. “It seems,” writes Bronk, that “the greatest kindness that we 
know, is to leave each other alone, to respect one another’s integrity, to meet 
with the grace and dignity of elms and only then to link arms.”19
The mutual recognition commended by hegel takes place through 
(nonenslaving) social relations. Thoreau’s friendship, with its emphasis on 
strangeness, reserve, and silence, is a counter to the human tendency toward 
social entanglement. Why do one’s fellows rarely invigorate individuality 
and instead instantiate the They? Because, Thoreau suggests, humans are 
in general insufficiently other to one another.20 It is too easy to see what is 
familiar in an other of “one’s own kind,” and familiarity breeds conformity. 
Thoreauvian individuality requires surprise even more than mirroring; 
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it insists on a greater diversity of experiences than that available among 
humans—even friends—alone.
Going Outside
The techniques of Thoreauvian individuality include not only solitary self-
examination, putting another on a pedestal and preserving a certain audi-
tory and spatial distance, but also a carefully modulated relationship with 
the outdoors, with the things there that elude and exceed human reckoning. 
nature is a thing “equally glorious with the most inward experience” (Jour-
nal of HDT, 4:313). Writing from the banks of the concord river, Thoreau 
notes that “there was no recognition of human life in the night . . . we sat 
up, kept wide awake by the novelty of our situation” (A Week, 40). nature is 
a vital part of the quest to cut oneself loose from the They, for a time.
Thoreau suggests that we be like the “anchorite,” one who withdraws 
from the known world but withdraws in order to find a more suitable back-
ground.21 The term is from the Greek anachorein, “to withdraw”; from ana 
and chorein, “to make room”; from choros, “place”:
all our lives want a suitable background. They should at least, like the life of 
the anchorite, be as impressive to behold as objects in the desert, a broken 
shaft or crumbling mound against a limitless horizon. character always se-
cures for itself this advantage, and is thus distinct and unrelated to near or 
trivial objects, whether things or persons. (A Week, 46)
The ideal relationship to the land, like relations among friends, preserves 
and defends an element of distance. The “friendliness” of nature is “un-
accountable,” and therein lies its peculiar value (Walden, 132). Thoreau’s 
model here is the native american: “The Indian’s intercourse with nature 
. . . admits of the greatest independence of each. If he is somewhat of a 
stranger in her midst, the gardener is too much of a familiar. There is some-
thing vulgar and foul in the latter’s closeness to his mistress, something 
noble and cleanly in the former’s distance” (A Week, 56).
Microvisioning
how does the Indian achieve independent intercourse? how can one en-
mesh oneself with nature without domesticating it and thereby destroying 
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its value, its wildness? Thoreau is alert to this dilemma and to the possibility 
of escaping it only sporadically. he understands those buoyant occasions 
as a function of a peculiar kind of observation of the outdoors. This gaze, 
which engages the “nobler faculties” that “in our daily intercourse with men 
. . . are dormant and suffered to rust,” is a simple concentration on one par-
ticular spot at one particular moment. Thoreau states: “I have stood under a 
tree in the woods half a day at a time, and yet employed myself happily and 
profitably there prying with microscopic eye into the crevices of the bark 
or the leaves or the fungi at my feet” (A Week, 267, 300). I call this fifth 
technique of self microvision.22
The “home-staying, laborious native of the soil”—as Thoreau refers 
to himself after hoeing beans all summer—pays attention first and most 
closely to his immediate surroundings (Walden, 157). “nature will bear the 
closest inspection,” he writes in “The natural history of Massachusetts,” 
and “she invites us to lay our eye level with the smallest leaf, and take an 
insect view of its plain.”23 Thoreau’s October 29, 1857, journal entry is a 
good example of this detail-centered microvision:
I see evidently what storer calls the little brown snake (Coluber ordinatus), 
driven out of the grass of the meadow by the flood. Its head is raised to the 
surface for air, and it appears sluggish and enfeebled by the water. putting 
out my paddle, it immediately coils about it and is raised into the boat. It has 
a distinct pale-pink abdomen, slightly bluish forward. above it is pale-brown, 
with a still lighter brown stripe running down the middle of the back, on each 
side of which is a line of dark-brown spots about an eighth of an inch apart, 
as the two lines are also an eighth of an inch apart. This snake is about one 
foot long. I hold it in my hand, and it is quite inoffensive. (Journal of HDT, 
10:139–40)
To practice microvision on nature is to transform it into something 
beautiful, sublime, and wild.
We can never have enough of nature. We must be refreshed by the sight of 
inexhaustible vigor, vast and Titanic features. . . . We need to witness our own 
limits transgressed, and some life pasturing freely where we never wander. 
(Walden, 318)
Thoreau trains his gaze on the native soil of concord, with faith that “the 
perception of surfaces will always have the effect of miracle to a sane sense” 
(Journal of HDT, 4:313).
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no method nor discipline can supersede the necessity of being forever on the 
alert. What is a course of history, or philosophy, or poetry, no matter how well 
selected, or the best society, or the most admirable routine of life, compared 
with the discipline of looking always at what is to be seen? Will you be a 
reader, a student merely, or a seer? (Walden, 111)
Microvision can also be applied to less pastoral objects. although 
Thoreau complains about the locomotive, whose “panting . . . interrupts 
my dreams,” close observation of this most contrived object too may re-
veal something strange and invigorating: “I am refreshed and expanded 
when the freight train rattles past me,” he says in Walden, “and I smell 
the stores which go dispensing their odors all the way from Long Wharf to 
Lake champlain, reminding me of foreign parts, of coral reefs, and Indian 
oceans, and tropical climes and the extent of the globe” (119).
Microvision is not only a specifying observation—“O the evening ro-
bin . . . ! If I could ever find the twig he sits upon! I mean he; I mean the 
twig” (Walden, 312)—but also a detached or cool observation, a “fingering” 
of the scenery rather than a probing or systematic study (Reform Papers, 
22). “I must let my senses wander as my thought, my eyes see without look-
ing. . . . Be not preoccupied with looking. Go not to the object; let it come 
to you. . . . What I need is not to look at all, but a true sauntering of the eye” 
(Journal of HDT, 4:351).
Thoreau’s rejection of “looking” shares much with nietzsche’s criticism, 
in Twilight of the Idols, of “objectivity”:
In an attitude of hostile calm one will allow the strange, the novel of every 
kind to approach one first—one will draw one’s hand back from it. To stand 
with all doors open, to prostrate oneself submissively before every petty 
fact, to be ever itching to mingle with, plunge into other people and other 
things, in short our celebrate modern “objectivity,” is bad taste, is ignoble 
par excellence.24
Both Thoreau and nietzsche are preoccupied with the problem of confor-
mity; both valorize the extraordinary; both afford distance a key ethical 
role; both seek to resuscitate pagan sensibilities as counters to christian 
ones. and yet in each of these instances, their tones differ.
In the quotation just cited, nietzsche tells us to wait for the strange in 
a “hostile” calm, while Thoreau is more likely to suggest a patient, recep-
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tive, and alert calm. This difference may be traced to the greater emphasis 
nietzsche places on struggle or the agon. Thoreau’s inward exploration con-
fronts a wildness more sublime than abysmal or chaotic and that calls more 
for awe than for will to power: Thoreau is less wary of “transcendentalizing” 
his subject. nietzsche would be highly critical of Thoreau’s very privileg-
ing of inwardness, with its link to the idea of a “soul” or “living kernel.” 
Thoreau’s invocation of this core self is taken up later in the chapter, where 
I consider whether Thoreau’s call to look “in” must mean that he assigns a 
prediscursive or given status to what is “seen.”
a second difference between the two thinkers concerns religion. 
nietzsche’s rejection of christianity is more relentless and thorough than is 
Thoreau’s. It is true that nature, especially as it appears in Thoreau’s essay 
“Ktaadn,” is no loving father’s creation and that Thoreau “almost always 
preferred to seek in Greek and roman religion rather than in christianity 
for his religious ideas, terms, and emotions.”25 But the voice of christian 
ethics can be heard clearly in his reform papers, especially in “Life without 
principle,” the John Brown defenses, and “slavery in Massachusetts.”
consider, as a final example of their rhetorical and philosophical differ-
ences, the question of “distance.” here is nietzsche:
“Equality,” a certain actual rendering similar of which the theory of “equal 
rights” is only the expression, belongs essentially to decline: the chasm be-
tween man and man, class and class, the multiplicity of types, the will to be 
oneself, to stand out—that which I call pathos of distance—characterizes 
every strong age.26
For nietzsche, the distance among us is a “chasm”; for Thoreau, it is some-
thing less dreadful. nietzsche is, moreover, more willing to rank than is 
Thoreau: failure to acknowledge the chasm and willingness to endorse 
“equality” are symptoms of decline and weakness. Thoreau says there is 
something “vulgar” and “foul” in closeness, but more often he prefers to 
distract us from our desire to intermingle than to condemn it overtly. he 
does so by holding before us alternative objects of affection: when we get 
too close to humans, he dangles the ideal of friendship; when we love society 
too much, he offers nature; when we begin to want to merge with nature, 
he invokes the alluring Wild. Whereas nietzsche ranks and judges, Thoreau 
invites, cajoles, and distracts.27
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Living Doubly
In terms of sheer volume, Thoreau’s writing contains more reportage than 
poetry. richardson notes that in 1852 Thoreau began, “systematically and 
in earnest, the vast project of keeping track of every stage of every plant in 
town, the project that would culminate in 1860 and 1861 in the great charts 
he would then assemble, large sheets of paper on which he recorded days of 
a month in a column down the left-hand side and years from 1852 to 1860 
. . . across the top.”28 Even Walden, Thoreau’s most theorized book, displays 
his mania for “the orderly accumulation of details.”29 an accountant not 
only of his household budget but also of the natural economy, Thoreau, 
prefiguring heidegger’s critique of “enframing,” strives to note the world 
without attempting to capture it, to describe detail in a way that displays 
how the world always fades into an indefiniteness that exceeds our best 
capacity for inventory.30
Despite this, the sojourner is not to be a dispassionate being. When 
Thoreau hoes beans, raises a house, chops wood, hikes, bakes bread, and 
makes a better pencil, he does so enthusiastically and with feeling. The poet 
shares the text with the detached scribe:
I only know myself as a human entity; the scene, so to speak, of thoughts and 
affections; and am sensible of a certain doubleness by which I can stand as 
remote from myself as from another. however intense my experience, I am 
conscious . . . of a part of me, which . . . is not a part of me, but spectator, 
sharing no experience, but taking note of it. (Walden, 135)
The sojourner on his way, then, is simultaneously a recording spectator and 
a very particular self with a series of specific passionate responses. Thoreau’s 
prose, in which the reporting mode alternates with the poetic, mirrors this 
duality.31
Thoreau is double in that he is both a subjective agent with the poten-
tial for submersion in intense personal experience and an objective agent 
capable of recording, with minimal mediation, the facts of nature.32 he 
is both a chanticleer of sentiment and a chronicler of data—and there is 
even a sense in which the latter enhances the former, for the sojourner 
is rewarded for microvision with a heightened sense of individuality. But 
the doubleness of which Thoreau speaks also refers to the fact that he is 
both a self-conscious agent and a mere object. “he” is acutely conscious of 
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and can articulate his interior thought, his character, his dual capacity for 
experience and spectation. But also, “he” is something that does not think 
at all but stands by as an object among others in nature, as an object for 
contemplation. The self-conscious, reflective I-Thoreau moves in tandem 
with the it-Thoreau that stands “as remote from myself as from another.”
The sojourning self, then, is doubly double. Through the doubleness of 
experience and observation, the sojourner finds him- or herself enmeshed 
with nature; through the doubleness of subjecthood and objecthood, the 
sojourner reflexively engages him- or herself. These doublings suggest that, 
for Thoreau, a “native” is no simple or primitive self but a highly complex 
identity composed of so many parts that an internal coordinating agency 
is needed. Thoreau describes the precariousness of this identity in a let-
ter to Blake: “The self constantly fluctuates, sometimes looming large, at 
other times almost vanishing. suddenly I can come forward into the utmost 
apparent distinctness, and speak with a sort of emphasis to you; and the 
next moment I am so faint an entity and make so slight an impression, that 
nobody can find the traces of me.”33
The sojourner requires a coordinating agency, but the self prior to the 
application of Thoreauvian techniques does not include one. It includes 
only “genius” and the imprint of the They. Genius, as the locus of internal 
wildness, confounds expectations; it cannot perform the orderly coordina-
tion of an identity made up of diverse parts. The They, in contrast, can 
order, but only at the price of the diversity of parts. Thoreau thus appoints 
“character” to head the multiple self: “a man’s peculiar character appears 
in every feature and in every action. . . . character is plenipotentiary and 
despotic. It rules in all things” (Journal, 3:5).
Thoreau’s descriptions of character often present it as an essence—as a 
true self or “meat” in contrast to a merely social presentation or “shell”:
It is the vice but not the excellence of manners, that they are continually 
being deserted by the character; they are cast-off clothes or shells, claiming 
the respect which belonged to the living creature. You are presented with the 
shells instead of the meat. . . . The man who thrusts his manners upon me . . . 
introduc[es] . . . me to his cabinet of curiosities when I wished to see himself. 
(Reform Papers, 175)34
Thoreau chastises those who act “as if we were all husk and shell, with no 
tender and living kernel to us” (Reform Papers, 175).35 he also writes of 
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character as something beyond conscious control: a man’s “influence is the 
result of his entire character—both that which is subject and that which is 
superior to his understanding—and what he really means or intends it is 
not in his power to explain or offer an apology for”; “manners are conscious. 
character is unconscious” (Journal, 2:45, 3:195).
But I do not take these claims as evidence that Thoreau views charac-
ter as something simply given to individuals. rather, character is made by 
one who aspires to become individual.36 Thoreau’s presentation of character 
as an essential self is designed to allow the sojourner to forget the artful 
quality of his or her identity.37 such claims are examples of Thoreauvian 
transcendentalizing—that is, his practice of presenting a fiction useful to 
the production of individuality as a truth. It is a truth in that it is part and 
parcel of (his vision of) nature. character is an artifice that, if properly 
constructed and maintained, functions as if it were always there. charac-
ter displaces both the authentic self and the They-self. The sojourner is 
individual because he or she posits a core of self that renders the sojourner 
whole, much as a magnet attracts metal pieces of various shapes and func-
tions without destroying the integrity of any of them.
If “character is Genius settled or established” (Journal, 2:37), then the 
key question becomes, how does that establishment occur? If the purported 
“center” of the self “may and perhaps oftenest does lie entirely aside from 
us, and we are in fact eccentric” (Correspondence, 298–99), what are the 
means by which the self is realigned and character formed?
Hoeing Beans
character building requires a certain orientation to human and nonhuman 
others. Thoreau’s comment about the anchorite (discussed earlier) is useful 
in specifying the relationship between these orientations and the notion of 
“character.” Let us examine this comment a second time:
all our lives want a suitable background. They should at least, like the life of 
the anchorite, be as impressive to behold as objects in the desert, a broken 
shaft or crumbling mound against a limitless horizon. character always se-
cures for itself this advantage, and is thus distinct and unrelated to near or 
trivial objects, whether things or persons. (A Week, 46)
Thoreau repeats the claim that character requires distance from “near or 
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trivial objects.” One goes to the desert to escape the order imposed by the 
They. But he also adds that the anchorite is “impressive”—as impressive, 
however, as a “broken” shaft and a “crumbling” mound. What is impressive 
about these things? Or, to put the question more aptly, what do they im-
press upon us? They leave us, I think, with the idea of partialness (a broken 
shaft) and temporariness (a crumbling mound). To be like the anchorite, 
then, is to place oneself against the backdrop of a limitless horizon in order 
to become impressed with one’s incompleteness and transitoriness. To be 
like the anchorite is to see that one lacks anything to shore oneself up with; 
it is to see that to escape the They is to disintegrate. This realization is an 
“advantage” for character, in that it is a precondition of the will to craft 
a new center of gravity, to insert into the fertile and uneven mix of one’s 
inward ground a magnetic core. and this is where another important means 
of character formation comes in: what Thoreau describes as “making invidi-
ous distinctions with his hoe” (Walden, 161).38
The “living kernel” or “character,” like the beans Thoreau grows at 
Walden, requires a “small herculean labor” of daily toil “from five o’clock 
in the morning til noon” (Walden, 155, 161). Thoreau describes this labor 
as “sedulous”: diligent, active, constant in application to the matter in hand, 
assiduous, persistent. Whereas Thoreau expresses disdain for politics and 
business as “nothing but work, work, work” (Reform Papers, 156), his ori-
entation toward repetitive labor also has another side. In another letter to 
Blake, the same phrase—“work, work, work”—recurs, this time to much 
different effect. surely, “work, work, work” is stupid motion, says Thoreau, 
but properly exercised, it is also integral to the finer, nobler pursuit of self-
individualization. repetitive work here appears as part of the process of 
forming in oneself a hard core of individuality: “Is it not imperative on us 
that we do something, if we only work in a treadmill? and indeed, some 
sort of revolving is necessary to produce a centre and nucleus of being” 
(Familiar Letters, 221).
We are like shellfish in this regard. “There are so many layers of mere 
white lime in every shell to that thin inner one so beautifully tinted. . . . 
With him [the shellfish], too, it is . . . ‘Work,—work,—work!’” Work is, 
Thoreau tells Blake, an existential necessity, a condition of being: “We must 
heap up a great pile of doing, for a small diameter of being.” We are the 
same here as the muskrat: “The other day I opened a muskrat’s house. It 
was made of weeds, five feet broad at base, and three feet high, and far and 
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low within it was a little cavity, only a foot in diameter, where the rat dwelt. 
It may seem trivial, this piling up of weeds, but so the race of muskrats is 
preserved” (Familiar Letters, 222, 221).
Thoreau’s criticism of business as monotonous busywork, then, exists 
alongside his conviction that work such as the hoeing of beans is integral to 
the task of building an individualized self capable of social criticism. Tho-
reau knows all too well the necessity of his implication in the political and 
economic structures he lambastes. The glorious moments of escape from 
the They are themselves launched from a base of diligent and painstaking, 
even mind-numbing work.
To grow character, one must cast the weeds aside in favor of those 
thoughts, ideals, images, and inclinations specific to the idiosyncratic expe-
rience that is one’s own life. One must “level . . . whole ranks of one species, 
and sedulously cultivat[e] . . . another” (Walden, 161). Diligent hoeing is 
required because the inward ground supports the more prolific and hardy 
They-seedlings as well as I-life. There is, however, a serious problem in-
volved in this cultivation of character: mixed in with the They-weeds are the 
weeds of one’s genius—the thoughts, ideals, images, and even instinctual 
drives that, though internal, are also alien, surprising, and wild, bearing 
no discernible relation to one’s unique life experience. The farmer’s very 
gaze, if too intense or lingering, will uproot their precious wildness before 
the hoe even hits them. reflection appropriates and familiarizes. how can 
one avoid doing to one’s “genius” what “neighbors” and “citizens” would 
do—namely, domesticate, digest, or declaw it?
Thoreau is surely alert to the problematic relation between the de-
liberate, self-conscious individual and the Wild. For example, the verb he 
chooses to describe their meeting is to front. This is Thoreau’s favorite 
verb for confronting, for being up at the very edge against something. It is 
what one does when faced with the elements of essential wildness.”39 “To 
front” the Wild is not to “explore” it, for that implies a relationship of depth: 
too much intimacy and not enough shock value. Even the more standard 
confront is inappropriate, not simply because it is too aggressive but also 
because aggression itself is too engaged, as the con, or “being with,” prefix 
suggests. come up to the edge of the Wild, face-to-face, says Thoreau, no 
more and no less.
The frontiers are not east or west, north or south, but wherever a man fronts 
a fact, though that fact be his neighbor, there is an unsettled wilderness be-
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tween him and canada, between him and the setting sun, or, further still, 
between him and it. (A Week, 304)
and in “Walking” he advises home builders to “bring your sills up to the 
very edge” of an “impervious and quaking swamp” (Excursions, 227–28; 
emphasis added).
But the tension between his ideal of a deliberate life and his ideal of 
a wild life—what I take to be the central tension driving his work—is not 
wholly resolved by “fronting,” which is but one of the coping strategies Tho-
reau employs. In other places he finds comfort in the thought that the Wild 
is indestructible, that complete domestication is impossible because every 
act of organization engenders elements that escape it: he who “grew fast and 
made infinite demand on life, would always find himself in a new country 
or wilderness” (Excursions, 226); or, “these continents and hemispheres are 
soon run over, but an always unexplored and infinite region makes off on 
every side from the mind, further than to sunset, and we can make no 
highway or beaten track into it, but the grass immediately springs up in the 
path” (A Week, 359).
These passages suggest that wildness is not a definable entity but the 
shadow of humanity’s brave but relentless quest to domesticate life, a quest 
that Thoreau knows himself to be implicated in. Wildness is the remainder 
that always escapes taxonomies of flora and fauna or inventories of one’s 
character or conscience; it is the variation in the woods that remains no 
matter how many times one walks them; it is the distance never bridged 
between two humans, no matter how well acquainted.40 Thoreau here 
presents nature as a fund of inspirational images cheerfully reconstituting 
itself just outside the border of any concept used to describe it. Wildness is 
thus partly constituted by a consciously cultivated longing for it, a longing 
Thoreau seeks to evoke in himself and his readers and put to ethical effect.41 
“I shall never find in the wilds of Labrador any greater wilderness than in 
some recess in concord, i.e. than I import into it” (Journal of HDT, 9:43). 
That the wilderness is in some sense a domestic product does not mean that 
there is nothing Other or Wild about it.
another of Thoreau’s responses to the tension between reflection 
and wildness, the tack he takes in “The Bean-Field,” is to hoe leisurely, 
relaxedly, to refrain from overcultivating the soil. Thoreau hoes alone, for 
example, and uses only the simplest hand tools so that his weeding remains 
imperfect and not wholly efficacious. His bean field has the special status 
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of being “the connecting link between wild and cultivated fields; as some 
states are civilized, and others half-civilized, and others savage . . . my field 
was, though not in a bad sense, a half-cultivated field” (Walden, 158).
Thoreau is troubled by the element of offense—the invidiousness—in 
his distinction between beans and weeds. his sweat has made “the earth 
say beans instead of grass,” but “what right had I to oust johnswort and the 
rest, and break up their [the woodchucks’] ancient herb garden?” “should 
I not rejoice also at the abundance of the weeds whose seeds are the gra-
nary of the birds?” (Walden, 157, 155, 166). Golemba describes Thoreau’s 
misgivings like this:
as soon as he begins to make the simplest distinctions, he not only raises 
havoc with the environment that he generally loves, but he creates distinc-
tions that lead to hatreds, even to roasting a Mexican on a spit and devouring 
him with relish. and this author, who seemed to make such clear distinctions 
between a noble, rustic, independent “I” in “Economy” and the multiform 
failures of civilization, reveals that all distinction, even the “most noble and 
inspiring” ones, are unfair and artificial, if not fatal.42
For Golemba, the fact that Thoreau hears the strains of military marches 
in town while hoeing is further evidence of his acknowledgment of the 
violence within his pastoral act of cultivation. “sometimes,” Thoreau says, 
“I felt as if I could spit a Mexican with a good relish,—for why should we 
always stand for trifles?—and looked round for a woodchuck or a skunk to 
exercise my chivalry upon” (Walden, 161). I concur with Golemba on this 
point, but my Thoreau retains his commitment to hoeing, despite misgiv-
ings. My Thoreau acknowledges injustice and falsity as elements within his 
discriminations and valuations, but these elements neither exhaust these 
practices nor counsel him to abandon them. hoeing, like idealization, re-
quires the invidious hoe.
This difference in interpretation can be traced in part to a difference 
in focus between Golemba and me. My Thoreau is “political” in the sense 
of consciously engaging in practices that mold a particular kind of self. 
Golemba’s Thoreau is primarily a rhetorician whose “beans” to be culti-
vated represent not a self in the making but a language rich with ambigu-
ity. Golemba’s Thoreau views “order, structure, and coherence” as acts of 
violence against the play of language. My Thoreau is a diligent worker who 
no more hopes for “a nondiscriminating reading experience” than for a self 
without a character.43
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Eating with Care
Thoreau’s cannibalistic urge with regard to the Mexican raises the need for 
techniques to govern the individual’s relation to appetite. In “chastity and 
sensuality” Thoreau argues that the mental discipline of weeding must be 
coupled with a careful regulation of bodily functions: “a man’s social and 
spiritual discipline must answer to his corporeal” (Early Essays, 275). such 
regulation bespeaks a “reverent” attitude or attentiveness toward the body: 
“In earlier ages, in some countries, every function was reverently spoken of 
and regulated by law . . . the hindoo lawgiver . . . teaches how to eat, drink, 
cohabit, void excrement and urine, and the like” (Walden, 221).
Thoreau makes a famous statement at the beginning of the chapter 
“higher Laws” in Walden:
as I came home through the woods with my string of fish, . . . I caught a 
glimpse of a woodchuck stealing across my path, and felt a strange thrill of 
savage delight, and was strongly tempted to seize and devour him raw; not 
that I was hungry then, except for that wildness which he represented. (210)
What troubles Thoreau about this episode is not, as many commentators 
suggest, the wildness of the object of his desire—to be hungry for wildness is 
most laudable—but the raw, indiscriminate, or undisciplined quality of this 
desire. he is not fascinated by the woodchuck but wants only to consume 
it. Fascination would require that one respect a certain distance, exercise 
a certain restraint. Thoreau’s urge that evening is not (as it is later, through 
his words) mediated by the imagination. The sojourner, in contrast, eats in 
such a way that does “not offend the imagination.” Thoreau, for the most 
part, refrains from “animal food, or tea, or coffee, etc.; not so much because 
of any ill effects which I had traced to them,” but because “it appeared more 
beautiful to live low and fare hard.” To “practice some new austerity, to let 
his mind descend into his body and redeem it,” is to treat one’s self “with 
ever increasing respect” (Walden, 215, 214, 222).
It is important to note that Thoreau makes a sharp distinction between 
sensuality (appetite for food, drink, and sex) and sensibility. clearly, the 
senses hold an esteemed place within his ethic; it can even be said that 
Thoreau’s texts are designed as “a medium capable of forming and alter-
ing perception, in which the ‘formation of the sense’ chiefly takes place.”44 
Thoreau seeks to forge a new sensibility, one ever alert to the details of 
one’s surroundings—but sensuality is a drug that dulls the senses: “In the 
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student sensuality is a sluggish habit of mind” (Walden, 220). “For Thoreau 
cold water remains the drink of drinks, although here, too, restraint must 
be exercised. ‘any excess,’ he writes, ‘—to have drunk too much water, even, 
the day before—is fatal to the morning’s clarity.’”45
an appetite may be powerful, but it is never sharp: an ax can fell a tree, 
but it cannot pull huckleberries from their stems. Continence is Thoreau’s 
name for one of the techniques that harness or channel the gross passions: 
“the generative energy, which, when we are loose, dissipates and makes 
us unclean, when we are continent invigorates and inspires us” (Walden, 
219). Invigorates us toward what end? Toward an alertness to the world in 
its glorious specificity. Inspires us to do what? To imagine the world as a 
beautiful universe.
If hoeing is the discipline of the mind, continence is hoeing applied to 
the body. It too involves sedulousness, and it too has a unifying or centering 
effect on the self: the term comes from the Latin continere, “to hold together,” 
“to press parts into a whole”; in geography, a continent is a continuous body of 
land, of a whole piece. Thoreau signals the link between the practices of hoe-
ing and continence by using the same imagery: hoeing is “a small herculean 
labor”; continence requires avoiding “uncleanness, and all the sins, work[ing] 
earnestly, though it be at cleaning a stable” (Walden, 221).
Thoreau’s religious vocabulary here—“Man flows at once to God when 
the channel of purity is open” (Walden, 220)—provokes a comparison with 
another advocate of continence: st. augustine. Like Thoreau, augustine 
argues that bodily desires must be disciplined if the self is to achieve a cer-
tain coherence: “certainly it is by continence that we are brought together 
and brought back to the One, after having dissipated ourselves among the 
Many.”46 and like Thoreau, augustine couples continence with a kind of in-
wardness—although augustine’s practice of confession differs in significant 
ways from Thoreau’s self-exploration. a brief discussion of these differences 
will help clarify Thoreau’s position.
The purpose of augustinian confession is to identify those thoughts 
and beliefs that are polluted by lust, those ideas and images that are the 
product of the body and its unregulated quest for feeling. These crudities 
are sin. To confess them is to take the first step toward remaking the self 
in the (anticorporeal) image of the christian God. Whereas Thoreau dis-
tinguishes between the sensual and the sensible, augustine tends to reject 
them both. augustine seeks to live not in doubleness but in pure spirit. his 
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continence involves not only fasting and chastity but also the minimization 
of sense perception and memory.
For augustine, continence requires confession because the self is a 
cloudy pool that must be purified before it is ready to receive God. The 
confessing self is under an injunction to probe its most remote nook and 
cranny. Even dreams are sites for investigation:
certainly you command me to restrain myself from the lust of the flesh, the 
lust of the eyes, and the ambition of the world. . . . But there still live in that 
memory of mine . . . images . . . which . . . come . . . in sleep.47
as we have seen, self-examination is also central to Thoreauvian individual-
ity. One directs one’s microgaze on one’s interior landscape as well as on the 
countryside, and the sojourner shall experience a correspondence between 
these two fields: “I . . . see a crimson cloud in the horizon. . . . This red vision 
excites me . . . makes my thoughts flow—and I have new and indescribable 
fancies” (Journal, 4:222).48 The self capable of civil disobedience must be 
in touch with its character, that moral center or conscience within. But as 
we have also seen, contact that is too relentless or thorough threatens to 
harm one’s genius. Thoreau’s inward exploration must avoid the inquisitorial 
zeal of augustinian confession, for the Wild must be treated at a distance, 
or else it ceases to be an object of fascination and becomes something to 
“devour.”
augustine’s ideal self, like Thoreau’s, is an arduous achievement. Using 
the same agricultural metaphors as Thoreau, augustine calls his confessional 
quest “hard labor, hard labor inside myself, and I have become to myself a 
piece of difficult ground, not to be worked over without much sweat.”49 We 
do not find in augustine, however, Thoreau’s warning against overcultiva-
tion of the soil. Given augustine’s harshness toward the pleasures of the 
body, too much “weeding” hardly appears to be a danger. Thoreau fears 
that excessive intellectual discipline reduces the richness of sense experi-
ence and thus deprives him of opportunities for transcendentalizing. The 
white water lily symbolizes for Thoreau this creative potential: “what purity 
and sweetness reside in, and can be extracted from, the slime and muck of 
earth” (Reform Papers, 108). sensory experience does not, it seems, harbor 
this potential for augustine.
augustine and Thoreau both speak of an inner core of identity: for 
augustine, it is the “soul”; for Thoreau, “character.” augustine’s confession 
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purifies a preexisting core; Thoreau’s hoeing helps form one. The augustin-
ian “soul” lacks both the artificiality and the wildness that together mark 
Thoreauvian “character.” The soul, albeit divine, is marred by a sin that is 
not specific to an individual but common to humanity, a sin that separates 
humans from the creator. although Thoreau speaks too of a shamefulness in 
our nature, his formulation does not match augustine’s vilification of human 
nature. For Thoreau, the “inferior and brutish” components of our nature are 
best described in a language of “perhaps,” “I fear,” and “to some extent”:
perhaps there is none but has cause for shame on account of the inferior and 
brutish nature to which he is allied. I fear that we are such gods or demigods 
only as fauns and satyrs, the divine allied to beasts . . . and that, to some 
extent, our very life is our disgrace. (Walden, 220)
surely it is difficult to channel the “generative energy” of the beast 
within (“from exertion come wisdom and purity; from sloth ignorance and 
sensuality” [Walden, 220]), but humans have within themselves all the re-
sources to do so: the ability to look inward, to gaze out, to idealize a friend, to 
distinguish between the They and the I. The sojourner requires something 
outside, but it is nature rather than divine grace. The unreconstructed self 
on which the sojourner applies his or her techniques of individuality has a 
susceptibility for nobility that the sinful creature augustine describes does 
not. Thoreau’s nature, having less subjectivity than augustine’s God (just 
how much Thoreau’s God has remains obscure), throws the bulk of respon-
sibility for self-cultivation on each particular individual-in-the-making.
although Thoreau makes generous use of christian imagery through-
out his writing, he draws also on Eastern religions (e.g., the Laws of Menu) 
and Greek mythology. an example of the latter is his use of the term devil: 
friendship is rare and sporadic because “every one has a devil in him” (A 
Week, 284). This devil refers to those aspects of the self that, though not 
necessarily beastly, conflict with the priorities, desires, or tendencies of 
one’s friend. It refers also to extravagant emotions and thoughtless urges, to 
intemperateness within the self: “It is proof of a man’s fitness for Friendship 
that he is able to do without that which is cheap and passionate” (A Week, 
274). But even these cheap and passionate dimensions are not placed within 
an augustinian framework of “sin” or “flesh” or “concupiscence.” Indeed, 
Thoreau’s conception of nobility is downright pagan:
Friendship . . . consists with a certain disregard for men and their erections, 
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the christian duties and humanities, while it purifies the air like electricity. 
. . . We may call it an essentially heathenish intercourse, free and irresponsible 
in its nature, and practicing all the virtues gratuitously. It is not the highest 
sympathy merely, but a pure and lofty intercourse . . . which . . . does not 
hesitate to disregard the humbler rites and duties of humanity. . . . When the 
Friend . . . forgets his mythology, and treats his Friend like a christian . . . 
then Friendship ceases to be Friendship. (A Week, 276)
Building the Sojourner
Thoreau’s sense of the great psychological appeal of domesticity explains 
his wariness of social life and collective projects. It is why he says in “re-
sistance to civil Government” that the best government is one that governs 
not at all. It is why he moves into the public realm only sporadically and 
negatively—for instance, to dissociate himself from slavery or to pronounce 
in lectures his rejection of a life without principle. Many have turned to 
Thoreau because of an interest in civil disobedience; they look to him for 
insight into how citizens might protest unjust forms of state power.
My Thoreau, however, takes one down a somewhat different path—to 
reflection into the type of self capable of an act of conscientious dissent 
and into the processes through which that individual may come into be-
ing. “Thoreau anchors public affairs in private ones, and he returns the 
word ‘economy’ to its original Greek sense of ‘household management’ or 
‘domestic arrangements.’”50 The question is not What is civil disobedience? 
but What kind of being could be disobedient to civil authority?51 The tools 
and techniques by which Thoreau seeks to erect such a being include, as 
we have seen, a kind of inwardness or solitude that enables one to resist 
the allure of conventional wisdom and the comfort of conformity. What 
is required is a periodic withdrawal from social intercourse; episodes of 
self-induced aphasia (or, at the very least, a wariness of language and a 
heightened respect for silence and distance); an awareness of the wildness 
or genius within; the investment of one’s highest hopes and ideals into the 
person of a friend; “work, work, work” to build character and to render 
bodily appetites sublime; and microvision, the deliberate and keen atten-
tion to the minutiae of the material world, a sensitivity to that robin, this 
twig. When practiced in concert, such exercises open the self to the Wild 
and help it to resist the lure of the They. 
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I have a great deal of company in my house; especially in the morning, when 
nobody calls.
—Thoreau, “Solitude,” in Walden
The dISTIncTIon beTween loneliness and solitude, it is said, turns 
on the state of mind of the person who is alone. In loneliness, we feel a 
sense of isolation, that we are cut off from others in a way that makes us 
bereaved, lost, without a proper bearing in the world. Isolation leads to 
desolation, a sense that the world itself has been abandoned. The alone-
ness of loneliness is destructive to our souls. but in solitude, we are alone 
in a sane sense, Thoreau says, able to console and counsel ourselves. Yet 
the difference between these two states of existence is not as simple as it 
seems, for solitude’s sanity is connected to a kind of derangement, or at 
least a reckoning of sanity that is not our usual sense of being sane. A clue 
to this connection between madness and sanity lies in the relationship of 
desolation to isolation, in the struggle we engage in to avoid the loss of our 
souls to the desert of loneliness. I do not want to reach any final conclusion 
concerning what it means to be alone in a sane sense. Instead, I explore how 
we might think about this sense of madness that informs Thoreau’s sense of 
sanity. In parsing that relationship between madness and sanity as Thoreau 
understands it, we might gain a better grasp of his achievement of solitude. 
Moreover, we might begin to get a better sense of the enduring importance 
of his thought for our times. The rise of a modern psychology has limited 
our understanding of both madness and sanity. Thoreau, however, offers 
something else, something that touches on the experience of both in a way 
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that might provide us with a renewed appreciation of an ancient sense of 
solace that is still available to us in these times of trouble.
Being Poor
At the beginning of Walden Thoreau explains, “I should not obtrude my af-
fairs so much on the notice of my readers if very particular inquiries had not 
been made by townsmen concerning my mode of life, which some would 
call impertinent, though they do not appear to me at all impertinent, but, 
considering the circumstances, very natural and pertinent. Some have asked 
what I got to eat; if I did not feel lonesome; if I was not afraid; and the like.”1 
The purpose of his book is to answer pertinent questions, and these first 
questions are paramount. The townspeople’s questions to Thoreau concern 
hunger, lonesomeness, fear, and other phenomena that may be related to 
them in one way or another. Their questions prompt his test of experience, 
which is what he calls his experiment in living. The book itself forms the 
core of his response to the citizens of concord, a town he considers one 
of the most important places in the world and, in fact, a surrogate for the 
world itself. If Thoreau successfully answers the questions of his townsmen, 
he will provide an answer for all those who wish to live.
Thoreau also suggests, “perhaps these pages are more particularly 
addressed to poor students” (259). poor students may be those who are 
lacking in money, but they are also people who are unable to learn from 
others and must instead learn from themselves. Although some readers will 
read him only partially, “accept such portions as apply to them” (259), poor 
students will be able to learn from him more completely because, paradoxi-
cally, they will not be his students at all; instead, they will descend to meet 
him in his woods and carry with them their own experiences. poor students 
form Thoreau’s community—those he will be able to teach, and those from 
whom he may learn. They might be considered American scholars who, 
despite their seeming prosperity, do not have what they need to assuage 
their hunger, to overcome their loneliness and fear. They are his poor, in 
answer to the question famously posed by emerson in “Self-reliance”: “Are 
they my poor?” whereas emerson claims that there is a class of people by 
whom he may be bought and sold, to whom he belongs, who constitute his 
poor, for Thoreau, poor students are those who learn to refuse both buying 
and selling. The poor student will remain poor so as to be a proper student, 
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and he will stay in the company of his peers, those who know how to be 
poor as well as he does. how he is able to reach this state of being is in large 
part the point of Walden.
This experiment, the experience of confronting the basics of life, 
provides Thoreau with a way of thinking that is grounded in the activity 
of the everyday, stripped to its essentials, simplified, so as to provide the 
possibility for living life, for becoming who he is. It is a way of life that is 
thoughtful, deliberate, in the sense of being willfully expressive of freedom. 
he writes, “Some of you, we all know, are poor, find it hard to live, are 
sometimes, as it were, gasping for breath” (262). The test at walden pond 
is to determine how hard life is so as to evaluate whether it is worth living. 
To gasp for breath is to lack inspiration, the vital breath that allows one to 
advance beyond the illusions of conformity. Such a person is dying instead 
of living. It is a most common experience. In an extremely lengthy sentence 
he writes:
It is very evident what mean and sneaking lives many of you live, for my sight 
has been whetted by experience; always on the limits, trying to get into busi-
ness and trying to get out of debt, a very ancient slough, called by the Latins 
aes alienum, another’s brass, for some of the coins were made of brass; still 
living and dying, and buried by this other’s brass; always promising to pay, 
tomorrow, and dying today, insolvent; seeking to curry favor, to get custom by 
how many modes, only not state-prison offenses; lying, flattering, voting, con-
tracting yourselves into a nutshell of civility, or dilating into an atmosphere of 
thin and vaporous generosity, that you may persuade your neighbor to let you 
make his shoes, or his hat, or his coat, or his carriage, or import his groceries 
to him; making yourself sick, that you may lay up something against a sick 
day, something to be tucked away in an old chest, or in a stocking behind the 
plastering, or, more safely, in the brick bank; no matter where, no matter how 
much or how little. (262)
here Thoreau not only acknowledges a condition afflicting his most im-
portant readers. he also describes the most important experience he has 
shared with his readers. when he writes “for my sight has been whetted 
by experience,” he is not referring to his observation of others’ experience. 
These experiences—the meanest, most self-abnegating, most alienating; 
the common division of labor; the connection between manners and com-
merce; the loss of a sense of self—are all his experiences and have been 
his as only he can know them. For his sight to be whetted by experience 
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suggests that it has deepened his vision, sharpened it.2 The very length of 
the sentence illustrates how important it is to him, for Thoreau is a careful 
writer, and for him to devote such a lengthy sentence to this subject is his 
way of underscoring the concentrated power of this alienation and its force 
on his insight.
Thoreau’s practical failures were many. The school he founded with 
his brother failed, and it is hard to imagine him as a schoolteacher, given 
his stubborn rectitude. he had admirers but few friends. Those friendships 
he had were prickly and contentious. Few of his contemporaries read his 
writings, and were it not for emerson and the Dial, the work of Thoreau 
and some of the other concord eccentrics might never have seen the light 
of day. emerson himself thought Thoreau a failure of sorts, one who did 
not fulfill his promise, who chose to lead huckleberry parties instead of 
men and women. (but to understand the importance of those huckleberry 
parties, see Shannon Mariotti’s chapter 15 in this volume.) he also gasped 
for breath, finally succumbing to consumption in 1862.
Walden is a testament of his struggle, his attempt to fulfill the contract 
he made with his townspeople to tell them of his experiment, to explain to 
his poor students how they might properly be poor, to present himself as an 
exemplar of joining and rejoining society. For Thoreau, resignation, a life of 
enslavement to one’s possessions, is a token of despair; it is the sleepwalk-
ing through life of those who never get to the heart of living, neither its 
meanness nor its sublimity. he contrasts that form of resignation to what he 
terms necessary resignation, which one does only after assessing the outside 
limits of what life can offer. This reckoning provides a true understand-
ing of the fullest sense of life, one that has to be stripped to its minimum 
requirements. To test the limits of life, to intensify and simplify, to intensify 
by simplifying, to determine for himself the meanness or sublimity of life 
itself—those are his reasons for going to the woods. And his return to so-
ciety, to lead other lives, is his re-signing, on his own terms, of the social 
contract he earlier resigned from.3
Solitude is the fruit of this struggle to achieve a fuller sense of life. In 
solitude Thoreau is sane, better able to reckon the costs of his resignation. 
he is not alone and desperate but shares the company of those who are 
able to ask his questions and answer them for themselves. but it remains for 
us to meet him on his terms, to explore the fine madness that informs this 
deeper sanity.
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Birds
Thoreau’s chapter on solitude is framed by two gestures, both made in 
reference to the value of the company of others. In what might be called 
a typical Thoreauvian paradox, the first sentence of “Visitors” (the chapter 
that follows “Solitude”) presents a strange endorsement of the social. There 
he claims, “I think I love society as much as most, and am ready enough 
to fasten myself like a bloodsucker for the time to any full-blooded man 
that comes in my way” (390). Like many of his sentences, we can read this 
one several ways—as a testament of his reckoning of the extent to which 
anyone loves society, for it is not clear that he thinks anyone likes society; 
as a confession of his desire to be with a full-blooded man, for he clearly 
wishes to find someone as awake as he is; or as a description of the impulse 
to socialize as emerging from a vampire-like, or at least parasitic, desire to 
live off the vitality of others, which is the despair of those who have never 
lived life, those who are not awake, those who are the walking dead.
If this passage from “Visitors” frames an exit from solitude into the riot 
of the social, the conclusion of the chapter “Sounds” frames an entrance 
into solitude by providing a sustained celebration of the absence of certain 
sounds from his home in the woods. The most important of these absent 
sounds is that of the cock crowing:
I am not sure that I ever heard the sound of cock-crowing from my clearing, 
and I thought that it might be worth the while to keep a cockerel for his 
music merely, as a singing bird. The note of this once wild Indian pheasant is 
certainly the most remarkable of any bird’s, and if they could be naturalized 
without being domesticated, it would soon become the most famous sound in 
our woods, surpassing the clangor of the goose and the hooting of the owl. 
. . . no wonder that man added this bird to his tame stock—to say nothing of 
the eggs and drumsticks. To walk in a winter morning in a wood where these 
birds abounded, their native woods, and hear the wild cockerels crow in the 
trees, clear and shrill for miles over the resounding earth, drowning the fee-
bler notes of other birds—think of it! It would put nations on the alert. who 
would not be early to rise, and rise earlier and earlier every successive day of 
his life, till he became unspeakably healthy, wealthy and wise? (378–79)
Stanley cavell suggests that Thoreau is uncertain about hearing the cockerel 
because “the sound is so familiar and frequent to his ear, and at once faint 
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and so unmistakable, that he is not sure it is a heard sound, i.e., that it comes 
from the outside. but then you may find yourself conjecturing whether one 
is quite sure one hears, or knows, the sound of one’s own voice.”4 To hear 
the sound of one’s own voice, one must be talking to oneself, a prelude 
to questioning one’s existence. (At the same time, we cannot actually hear 
our own voices without the aid of technology. our mouths cannot speak 
directly into our ears, as we can speak into our neighbors’ ears. Thus the 
sounds of our voices on a recording are always different from the sounds of 
us talking to ourselves. Furthermore, insofar as the mediation of technology 
distorts the sounds of our voices, we never hear ourselves as others hear us.) 
existence itself becomes a question for those of us who listen for the sound 
of our own voices.
both questions—suggesting that we might be able to imagine we do 
not exist at all—can be read as expressions of the skepticism of descartes. 
For descartes, a key question is whether we as individuals or the world 
itself exists. our proofs of existence—the presence of others to whom we 
speak, the sound of our own voices—ultimately fail us, and we fall back 
on the very thought of our doubt. Thus, famously, the cogito itself consists 
of the proof of our existence. “I think, I am.” but if our thought is mad, 
then what? (The famous controversy between Michel Foucault and Jacques 
derrida concerning descartes centers on this question: whether madness 
should be given the same status as dreaming in presenting a challenge to 
the testing of reality.) Thoreau’s response to skepticism is to understand 
his thought as a practical activity that occurs between the natural and the 
cultivated, in the arena of the wild.
Thoreau says that for the cockerel’s sound to become famous, and thus 
provide a social assurance that we would be able to hear it, the bird would 
have to be “naturalized without being domesticated.” what does Thoreau 
mean by this? To be naturalized suggests being attuned to nature, to be 
one with it. when placed in opposition to the idea of being domesticated 
—which suggests tamed, comfortable in the company of humans, and 
humans comfortable with it—naturalized seems to mean being wild. but 
this does not quite exhaust the idea underlying the term, for the cockerel 
is descended from a once wild breed of bird. The passage does not suggest 
a return to the wild, for something already wild cannot return to wildness. 
A retention of wildness, or the latent wildness of the cockerel, raises the 
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possibility that naturalization may be a way of continuing to be wild in the 
context of domestication, and it may provide a clue to Thoreau’s embrace of 
the cockerel as a bird he admires.
An alternative or complementary idea is that Thoreau wishes to make 
the cockerel a harbinger of citizenship, for to be naturalized is to become a 
citizen of the land one inhabits. To be domesticated means to be subjected 
to the social forces of conformity, to live a desperate life that is no life for a 
proper citizen, a free person. The fame of the cockerel’s sound suggests the 
full awakening of man, a proper claim for citizenship being wakefulness. 
but even more, wakefulness is a form of godliness. “To be awake is to be 
alive. I have never yet met a man who was quite awake. how could I have 
looked him in the face?” (343). To look a fully awake man in the face is to 
look into the face of a god, to risk one’s existence for a glimpse at divinity. 
This is what Thoreau whets his sight to do.
The cockerel, as cavell notes, is preceded by the owl for Thoreau, the 
traditional bird of philosophy that flies at dusk. Thoreau hears a strain in the 
call of the screech owl, a voice that cries, “Oh-o-o-o-o that I never had been 
bor-r-r-n!” The call of the screech owl represents a mortification, and more 
generally, the voices of all owls “represent a stark twilight and unsatisfied 
thoughts which all have” (376–77). The contrast with the cockerel could 
not be more extreme—it is day and night. but that is also his point. The 
night precedes the dawning of the day. The screech owl echoes the ancient 
wisdom of Silenus, taken from Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus, that it is best 
never to have been born, and it is second best to die young.5
In the original preface to History of Madness, Michel Foucault 
writes:
In our time, the experience of madness is made in the calm of a knowledge 
which, through knowing it too much, passes it over. but in the movement 
from one experience to the other, the passage is made through a world with-
out images or positivity, in a sort of silent transparency that allows a great 
immobile structure to appear, like a wordless institution, a gesture without 
commentary, an immediate knowledge; this structure is neither that of drama 
nor of knowledge; it is the point at which history freezes, in the tragic mode 
that founds it and calls it into question.
At the centre of this attempt to re-establish the value of the classical 
experience of madness, in its rights and its becoming, there is therefore a 
motionless figure to be found; the simple division into daylight and obscurity, 
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shadow and light, dream and waking, the truth of the sun and the power of 
midnight. An elementary figure, which only accepts time as the indefinite 
return of a limit.6
Foucault’s description of the motionless figure can serve as the template 
for another such elementary figure, one that accepts time as the indefinite 
return of a limit—namely, Thoreau at walden pond. Thoreau’s compression 
of time, his quest for a glimpse of eternal truths, his melding of beans and 
tropes, his testing of the value of living by greeting an earlier and earlier 
dawn in himself, and the heroic nature he surrounds himself with all attest 
to a fine madness, fully aware of its rights and its becoming. The relation-
ship of this madness—an experience that is not quite nameable, or, as he 
puts it, “wordless”—to the sanity one may come to realize is the problem 
Thoreau struggles with throughout Walden, but the struggle reaches a peak 
in his chapter on solitude.
A Slight Insanity of Mood
It is important to remember that one of the pertinent questions Thoreau 
is asked is whether he ever feels lonesome at walden. his most immediate 
answer is straightforward: 
I have never felt lonesome, or in the least oppressed by a sense of solitude, 
but once, and that was a few weeks after I came to the woods, when, for an 
hour, I doubted if the near neighborhood of man was not essential to a serene 
and healthy life. To be alone was something unpleasant. but I was at the same 
time conscious of a slight insanity in my mood, and seemed to foresee my 
recovery. (382–83)
explaining why he suffers this mood and describing his overcoming of it are 
the subjects of his chapter on solitude. his hour of doubt concerning the 
need for the near neighborhood of man is a moment of crisis for Thoreau. 
his largest claim for his experiment is to be present in his present. he 
writes, “In any weather, at any hour of day or night, I have been anxious to 
improve upon the nick of time, and notch it on my stick too; to stand on the 
meeting of two eternities, the past and the future, which is precisely the 
present moment; to toe that line” (272). here, he gives that idea of presence 
his full attention. hence, Thoreau’s awareness of the weather helps him 
overcome his insanity of mood: 
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In the midst of a gentle rain while these thoughts prevailed, I was suddenly 
sensible of such sweet and beneficent society in nature, in the very pattering 
of the drops, and in every sound and sight around my house, like infinite 
and unaccountable friendliness all at once like an atmosphere sustaining me, 
as made the fancied advantages of human neighborhood insignificant, and I 
have never thought of them since. (383)
This insight is in keeping with his observation, “There can be no very black 
melancholy to him who lives in the midst of nature and has his senses still” 
(382).
but it is not as if this nature is pastoral, at any far remove from the 
worlds of human being. Although Thoreau is able to foresee a recovery from 
this insanity because his sensibility is expanded by his contact with a world 
wider than the neighborhood of man, his repose within this wider horizon 
is still deeply human. how this tension between the natural and the human 
is negotiated is a key to understanding his sense of solitude.
In the first place, Thoreau’s sense of space is crucial to his realization of 
a wider horizon. Space, for him, is a question of perspective:
There is commonly sufficient space about us. our horizon is never quite at our 
elbows. The thick wood is not just at our door, nor the pond, but somewhat is 
always clearing, familiar, and worn by us, appropriated and fenced in some 
way, and reclaimed from nature. (381)
The horizon is formed by our contact with nature, yet there is an antago-
nism between ourselves and nature, an appropriation by the human, if 
only through the casting of our eyes on the horizon itself. nonetheless, our 
contact with each other is mediated through an immeasurable distance that 
lies between us:
This whole earth which we inhabit is but a point in space. how far apart, 
think you, dwell the two most distant inhabitants of yonder star, the breadth 
of whose disk cannot be appreciated by our instruments? why should I feel 
lonely? Is not our planet in the Milky way? . . . what sort of space is that 
which separates a man from his fellows and makes him solitary? I have found 
that no exertion of the legs can bring two minds much nearer to each other. 
(384)
It is not the fact of space, then, but the sort of space we choose to 
inhabit that separates a man from his fellows. whether we are in the town 
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or the country matters not in this regard. what counts instead is the sort 
of space we are in. And this is a space in which time and place fall away, 
a space of awakening. “Any prospect of awakening or coming to life to a 
dead man makes indifferent all times and places,” he writes (385). Such an 
indifference to place is the first and final fact about space for Thoreau. To go 
to the woods, to move away from the society of men, is not the point, except 
for the sake of the metaphors, the new materials, they may provide. what 
matters is to awaken, to have the dawn inside oneself.
Indifference to place is one thing, but what about indifference to time? 
cavell claims that Thoreau’s discussion of the present is his open admission 
of his path to mysticism, his way of showing us how we are to be awakened, 
to have the dawn in us, and how improving on the nick of time neces-
sarily involves a writing of the moment, a moment writing.7 This idea is 
verified by Thoreau’s description of his experiment. “The present was my 
next experiment of this kind, which I propose to describe more at length, 
for convenience, putting the experience of two years into one” (337). his 
writing of the present, then, is the experiment of Walden, a compression 
of two years into one, an intensification of time, designed to illuminate the 
power of being present in our present.
The coming to life of a dead man also carries with it at least two very 
disturbing associations—one of resurrection, and hence of divinity, and the 
other of reanimation or zombification. In this sense, indifference to time 
and place may lead one to two political extremes—the sovereignty of a god, 
on the one hand, and the status of a neo-morph, the quintessentially modern 
version of homo sacer, on the other.8 Thoreau attempts to rise above both 
extremes by endeavoring to become human, a state that lies between:
I only know myself as a human entity; the scene, so to speak, of thoughts 
and affections; and am sensible of a certain doubleness by which I can stand 
as remote from myself as from another. however intense my experience, I 
am conscious of the presence and criticism of a part of me, but spectator, 
sharing no experience, but taking note of it; and that is no more I than it is 
you. (386)
doubleness, a standing away from oneself, enables the movement away from 
the state of insanity even as one is able to incorporate it through spectator-
ship. This return to a vision that is whetted, sharpened, by experience and 
yet is not part of that experience, that is perhaps objective—no more I than 
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you—is indeed close to what Foucault calls the indescribable experience of 
madness.
Thoreau recognizes this mad element of objectivity, cavell notes, in 
his praise of the loon.9 This madness finds expression in “Solitude” when 
he writes, “I am no more lonely than the loon in the pond that laughs so 
loud, or than walden pond itself” (388). This is yet another double-edged 
sentence, and because it comes after he notes that his moment of loneliness 
was accompanied by a slight mood of insanity, his invocation of the loon and 
the pond itself suggests a deeper madness underwriting his solitude than the 
fleeting sense to which he refers more directly. becoming animal, becoming 
thing, he is metamorphosed, inhabiting the metaphors he lives by.
For Thoreau, the relationship of sanity to loneliness and society pres-
ents itself as an inversion of the normal. The normal itself is a kind of death 
or insanity, but the society of others remains a part of experience. one of his 
most complex formulations of this inversion is the following paragraph:
I have heard of a man lost in the woods and dying of famine and exhaustion at 
the foot of a tree, whose loneliness was relieved by the grotesque visions with 
which, owing to bodily weakness, his diseased imagination surrounded him, 
and which he believed to be real. So also, owing to bodily and mental health 
and strength, we may be continually cheered by a like but more normal and 
natural society, and come to know that we are never alone. (387)
how might we understand this passage? The story of a man being lost in 
the woods may be understood as an allegory, evoked throughout Walden, 
for how we become lost in our words. In language, one may become lost, 
enfeebled, starved, and subjected to grotesque imagination. but our recov-
ery involves a less extreme version of the same vision. we must always be 
talking to ourselves but also imagining ourselves in the company of others. 
This passage may be thought of as a reformulation of emerson’s advice to 
treat the men and women as if they are real, for perhaps they are. but it 
admits of more, of the essential weakness of the body, the neediness that 
prevents us from a fuller awakening.
To reach this dreamlike state of being entails thinking. “with thinking 
we may be beside ourselves in a sane sense,” he writes (385). The thinking 
that Thoreau suggests we do involves a forgetfulness of time and place, a 
removal from the constraints and bonds of the social. Thoreau here is evoca-
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tive of his poor teacher emerson, who reminds us in his essay “Intellect” 
that “the intellect goes out of the individual, floats over its own personality, 
and regards it as a fact, and not as I and mine. he who is immersed in 
what concerns person or place cannot see the problem of existence. This 
the intellect always ponders.”10 The scholar in the hive of cambridge, the 
carpenter working on a bench, the farmer hoeing weeds—each is outside 
of him- or herself, each is engaged in thinking. In all this activity we are 
talking to ourselves, inventing ourselves as our most essential companions, 
becoming objects of interest to ourselves.
This is madness. but it is a fine madness, a sane madness, a kind of 
thinking through which we split ourselves wide open in order to touch our 
wounds, to actually find out whether we exist. Such a madness is essential to 
our very being. how else are we to live with ourselves and one another and 
remain true to who we are?
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Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.
—Rousseau, On the Social Contract
What is it to be born free and not to live free?
—Thoreau, “Life without Principle”
BoTh Rousseau and ThoReau understand freedom as indepen-
dence, and both these quasi-romantic thinkers are preoccupied by the 
question of the human and social relation to nature.1 Rousseau’s major con-
structive works—Emile (1762), Social Contract (1762), and the novel Julie, 
or the New Héloise (1761)—explore the ways in which education, politics, 
and the family could variously reshape the self to achieve a social analogue 
of the standard of natural independence and freedom identified in his Dis-
course on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men (1754). 
one hundred years later, Thoreau’s major constructive work, Walden (1854), 
rejects the claim that social agency is necessary to reshape the self, arguing 
instead that one can live the good life on one’s own resources if one lives 
economically and independently of society; in this quest, living in nature 
serves as both instrument and metaphor. using the language of utopianism, 
a language that has been widely applied to construe both writers’ signifi-
cance for political thought, one can say that whereas Rousseau’s various 
models fit the standard utopian tradition whereby only a reformed society 
(even if it is only a society of two, as in Emile) can produce a good and free 
person, Thoreau in Walden stands that tradition on its head, proposing that 
individual self-reform is the only path to a reformed society.2
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Yet there is another, less familiar comparison to be made between these 
two figures.3 In their later writings, both develop a romantic celebration of 
nature that charts a very different relationship to nature and utopia from 
that in their constructive works.4 There we can compare Rousseau’s Rever-
ies of a Solitary Walker (written in 1776–1778 and published in 1782) and 
Thoreau’s later writings, beginning with “Walking” (a lecture first delivered 
as “The Wild” on april 23, 1851) and encompassing his post-Walden journals 
and late manuscripts.5 (of course, the division between works and periods 
cannot be absolute, and there are remarks in later works that echo those in 
earlier ones, and vice versa.) each thinker’s later writings differ importantly 
in emphasis from his constructive writings, sharing a preoccupation with 
the value of exploring nature in the wild, especially through botany.6 For 
Rousseau, this remains pure consolation, but for Thoreau, it blossoms into 
a new relationship to the landscape in which the positive meaning of utopia 
is reclaimed in its etymological sense of topos or place. In both cases, the 
later works help us appreciate and shed light on the earlier works, while 
moving in a new direction. I summarize these comparisons in the follow-
ing list and label them with Greek words coined here to parallel utopia. 
Whereas we have come to use utopia to signify the good society or city, in 
fact, this tradition as engaged in Rousseau’s constructive works is better 
called upolia (literally, “the good city”) to capture its civic dimension, a 
vision that contrasts with Thoreau’s constructive aim of uidia, or “the good 
individual life” (from the Greek idiotes). Rousseau’s Reveries turn instead 
to the ideal of a good day or a brief stretch of time, which I term uhemeria 
(literally, “the good day”) or uchronia (“the good time”). although Thoreau 
shares this celebration of the good day in his later writings, he also invents 
a new and more literal sense of utopia as “the good place,” the landscape 
where politics must be situated and to which it must be subordinated. The 
remainder of the chapter discusses each of these elements in turn.7
rousseau
Constructive Works: utopia in the tra-
ditional sense of upolia (the good city) 
Late Works: uhemeria (the good day), 
or more generally, uchronia (the good 
time)
thoreau
Constructive Works: uidia (the good 
individual life)
Late Works: uhemeria (the good day), 
but also utopia in the literal sense (the 
good place)
¯
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the Constructive texts
Rousseau and Thoreau strikingly, and similarly, depart from one central as-
pect of the utopian tradition stretching from Plato to More and subsequent 
interpreters.8 Plato, his followers, and two of the major hellenistic schools 
suggest that for a city to be ideal, it has to abolish the divisive institution 
of the household. The city is a site of commonness and communality, the 
achievement of which is obstructed by the family and private property, 
which constitute the household. In the words of a leading student of the 
subject, the Platonic utopia was “a city without the household,” the Cynic 
way was “a life without the household,” and the stoic utopia was “a world 
without households.”9 Yet both Rousseau and Thoreau abandon the hostil-
ity to the household that characterizes this central strand of the utopian 
tradition. They countenance the household as a possible—and, for Thoreau, 
even necessary—site of political relevance.
Rousseau affirms the possibility of reforming the household in his novel 
Julie, or the New Héloise, where the estate of Wolmar (Julie’s husband) 
constitutes a sort of miniature affective utopia. But there is no suggestion 
that reforming the household is the path to, or a building block for, a larger 
civic and political utopia. The Social Contract does not prescribe hundreds 
of freely associating patriarchs, or patriarchal estates, as sufficient to es-
tablish a legitimate polity. Its citizens will be allowed households, but this 
will not make them citizens; their transformation into citizens requires the 
general will to establish and transform the body politic. Indeed, Rousseau 
has already insisted in the Encyclopédie that “l’économie domestique, ou 
particulière,” or the economy of the household, must be sharply distin-
guished from “l’économie générale, ou publique,” or political economy.10 
and he goes so far as to remark in Emile that “forced to combat nature or 
the social institutions, one must choose between making a man or making a 
citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time.”11
Thoreau goes even further in the revaluation of the household and its 
economy, drawing on but also challenging and transforming a rival tradi-
tion of œconomia stemming from Xenophon, which focuses not on politics 
but on the household per se. While insisting on the critical importance of 
a “rigid economy” for the individual—“economy” is the title of the first 
chapter of Walden—Thoreau dispenses with œconomia’s traditional con-
stituents of money, property, and family. he announces that the economy 
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of the individual’s living establishment has no need for money or property 
beyond a cabin (built on emerson’s land: ownership, too, is unimportant) 
and a few tools.12 Instead of prescribing ways of increasing wealth, as did 
the classical works of œconomia, Thoreau’s economics prescribes ways to 
prevent the drive for wealth from consuming mental and spiritual inde-
pendence.13 and one key path to this aim is to recover, in some form, the 
independence of a life in nature as opposed to the settled households of 
civilization. “Men have become the tools of their tools,” he laments, draw-
ing this contrast: “The man who independently plucked the fruits when he 
was hungry is become a farmer; and he who stood under a tree for shelter, a 
housekeeper. We now no longer camp as for a night, but have settled down 
on earth and forgotten heaven.” The world itself, the natural world and the 
intimations of the spiritual world it brings, has been shut out and forgotten 
in this settled, “comfortable” civilization: “We have built for this world a 
family mansion, and for the next a family tomb.” These domestic comforts 
must be abandoned if true independence is to be achieved.14
Yet despite sharing this significant revaluation of the household, the two 
thinkers take very different views of the relationship between the household 
and society. Rousseau’s constructive utopias come in various shapes, sizes, 
and relations to nature, all of them depending on the standard of natural 
independence, in which needs equate to capabilities and psychological self-
sufficiency is preserved, but this is achieved within social contexts designed 
to render otherwise oppressive dependence benign.15 The Social Contract 
achieves this through the artificial transformation of man into citizen by the 
wise legislator; Emile, through the preservation of natural independence 
in the society of two between a boy and his wise tutor; The New Héloise, 
through the preservation of natural emotional independence in the context 
of the family in the small society of the estate belonging to the wise Wol-
mar.16 Yet in all these solutions to human self-division, Rousseau adheres to 
the traditional view of utopia as a social project. he shares this approach 
with the Greek republican lineage, and it is embraced as well by the Puritan 
and nonconformist utopian communities established in the united states: 
one must change society to create a new individual.17 That is why I identify 
Rousseau’s constructive works with utopia in the traditional, Greek-derived 
understanding of the upolia, or good city (taken here in the broadest sense 
of a community of at least two).
Thoreau turns this theory of utopia on its head. For him, the way to 
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make good individuals is not to reform society. Rather, individuals must make 
themselves good; only then do they have a chance of making a good—or 
at least tolerable—society. But in any case, the fundamental question is of 
the good life.18 Thus Thoreau inverts the traditional utopian understanding 
of the relationship between society and the individual. he is undoubtedly 
influenced by the Puritan commitment to the holy society, the millennial-
ism ingrained in the american historical imagination, and the tiny utopian 
outposts dotted across new england. The last include ventures founded by 
friends, such as Bronson alcott’s Fruitlands, and the progressive Raritan 
Bay union school founded in the 1850s by abolitionists Theodore Weld 
and angelina Grimké (which Thoreau visited and described as a “queer 
place”).19 he is certainly aware of the appeal to spiritual recovery in nature 
in the second Great awakening; many revivalist meetings were held in 
fields.20 But he does not see the path of social reform as primary. Instead, 
he posits the individual household and life, or uidia, to be the primary in-
gredient of utopia, not its derivative. Walden has been called a “community 
of one,” but as another critic rightly observes, “one man does not make a 
community, even a utopian community.”21 There is an infinite difference 
between a political society, or polis (as writ large by Rousseau in the Social 
Contract or small in the relationship between emile and his tutor), and a 
so-called community of one. Uidia is a certain kind of solitary life: a heroic 
life of self making and world making. This is not the solipsistic solitude of 
a man “obsessed with his own salvation” alone.22 Thoreau is committed to 
making himself an exemplar for others, and he spends his life exhorting and 
provoking them to change (discussed in more detail later). But the good 
life he models for others does not involve an engagement with others as 
a foundation of its goodness. neighborliness, though Thoreau occasionally 
extols it and recounts his various visitors, is incapable of remaking one’s life 
without the individual economics, and attunement to nature, at the heart of 
Walden’s “experiment in living.”23
These different solutions arise from different diagnoses of what is 
wrong with the social state. Both Rousseau and Thoreau hold that social 
existence imposes false necessities. according to Rousseau, we desire 
luxury because our anxious craving for outside approval—rooted originally 
in the physical and sexual division of labor, which soon became a division 
of psychic labor as well—inflates our natural desires. once spurred by 
amour-propre, or the competitive need for self-esteem (which contrasts 
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with simple self-preservation, or amour de soi), human nature at once de-
velops and degenerates. Runaway and perverse desires are uncontainable 
without a strong exertion of law, education, or authority to reshape them 
from the beginning. But Rousseau is not optimistic about the chances of 
that occurring. There is no natural path from our history of degeneration to 
utopia; this would require a drastic social intervention and transformation 
by a legislator, a tutor, or a wise, aristocratic paterfamilias.
For Thoreau, as for Rousseau, opinion and dependence constitute 
the shackles of society, which is why both seek freedom as independence. 
Thoreau, however, rejects the psychology of internalization on which Rous-
seau bases his analysis of amour-propre. For Thoreau, only habit and the 
false perception of necessity—“mere ignorance and mistake”—bind us to 
the social.24 The extent of disagreement is measured in Thoreau’s claims 
that “the civilized man is a more experienced and wiser savage” and that 
“inside the civilized man stands the savage still in a place of honor.”25 he 
sees civilization as a superficial veneer that can be stripped off if we only 
muster the will to do so. To Thoreau, we are externally corrupted but still, in 
crucial respects, the same as savages (“every genuine thing retains this wild 
tone—which no true culture displaces”).26 To Rousseau, we are internally 
corrupted and so no longer savages.
strikingly, both men reject the notion of a fatal original sin: Thoreau 
has been called “the ultimate Pelagian,” whereas Rousseau, controversially, 
puts the account of evil as originating in human moral freedom, a sort of 
Pelagianism, in the mouth of his character saint-Preux in Julie. according 
to saint-Preux, Wolmar insists that the existence of evil indicates “deficiency 
of power, of intelligence, or of goodness in the first cause,” but saint-Preux 
argues that “the origin of physical evil lay in the nature of matter, and that 
of moral evil in man’s freedom.”27 Yet for Rousseau, this free choice of evil 
has deep historical roots in real social choices, even if not in a single adamic 
fall. Thoreau, however, rejects history as well as fate, attacking the tendency 
to blame current woes on the past: “a man will not need to study history to 
find out what is best for his own culture.”28 For Rousseau, the depth of our 
corruption by society is tragic and, like tragedy, historically rooted and so 
not easily undone (only to be overcome or, in reverie, temporarily escaped); 
for Thoreau, our muddled vision is inexplicable, so the best strategy against 
it is the comic. If we can see and avoid this danger, then society is not tragic 
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but pathetic and sometimes bathetic: “Thus men invite the devil in at every 
angle and then prate about the garden of eden and the fall of man.”29
For Rousseau, almost all civilized people are doomed to psychological 
misery unless some utopian solution can be imposed—and the conditions 
for doing so are difficult and in most places impossible. For Thoreau, indi-
vidual self-discipline should be enough. he prescribes “a stern and more 
than spartan simplicity of life and elevation of purpose.”30 The reference to 
sparta nicely measures the difference between the two thinkers. For Rous-
seau, the spartans are firmly in the ancient past, an ideal but anachronistic 
model of social unity (Emile recounts with awe the tale of a spartan mother 
who sent five sons into battle; the first question she asked the messenger 
was not whether they had survived but whether the war had been won).31 
For Thoreau, in contrast, a spartan life has no social prerequisites; it is the 
life of voluntary individual simplicity open to anyone with sufficient will.32 
even when Thoreau asserts that “the mind can be permanently profaned by 
the habit of attending to trivial things,” this is not an indelible permanence, 
for he immediately proffers its remedy: “by wariness and devotion to recon-
secrate ourselves.”33
here we come to a crucial difference in the two thinkers’ attitudes 
toward law and freedom, epitomized by the epigraphs of this chapter: are 
we actually in chains, or simply not choosing to “live free”? For Rousseau, 
being born free is a natural human condition that is violated by the unjust 
social pacts enslaving men everywhere. The social problem for Rousseau 
is fundamentally a problem of unjust laws. Because man is born free but is 
everywhere in chains, the correct response is to take “men as they are, and 
laws as they can be.”34 This is why Rousseau’s great constructive projects of 
the Social Contract, Emile, and New Héloise fall in the broad tradition of 
utopianism: they envision a wholly new society in which, and only in which, 
humans can be (made) happy, virtuous, and, crucially for Rousseau, free. 
Law—or its analogues education and estate management, in the smaller 
societies—must be the starting point, not the end result, of the formation 
of good communities and so of good individuals.
In contrast, free birth for Thoreau applies not only to a natural condi-
tion but also to the special condition of the american birthright of civil 
as well as natural liberty. so the law is not the source of unfreedom for 
most men (though it is, of course, the source of unfreedom for slaves; on 
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Thoreau’s anti-slavery writings, see Jack Turner’s chapter 6 in this volume). 
Rousseau dares to say that the old world needs to be remade but sees this 
as demanding a wholesale social change from above, whether at the mi-
crocosm or macrocosm level in society. Thoreau is trying to live up to the 
promise of the new World by calling on individuals to make their world 
anew; as I argue at the end of this chapter, for Thoreau, the new World 
means independence more profoundly than it means democracy. so in con-
trast to Rousseau’s exploration in the Social Contract of what laws “can be,” 
Thoreau announces in “slavery in Massachusetts” that “the law will never 
make men free; it is men who have got to make the law free.”35 This is the 
uidia solution. Man has to reform himself, in contrast to the vain hope of 
transforming society and so the individual from above.
so in Rousseau’s constructive works, the notion of nature is that of hu-
man nature, and law is the solution to transforming it. In Walden, Thoreau’s 
relation to nature is more complicated. he suggests that the way to escape 
false necessity and to recover a sense of ourselves through economy is to go 
back to nature and live according to it, not according to civilized standards. 
nature offers a new and asocial standard, such as in its exemplification 
of innocence and of chastity, which bridges the wild and the good: “The 
moral aspect of nature is a disease caught of man—a jaundice imported 
into her—To the innocent there are no cherubim nor angels.”36 Yet even 
here, the primary focus is on using such natural standards to remake human 
nature. nature serves as a yardstick and a resource for human effort, and 
although its radical and alien integrity is often glimpsed, its invocation is 
primarily hortatory and for edification.37
The task of remaking human nature is conceived in Walden as an act 
of heroism. The activity of clearing a space of consciousness in which to 
create the world is heroic: it is solitary combat that, in triumphing over 
nature—whether by written account or by domination in farming— 
displays the force of a natural phenomenon. The continual epic references 
in Walden—the battle of the ants portrayed as Roman civil war, the “ho-
meric or Paphlagonian” woodcutter, the “small herculean labor” Thoreau 
carries out in the bean field—all serve to establish Thoreau as the hero over 
and against the spectator roles to which his neighbors allow themselves to 
be limited.38 In Walden, the individual must both triumph over nature and 
reidentify himself with it, separating himself from a corrupt society in the 
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cause of remaking himself according to an independent standard able to 
judge and indict it.
If the uidia of Walden is hectorian, it is also hectoring. Thoreau con-
ceives his task to be that of the prophet: he calls Walden a scripture, one 
of the race of holy books that may be “more salutary than the morning” for 
our lives.39 (nor does Thoreau have any of the qualms about the instability 
and impurity of the written word, as compared with the oral word, that 
derrida explores in Rousseau’s prose.40 For Thoreau, the spoken language 
is impermanent and animal, while the written language is “a reserved and 
select expression, too significant to be heard by the ear, which we must be 
born again in order to speak.”41) Thoreau is never inclined to hide his light 
under a bushel; as he declares to his journal at age twenty-five, “I would 
fain communicate the wealth of my life to men.”42 his writing, and indeed 
his living, is conceived not as personal or private but as suitably public for 
others’ improvement: “Truth and a true man is something essentially public 
not private. . . . By living the life of a man is made common property.”43 
notice, however, that Thoreau’s determination to give his fellows “a strong 
dose of myself” refers to the professional obligations he undertakes as a 
lecturer, not, as has been suggested, to the general demands of democracy.44 
I return to whether his commitments are “democratic” later. here, it is suf-
fices to note that Rousseau too conceives his task in the constructive works 
to be like the great prophet-lawgivers—Moses, solon, numa, Lycurgus. But 
unlike Thoreau, he does not seek to inspire his readers to heroism. his 
constructive thought is directed not to making individuals unique but to 
making them happy and equal and free by means of a healing authority.
the turn to Naturalist Pursuits: Consolation versus the 
Landscape
Rousseau and Thoreau change their tone, and their preoccupations, in their 
naturalist works (specifically, the Reveries for Rousseau; his journal from 
about 1850, late lectures, and late manuscripts for Thoreau, although in 
Thoreau’s case, this turn has earlier intimations and is also expressed in 
the latter, and late-redacted, parts of Walden). Both become accomplished 
botanists who delight in nature: Thoreau calls “walking” the activity of the 
“saunterer,” and Rousseau names himself the “solitary walker.”45 Both de-
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ride medical approaches to nature. Rousseau says they “tarnish the colour 
of the meadows,” and Thoreau criticizes the invalid who drinks herb tea 
rather than living according to the seasons, “for all nature is doing her best 
each moment to make us well. she exists for no other end.”46 Both of them 
celebrate the experience of an episodic and transitory absorption in nature 
(named here uhemeria, “the good day,” or more generally, uchronia, “the 
good time”). Yet despite sharing this love of naturalist exploration, the two 
disagree on the meaning of such immersion in nature. Rousseau’s public-
mindedness gives way to an insistence on private consolation from which 
there is no path to public reform; Thoreau largely abandons the hectoring 
demand for heroism from his readers in favor of a gentler invitation to situ-
ate themselves and their polis inside a natural landscape and to accept with 
gratitude the plenitude nature there bestows. Thus for Rousseau, the nature 
of the constructive works, in which human liberation is a social enterprise, 
means that communing with nature can at best be consolation, not a social 
solution. Thoreau, in contrast, retains a faith in the power of individual ac-
tion, though softening it from the self-mastery of Walden to the acceptance 
and gratitude we see in his later works. In both cases, the later works help 
us appreciate and shed light on the earlier works. 
Rousseau’s Reveries canvasses a range of motives for writing, virtu-
ally all of which refer solely to himself. he proclaims himself to have been 
relieved of the burden of social responsibility he executed in his earlier, 
constructive texts by the persecution that has driven him out of society. The 
derision and defamation showered on him exonerate him from any concern 
for social welfare; henceforth his fellows can and will be nothing for him.47 
so the Reveries is a new kind of text, different from the social address and 
purpose of the Confessions, which had been written “to display to my kind 
a portrait in every way true to nature.”48 he is writing now to benefit not 
others but himself.
In a paragraph of the Reveries, Rousseau explores the possible pur-
poses such writing might serve—to “take the barometer readings of my 
soul,” to re-create former pleasures by using writing to “double the space 
of my existence.”49 Personal consolation, not social reform, is the purpose of 
the Reveries, and Rousseau proposes no path from the former to the latter. 
It is not even meant to be exemplary—Rousseau contends that reverie is 
unwise for most men, given their socially inflated needs. his uniqueness 
is not presented as a model for emulation. Whereas in Walden Thoreau 
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presents himself as a hero to inspire others to be equally heroic, and in 
the late writings as a saunterer whom others would benefit from emulating 
or accompanying, in the Reveries Rousseau presents himself as a uniquely 
unfortunate man, with a uniquely natural heart, whom others should ac-
knowledge as unique rather than seek to imitate.
Thus the purpose of the Reveries is explicitly stated as the search for 
temporary personal consolation. This is the fallacy in recent attempts to 
recover Rousseau’s reveries for deep ecology.50 nature has no privileged 
status for Rousseau but is only one of several possible paths to his real in-
terest, which is emotional independence. although Rousseau enjoys losing 
himself in the surface of nature (I discuss his botanizing later), nature is 
only one of several possible sources of reverie, and he values the reverie 
of a lost sexual partnership in the Tenth Walk even more highly than the 
pastoral charms of the island of st. Pierre described in the Fifth Walk: the 
lost sexual partnership is described as “that one short time in my life when 
I was myself, completely myself, unmixed and unimpeded, and when I can 
genuinely claim to have lived.”51 What is important is not the experience 
of nature or sex per se, but rather the experience of freedom and indepen-
dence achieved in each. Indeed, nature is so far from being essential (and 
Rousseau’s conception of reverie so far removed from deep ecology) that 
he declares, “I have often thought that in the Bastille, and even in a dun-
geon with not a single object to rest my eyes on, I could still have dreamed 
pleasantly.”52 The value of the lost sexual union with Madame de Warens 
is this: “I was perfectly free, or better than free because I was subject only 
to my own affections and did only what I wanted to do.”53 What matters 
most is not the content of any given reverie but rather the sense of being 
“self-sufficient like God,” freed even from the trammels of time, as “the 
present runs on indefinitely but this duration goes unnoticed, with no sign 
of the passing of time.”54 Finally, these sentiments are experienced as well 
or better in the recall of reverie or the reading of his composed Reveries as 
in the original experience itself; this is what Jean starobinski identifies as 
“the prospect of ecstasy, repeated indefinitely through reading.”55 Far from 
being identical with deep ecology, Rousseau’s solipsistic account of reverie 
is its polar opposite.
For Rousseau, then, the overriding purpose of immersion in nature is 
emotional solace and consolation. For Thoreau, its purpose—described in 
the journal entry for september 7, 1851, in which he declares watching to be 
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“the way to spend a day”—is quite different.56 his commitment to watchful-
ness in time aims to “find God in nature,” echoing emerson’s schematic 
program in his essay “nature.”57 But now it is infused with a humboldtian 
and darwinian commitment to knowledge of the natural world as the path 
to knowledge of the (divine) whole.58 Thoreau’s purpose is knowledge and 
a higher understanding. although he never ceases the search for emotional 
consolation, particularly after the devastating loss of his brother John in 
1842, he seeks it through patient and careful investigation, through wake-
fulness rather than through blissful Rousseauian forgetfulness. (Indeed, 
Rousseau’s failure to find a higher moral law in nature was attacked by one 
of his earliest critics, the Jesuit Louis-Bertrand Castel, who defended a view 
of “naturalisme” as including and leading to an understanding of God—a 
sort of anticipation of the path to transcendence taken by Thoreau.)59
such different purposes lend a different coloration to their views of 
botany, knowledge, and time. although Rousseau recommends the pursuit 
of botany as part of reverie, he sees this not as a key to the understanding of 
nature but rather as an activity deliberately confined to the pleasant surface 
of nature. Plants are the visible surface of nature, the “clothing and adorn-
ment of the earth.” They are available to the unaided eye without expense 
or effort, with no need to probe or postulate any deeper level of reality, 
in contrast to the unpleasant toil that the study of minerals or anatomy 
requires. (“What a terrible sight an anatomy theatre is! stinking corpses, 
livid running flesh, blood, repellent intestines, horrible skeletons, pestilen-
tial vapours!”)60
Thus for Rousseau, the study of botany is not intended to generate any 
strong program of knowledge of the kind needed to rebut the Pyrrhonian 
skepticism about the relationship between appearance and reality and the 
impossibility of knowing reality that, in its reformulation by Montaigne, so 
troubled Rousseau. It is only in his “Moral Letters,” written in a purported 
address to sophie d’houdetot and haunted by Montaigne, that he fully 
expresses the enormity of this skepticism. There Rousseau admits to an 
“awful doubt” grounded in the imprisonment of our sensory faculties (we 
do not feel the real weight of gravity or the blood circulating within us) and 
the impossibility of knowledge.61 summing up the limitations of our senses 
and so our knowledge, Montaigne had declared that “our vision is reduced 
to the length of our nose.”62 Like Montaigne, Rousseau indicts our reason 
as well as our senses, since reason relies on the senses, which are so easily 
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fooled even about size and touch: “We know nothing, dear sophie, we see 
nothing; we are a troop of blind men, thrown out by chance in this vast 
universe,” and in short, “we have no certain notion of anything.”63
But if Rousseau bows under the same doubt as Montaigne, he is unable 
to accept his predecessor’s equable willingness to live with it. savaging hu-
man presumption is no pleasure for Rousseau as it is for Montaigne; Rous-
seau longs for human dignity in the universe, even while saying grimly that 
we are and must appear ridiculous. The solution to which Rousseau’s doubt 
drives him is a renunciation of the possibility of knowledge—understood as 
knowledge beyond appearances, resulting from investigation—but also an 
insistence on the possibility of happiness. our senses and reason were given 
to us to secure happiness, not knowledge. When we use them to investigate 
nature, “they are insufficient, they fool us.”64 But if we use them only to 
preserve ourselves, they will be dependable; we may be misled as to the 
outside world, but never as to our own happiness (we can achieve emotion-
ally independent self-preservation, and so happiness, without speculative 
knowledge). hence we can be at home in nature. Montaigne had denied 
that nature is an unjust stepmother, meaning that she provides for us ade-
quately; Rousseau affirms in the Reveries that she is a true mother indeed.65 
We must give up any drive for knowledge, any natural object whose study 
requires effort or penetration, to take consolation in those aspects of nature 
available to us on the surface, without strain. This is why Rousseau shrinks 
back from the horrifying sights of the anatomy theater and cries out instead 
to the flowers, streams, woods, and glades, to nature circumscribed to the 
pleasing and pastoral alone. The “study” he applauds in the Reveries must 
be understood within the context of this peculiar response to skepticism. 
It is a purely ruminative study, involving a comparison of appearances and 
delight in perceptions, but no attempt to base rational deductions on those 
flimsy foundations, in contrast to the investigation of the reality behind ap-
pearances that Thoreau pursues. For Rousseau, the “effortless pleasure” of 
botany alone among cognitive activities escapes the constraining calculus of 
cause and effect, truth and lying, labor and suffering; it enables those few 
who are able to pursue it with a pure heart to be at home in nature without 
strain or transformation.66
unlike Rousseau, Thoreau is not fearful of depths or investigation. In 
Walden he glorifies digging below the surface as a way of getting to real-
ity—the famous passage in which he measures the depth of Walden Pond is 
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meant as a cure for the skepticism based on a false longing for metaphysical 
depths—and constructs the text of bottoms and foundations.67 he aims to 
establish a distinction between reality and appearance that will hold firm 
both materially and morally. The bottom is “a place where you might found 
a wall or a state,” and this is something anyone can do: “there is a solid 
bottom every where.”68 Thoreau feels skepticism as a loss of compass and 
responds to it by establishing a bottom; Rousseau feels it as the absurdity 
of human pretensions in the universe and responds to it by substituting 
feeling—in which we are not ridiculous—for knowledge.
In Walden Thoreau sometimes expresses a peculiar conception of 
knowledge, such as his insistence that he has built his cabin on a previously 
unoccupied site: “I am not aware that any man has ever built on the spot 
which I occupy. deliver me from a city built on the site of a more ancient 
city, whose materials are ruins, whose gardens cemeteries.”69 satisfying 
knowledge, it seems, is available only by making something from scratch. 
here he sets out to create the world in order to know it. solitude functions 
to exclude the other who could disturb this balance. Immediately after 
the reflection just quoted, Thoreau repopulates the woods that he has just 
cleansed of human presence: “With such reminiscences I repeopled the 
woods and lulled myself asleep.”70 he is oriented in nature here only by 
projecting it on a self-made foundation.
But there are already hints in Walden of a less solipsistic, more cosmic 
kind of knowledge: “not till we are lost, in other words, not till we have lost 
the world, do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and the 
infinite extent of our relations.”71 elsewhere Thoreau extends the trust in 
nature expressed in Walden (“I think that we may safely trust a good deal 
more than we do. . . . nature is as well adapted to our weakness as to our 
strength”) to a trust in the knowledge it is possible to gain of nature’s whole 
interrelated and infinite workings.72 he expresses this specifically in, among 
other ways, his active interest in the indigenous population. The posture 
of solipsistic foundation that he plays with, at times, in Walden must be 
juxtaposed with his awareness elsewhere in that text, and in other texts, of 
amerindian displacement as the fundamental condition for the indepen-
dence of new england.73 Thus in some moods he relaxes the requirement 
of a tabula rasa for the landscape:
I love that the rocks should appear to have some spots of blood on them. 
Indian blood at least—to be convinced that the earth has been crowded with 
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men—living enjoying suffering—that races past [sic] away have stained the 
rocks with their blood—That the mould I tread on has been animated—aye 
humanized. I am the more at home. I farm the dust of my ancestors—though 
the chemists [sic] analysis may not detect it—I go forth to redeem the mead-
ows they have become.74
here Thoreau can tolerate the peopling as well as the studying of the world; 
he does not need the purity of the tabula rasa to enable him to understand 
nature.75
Yet it is not only knowledge of the natural world, and the divinity 
revealed within it, that Thoreau seeks in his naturalist writings. It is also 
a new understanding of the “landscape” of which both individuals and so-
ciety are but a part, and against the background of which they must come 
to understand themselves as partial. This is heralded earlier in Thoreau’s 
career in his 1842 journal: “how little matters it all men have built and 
delved there in the valley, it is but a feature in the landscape.”76 This pres-
ages a new understanding of the relation between nature and utopia: the 
valley—by which Thoreau means city and civilization—is to be understood 
as subordinate and as decentered in a greater natural whole. The same line 
of thought is developed in “Walking” in 1851:
Man and his affairs, church and state—and school, trade and commerce, 
and manufactures and agriculture—even politics, the most alarming of them 
all,—I am pleased to see how little space they occupy in the landscape. Poli-
tics is but a narrow field, and that still narrower highway yonder leads to it.77
Thus politics—the city—is not the whole of human existence. It must be 
put in (decidedly minor) proportion in relation to the natural world.
This perspective on both nature and politics generates a distinctive 
set of emotional and cognitive attitudes toward nature. Preeminent among 
these attitudes are gratitude, love, and freedom: the love and enjoyment 
of pursuits in nature as leisure rather than commerce, and gratitude for 
the munificence of nature, which provides freedom as both leisure and 
independence. Characteristic of this attitudinal complex is the setting of 
human affairs—in particular, social and political institutions—into a defi-
nite and limited perspective. as Thoreau writes in his journal, “some rarely 
go outdoors—most are always at home at night—very few indeed have 
stayed out all night once in their lives—fewer still have gone behind the 
world of humanity—seen his institutions like toad-stools by the way-side.”78 
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although human affairs are not central, they benefit from the plenitude and 
leisure available in nature. Thoreau declares in a late manuscript that “the 
very earth itself is a granary and a seminary.”79 This is not nature as opposed 
to civilization but nature as the context or home for civilization, in which it 
belongs, a context of plenitude from which we may learn and to which we 
must be grateful.
Thoreau’s greatest image of the leisure and freedom afforded by nature 
to its chastened and somewhat dwarfed human inhabitants is that of ber-
rying, or huckleberry picking. shannon L. Mariotti remarks in chapter 15 
of this volume how the physicality of berrying transforms perception; here, 
our focus is on the experience of leisure and thus the independence and 
self-sufficiency it provides. Berrying is a free gift from nature, “a pastime, 
not a drudgery,” an original type of leisure in nature that we can still experi-
ence. Thoreau dramatically equates the independence afforded by summer 
berry picking with that achieved on the first of august, the anniversary of 
Britain’s 1834 emancipation of the slaves in the West Indies, which was 
widely celebrated throughout antebellum new england. Thoreau names 
this “the anniversary of emancipation in new england,” twinning the 
emancipation of legal slaves with the emancipation from dependence and 
slavishness for all.80 In berrying, we are emancipated from the need to buy 
food, from the need to spend our lives in slavish pursuits; we are free to 
enjoy our natural livelihood.
Thoreau establishes a further parallel between berrying and a chas-
tened politics when he observes that the “natural rights” to huckleberrying 
have been lost in england and the Continent already.81 only americans, 
who can still go berry picking, can find the perfect independence as self- 
sufficiency that Thoreau (and indeed, Rousseau) seeks. The bounty of nature 
is incompatible with slavishness and exploitation; it is compatible only with 
independence and self-sufficiency on the part of each individual. speaking 
of the “true fruit of nature,” in both metaphorical and literal senses, he 
warns (in a remark anticipated in Walden) that “no hired man can help us to 
gather that crop.”82 no one else can do that for an individual who desires to 
preserve independence; in relation to nature, one must be independent and 
self-sufficient: “you who taste these berries are a god” (recall Rousseau’s 
assertion that, in reverie, one is “self-sufficient like God”).83 and as a god, 
one is innocent as well as independent, so the rejection of original sin 
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noted in the 1855 journal is reiterated: “[Berrying] is a sort of sacrament, a 
communion,—the not forbidden fruits, which no serpent tempts us to eat.”84
notice that Thoreau talks similarly about leisure for certain farmers 
as for berry pickers. For example, just as berrying is a pastime and not a 
drudgery, so he speaks of the farmer Minot doing “nothing (with haste and 
drudgery)—but as if he loved it.”85 his point, then, cannot be to draw a strict 
line between wild, untouched nature and civilization. although he talks of 
wanting “absolute Freedom and Wildness” as opposed to freedom that is 
“merely civil,”86 he also talks of any relation to nature—whether farming 
or berrying—as potentially affording the same leisure. It is important to 
preserve the wild, especially in the context of the dramatic deforestation of 
the Concord area in Thoreau’s lifetime. But we can experience nature, and 
the gratitude and delight it inspires, even in and around a well-organized 
settlement of civilization.87
Within this landscape, we do have some civic tasks. Thoreau acknowl-
edges a need for government but insists that it is not worth our conscious 
attention: the functions of government are “vital functions of human society, 
but should be unconsciously performed, like the corresponding functions 
of the physical body. They are infra-human, a kind of vegetation.”88 (note 
Thoreau’s scorn for the vegetable state for which Rousseau’s Reveries yearn.) 
Ideally, the state should accept this subordinate place, as already stated in 
the conclusion of “Resistance to Civil Government” (1849):
I please myself with imagining a state at last which can afford to be just to all 
men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would 
not think it inconsistent with its own repose, if a few were to live aloof from 
it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of 
neighbors and fellow-men. a state which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered 
it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect 
and glorious state, which also I have imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.89
earlier in that essay, Thoreau criticizes those statesmen who “speak of mov-
ing society, but have no resting-place without it.”90 There he is speaking 
metaphorically about principles. But the late writings constitute a similar 
image, offering a resting place not in the sense of absolute archimedean 
principles but in the sense of a place for actual rest. Leisure has political 
significance because it allows us to recall our relation to nature and the 
subordinate position of politics in the landscape.
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The truly utopian task lies not in the city but in the landscape as a 
whole: “We are all schoolmasters, and our schoolhouse is the universe.”91 
(Recalling the hectoring tone of Walden, Thoreau characteristically makes 
his readers the teachers rather than the pupils.) having earlier insisted that 
the good individual must precede the good society, Thoreau here steps 
outside and beyond that debate by acknowledging the need to begin by 
establishing one’s sense of place, putting both self and polity into severe pro-
portion while gaining for them the plenitude of leisure. Whereas Rousseau’s 
attempts to remake human nature give way to an attempt to lose himself in 
nature and forget the political altogether in uchronia, Thoreau’s later vision 
of nature as utopia teaches that utopia must return to its original meaning 
and recover the meaning and value of our place in the natural world as the 
setting for a suitably chastened politics.92 If nature serves both Thoreau 
and Rousseau as a moral yardstick, it becomes a refuge for Rousseau, while 
it modulates for Thoreau from a gladiatorial arena to an all-encompassing 
environment. The flight to nature can bear many political meanings. It need 
not signify a mere rejection of the political; it can also yield a reformulation 
of its boundaries and significance.
Thus the naturalist writings shed new light on the question of whether 
Thoreau is a political thinker, as memorably denied by hannah arendt. 
arendt’s attack on Thoreau for heeding, and caring for, only his “unpolitical” 
individual conscience, rather than joining in a corporate political judgment 
as a citizen, deals only with “Resistance to Civil Government.”93 although 
I do not evaluate that text here, I have argued that a full assessment of 
Thoreau’s politics requires an understanding of his changing views of the 
place of politics in nature. But that still leaves the question of the nature of 
his politics. Partly in response to arendt, George Kateb and nancy Rosen-
blum have pioneered the reading of Thoreau as a “democratic individual-
ist” who is committed, at least provisionally and for his own purposes, to 
representative democracy.94 Mariotti, too, repeatedly imputes a concern 
with democracy to Thoreau, claiming that he wants to cultivate “more truly 
democratic citizens,” to “reach toward a more truly democratic polity,” and 
that “he sees these critical practices as opening up more democratic pos-
sibilities.”95 Likewise, George shulman suggests in chapter 5 of this volume 
that Thoreau’s concern with prophecy must be understood in the context of 
democratic culture,96 while Brian Walker argues in chapter 2 that Walden 
belongs to the genre of “democratic advice book.”97 against such claims, 
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Leigh Kathryn Jenco, in chapter 3, argues that Thoreau’s concern with “ac-
tion from principle” leads him to criticize democratic majoritarianism and 
representation for embodying legal claims potentially opposed to genuine 
moral demands.98
absent a full evaluation of the writings on resistance and “action from 
principle,” it is impossible to settle the question of whether Thoreau is a 
democratic thinker. Certainly, he does not sing praises to democracy, as 
Whitman does. It is notable that although he certainly plays on the lan-
guage of voting and representation, forms of the word democracy appear 
only twice in any of Thoreau’s works collected in the Cambridge Political 
Writings volume; compare the thirteen or so references to democracy in 
Rosenblum’s introduction to that volume.99 This does not prove that democ-
racy is not a fruitful category to discuss his thought (it is at least a category 
he used at times, unlike the category of utopia used to organize this chap-
ter), but it suggests that to assimilate him too readily to Whitman or even 
emerson on democracy may be to fail to register a significant difference 
in the pattern of his thought and prose. For all their commonalities, a gulf 
divides Thoreau’s commitment to independence and the uses of individual-
ity from Whitman’s ecstatic democratic odes. This chapter has argued that 
the language and meaning of freedom as independence afford an illuminat-
ing account of Thoreau’s writings, as well as those of Rousseau, and should 
frame any evaluation of his politics, including the vexed question of their 
democratic character.
In this respect, Thoreau’s own language may be said to be the child 
not of 1787 or 1828 (the year of andrew Jackson’s election) but of 1776. In 
Walden, Thoreau proclaims himself “more independent than any farmer in 
Concord” and evaluates his occupation as day-laborer as “the most indepen-
dent of any.”100 The new World is, for Thoreau, the land promising indepen-
dence, the same psychological standard of self-sufficiency that Rousseau 
finds has vanished in the corruption of the old. such independence raises 
a political question, however, if it is meant to be independence not only for 
one but for all, as it certainly is for Thoreau, the preacher and prophet. But 
independence does not demand interpersonal interaction, even though it 
may set itself up as a model for others. It is the politics of the lonely beacon, 
not the convivial bonfire.
as noted earlier, Walden’s insistence on uidia must be read in the light 
of Thoreau’s simultaneous and incessant insistence on addressing a public 
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that he exhorts to emulate him. Thoreau says little about the lineaments of a 
society made up of independent and economical figures, except to mention 
briefly—without filling in—the idyll of “a still more perfect and glorious 
state” for which such a society of independent figures can pave the way. 
From his naturalist writings, we can sketch in the further importance of 
the independence secured by the plenitude and leisure that can be enjoyed 
in nature, as bulwarks against an excessively dependent or oppressive social 
condition. If independence is to be secured, uidia must become utopia 
while maintaining the psychic enjoyment of uchronia. These approaches 
to the good individual and the good society replace the traditional role and 
meaning of utopia as upolia. Instead of starting from the good society, let 
alone the democratic polity, Thoreau’s conception of independence affords 
each person a relationship to nature and the self that would dispense with 
the traditional route to utopia altogether.101
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This chapter owes its inception to the incomparable teaching of Judith n. shklar, 
with whom I first studied Rousseau and american political thought, and to the 
provocative model of stanley Cavell’s and George Kateb’s reflections and teach-
ings on Thoreau. Professor shklar was the adviser of my undergraduate disserta-
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economics, King’s College, Cambridge, provided helpful research assistance. 
Participants in the Gresham College–school of advanced study symposium 
on utopia in London (May 2007), the Cambridge university Reading Group in 
american Intellectual and Cultural history (october 2007), and the conference 
“Men and Citizens: nature, Foundations and Challenges of Citizenship,” Centre 
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discussions of previous drafts. I am particularly grateful to the anonymous readers 
of this volume for their comments, to Michael sonenscher for sharing his erudite 
knowledge of Rousseau, and to Jack Turner for his similar knowledge of Thoreau, 
combined with stimulating and precise editorial advice.
1. The comparison between Rousseau and Thoreau was briefly made by stan-
ley Cavell, The Senses of Walden (san Francisco: north Point Press, [1972] 1981), 
87, remarking on their understandings of society as conspiracy, and by Frederick 
Garber, Thoreau’s Redemptive Imagination (new York: new York university Press, 
1977), on their understandings of nature. More recently, it has been advanced 
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in the context of appropriating both for deep ecology in an article by Joseph h. 
Lane Jr. (see note 4). on romanticism in Rousseau, see, for example, Peter Gay, 
“Reading about Rousseau: a survey of the Literature,” in The Party of Humanity: 
Essays in the French Enlightenment (new York: Knopf, 1963). on romanticism 
in Thoreau, see Perry Miller, Nature’s Nation (Cambridge, Ma: harvard univer-
sity Press, 1967); Michael Gilmore, American Romanticism and the Marketplace 
(Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1985); daniel Walker howe, Making the 
American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Cambridge, Ma: Belknap 
Press of harvard university Press, 1997) (howe calls Thoreau a “Romantic reli-
gious perfectionist” [244]); and important work by nancy Rosenblum, especially 
Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the Reconstruction of Liberal Thought 
(Cambridge, Ma: harvard university Press, 1987), and chapter 1 of this volume. 
The nonstandard relationships of both authors to romanticism are indicated, for 
example, by Leon Chai, The Romantic Foundations of the American Renaissance 
(Ithaca, nY: Cornell university Press, 1987), who classes Rousseau’s Reveries as 
“pre-Romantic” (2) and omits Thoreau and Whitman from the main theme, seeing 
their relationship to romanticism as “mediated through the vision of emerson” 
(7). It is this sort of uneasiness of classification that I indicate in the term quasi-
romantic. I am grateful to Michael o’Brien for helpful discussions of the meaning 
of, and literature on, american romanticism.
2. neither thinker uses the term utopia himself. I introduce it here (following 
a large literature, especially on Thoreau), with the variations noted, as a neat way 
to capture the changing significance of their stances for political philosophy. Tho-
reau is more central to most studies of utopia than is Rousseau (but see Judith n. 
shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory [Cambridge: Cam-
bridge university Press, 1969], 8–12). The fullest discussion is andrea Bollinger, 
Henry David Thoreaus “World of Full and Fair Proportions”: Gesellschaftskritik, 
Sozialreform und Utopie in Neuengland (Bern: Peter Lang, 1995), who argues 
that the peaceful revolution of self-reform in Walden, heralding an existentialist 
kind of liberal utopia that contrasts with the “holy utopia” of Puritanism, becomes 
impossible to maintain with the rise of controversy about slavery and is abandoned 
in favor of political action in the later writings on John Brown (244). exceptionally, 
a chapter is devoted to Rousseau, but only passing mention is made of Thoreau, in 
Frank e. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World 
(Cambridge, Ma: harvard university Press, 1979). By using the term utopia, 
however, I do not mean to prejudge how applicable or possible an author believes 
a particular model to be. The term constructive work is my own heuristic to signal 
works in which the author advances some sort of arguably utopian model, as op-
posed to works that have a less directive or focused ambition.
3. This is an exercise in comparison and contrast, not a claim of influence. 
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There is no mention of any work by Rousseau in Robert sattelmeyer, Thoreau’s 
Reading: A Study in Intellectual History with Bibliographical Catalogue (Prince-
ton, nJ: Princeton university Press, 1988), nor of any work by Montesquieu. Tho-
reau is not interested in constitutional questions. however, as sattelmeyer shows, 
Thoreau was well read in certain French literature, in particular Victor Cousin’s 
“eclectic” introduction to the history of philosophy, and he was familiar with other 
French thinkers such as Fénelon (28) and Constant (20), though probably not the 
then little-known lecture on the ancients and the moderns. Cousin’s book would 
have acquainted Thoreau with the then widely held critical view of Rousseau as 
an epicurean and a hobbist, hostile to the idealist themes that Cousin and his 
american followers such as emerson and orestes Brownson (Thoreau’s teacher at 
harvard) found compelling in German transcendental philosophy and its english 
exponents such as Coleridge and Carlyle.
4. This is the appropriate object of comparison, contrary to the opinion of 
Joseph h. Lane Jr., “Reveries and the Return to nature: Rousseau’s experience of 
Convergence,” Review of Politics 68 (2006): 474–99, who argues for the similarity 
of Thoreau’s Walden and Rousseau’s Reveries. To treat these two texts as similar 
misunderstands their purposes and natures and indicates a deafness to the differ-
ence between heroic self and world remaking and the search for personal consola-
tion. as I show, the more relevant (though still divergent) comparator to Rousseau’s 
Reveries is Thoreau’s later and more committedly naturalist writing, although the 
temporal boundary is not stark: he continued to work on Walden after the 1851 
turn in “Walking,” and there is much continuity in his preoccupations as well as 
a change in emphasis. see sharon Cameron, Writing Nature: Henry Thoreau’s 
Journal (new York: oxford university Press, 1985), 25–26.
5. The editions and translations quoted in the text are as follows. For Jean-
Jacques Rousseau: On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters, ed. Roger d. 
Masters (new York: st. Martin’s Press, 1978); The First and Second Discourses, 
Together with the Replies to Critics, and Essay on the Origin of Languages, ed. 
and trans. Victor Gourevitch (new York: harper and Row, 1986); Reveries of the 
Solitary Walker, trans. Peter France (suffolk: Penguin, 1979); The Confessions 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. J. M. Cohen (harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985); 
Emile, trans. allan Bloom (new York: Basic Books, 1979); and the French texts for 
the above as well as “Lettres Morales” (for which I provide my own translations) 
and “[discours sur] L’économie politique” (quoted in French) in Oeuvres com-
plètes, 4 vols., gen. ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 
1959–1969). For henry david Thoreau, the authoritative Princeton university 
Press editions (not yet completed) are used to the extent possible: Excursions, ed. 
Joseph J. Moldenhauer (2007; including “Walking”); A Week on the Concord and 
Merrimack Rivers, ed. Carl F. hovde et al. (1980); Reform Papers, ed. Wendell 
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Glick (1973; including “Resistance to Civil Government,” “Life without Principle,” 
“slavery in Massachusetts,” and “a Plea for Captain John Brown”); Walden, ed. J. 
Lyndon shanley (1971); and Journal, vols. 1–8, gen. ed. John C. Broderick (1981–
2002), volumes cited by Roman numerals. For the last, when the Princeton text 
has not yet been published, I cite Journal, 14 vols., ed. Bradford Torrey and Francis 
h. allen (salt Lake City: Peregrine smith Books, 1984), volumes cited by arabic 
numerals. For the late Thoreau manuscripts written in 1858–1861: Wild Fruits, 
ed. Bradley P. dean (new York: W. W. norton, 2000); and “The dispersion of 
seeds,” in Faith in a Seed: The Dispersion of Seeds, and Other Late Natural History 
Writings, ed. Bradley P. dean (Washington, dC: Island Press/shearwater Books, 
1993), 21–173. Rather than refer to the posthumous selections and publications of 
Thoreau’s natural history essays “Wild apples,” “autumnal Tints,” and “huckleber-
ries,” I refer to them in dean’s Wild Fruits. Likewise, rather than refer separately 
to the essay “The succession of Forest Trees,” published in 1860 in both the New 
York Tribune and Transactions of the Middlesex Agricultural Society, I cite the 
manuscript from which it was taken, “The dispersion of seeds.” For information of 
publication and provenance, I found the following overview useful: Ronald Wesley 
hoag, “Thoreau’s Later natural history Writings,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Henry David Thoreau, ed. Joel Myerson (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1995), 152–70.
6. The discussion of Rousseau’s later work refers to the Confessions (completed 
in 1770) and the Reveries (begun in 1776), but it excludes the uneven, repetitive, 
and vitriolic text Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues (written in 1775).
7. as has often been noted, the u in Thomas More’s coinage of utopia is a 
privative, so that utopia means “no place” and fits with the other puns More makes 
in Utopia (1516), such as the river anyder, named by the Greek for “waterless.” see 
Thomas More, Utopia, ed. George M. Logan and Robert M. adams (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 1989), especially 5n9. however, it has become widely 
and traditionally interpreted as the ideal society (playing on the typographically 
and possibly aurally similar eu, or “good,” in Greek). My coinages play on this 
traditional interpretation of utopia.
8. on the distinctiveness of this tradition, see eric nelson, The Greek Tradi-
tion in Republican Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2004).
9. doyne dawson, Cities of the Gods: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 1992); these are the titles of chaps. 2–4. Coined 
by More in the sixteenth century, the term utopia was obviously not used by Plato 
or other ancients any more than by Rousseau or Thoreau, but I follow dawson, 
among others, who adopt it in discussing ancient thought. see also Melissa Lane, 
“Plato, Popper, strauss, and utopianism: open secrets?” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1999): 119–42.
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10. Rousseau, “Économie politique,” l’Encyclopédie, vol. 5, november 1755; 
Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3, 241–78, quoting from 277. on enlightenment concep-
tions of “economy,” both domestic and political, see Christophe salvat, “Les articles 
‘Œ\Économie’ et leurs désignants,” Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie 
40–41 (2006): 107–26.
11. Rousseau, Emile, 39; see also shklar, Men and Citizens, 5.
12. The exclusion of money from the list of “necessaries” (Walden, 329) is 
noted by Richard J. schneider, “Walden,” in Cambridge Companion to Thoreau, 
92–106, at 98.
13. an instructive discussion of Walden’s strategies of economy is provided by 
Brian Walker in chapter 2 of this volume, although I question below his claim that 
these strategies are best conceived as deliberately “democratic.” see also Gilmore, 
American Romanticism. 
14. all quotations are from Thoreau, Walden, 37.
15. For Rousseau, the self-sufficiency that matters is purely psychological; 
that others meet one’s bodily needs is no objection so long as this does not intro-
duce any psychological dependence (so the Wolmar estate is self-sufficient because 
it can rely on servants to grow produce and do all the necessary work). Compare 
Thoreau’s sense of self-sufficiency, which is in no way compromised by the fact that 
emerson owns the land on which the cabin at Walden Pond stands, or by the din-
ner parties he attends and laundry services he regularly obtains from friends and 
family in Concord; he simply decrees that ownership and menial assistance (not 
to mention familial and friendly companionship) are irrelevant to emotional and 
material independence. Contrast the ideal of Bronson alcott’s Fruitlands utopian 
society, which aspired to divide labor and leisure equally, although this noble aim 
was scuppered by a persisting sexual division of labor.
16. The conception of these diverse projects as parallel is articulated in the 
precursor of this chapter: Melissa sharon Lane, “The Flight to nature as a Mode 
of social Critique: a study of Rousseau and Thoreau” (aB diss., harvard univer-
sity, 1988), stored and cataloged in the harvard archives. a similar conception is 
articulated in terms of Rousseau’s multiple “archetypes” in Joseph h. Lane Jr. and 
Rebecca R. Clark, “The solitary Walker in the Political World: The Paradoxes of 
Rousseau and deep ecology,” Political Theory 34 (2006): 62–94; George arm-
strong Kelly, “a General overview,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, 
ed. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2001), 8–56; and 
shklar, Men and Citizens.
17. The claim that one must change society in order to create a new individual 
does not preclude the possibility of a few exceptional individuals arising, spontane-
ously, within the existing society. This is countenanced by Plato in his discussion of 
the “natural philosophers” in Republic VI (see especially 485a–487a) and by Rous-
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seau in his celebration of his own natural goodness and innocence in Confessions, 
qualities that make possible his later Reveries. But for neither thinker is the need 
to transform society to make the vast majority of people happy and good negated 
by these few exceptions. on this issue in Plato, see Melissa Lane, “Virtue as the 
Love of Knowledge in Plato’s Symposium and Republic,” in Maieusis: Essays in 
Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, ed. dominic scott (oxford: 
oxford university Press, 2007), 44–67.
18. I am grateful to John Thompson for the latter formulation.
19. Quoted in John L. Thomas, “antislavery and utopia,” in The Antislavery 
Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin duberman (Princeton, 
nJ: Princeton university Press, 1965), 240–69, at 263. on the Puritan “holy soci-
ety” and its influence on Thoreau, as well as his distancing of himself from it, see 
Bollinger, Thoreaus “World of Full and Fair Proportions,” 29–60, 236n4.
20. I am grateful to Gideon Mailer for this suggestion.
21. The first quotation is from Robert s. Fogarty, All Things New: American 
Communes and Utopian Movements, 1860–1914 (Chicago: university of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 24; the riposte is from Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in 
Modern Times (oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 82, remarking that this makes 
Thoreau at once the epitome and the reductio ad absurdum of american utopia-
nism in its traditional sense.
22. as John Patrick diggins contends he is in “Thoreau, Marx, and the ‘Riddle’ 
of alienation,” Social Research 39 (1972): 571–98, at 581, quoted by Bob Pepperman 
Taylor, America’s Bachelor Uncle: Thoreau and the American Polity (Lawrence: 
university Press of Kansas, 1996), 16. Taylor rejects the idea that Thoreau agrees 
with emerson in viewing nature as “a refuge from society.”
23. To put it another way, on this reading, Thoreau should not count as what 
Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley: univer-
sity of California Press, 1973), calls a “fraternal” thinker. McWilliams, however, 
uses the idea of utopia in connection with fraternity rather oddly, speaking of “the 
old liberal utopia” as “a world of total private liberty” that is “blind to the nature of 
communion” yet seeks to “blot out separate identity” of each individual ego (620).
24. Thoreau, Walden, 6.
25. Ibid., 40; Thoreau, A Week, 345.
26. Thoreau, Journal, april 21, 1852, IV:479. 
27. The phrase “the ultimate Pelagian” is from howe, Making the American 
Self, 248. Michael sonenscher called my attention to what one might consider 
Rousseau’s Pelagianism, in the form of an advocacy (by the character saint-Preux) 
of the views of the Jesuit Luis de Molina. saint-Preux asserts that “God could do 
anything, except create other substances as perfect as his own and affording evil 
no purchase” (pt. V, letter 5, 595). Rousseau defends the theological content of his 
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novel (though playfully attributing some independence to saint-Preux) in a 1761 
exchange of letters with Chrétien-Guillaume de Lamoignon de Malesherbes, who 
was seeking changes to the work being published in amsterdam to make it accept-
able to the French authorities. see Rousseau to Malesherbes (March 10?, 1761), 
in Correspondance complète de Jean Jacques Rousseau, vol. 8, ed. R. a. Leigh 
(Geneva and Madison: Institut et musée Voltaire and university of Wisconsin 
Press, 1969), 237 (letter 1350), 119–20 (letter 1298), 132–33 (letter 1303, rejecting 
“cette mutilation” [132] as unnecessary for a “Roman genevois” to accept [133]). 
For background, see Victor Gourevitch, “The Religious Thought,” in Cambridge 
Companion to Rousseau, 193–246.
28. Thoreau, Walden, 205. There is much of interest in Joan Burbick, Thoreau’s 
Alternative History: Changing Perspectives on Nature, Culture, and Language 
(Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), which argues that Thoreau 
invents an “uncivil history” (1), based on nature, to counter american progressivist 
accounts. Burbick draws on both Walden and the later writings to make her case. Yet 
the invention of a new kind of natural history does not contradict the condemnation 
of history as an explanation of human nature or fate, which is such a significant a part 
of Walden. In contrast, Bernard Rosenthal, City of Nature: Journeys to Nature in the 
Age of American Romanticism (newark: university of delaware Press, 1980), takes 
the rejection of the external american narratives of history and religion, in favor of 
a mythic and religious private world that is within one’s own power to perceive and 
construct, to be central to american romantics (including Thoreau).
29. Thoreau, Journal, november 5, 1855, 8:8.
30. Thoreau, Walden, 92.
31. Rousseau, Emile, 40.
32. strikingly, he later calls the violent abolitionist John Brown “a man of spar-
tan habits” in “a Plea for Captain John Brown,” in Reform Papers, 111–38, at 115.
33. Thoreau, “Life without Principle,” in Reform Papers, 155–80, quoting 
from 173.
34. Rousseau, On the Social Contract, 46; the Thoreau epigraph is from “Life 
without Principle,” 174.
35. Thoreau, “slavery in Massachusetts,” in Reform Papers, 91–110, quoting 
from 98.
36. Thoreau, Journal, august 1, 1841, I:315. on chastity, see Walden, 219–20.
37. Walden’s purpose and rhetoric in these respects often differ even from the 
closely related journal passages, as discussed by Cameron, Writing Nature, 22–24.
38. Thoreau, Walden, 229–30 (ants), 144 (woodcutter), 155 (herculean la-
bor). The epic aspects of these encounters is noted by schneider, “Walden,” 101.
39. Thoreau, Walden, 107. on Thoreau as prophet, see George shulman’s 
chapter 5 in this volume.
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41. Thoreau, Walden, 101.
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anxious concern with the circulation and sales of his books, described in Gilmore, 
American Romanticism, 9–10, 50–51. But in reading the shift in tone in the latter 
part of Walden as due to an attempt to avoid the commodification of his work (15), 
Gilmore misses its relationship to the naturalist turn described in this chapter.
43. Thoreau, Journal, august 8, 1852; V:289–90.
44. Thoreau, “Life without Principle,” 155. In chapter 1, Rosenblum mis-
characterizes this passage—in which Thoreau is describing his response to paid 
invitations to lecture—as “his insistence that democracy means ‘giving a strong 
dose’ of oneself” (emphasis added).
45. evidencing his new devotion to naturalist studies, from mid-november 
1850, Thoreau began to carefully date his notebooks, according to dean, intro-
duction to Wild Fruits, ix–xvii, at ix–x. also demonstrating his late naturalist 
commitment is his active engagement with darwin’s writings both before and 
after the publication of The Origin of Species in 1859 (darwin was well known 
from the publication of his Beagle journal in 1839). see Robert d. Richardson 
Jr., “Introduction: Thoreau’s Broken Task,” in Faith in a Seed, 3–17, at 11–14, and 
Laura dassow Walls, Seeing New Worlds: Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-
Century Natural Science (Madison: university of Wisconsin Press, 1995).
46. Rousseau, Reveries, 110; Thoreau, Journal, august 23, 1853, 5:395.
47. Rousseau, Reveries, 27.
48. Rousseau, Confessions, 17.
49. Rousseau, Reveries, 33, 34.
50. J. h. Lane and Clark, “solitary Walker”; Lane, “Reveries.”
51. Rousseau, Reveries, 153–54.
52. Ibid., 90.
53. Ibid., 154.
54. Ibid., 89, 88.
55. Jean starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, 
trans. arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1988), 361, 
emphasis in original; first published as Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La transparence et 
l’obstacle (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).
56. Thoreau, Journal, september 7, 1851, IV:54. The importance of this pas-
sage is identified and well explained in dean, introduction to Wild Fruit, xi–xii.
57. emerson’s “nature” was published in 1836, during Thoreau’s senior year 
at harvard, and deeply influenced the younger man.
58. The humboldtian and darwinian connections are discussed extensively 
368  Melissa Lane
in Walls, Seeing New Worlds. Contrasting Thoreau with the “rational holism” of 
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by Robert Richardson (“practical transcendentalism”), in humboldt by Margarita 
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rialism”) (133–34).
59. The abbé (Louis-Bertrand) Castel published a pamphlet attacking the 
“second discourse” titled “L’homme moral oppose à l’homme physique de M. 
R***” in Toulouse in February 1756, reprinted in Collection complete des oeuvres 
de J.-J. Rousseau, citoyen de Genève, ed. P. Moultou and P.-a. du Peyrou (Ge-
neva: société Typographique, 1782). he argues, for example, that “la societé est 
le fondement de tout; elle est naturelle et de la première nature” (221). I owe my 
knowledge of Castel to Michael sonenscher. see also the discussion of Castel in 
John T. scott, “The Theodicy of the second discourse: The ‘Pure state of nature’ 
and Rousseau’s Political Thought,” American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 
(1992): 696–711, at 699–700.
60. Rousseau, Reveries, 108, 114.
61. The letters are quoted in my translation from Oeuvres complètes, vol. IV; 
see second Letter, IV:1087, and Third Letter, IV:1094. 
62. Michel de Montaigne, “of the education of Children,” in The Complete 
Works of Montaigne, trans. donald M. Frame (London: hamish hamilton, 1958), 
106–31, at 116.
63. “nous ne savons rien, chère sophie, nous ne voyons rien; nous sommes 
une troupe d’aveugles, jettés à l’aventure dans ce vaste univers” (Third Letter, 
IV:1092). “nous n’avons nulle notion certaine de rien” (Third Letter, IV:1096).
64. “Ils sont insuffisants, ils nous trompent” (Third Letter, IV:1093).
65. Montaigne, “apology for Raymond sebond,” in Complete Works, 318–457, 
at 333; Rousseau, Reveries, 112.
66. Rousseau, Reveries, 116.
67. I see no basis for Rosenblum’s claim in chapter 1 that this is actually a 
“skeptical” passage in which Thoreau is “confident that the search for a ‘Realo-
meter’ will be disappointed.”
68. Thoreau, Walden, 98, 330.
69. Ibid., 264.
70. Ibid. 
71. Ibid., 171.
72. Ibid., 11.
73. Taylor, America’s Bachelor Uncle, 15–34, especially 16–17, shows that this 
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74. Thoreau, Journal, March 4, 1852, IV:375–76.
75. see shulman’s chapter 5 of this volume.
76. Thoreau, Journal, undated (transcribed in 1842), I:406. Lawrence Buell, 
“Thoreau and the natural environment,” in Cambridge Companion to Thoreau, 
171–93, at 182, discusses Thoreau’s interest in what the literature has termed 
“landscape aesthetics,” as linked to the work of William Gilpin and John Ruskin.
77. Thoreau, “Walking,” 185–222, quoting from 191–92.
78. Thoreau, Journal, april 2, 1852, IV:420.
79. Thoreau, Faith in a Seed, 151.
80. Both quotations are from Wild Fruits, 54. I am grateful to Jack Turner for 
discussion of the 1834 declaration.
81. Thoreau, Journal, august 6, 1858, 11:78–79; see also Mariotti’s chapter 
15 in this volume.
82. Thoreau, Wild Fruits, 235. In Walden, a few sentences at the beginning 
of the chapter “The Ponds” anticipate this concern with huckleberrying and the 
free and independent livelihood it affords, but Thoreau does not develop its politi-
cal significance.
83. Thoreau, Wild Fruits, 52; Rousseau, Reveries, 89.
84. Thoreau, Wild Fruits, 52.
85. Thoreau, Journal, october 4, 1851, IV:116.
86. Thoreau, “Walking,” 185.
87. These complexities are noted, but Thoreau’s appropriation for environ-
mentalism (not deep ecology) is still defended, in Buell, “Thoreau and the natural 
environment.” Contrast Rosenthal, City of Nature, 220, who is puzzled by “the 
same man equating the city with the swamp [in a letter to harrison Blake dated 
august 9, 1850], who in ‘Walking’ would proclaim the much-quoted phrase, ‘in 
Wildness is the preservation of the World.’” 
88. Thoreau, “Life without Principle,” 178 (emphasis in original).
89. Thoreau, “Resistance to Civil Government,” in Reform Papers, 63–90, 
quoting from 89–90.
90. Ibid., 86–87.
91. Thoreau, Wild Fruits, 238.
92. Walls, Seeing New Worlds, 249, calls this hybridity, making Thoreau into 
a sort of postmodern, or as she puts it, “‘nonmodern.’” her account risks diminish-
ing his focus on perspective, on subordinating and settling the social and political 
in contraposition to the greater unity of nature. But this caveat should not blind 
us to her stunning description of Thoreau’s late attitude as a surveyor, tracing “an 
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rather than apocalypse, in a land constituted by history and preparing in the pres-
ent the mold—not the determinate stamp, but the yeasty wild compost—for its 
own future. Indeed, if ‘the preservation of the World’ is in the Wild, it is in the wild 
seen not as a demarcated zone but as a sustainable process” (252).
93. hannah arendt, “Civil disobedience,” in Crises of the Republic (har-
mondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 43–82, quoting from 50.
94. see especially George Kateb, “democratic Individuality and the Claims 
of Politics,” in The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture (Ithaca, 
nY: Cornell university Press, 1992), 77–105; Rosenblum, Another Liberalism and 
chapter 1 of this volume. Their trajectories on this question seem to have crossed. 
Kateb has become more skeptical of Thoreau’s political-democratic commitments 
in his latest work, “Wildness and Conscience: Thoreau and emerson,” in Patriotism 
and Other Mistakes (new haven, CT: Yale university Press, 2006), 245–71, where 
he avers that, for Thoreau and emerson, “anarchy is their highest hope” (251) 
and speaks of their “overall political skepticism” (253). In contrast, Rosenblum’s 
early insistence on a “tension” between Thoreau’s “radical individualism” as a 
“social conscience in a democracy” and his “romantic soul” (in “Thoreau’s Militant 
Conscience,” Political Theory 9, no. 1 [1981]: 81–110, at 83) has given way to her 
confident assertion of his “democratic individualism” in her chapter in this volume. 
For Kateb, the democratic aspects of emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman include 
their attack on social and institutional conventions and their insistence on limited 
government—even, in Thoreau’s drastic aspiration, to a government that does as 
little as possible: “That government is best which governs not at all” (“Resistance to 
Civil Government,” 63). Yet it is not clear why either of these should necessarily be 
democratic in character: one of the greatest attacks on convention ever made was 
launched by Plato, who was no democrat, while the most eloquent insistence on 
limited government in recent decades has been F. a. von hayek, only instrumen-
tally and contingently a democrat. admittedly, as Kateb observes, even Whitman 
ultimately sees democracy as instrumental to the project of developing the soul: “It 
is not that democracy is of exhaustive account, in itself. Perhaps, indeed, it is (like 
nature) of no account in itself. It is that . . . it is the best, perhaps the only, fit and 
full means, formulater, general caller-forth, trainer for the million . . . for immortal 
souls” (Inner Ocean, 85, quoting Whitman, Democratic Vistas). Yet for Whitman, 
democracy is constitutive as a means to this end, as a form of relationship—the 
relationship of political participation, and the more fundamental relationship of 
equality and nonservility on which participation is grounded. For Thoreau, it is 
not the fact of equality but its uses that matter; he is indifferent to positionality, to 
the agon of admiration and disdain in which democratic citizens struggle with one 
another for esteem (an agon stretching back to the competitive roots of athenian 
democracy). Likewise, the subtle lineaments of the “inhibitions” of democracy that 
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Rosenblum traces in Thoreau do not establish a democratic purpose at the heart 
of his thought.
 95. see Mariotti’s chapter 15 in this volume.
 96. shulman’s argument hinges on Thoreau’s claim in “Resistance to Civil 
Government” that “a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation with a con-
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attributed to edward, first Baron Thurlow and Lord Chancellor of england (1731–
1806): “did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no 
soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?” The story has been widely quoted; 
see John C. Coffee Jr., “‘no soul to damn: no Body to Kick’: an unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment,” Michigan Law Review 79, 
no. 3 (1981): 386–459, at 386n1. Thurlow’s challenge has been taken up by modern 
organizational theorists to argue that conscience (moral reasoning and action) can 
emerge from within the organization itself. Thoreau’s riposte to Thurlow’s chal-
lenge, in contrast, is to insist that the conscience of an individual or individuals 
within the group is enough. Whereas modern proponents of organizational ethics 
look to ethics as an emergent property of the whole, Thoreau sees it as a function 
of the individual. so shulman’s slight misquotation matters: he speaks of Thoreau’s 
aim being to create “corporations of conscientious men,” as if this were set out 
by Thoreau as a goal; in fact, Thoreau speaks in the singular of “a corporation of 
honest men” not creating but merely analyzing the condition of a corporation (an 
organized body) to point out that its conscience must derive from the consciences 
of the individuals within it.
 97. That Thoreau is aware of such advice books does not establish that his 
relationship to them is not satirical. one might argue that he rejects advice that 
would entrench one in social conformity and success in favor of a heroic standard 
of individual self-development.
 98. Jenco must be right when she observes that “Thoreau’s criticisms are 
phrased in terms familiar to a democratic conception of government, but this does 
not mean he endorses the ideals of the democratic project,” to show that the latter 
requires further argument. however, her own case fails to take the measure of 
Thoreau’s claim in “Resistance to Civil Government” (64) to be speaking “practi-
cally and as a citizen.” That claim may be better indexed to the occasion and the 
provocation for that specific work.
 99. nancy L. Rosenblum, introduction to Thoreau: Political Writings (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge university Press, 1996), vii–xxxi. 
100. Thoreau, Walden, 56, 70.
101. at proof stage, I saw Zev Trachtenberg, “The exile and the Moss-trooper: 
Rousseau and Thoreau on Walking in nature,” in The Nature of Rousseau’s Rêver-
ies: Physical, Human, Aesthetic, ed. John C. o’neal (oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
2008), 209–22, with which I broadly agree.
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Thoreau played a significant role in Mahatma Gandhi’s intellectual 
life from 1907 to about 1920. he was one of five who had a lasting impact 
on Gandhi. Writing to a disciple in 1931, Gandhi stated: “‘hero’ means 
one worthy of reverence, a god, so to say. In the political field, Gokhale 
[1866–1915] holds that place for me. The persons who have influenced 
my life, as whole and in a general way, are Tolstoy [1828–1910], ruskin 
[1819–1900], Thoreau [1817–1862] and rajchandbhai [1868–1901].”1 he 
first read Thoreau in 1907 in South africa, when an unidentified friend sent 
him a copy of “The duty of Civil disobedience.”2 he found the essay “to 
be so convincing and truthful” that he began to read more of Thoreau. his 
early readings included Walden and henry S. Salt’s biography of Thoreau.3 
In September 1907 Gandhi published a paraphrase of “The duty of Civil 
disobedience” in a two-part series in his durban weekly newspaper, Indian 
Opinion; it was later published as a pamphlet.4 Thoreau was, for him, the 
model par excellence for the early practitioners of satyagraha. he exhorted 
his followers to resist unjust laws to the last and be “so many Thoreaus in 
miniature.”5 In particular, they were to imitate his sincerity and sense of 
commitment. “The great Thoreau said that one sincere man is more than 
a hundred thousand insincere men. We want to know how many of us are 
sincere.”6 likewise, “The great Thoreau has said that a worthy cause should 
not be deemed lost, that it is bound to triumph, so long as there is at least 
one sincere man to fight for it.”7
In November 1907 Gandhi put Thoreau on the reading list he had pre-
pared to guide those entering an essay competition on the topic “The eth-
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ics of passive resistance.” “It [the essay] should contain an examination of 
Thoreau’s classic, ‘The duty of Civil disobedience,’ Tolstoy’s works—more 
especially The Kingdom of Heaven Is within You—and it should give Bibli-
cal and other religious authorities and illustrations and also the application 
of the Apology of Socrates to the question. The essay should give illustra-
tions from modern history in support of the doctrine.”8 In 1908, during 
his incarceration in South africa, Gandhi read “the essays of the great 
Thoreau,” and he saw his own imprisonment as a verification of Thoreau’s 
dictum that in a tyrannical state, jail is the only place for a just man.9
In March 1910 he paid Thoreau a high compliment by mentioning him 
in the preface to the english translation of Hind Swaraj, his fundamental 
work. “Whilst the views expressed in Hind Swaraj are held by me, I have 
but endeavored humbly to follow Tolstoy, ruskin, Thoreau, emerson and 
other writers, besides the masters of Indian philosophy.”10 In addition, two 
of Thoreau’s works, “The duty of Civil disobedience” and “life without 
principle,” were included in the famous appendix I of Hind Swaraj. It con-
tained a list of twenty works—six by Tolstoy, two by ruskin, and one each 
by plato and Mazzini. The readers of Hind Swaraj were advised to study 
these twenty works if they wanted to gain a deeper understanding of its phi-
losophy. ever since, Thoreau has remained a permanent part of the broader 
field of Gandhi studies. In 1911 Gandhi urged Maganlal Gandhi, his deputy 
at phoenix ashram near durban, to read Salt’s biography of Thoreau.11 he 
further urged him “to copy out a sentence from Thoreau occasionally” and 
publish it in Indian Opinion.12
In 1915, the year Gandhi returned to India for good, he took Thoreau 
with him. Throughout 1916, we are told, “The duty of Civil disobedi-
ence” was read every evening in Sabarmati ashram in ahmedabad.13 By 
1919 “The duty of Civil disobedience” was on a new reading list he had 
prepared for his followers in India—a list that included works by plato (The 
Apology), ruskin, and Tolstoy as well. however, Thoreau was singled out 
for special treatment: in March 1919 Gandhi published Satyagraha Leaflet 
No. 1, entitled “extracts from ‘The duty of Civil disobedience,’ by henry 
Thoreau, Schoolmaster of Massachusetts, dated 1849.”14 all those involved 
in the new Gandhian movement in India were expected to read this Tho-
reau digest—about one-quarter of the original text.
although his interest in Thoreau was focused on “The duty of Civil 
disobedience,” it was not limited to it. as noted earlier, “life without prin-
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ciple” was honored by its inclusion among the twenty works in appendix I 
of Hind Swaraj. and Thoreau’s essay “Walking” came up for interesting 
comments in some of his other writings.
In this chapter I give a brief account of Gandhi’s interest in these three 
writings, followed by an assessment of Thoreau’s impact on his thought. 
I conclude with comments on the broader implications of the Gandhi- 
Thoreau encounter for political philosophy in general and comparative 
political philosophy in particular.
“Walking”
according to robert richardson, “Walking” is Thoreau’s “central essay,” 
just as Walden is his “central book.”15 Walking, for Thoreau, is more than 
just a physical activity. It is a means of experiencing “wildness” or “absolute 
freedom,” contrasted with “freedom and culture merely civil.” The opening 
lines of the essay make this point clear: “I wish to speak a word for Nature, 
for absolute freedom and wildness, as contrasted with a freedom and culture 
merely civil—to regard man as an inhabitant, or part and parcel of Nature, 
rather than member of society.”16 Man the walker, not the rider, is the 
authentic representative of Thoreauvian humanity. The walker constitutes 
“the fourth estate, outside of the Church and State and people.”17 It is only 
when we get away from the institutions of society and retreat into our inner 
self that we experience true freedom. Not only are absolute freedom and 
civil freedom put in oppositional terms, but the importance of the political 
seems to be downgraded. politics, he remarks, is “but as the cigar smoke 
of a man.”18 “life consists with wildness. The most alive is the wildest.”19 
and “all good things are wild and free.”20 There is something “servile,” he 
writes, “in seeking after a law which we may obey.” although there is no 
harm in studying such laws, “a successful life knows no law.” In support of 
this view, he invokes the advaita doctrine of absolute freedom as treated in 
the Vishnu Purana: “That is active duty . . . which is not for our bondage; 
that is knowledge which is for our liberation: all other duty is good only unto 
weariness; all other knowledge is only cleverness of an artist.”21
although Gandhi found this essay “highly thought-provoking,”22 on 
closer inspection, it appears he had a different conception of what walk-
ing means. he was, of course, a famous walker—as demonstrated by the 
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241-mile Salt March of 1930. his walking staff has become as integral to 
his public image as his loincloth. First of all, he looked on walking as a 
means of maintaining physical health: walking is, as he put it, “the prince 
of exercises.”23 he believed there existed a link between the habit of taking 
long walks and that of producing excellent writing. he invoked Thoreau’s 
authority to support his belief: “according to him the writings of one who 
refuses to leave his house on the excuse of lack of time and who undertakes 
no physical activity, are bound to be anemic like himself. Speaking of his 
own experience, he says that when he wrote his best books he was doing 
his longest walking. he thought nothing of walking four or five hours at a 
stretch.”24 Though walking is “the best exercise,” to take advantage of it, one 
has to walk “six miles at a stretch in the morning and again in the evening. 
The walking should be done briskly, at a speed of four miles an hour. Tho-
reau used to walk for eight hours daily when he wrote his best book.”25 as 
late as 1936, Gandhi was reminding friends of Thoreau and his walks: “To 
appreciate all the advantages of walking you must read Thoreau.”26
Second, Gandhi attached a religious symbolism to walking, as in pil-
grimages or in the tours of itinerant religious preachers. For him, walking 
was a means of spiritual exercise too, of communicating and communing 
with people. his famous village tours to visit the poor and the oppressed 
were deliberately done on foot as a “spiritual act.”27 They had, he said, “the 
beauty and the necessity of pilgrimages.” “people’s hearts cannot be touched 
by a mad rush through space. They can be by quiet, personal, intimate con-
tact with them.”28 By taking this view of walking, he was but following the 
example of kindred spirits “in all climes and ages” who had experienced “the 
joy and beauty of traveling on foot.” “all the great reformers of the world who 
have from time to time effected religious revolutions have eschewed the use 
of vehicles and walked thousands of miles for delivering their mission. yet, 
by the intensity of their faith and the strength of their realization, they were 
able to achieve what we, in our aeroplane age, with all the gee-gaws at our 
command, could hardly aspire to. Not mad rush, but unperturbed calmness 
brings wisdom.”29 It is interesting to note that Gandhi also listed Thomas 
F. Taylor’s Fallacy of Speed (1909) in the appendix to Hind Swaraj. Taylor 
questioned the wisdom of the modern tendency to regard faster as better. 
like Thoreau and Gandhi, he believed that modern speed militated against 
leisure in considerable sections of modern communities.30
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“Life without Principle”
Several critics have commented on the important place this essay occupies 
in the Thoreau corpus. according to William Cain, it contains “a distilled 
statement” of Thoreau’s beliefs.31 richardson calls it “the tactical polemical 
obverse of Walden”: whereas the latter tells us what to live for, this essay 
tells us what not to live for. It is “Thoreau’s most puritanical piece,” without 
being Calvinistic; it is an attack against “both protestant ethic and the spirit 
of capitalism.” Considered by many to be “Thoreau’s best, most concen-
trated statement on his major message,” it is the equivalent of emerson’s 
“Self-reliance.”32 len Gougeon sees “life without principle” as an attack 
on america’s “restless materialism” and its impact on american culture.33
Gandhi’s interest in this work arose from his broader interest in the 
question of the impact of industrial capitalism on society in general and 
India in particular. of the twenty works in appendix I of Hind Swaraj rec-
ommended for further reading, more than half were on nineteenth-century 
industrial capitalism; six were on the social impact of the Industrial revo-
lution on Great Britain, and two on the impact of colonial capitalism on 
India.34 “life without principle” belongs to this genre of books, and it was 
the sole entry on the impact of nineteenth-century capitalism on the united 
States. It was Gandhi’s hope that Indians who were anxious to embark on 
the path of economic development would learn from the experiences of 
Great Britain and the united States.
“life without principle,” Gandhi implied, contained a timely warning 
for Indians. Nineteenth-century business capitalism in the united States 
had a questionable impact on american culture, politics, and journalism. 
It was promoting a philosophy of life that seemed to lack a transcendent 
spiritual principle. “let us consider the way in which we spend our lives,” 
the essay begins. “This world is a place of business. What an infinite bustle! 
. . . There is no Sabbath. . . . It is nothing but work, work, work.” Nothing 
is more opposed to poetry, philosophy, and life itself, moans Thoreau, than 
this “incessant business.”35 It has made moneymaking the sole object of 
labor, depriving it of any transcending moral end. and “the ways of making 
money today almost without exception lead downwards.” even the intel-
lectuals (“writers and lecturers”) are no exception: they succumb to the lure 
of fame and popularity.36 The California gold rush is cited as symptomatic 
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of modern economic life. The greatest “disgrace on mankind,” it has the 
support not only of merchants but also of “philosophers and prophets, so 
called.” It turns making a living into something akin to gambling or living 
by luck. “and it is called enterprise!”37
Business culture is distorting the meaning of freedom itself, for it sees 
freedom merely in political terms—as freedom from colonial rule. america 
escaped colonial rule only to come under the rule of “an economical and 
moral tyrant”—business. To be “born free,” warns Thoreau, is not the same 
as “living free.” political freedom, in its full sense, should mean “moral free-
dom,” that is, “the freedom to be free.”38 Instead of leading to full freedom, 
political freedom has led to the new economic slavery to business.
at the root of the all-consuming devotion to trade, commerce, manu-
facture, and agriculture is the marginalization of the soul. The soul does 
not get its due share in the new culture. “There is a part of us which is not 
represented,” Thoreau complains. “It is taxation without representation.”39 
Because of this, life in the world of business culture lacks a solid foundation. 
Though we select granite stones for the foundations of our dwellings, “we 
do not ourselves rest on an underpinning of granitic truth.”40 We do not 
“worship truth, but the reflection of truth.”41 The outcome of all this is that 
there is no inwardness to life. as our inward life fails, our dependence on 
trivialities increases in the same proportion. Conversation degenerates into 
gossip. We have no time to listen ourselves.42 We are industrious, yet we do 
not spend our time well.43
one of the worst effects of modern business culture has been on jour-
nalism. Newspapers reflect the values of the business world. Thoreau finds 
it “too much to read one newspaper per week.” The news the papers print 
is not news but “the stalest repetition.” The newspapers trivialize life issues. 
The stratum of human experience with which they are concerned is thin-
ner than the paper on which the news is printed.44 The “facts” they print 
appear to float in the atmosphere, “insignificant as the sporules of fungi,” 
and impinge only on “the surface of our minds.”45 They threaten “the mind’s 
chastity.”46
The impact of modern business culture on politics is perhaps greatest. 
politics lacks “a high and earnest purpose.” It is interested more in potatoes 
than in culture. Though it ought to be a part of “the vital functions of hu-
man society,” in a culture dominated by business, it produces a sort of social 
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dyspepsia. It is, “as it were, the grizzard of society, full of grit and gravel, 
and the two political parties are its opposite halves. . . . Not only individuals, 
but states, have thus confirmed dyspepsia.”47
although the tone of “life without principle” is negative, its overall aim 
is positive—to appeal to the people to find a cure for the malaise spreading 
through american culture. The cure consists in restoring the balance between 
material interests and spiritual aspirations. This calls for an inner awareness 
of the nature of the malady, a psychological and spiritual self-mobilization. If 
we have “desecrated ourselves,” it is time that we “re-consecrate ourselves.” 
“read not the Times, read the eternities.” We have to show that we are not 
all husk and shell but have “tender and living kernel to us.”48
The question arises as to why Gandhi would recommend this essay to 
the readers of Hind Swaraj. The answer is that the issues it raises were of 
interest not only to americans but also to Indians and to people everywhere 
who were concerned with the harmful consequences of the domination of 
modern life by business culture. Thoreau was correct in thinking that this 
dominance had upset the balance between the interests of the body and 
those of the soul, between the secular and the spiritual. These ideas reso-
nated with Gandhi, for he too was trying to restore the right balance between 
artha (material interests of power and wealth) and moksha (a transcending 
spirituality) in India. In the past, India had ascribed undue importance to 
spirituality to the point of neglecting the economic well-being of the people. 
one of Gandhi’s life missions was to restore the correct balance between 
the material and spiritual goals of life. he was afraid, however, that Indians 
were in danger of adopting uncritically the nineteenth-century american 
model. For those who were tempted, “life without principle” had a salutary 
warning. Gandhi’s point was not that India should not embark on economic 
reconstruction. It was that India should do so without losing its balance. 
economic development should not lead to a divorce between the secular 
and the spiritual.
In this respect, Gandhi’s own 1916 lecture on the relationship of 
economic development to spiritual development may be profitably read as 
a companion piece to “life without principle.” In that lecture, he raises 
the question of whether spiritual progress increases in the same proportion 
as economic progress.49 The answer is that it does not. economic progress 
and spiritual progress follow different sets of rules. That is why economic 
progress does not automatically produce spiritual progress. he makes his 
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point by a masterly analysis of the parable of the rich young man in Mark 
10:17–31. This young man, though very rich, is spiritually vacuous. an inner 
emptiness exists despite his wealth—wealth justly acquired, as the parable 
is careful to point out. Jesus’ advice to the young man is that if he is serious 
about making spiritual progress, he has to make a serious adjustment in his 
life—which the young man is unwilling to do. Because he cannot make 
the required change, he goes away grieved. Gandhi’s main point is that all 
societies that embark on economic development should integrate economic 
progress with the requirements of spiritual development.
There was no doubt in Gandhi’s mind that India needed economic 
and political development. The question, however, was whether it could 
be achieved without sacrificing spiritual development. The examples of 
nineteenth-century Great Britain and the united States were not reassuring. 
as he states in Hind Swaraj, “It would [be] a folly to assume that an Indian 
rockefeller would be better than the american rockefeller.”50 one way to 
avoid such folly is to learn from essays such as “life without principle.”
“The Duty of Civil Disobedience”
This essay made a lasting impact on Gandhi. The paraphrase of 1907 and 
Satyagraha Pamphlet No. 1 of 1919 help us determine what he found in it 
that was relevant to his purpose. What interested him most was its political 
theory, particularly the theory of the moral basis of the state. although the 
paraphrase and the pamphlet make no mention of the Mexican War, those 
writings are fully appreciative of the context of the anti-slavery movement 
in the united States. “historians say,” the opening page of the paraphrase 
begins, “that the chief cause of the abolition of slavery in america was 
Thoreau’s imprisonment and the publication by him of the above mentioned 
book after his release. Both his example and writings are at present exactly 
applicable to the Indians in the Transvaal.”51
Four ideas from this essay greatly impressed Gandhi. The first con-
cerned the moral basis of government and the state. To be strictly just, 
government must have the sanction of the governed. This idea found its way 
into the famous “declaration of Independence” that Gandhi wrote in 1930 
to launch the radical phase of the Indian nationalist movement. Indians had 
a right to choose their own government, and if any government deprived 
them of that right, they had the right “to alter or abolish it.”52
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The second idea concerned the relationship of the individual to the 
state. In some respects, the individual was subject to the power of the state, 
but in some other respects, he or she was independent of it. Gandhi agreed 
with Thoreau that there would never be a truly free and enlightened state 
until the state recognized the individual as a higher and independent power 
from which all its own power and authority were derived and treated him or 
her accordingly.53 possessing “a higher and independent power,” the citizen 
has the right and the duty to resist the state when it acts unjustly.54
The role of conscience further strengthens the right to resist the unjust 
state. Conscience makes us “men” first and subjects afterward. actions 
arising from principles of this sort change things and relations: they are 
equivalent to peaceful revolution. a decision based on one’s conscience has 
priority over a decision based on the will of the majority. It is “a great error” 
to believe that justice prevails in a country in which “everything is decided 
by a majority vote.” It is a “mere superstition” to believe that “what is done 
by the multitude is bound to be right.” Conscience, not majorities, should 
decide what is right and wrong. “Those who obey their sense of justice while 
holding the reins of government are always found to be in conflict with the 
state.”55
The term Gandhi often uses for conscience is inner voice. Inner voice, 
according to him, is the voice of truth. We have access to the voice of truth 
only through relative truth—truth as we see it and as conscience approves 
it. It is therefore necessary to train ourselves to discern what is true in 
relative truth, lest we fell into the error of moral subjectivism. The study of 
moral philosophy, the acquisition of self-discipline, and consultation with 
persons of moral probity and experience are necessary to acquire the habit 
of correct moral discernment. “definite rules have been laid down to help 
us realize Truth, and we can know Truth only by following them. hence, 
just as we cannot know geometry without studying it, so also it is not pos-
sible for anybody to hear the inner voice without the necessary effort and 
training. hence, according to my definition, a murderer cannot cite inner 
voice in defense of his act.”56
The third idea concerned the need to limit government’s power over 
the citizen. “That government is best which governs least” is the famous 
motto of Thoreau that Gandhi adopted as his own. The state is, of course, 
a necessary institution, but there are things that citizens, both individu-
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ally and in small groups, can achieve without the interference of the state. 
The following is Gandhi’s commentary on Thoreau’s motto: “This means 
that when people come into possession of political power, the interference 
with the freedom of the people is reduced to a minimum. In other words, 
a nation that runs its affairs smoothly and effectively without much State 
interference is truly democratic. Where such a condition is absent, the form 
of government is democratic in name [only].”57
The fourth idea was that the duty to disobey an unjust law requires 
prompt, concrete action. It is true that a good constitutional state normally 
provides means of self-correction. unfortunately, these means (such as vot-
ing) are slow and cumbersome. “When the majority shall at length vote for 
the abolition of slavery, it will be because there is but little slavery left to 
be abolished.”58 Mere profession of opposition to injustice is not enough; 
to be credible, it must be followed by action. “There are thousands who 
in opinion are opposed to slavery, but act contrary to their view.” They sit 
down “with their hands in their pockets and say that they know not what 
to do, and do nothing. at the most they give lectures and send petitions. 
There are nine hundred and ninety nine persons who profess virtue to one 
virtuous man. yet he who acts virtuously, though he be the only one, is of far 
greater worth than those who only profess it.”59 Given this, one should take 
immediate action and resist unjust laws even if the majority does not join, 
and even if the action costs dearly in terms of personal suffering, such as 
imprisonment and loss of income and property. “If there is only one man in 
Massachusetts who is opposed to slavery, he should effectually withdraw his 
support from the government, both in person and property, without waiting 
till there is majority on his side. For, he is not alone. God is ever on his 
side. any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one 
already.”60 If only one person in Massachusetts refuses to pay taxes in order 
to oppose slavery and is locked up in jail for it, “it would be the abolition of 
slavery in america. What is once well done is done for ever.” Thoreau’s fa-
mous dictum that, under a government that imprisons any person unjustly, 
“the true place for a just man is also a prison”61 went straight to Gandhi’s 
heart. Suffering in vindication of the rights of conscience and for the sake of 
justice was thought to have special moral efficacy. Moreover, he linked the 
voluntary acceptance of his jail term with nonviolence and the ascetic ideal 
of self-suffering. “Thoreau in his immortal essay shows that civil disobedi-
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ence, not violence is the true remedy. In civil disobedience, the resister 
suffers the consequences of disobedience. This was what daniel did when 
he disobeyed the law of the Medes and persians. That is what John Bunyan 
did and that is what the raiyats [peasants] have done in India from time 
immemorial. It is the law of our being. Violence is the law of the beast in 
us. Self-suffering, i.e., civil resistance, is the law of the man in us. It is rarely 
that the occasion for civil resistance arises in a well-ordered State.”62
Gandhi readily endorsed the theory that the state’s authority over the 
life, liberty, and property of its citizens is never absolute or unconditional. It 
is conditional on the state’s behavior being just. and the state’s behavior is 
never just when it imprisons a just citizen who justly disobeys specific laws. 
a corollary to this theory is that the practice of civil disobedience requires 
an attitude of detachment from the comforts associated with civic life, lib-
erty, and property. a civil disobedient should be prepared to sacrifice these 
benefits for the sake of justice and to accept gladly the discomforts of prison 
and the loss of friends, income, and property.
Gandhi was an experienced practitioner of civil disobedience. Between 
1908 and 1942 he was imprisoned ten times for a total of about five years 
and ten months. he found in Thoreau’s dictum much solace and encour-
agement. By going to jail, he wrote, Thoreau had “sanctified” his essay. It 
was written “for all time,” and its “incisive logic unanswerable.”63 again, 
“as Thoreau has said, loss of liberty, wealth and intense suffering were the 
only course of honorable conduct under an unjust government.”64 “I think 
with Thoreau that the citizen who resists the evil government must ignore 
property rights.”65 “Thoreau told the truth when he said that possession of 
riches under an evil government was a sin and poverty was a virtue.”66 “let 
them remember Thoreau’s immortal words that possession is a vice and 
poverty a virtue in a tyrannical State.”67
The Extent of Thoreau’s Impact
although there is universal agreement on the fact of Thoreau’s impact on 
Gandhi’s political thought, there is some difference of opinion about its 
actual extent. Gandhi himself made three points on this matter. The first 
is that he started his movement in South africa a year before he read Tho-
reau. Therefore, Thoreau did not contribute to its genesis. Second, there is 
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a conceptual difference between civil disobedience and satyagraha. Third, 
Thoreau’s actual role was to confirm and morally support what Gandhi had 
already started in South africa.
Writing to a friend in 1935, Gandhi stated the following: “The state-
ment that I had derived my idea of civil disobedience from the writings 
of Thoreau is wrong. The resistance to authority in South africa was well 
advanced before I got the essay of Thoreau on civil disobedience. But the 
movement was then known as passive resistance. as it was incomplete I 
had coined the word satyagraha for the Gujarati readers. When I saw the 
title of Thoreau’s great essay, I began the use of this phrase to explain 
our struggle to english readers. But I found that even civil disobedience 
failed to convey the full meaning of the struggle. I therefore adopted the 
phrase civil resistance. Non-violence was always an integral part of our 
struggle.”68
as for the origin of the concept of satyagraha, the following is Gandhi’s 
account. In 1906, when the resistance movement against racist legislation 
in South africa began, he did not know what to call the movement. “None 
of us knew what name to give our movement. I then used the term ‘passive 
resistance’ in describing it. I did not quite understand the implications of 
‘passive resistance,’ as I called it. I only knew that some new principle had 
come into being. as the struggle advanced, the phrase ‘passive resistance’ 
gave rise to confusion and it appeared shameful to permit this great struggle 
to be known only by an english name.”69 he therefore invited the readers 
of Indian Opinion to make suggestions. one suggestion was to call it the 
sadagraha movement. Sad in Gujarati means “a good cause,” and agraha, 
“firmness.” Thus, sadagraha means “firmness in a good cause.” Gandhi 
was not fully satisfied with this new term either. he changed sadagraha to 
satyagraha. Satya in Gujarati means “truth,” so satyagraha means “firmness 
in holding on to truth.” From January 1908 onward, he called his movement 
satyagraha and gave up the phrase passive resistance.70
The focus of Gandhi’s movement, then, was on truth. as he put it, 
“Civil disobedience is disobedience to untruth, and it becomes ‘civil’ if it 
is ‘truthful’ in its manner.”71 however, at different periods of its develop-
ment, the Gandhian movement had used four different terms to describe 
itself—satyagraha, passive resistance, civil disobedience, and noncoopera-
tion. This caused confusion in the minds of many observers, so to remedy 
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this, Gandhi wrote an article for Young India in 1921, which I reproduce 
here despite its length:
Satyagraha . . . is literally holding on to Truth and it means, therefore, Truth-
force. Truth is soul or spirit. It is, therefore, known as soul-force. It excludes 
the use of violence, because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth 
and, therefore, is not competent to punish. The word was coined in South 
africa to distinguish the non-violent resistance of the Indians of South africa 
from the cotemporary “passive resistance” of the suffragettes and others. It is 
not conceived as a weapon of the weak.
passive resistance is used in the orthodox english sense and covers the 
suffragette movement as well as the resistance of the nonconformists. pas-
sive resistance has been conceived and is regarded as a weapon of the weak. 
Whilst it avoids violence, being not open to the weak, it does not exclude its 
use if, in the opinion of a passive resister, the occasion demands it. however, 
it has always been distinguished from armed resistance and its application 
was at one time confined to Christian martyrs.
Civil disobedience is civil breach of unmoral statutory enactments. The 
expression was, so far as I am aware, coined by Thoreau to signify his own re-
sistance to the laws of a slave state. he has left a masterly treatise on the duty 
of civil disobedience. But Thoreau was not perhaps an out-and-out champion 
of non-violence. probably, also, Thoreau limited his breach to statutory laws 
to the revenue law, i.e., payment of taxes,72 whereas the term “civil disobedi-
ence” as practiced in 1919 covered a breach of any statutory and unmoral 
law. It signified the resister’s outlawry in a civil, i.e., non-violent manner. he 
invoked sanctions of the law and cheerfully suffered imprisonment. It is a 
branch of satyagraha.
Non-cooperation predominantly implies withdrawing of cooperation from 
the state that in the non-cooperator’s view has become corrupt and excludes 
civil disobedience of the fierce type described above. By its very nature, 
non-cooperation is even open to children of understanding and can be safely 
practiced by the masses. Civil disobedience presupposes the habit of willing 
obedience to laws without fear of their sanctions. It can therefore be prac-
ticed only as a last resort and by a select few in the first instance at any rate. 
Non-cooperation, too, like civil disobedience is a branch of satyagraha which 
includes all non-violent resistance for the vindication of Truth.73
In a letter written in 1934, he made further comments on the subject: 
“Civil disobedience is not necessarily an accurate expression of the attitude 
indicated in ‘civil resistance.’ ‘Civil disobedience’ may also indicate an at-
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titude of mind. The term ‘civil disobedience’ was first used by Thoreau. 
I didn’t like it because it didn’t suggest all that I had in mind. looking 
for a new phrase, I fixed upon ‘civil resistance.’ The current phrase was 
‘passive resistance.’ But my way of resistance or the force which I had in 
mind was not passive. It was active, but ‘active’ might also mean violent. 
The word ‘civil’ suggests nothing but non-violence. I therefore joined it with 
‘resistance.’”74
In 1942 Gandhi specified the exact nature of Thoreau’s influence on 
him: “through his essay on the ‘duty of Civil disobedience,’” Thoreau pro-
vided “scientific confirmation” of what Gandhi was doing in South africa.75
In the light of the foregoing discussion, richardson’s interpretation of 
Thoreau’s influence on Gandhi is untenable. It makes four claims. First, 
Thoreau domesticated “into an american context” the hindu concept of 
moksha, or final liberation of the spirit. Second, he transcended the hindu 
view that the quest for moksha requires acquiescence in outward tyranny. 
Third, he gave back to India its own tradition, “improved and made prac-
ticable.” Finally, Gandhi’s concept of swaraj as expressed in Hind Swaraj 
drew explicitly on Thoreau.76
richardson, in my view, exaggerates the sophistication of Thoreau’s 
knowledge of hindu philosophy. Because of this, he misjudges the relevance 
of Thoreau for a helpful understanding of modern India in general and for 
Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj in particular. It is true that Thoreau had read in 
translation (early translations, at that) such works as The Laws of Manu, 
parts of Mahabharata, Vishnu Purana, the Samkhya Karika, Kalidasa’s 
Sakuntala, the Harivansam, the Sama Veda, and the Bhagavad Gita.77 In 
“Walking” he appears to endorse the traditional view of Vishnu Purana 
that the pursuit of artha (politics and economics) is incompatible with 
the pursuit of spiritual liberation or moksha.78 his praise of The Laws of 
Manu, a work that represents social hierarchy in its most oppressive form, 
is indicative of his limited understanding of the impact of its teachings on 
Indian society. one has only to contrast Thoreau’s admiration for The Laws 
of Manu with its public burning in India in 1927 by the followers of a. r. 
ambedkar, the Columbia university–educated jurist and political thinker, 
leader of the much despised untouchables, and future chairman of the 
drafting committee of India’s modern constitution (1950).
To cap it all, Gandhi took no note of Thoreau’s comments on hindu 
philosophy. his deep and enduring appreciation of Thoreau was based solely 
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on his political essays. Thoreau had nothing to do with Gandhi’s interpreta-
tion of the meaning of swaraj as it appears in Hind Swaraj.79
Thoreau and Gandhi: A Comparison
although there are many points in common between these two thinkers, 
there are also some interesting differences between them. This makes them 
apt subjects for comparative political thought. The conceptual differences 
between civil disobedience and satyagraha have already been noted. There 
are three other points on which Thoreau and Gandhi can be compared; 
they concern the relationship of civil disobedience or satyagraha to social 
reform, violence, and virtue.
as for the relationship of civil disobedience to social reform, Thoreau 
saw very clearly the need for the abolition of slavery. Some critics still de-
bate the extent of Thoreau’s commitment to reform, however. even though 
there is a collection of his writings entitled Reform Papers, and even though 
the two essays Gandhi honored include the issue of reform, the debate 
continues.80 There is no question that Thoreau was dissatisfied with slavery 
and that american society was in need of internal reform. and as noted in 
“Walking,” the reform of the individual is the key to the reform of society. 
The individual has to experience true inner freedom, which can be found 
only in “wildness” and retreat from society and polity. at the same time, as 
Gougeon points out, Thoreau finally came to the conclusion that the reform 
of individuals through self-culture can occur only in a well-ordered polity 
that guarantees personal freedom.81
In Gandhi’s mind, there was no doubt whatsoever about the necessary 
connection between civil disobedience and social reform, or what he called 
“constructive programme.” In 1941 he published a thesis entitled “Con-
structive programme: Its Meaning and place.”82 In the Gandhi corpus, its 
importance is second only to that of Hind Swaraj. Its main argument is that 
social reform, carried out by voluntary organizations, has an indispensable 
role in a free society. Voluntary organizations are better equipped to bring 
about certain types of social reform than are the agencies of the state. The 
greater the number of voluntary agencies in a society, the less violent that 
society will be, and the less dependent on the state the citizens will be. 
Voluntary agencies hold the key to creating a government that governs the 
least.
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Constructive programme, according to Gandhi, represents the positive 
side of politics, while satyagraha represents its negative side. Satyagraha is 
protest politics. But a society cannot live by protest alone. Its normal life 
has to be lived by constructive citizenship. That is to say, in Gandhi’s phi-
losophy, satyagraha is not the whole of politics; it is only part of the broader 
vision of politics. as he puts it, satyagraha is for rare occasions and for the 
few, while constructive programme is for always and to be carried out by 
everyone.83 The metaphor of the paralyzed hand attempting to lift a spoon, 
which he uses toward the end of “Constructive programme,” says it all: “For 
my handling of civil disobedience without the constructive programme will 
be like a paralyzed hand attempting to lift a spoon.”84
a second area of comparison is their respective stands on nonviolence. 
as Jack Turner has argued, Thoreau believes that liberators of society may 
resort to revolutionary violence on the basis of natural right. a “contingent 
willingness” to kill or be killed in resistance to political evil is consistent 
with Thoreau’s philosophy. Thoreau does not stand in the way of morally 
concerned citizens who want to end the state’s monopoly of legitimate 
violence.85
Gandhi’s concept of nonviolence recognizes the right to use legitimate 
violence in self-defense both private and public. however, in the exercise 
of satyagraha, this right does not and may not come into play. his famous 
definition of satyagraha makes this clear enough. “passive resistance 
[satyagraha] is a method of securing rights by personal suffering; it is the 
reverse of resistance by arms. When I refuse to do a thing repugnant to my 
conscience, I use soul-force.”86 Gandhi staked his reputation as an original 
political thinker on this specific issue. hitherto, violence had been used in 
the name of political rights, such as in street riots, regicide, or armed revolu-
tions. Gandhi believes there is a better way of securing political rights, that 
of nonviolence, and that this new way marks an advance in political ethics. 
With regard to the narrow issue of securing rights in open, free, democratic 
societies, he was absolutely opposed to the use of violence.
The third area of comparison between Thoreau and Gandhi concerns 
the role of virtue in resistance politics or satyagraha. here again, a distinc-
tion is necessary as far as Gandhi is concerned. Those who wanted to prac-
tice satyagraha in the heroic sense were expected to practice four specific 
virtues—chastity, voluntary poverty, truthfulness, and fearlessness.87 oth-
ers who practiced satyagraha for reasons of expediency were not bound by 
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these virtues, even though the virtue of nonviolence was obligatory. Chas-
tity and truthfulness are included in this list in deference to Indian moral 
philosophy. “Chastity,” writes Gandhi, “is one of the greatest disciplines 
without which the mind cannot attain firmness.”88 as for voluntary poverty, 
“pecuniary ambition” and civil disobedience in the heroic sense do not go 
well together. No one is expected to throw money away, but a practitioner of 
satyagraha is expected “to be indifferent to it.” Finally, the civil disobedient 
has to have the virtue of courage so that he or she may be free from the fear 
of losing friends, relatives, property, and even life itself.89
Thoreau does not write systematically on the need for virtue. however, 
it is clear—for example, in “life without principle”—that one of his criti-
cisms of modern capitalist culture is its disregard for moral virtue. and who 
can forget the distinction he draws in “The duty of Civil disobedience” 
between “the nine hundred and ninety nine” patrons of virtue and “one 
virtuous man”? as noted earlier, one of the attributes of character that at-
tracted Gandhi to Thoreau was his moral earnestness.
I conclude with an evaluation of the broader contributions these two think-
ers have made to the field of comparative political thought. Thoreau made 
two contributions in this regard. The first is his lasting impact on Gandhi’s 
political thought through the three essays discussed in this chapter. The 
second is his signal to future generations of american intellectuals that they 
should take a serious interest in Indian thought. even though this interest 
did not influence Gandhi in any way—or modern Indian political thought, 
for that matter—it nevertheless sets a very good example for his compatriots. 
It reminds them that to be well educated in the contemporary world, it is no 
longer sufficient to be conversant with the political philosophy of one’s own 
culture. To be politically literate in today’s world, they need to cross their 
canonical boundaries and engage in serious comparative political thought. 
Thoreau was a pioneer in this regard. accordingly, his contributions in this 
area should be evaluated not in terms of the depth of his knowledge of 
Indian thought (which he lacked) but in terms of his recognition of the need 
to learn from Indian thought.
Gandhi made a similar contribution to comparative political thought. 
he taught his Indian compatriots how to cross the canonical boundaries 
of their own culture and absorb new ideas from america and elsewhere, 
without losing their intellectual identity. The story of the transformation 
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of civil disobedience or passive resistance into satyagraha is a story of how 
to practice comparative political thought in our times. Crossing canonical 
boundaries does not mean or require abandoning one’s canon.90 It means 
updating it and making it relevant to modern times. Gandhi was able to 
integrate what was universal in Thoreau’s essays into the new Indian canon 
without undermining the latter’s integrity. here I must refer once again to 
appendix I of Hind Swaraj, a major text of the new Indian political canon. 
It invites Indians to integrate the thoughts of such Western authors as plato, 
Tolstoy, ruskin, Thoreau, and others within the framework of the new In-
dian canon. Gandhi’s mode of comparative political thought has universal 
application.
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Thoreau, Ador no, and the Cr itical 
Potential of Par ticularity
393
Despite vast Differences of time, space, and context, Henry 
David thoreau and theodor W. adorno similarly identify a critically valu-
able quality in particular things. as he shows especially in the aphorisms 
of Minima Moralia, adorno thinks particular objects contain dissonant 
“nonidentical” qualities that can be drawn out to highlight the illusory 
harmonies of late modern society.1 adorno’s aphorisms enact the practice 
of negative dialectics: he focuses on seemingly insignificant things (the 
taboo on “talking shop,” hobbies, ideals of beauty) and shows how they, 
like monads, contain an image of the contradictions and antagonisms of 
modern society. thoreau enacts a more corporealized version of adorno’s 
negative dialectics: for thoreau, “little things” such as wild apples or the 
tiny huckleberry valuably encapsulate rupturing contradictions that can be 
drawn out toward a critique of the seemingly smooth machinations of a 
rapidly modernizing nineteenth-century society.
adorno’s understanding of the critical potential of particular objects 
helps us better understand the political significance of thoreau’s so-called 
nature writings. there are important sympathies between adorno’s notion 
of the “nonidentical” and thoreau’s quest in nature for the “wild” potential 
contained within particular objects. Both thoreau and adorno show us 
how confrontations with particular objects that resist (and illuminate) the 
domesticating, categorizing, containing logic of modernity can stimulate 
critical capacities that work against these conventional ways of thinking and 
perceiving, in democratically valuable ways.
there is something strikingly similar about the ways thoreau and 
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adorno see. Both, in contrast to the abstracting idealist gaze, employ what 
adorno calls a “microscopic gaze.”2 Both thoreau and adorno often focus 
on apparently minor things as a pathway toward broader critiques of society 
at large.3 their eyes move from small, seemingly insignificant, particular 
things to broader, more general things, and not in the other direction. for 
both, “little things” encapsulate something of the universal but also contain 
a critique of it. thoreau and adorno are interested in the ways particular 
things depart from general trends and go against the grain of convention. 
in this way, paying attention to particularity can both inspire criticism of 
“what is” and contain the possibility of an alternative to convention and the 
status quo. they enact their politics in their engagement with particular 
things.
Adorno’s Critique of the Logic of Identity and Idealism
for adorno, particular objects contain contradictory, rupturing possibilities 
we are blind to and dissonant speech we do not hear. if we would linger with 
these objects, they would help us see the illusory harmonies of the logics of 
modern capitalist society. adorno dialectically engages the object in ways 
that avoid both projecting the self onto it and approaching it as a “fact,” as 
“given” or self-explanatory: the thinker actively and creatively, but nonin-
strumentally and “without anxiety,” engages the object to draw out an image 
of its rupturing, critical potential.4 if we looked closely at technology, at the 
designs of our homes, at how people tell lies, how they chase after buses, at 
manners and notions of tact, small talk, sleepless nights, gift giving, customer 
service, love, marriage, or divorce, we could illuminate contradictions that 
highlight an unharmonious modern reality.5 if approached the right way, 
these objects would allow us to see how the identifying and abstracting log-
ics of modernity mask violence, damage life, and turn us into unthinking, 
conforming, alienated, machine-like creatures. in Minima Moralia, adorno 
trains his truthful yet transformative “microscopic gaze” on these objects, 
highlighting aspects that refuse to be synthesized, unified, or reconciled. in 
this way, adorno illuminates what he calls the “nonidentical.”
conventional ways of thinking, represented through the idealist dia-
lectic and the logic of abstract exchange, act as an obstacle to this critical 
practice. in the interest of maintaining harmony, stability, and the status 
quo, they blind us to all that is unharmonious, rupturing, and negative. 
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When we are guided by these logics, when we see in abstract and identifying 
ways, we become conformists and tend to let the authority of the collective 
rule. such a life can barely be called living, for adorno: it is a dull, lifeless, 
monotonous, and formulaic mode of experience. this “damaged life” or 
“vanished life” is alienated life.6 it describes the personal, psychological, 
and social effects of modernity characterized by the urge to “identify,” to 
classify and categorize that which is other, particular, unique, different, and 
nonidentical.
adorno’s philosophical argument rests on a critique of idealist dialectics, 
of a logic that seeks to resolve all contradiction and reconcile all differences. 
Hegel exemplifies this positive version of the dialectic, where the universal 
and the particular find unity in the subject. adorno critiques Hegel’s notion 
of the absolute subject, but his primary objection is that Hegel’s dialectics 
represents a “system,” a “form of presenting a totality to which nothing 
remains extraneous” (Negative Dialectics, 24). this system consumes all: 
every difference and particularity is a contradiction to be overcome. as 
adorno says, “the name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that 
objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder” (Nega-
tive Dialectics, 4). But under an identifying dialectic, this remainder (the 
nonidentical) is seen as simply a contradiction to be reconciled. its unique 
qualities are violated in the rush to systematize: “What we differentiate 
will appear divergent, dissonant, negative for just as long as the structure 
of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity; as long as the demand for 
totality will be its measure for whatever is not identical with it” (Negative 
Dialectics, 5).
the appearance of the nonidentical is inevitable, as concepts never 
fully cover their objects. as J. M. Bernstein says, something inevitably “slips 
through the unifying net”; “contradictions testify to antagonisms in reality.”7 
for adorno, dialectics is driven by “the consistent sense of nonidentity,” by 
the recognition that there is always something that escapes and eludes this 
unified way of thinking. particular things indicate the presence of these 
remainders that resist the systematizing logic of modernity, but there are 
other logics at work in society that attempt to silence the dissonant call of 
particular things that disrupt, challenge, contradict, and antagonize more 
harmonious ways of thinking.
the traditional dialectic masks this inevitable nonidentity and, smooth-
ing over the disjuncture, instead “serves the end of reconcilement” (Nega-
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tive Dialectics, 6). the logic of identity is also reflected in the capitalist 
system of abstract exchange, whereby one thing can be replaced by another 
different and unique thing as long as they have equivalent monetary value; 
these two logics do similar violence to specific objects in the interest of 
promoting fungibility between disparate things (Negative Dialectics, 146). 
adorno sees the exchange or barter principle (Tauschprinzip) as originally 
and foundationally related (urverwandt) to the principle of identification: 
it is an “ur” relationship.8 the exchange principle reduces X and Y to an 
equal monetary value and holds them to be identical and interchangeable, 
even though they are actually very different. the exchange principle also 
turns subjects into objects, transforming the subject’s labor into a calcula-
tion of hourly wages. the “obligation to become identical” that the principle 
of exchange “imposes on the whole world” involves a tendency to abstract 
away from particular objects, which lose their particularity and uniqueness 
(Negative Dialectics, 146). We simply see them as a means to the end of 
exchange and profit, or as a subset of a category or concept that is supposed 
to capture the object completely.
the object is treated instrumentally and only as a means to an end. 
identity does violence to the object in abstracting away its difference and 
particularity. this logic also deadens experience by imposing sameness on 
the world.9 it tries to silence the rupturing qualities of particular objects:
Unquestionably, one who submits to the dialectical discipline has to pay dearly 
in the qualitative variety of experience. still, in the administered world the 
impoverishment of experience by dialectics, which outrages healthy opinion, 
proves appropriate to the abstract monotony of that world. its agony is the 
world’s agony raised to a concept. (Negative Dialectics, 6)10
adorno makes us first feel this loss and then models how to work against it. 
negative dialectics is the practice he enacts against this alienated sensibility, 
teaching us to pay attention to particular objects, to hear their dissonance. 
to try to restore the object’s ability to speak and to work against the deaden-
ing power of the logic of identity is to engage in the practice of negative 
dialectics. adorno’s negative dialectics is an “anti-system” that shines light 
on what has hitherto been neglected by traditional philosophy and idealist 
dialectics, what was dismissed by Hegel and plato alike as “transitory and 
insignificant”: the nonidentical and the particular, that which eludes general 
concepts, that which cannot be subsumed (Negative Dialectics, 8).
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Negative Dialectics and Adorno’s Microscopic Gaze
the logics of identity and exchange both fail to recognize “the preponder-
ance of the object” (Negative Dialectics, 183). adorno says we must learn 
to see with our eye on the object, not on its category. We need to let our eye 
linger on the object and employ a “microscopic gaze.” as susan Buck-Morss 
shows, the microscopic gaze adorno adopted was deeply influenced by Wal-
ter Benjamin’s way of seeing (in fact, this was the phrase adorno used to 
describe Benjamin’s gaze).11 adorno is interested in the kinds of particular 
phenomena that Hegel dismissed as “foul existence.”12 adorno focuses on 
seemingly minor phenomena that, at first glance, seem unlikely to yield 
any larger critique of bourgeois society: gift giving, astrology, running in 
the streets, children’s fairy tales. But he uses these particular phenomena 
as ways to illuminate the dominating and alienating tendencies of modern 
society. as Buck-Morss says: “What distinguished adorno’s approach was 
not only his Hegelian assertion of the dialectical relationship between the 
particular and the general but the fact that, unlike Hegel, he found the 
general within the very surface characteristics of the particular, and in-
deed, within those that were seemingly insignificant, atypical or extreme.”13 
for adorno, the particular is not a part of the whole or something that 
can be subsumed. the particular is like a monad that contains an image of 
the whole that can be interpreted to yield a critique of bourgeois society.14 
particular objects contain a truth, to be released through the interpretation 
of the thinker.
But the particular also contains “truth” in another sense: these phe-
nomena, in their resistance to the whole, in their nonidentity, in their con-
tradictions, testify to an alternative possibility to the bourgeois “false” life. 
as Buck-Morss says, there is “a utopian dimension” to the particular: “the 
transitoriness of particulars was the promise of a different future, while 
their small size, their elusiveness to categorization implied a defiance of the 
very social structure they expressed.”15
this microscopic gaze disrupts the logic of identity that works in the 
interest of bourgeois powers. the principle of identity is conservative: it 
smoothes over the chasms between disparate things that characterize capi-
talist society. the logics of identity and exchange would have us believe that 
the subject’s labor and the wage he is paid are truly fungible and equiva-
lent, giving the appearance that the whole system is stable, unified, and 
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harmonious. to give another example, it is also in the interest of power to 
try to smooth over any potential conflict between the individual’s own life 
ambitions and society’s need to manipulate individuals into certain modes 
of living:
experience forbids the resolution in the unity of consciousness of whatever 
appears contradictory. for instance, a contradiction like the one between the 
definition which an individual knows as his own and his “role,” the definition 
forced upon him by society when he would make his living—such a contra-
diction cannot be brought under any unity without manipulation, without 
the insertion of some wretched cover concepts that will make the crucial 
differences vanish. (Negative Dialectics, 152)
to engage in the practice of negative dialectics is to highlight these expe-
riential differences, to widen the contradiction, to work against the false 
manipulation of the identity principle. negative dialectics describes this 
continual process of upsetting “what is,” highlighting its contingency and 
instability. as seyla Benhabib puts it, for adorno, “the task of the critic 
is to illuminate those cracks in the totality, those fissures in the social net, 
those moments of disharmony and discrepancy, through which the untruth 
of the whole is revealed and glimmers of another life become visible.”16 But 
we can get to this critical point only by paying attention to the difference, 
particularity, and uniqueness of objects. this is why the “preponderance of 
the object” is so important as a limit to power for adorno.
as we will see, while walking and in his writings on “Wild apples” and 
“Huckleberries,” thoreau employs a similar gaze. He draws out the “wild” 
qualities of “little things” like huckleberries or apples toward a critique of 
the domesticating and taming tendencies of modern society. thoreau, like 
adorno, focuses on seemingly insignificant things to disrupt the abstract 
logics of modernity. in his nature writings, thoreau enacts a dissonant 
critique of modern society that is deeply sympathetic to adorno’s practice 
of negative dialectics.
Thoreau and Modernization: Man as Machine
What features of his own nascent modernity does thoreau criticize? What 
is the topography of his nineteenth-century context? thoreau was born in 
1817 and died in 1862. His life span corresponds to the era historians rec-
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ognize as an especially intense period of urbanization and industrialization 
in Massachusetts and in the United states generally. the first half of the 
nineteenth century saw many changes: on the broadest level, the popu-
lation increased throughout the state, and there was a general shift from 
rural ways of life to more urban lifestyles. as historians richard Brown and 
Jack tager note: “after 1780 and especially in the decades after 1820, the 
population grew swiftly, at rates comparable to the most dynamic periods of 
colonial settlement. . . . the population density had risen from 33 persons 
per square mile in 1780 to 153 persons per square mile in 1860. Massachu-
setts became the most thickly settled state in the union, save only for tiny 
rhode island.”17 
as the population increased and as transportation became less ardu-
ous, there were incentives for farmers to grow surplus to supply the nearby 
markets of Boston. the railroads were a major factor in opening up new 
markets for farmers, thus prompting a shift away from family-based sub-
sistence farming toward market-oriented farming.18 Yet while new markets 
opened up for profit-oriented farmers, agriculture declined overall, and 
more people moved toward manufacturing. the years from 1790 to 1860 
saw a shift from household or workshop production of consumer goods to 
factory-based production.19 During this process of urbanization, “the more 
people turned to market production, even on this small scale, the more 
thoroughly they became enmeshed in the world of commerce.”20 this was 
the era of the textile boom. the mill city in Lowell, Massachusetts (about 
fifteen miles from concord), was created in 1826, and although this was an 
extreme form of urbanization, the model was repeated to a lesser degree 
throughout the state: “What was happening in Lowell, urbanization based 
on industry, was far more rapid and intense than in other towns. Yet the 
direction was the same almost everywhere in Massachusetts during the first 
half of the nineteenth century.”21 as Brown and tager note, “Between 1820 
and the civil War, Massachusetts turned toward industry and away from 
agriculture. from a labor force where 60% of workers were in agriculture, 
by 1865 only 13% were on farms. . . . now workers were largely employees, 
no longer owning property or small businesses. the demand for skilled arti-
sans declined and self-employment became unusual. Workers had become 
dependent on others for employment.”22 
accompanying these changes were more general shifts in values, 
ideals, and lifestyles. a more bourgeois class of people began to develop 
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in Massachusetts. people became more concerned with fashion and the 
goings-on of “society.” By looking at which consumer items became popular, 
we can see the shift in people’s material desires and aspirations to greater 
refinement and “gentility”: “the production of consumer goods—items like 
clothing, home furnishings, musical instruments and books—reflected the 
radical changes in american ways of life between 1800 and 1860. these 
were the years when semi-subsistence farming all but disappeared and the 
ideals of bourgeois comfort and amenities characteristic of the victorian 
age supplanted the rustic simplicity that religious beliefs and economic 
realities had forced on the majority of people from Winthrop’s day to John 
Hancock’s.”23 
Modernization during thoreau’s lifetime entailed greater organization, 
greater coordination of activities, and systematizing of behaviors. instead of 
individuals self-sufficiently producing most of their own goods, they coordi-
nated their needs and desires with the market. the number of people work-
ing for themselves declined, and more people became employees, with more 
rigid codes of conduct governing their behavior. the population increased; 
people began living in closer proximity to others and were able to compare 
and model their own lifestyles on the lifestyles of others, following popu-
lar styles and fashions. as transportation technologies advanced, routines 
emerged.
With the railroads came the possibility of selling surplus agricultural 
produce; those who continued farming cultivated larger swaths of land, 
no longer farming for only their own families. the activities of weeks and 
months took on greater regularity and predictability, following the railroad 
timetables, the demands for goods in Boston, and the schedules of employ-
ers. the introduction of the railroad in concord was, for thoreau, a major 
factor in the increasingly routine and formulaic ordering of the day. in the 
“sounds” chapter of Walden, thoreau describes how the regular whistles of 
the trains going to and from Boston became a marker of time and a dictator 
of action:
i watch the passage of the morning cars with the same feeling that i do the 
rising of the sun, which is hardly more regular. . . . if the enterprise were as 
innocent as it is early! . . . if the enterprise were as heroic and commanding 
as it is protracted and unwearied! . . . the startings and arrivals of the cars 
are now the epochs in the village day. they come and go with such regularity 
and precision, and their whistle can be heard so far, that the farmers set their 
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clocks by them, and thus one well-conducted institution regulates a whole 
country.24
people moved in time to the railroads, which moved in time with the 
market. the farmers in the country sent raw materials to Boston: cotton 
and wool. the factories and the “restless city merchants” sent back finished 
products: woven cloth and silk.
Here come your groceries, country: your rations, countrymen! nor is there 
any man so independent on his farm that he can say them nay. and here’s your 
pay for them! screams the countryman’s whistle. . . . Up comes the cotton, 
down goes the woven cloth; up comes the silk, down goes the woolen; up 
come the books, but down goes the wit that writes them. (Walden, 115)
activity was coordinated on increasingly large scales: the railroads indeed 
“regulate[d] a whole country,” and people timed their days by the whistle 
of the train. the railroad coordinated activity to make certain artificial pat-
terns of action look natural, like fate, as regular and inevitable as the rising 
and setting of the sun.
the face of the land reflected these social changes. in his essay “the 
forests and fields of concord: an ecological History, 1750–1850,” Brian 
Donahue describes a concord being rapidly depleted of timber and of good 
farmland.25 Because of the great need for firewood, the forests of concord 
were reduced to about half the town’s surface by the end of the colonial 
era. By 1850, only 11 percent of concord remained wooded.26 Donahue 
says, “the most important thing about the forest in this period is that it was 
being wiped out. in concord, ‘woodland’ dropped from roughly a quarter 
to about a tenth of the land surface of the town. the drop was particularly 
sharp after 1820.”27 By 1860, “virtually all of the forest in concord was either 
managed woodlot or ‘new woods’ that had occupied abandoned farmland. 
there was no ‘virgin’ forest left; and most of the mature second growth 
timber had been cut as well.”28
With all these changes, something was lost. experience, like nature, 
became tamed and domesticated. people were cultivated, just as nature was 
increasingly becoming the material for consumption and industry. activities 
conformed to expected patterns. people’s lives took on predictable shapes. 
thoreau identifies a corresponding watering down of experience; he is 
constantly urging himself and his readers to bite more deeply into life, to 
experience in unconventional ways, and to move past expected and formu-
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laic ways of thinking and acting. for thoreau, lifestyle expectations, habits, 
manners, and codes of conduct eviscerate real life and real experience, 
which are defined by that which negates regularizing. Life, for thoreau, is 
a unique and unexpected surplus that exceeds common expectations. as he 
says in the chapter “Where i Lived and What i Lived for,” “i went to the 
woods because i wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts 
of life, and see if i could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when i came 
to die, discover that i had not lived. i did not wish to live what was not life 
. . . i wanted to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life” (Walden, 90). 
thoreau is trying to address a problem of modern life. Lives are not lived 
because the individual does not experiment for himself or herself: “Here is 
life, an experiment to a great extent untried by me; but it does not avail me 
that they have tried it” (Walden, 9). thoreau contrasts living with modern 
ways of simply getting a living, where we conform to the market and to 
conventional ways of making money. as he says in “Life without principle,” 
“there is no more fatal blunderer than he who consumes the greater part of 
his life getting his living.”29 He begins that essay by saying, “Let us consider 
the way in which we spend our lives,” punning that we literally buy our way 
out of real life (“Life,” 156). as he often does, thoreau opposes the market 
with life and living.
thoreau often uses the term common sense to describe this alienated 
sensibility. for example, in the conclusion to Walden, he calls our “dullest 
perception” common sense and says, “the commonest sense is the sense of 
men asleep, which they express by snoring” (325). common sense evokes 
images of the self-evident, the obvious, ideas that are immediately avail-
able to understanding. if something is common sense, it is accessible to an 
everyday, mainstream sensibility. But for thoreau, these ways of thinking 
problematically follow conventional patterns. thoreau’s notion of common 
sense corresponds to adorno’s notion of “damaged life.” for thoreau, to be 
alienated is to think what we are expected to think, to say what we are ex-
pected to say. Like adorno, thoreau places the greatest value on the part of 
us that can negate, say no, and think against the grain of common thought. 
But this is the capacity that is eviscerated when we use a common and ev-
eryday sensibility. thoreau wants to “transcend” this common sensibility by 
awakening an ability to negate familiar modes of perception for something 
more wild, unexpected, unpredictable, and idiosyncratic.
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thoreau thinks we are seductively alienated by routine, habit, patterns 
of conduct, formulas for how we should behave: all this tames and domes-
ticates the self so that we can scarcely negate convention at all. thoreau ex-
plicitly ties these tendencies to the processes of modernization taking place 
around him. in the opening passages of Walden, he says, “i have traveled 
a good deal in concord; and everywhere, in shops and offices, and fields, 
the inhabitants have appeared to me to be doing penance in a thousand 
remarkable ways” (4). their “penance” is to inherit farms that give them 
no choice in how to order their lives, but rather map out their destinies for 
them.30 it is not the activity of farming itself that thoreau objects to, but 
the lack of choice involved in most people’s livelihood: their lives follow a 
pattern they have not themselves created.
consequently, in losing the ability to negate, to choose, to experiment 
outside of convention, “the better part of the man is soon plowed into the 
soil for compost” (Walden, 5). the laboring man “has no time to be any-
thing but a machine” (Walden, 6). thoreau argues that we are slaves to 
majority sentiment, to conventions that have settled within us, to public 
opinions we have privatized. We have, so to speak, internalized external 
authority so that we do not even recognize that we have not chosen how to 
order our lives: we think we have freely chosen. thoreau says, “it is hard to 
have a southern overseer; it is worse to have a northern one; but worst of 
all when you are the slave driver of yourself. . . . public opinion is a weak 
tyrant compared with our own private opinion” (Walden, 7). Men are not 
aware of their lack of choice: “it appears as if men had deliberately chosen 
the common mode of living because they preferred it to any other. Yet they 
honestly think there is no choice left” (Walden, 8). 
We are not content with this state of affairs: “the mass of men lead 
lives of quiet desperation” (Walden, 8). thoreau notices that “the incessant 
anxiety and strain of some is a well-nigh incurable form of disease” (Walden, 
11). Yet we deny that change is possible: “so thoroughly and sincerely are 
we compelled to live, reverencing our life and denying the possibility of 
change. this is the only way, we say; but there are as many ways as there can 
be drawn radii from one center” (Walden, 11). in his essay “Walking,” tho-
reau again draws our attention to the dire effects of the ways our lives have 
become routinized by modernization: “When sometimes i am reminded 
that the mechanics and shopkeepers stay in their shops not only all the fore-
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noon, but all the afternoon too, sitting with crossed legs . . . i think that they 
deserve some credit for not having all committed suicide long ago.”31 these 
men are not “living” in the way thoreau understands the term, because 
they conform to the patterns of the market and stay in their shops all day. 
they are nearly dead already, because they are being buried by sedimented 
social conventions. for thoreau, as for adorno, “life does not live” when 
our thoughts and actions conform to the expected, conventional patterns 
of modernity.
Thoreau and Huckleberrying 
Huckleberrying exemplifies the kind of practice that counteracts these mod-
ern forces of alienation by allowing us to withdraw from society for a time, 
but huckleberrying is a practice that also enacts and prompts the change 
in perception that thoreau sees as necessary if we are really to live rather 
than sleepwalk through life as unthinking, uncritical machines.32 Like a 
more bodily, physical, and corporealized practice of negative dialectics, the 
primary changes that come from huckleberrying are changes in perception. 
Huckleberrying teaches us to think outside of traditional norms and ways 
of seeing the world, to escape conventions instead of just accepting them. 
Huckleberrying teaches us to form our own opinions by paying attention to 
detail, to the little things. this practice fosters our ability to notice particu-
larity and uniqueness. after reading the essay, we learn that the abstract 
category of “huckleberries” actually tells us nothing about these wild fruits. 
through modeling attention to detail and critical perception, thoreau tells 
us a much richer story about huckleberries, history, convention, perception, 
and practices that can makes us real citizens.
thoreau begins his essay “Huckleberries” with two themes: “little 
things” and “education.” He tells us that he is going against conventional 
wisdom about what is important: he is going to speak about “little things” 
that are often deemed insignificant. He says, “Many public speakers are 
accustomed, as i think foolishly, to talk about what they call little things in 
a patronising way sometimes.”33 He says that “what is thought to be covered 
by the word education—whether reading, writing or ’rithmetic—is a great 
thing, but almost all that constitutes education is a little thing in the estima-
tion of such speakers as i refer to” (“Huckleberries,” 468). Here thoreau 
contrasts “what is thought to be covered by the word education” with his 
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own definition of education: he is going to show us how education is really 
about “little things.”
after this brief introduction, thoreau seems to forget his self-professed 
topic of education and presents a rather straightforward natural history 
of huckleberries. (this kind of seeming digression is typical of thoreau’s 
excursionary style of writing: he walks around a topic, looking at it from 
unexpected angles, and rarely addresses his subject matter head-on.) tho-
reau tells us when these berries ripen. He tells us what different types of 
huckleberries exist and describes each variety. He tells us where they grow 
and what they taste like. He gives us the etymology of their names.
about midway through the essay, thoreau begins to attach huckleber-
ries explicitly to a certain kind of lifestyle when he recounts testimonies of 
native american uses of these wild fruits. (as i will show, however, even 
his natural history descriptions of these fruits constitute an “education” in 
an alternative way of thinking, seeing, and perceiving.) He emphasizes how 
native americans taught whites about huckleberries, not the other way 
around, and argues for the restoration of the berries’ aboriginal names. 
thoreau describes how native americans used the berries and lauds them 
for living simply on natural resources instead of supporting themselves by 
growing tobacco, with all its concomitant evils, such as slavery (“Huckle-
berries,” 487).
But the object is clearly not just to live simply and subsist on huckleber-
ries. the primary value of huckleberries, for thoreau, consists in the act of 
gathering them: “for my part, i would not exchange fruits with them—for 
the object is not merely to get a ship-load of something which you can eat 
or sell, but the pleasure of gathering it is to be taken into the account” 
(“Huckleberries,” 486). thoreau counts himself lucky to be his family’s ap-
pointed huckleberry collector: “they at home got nothing but the pudding, 
a comparatively heavy affair—but i got the afternoon out of doors. . . . they 
got only the plums that were in the pudding, but i got the far sweeter plums 
that never go into it” (“Huckleberries,” 491). thoreau says he learned more 
in the huckleberry field than he ever learned in school:
i well remember with what a sense of freedom and spirit of adventure i used 
to take my way across the fields with my pail . . . and i would not now exchange 
such an expansion of all my being for all the learning in the world. Liberation 
and enlargement—such is the fruit which all culture aims to secure. i sud-
denly knew more about my books than if i had never ceased studying them. 
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i found myself in a schoolroom where i could not fail to see and hear things 
worth seeing and hearing—where i could not help getting my lesson—for my 
lesson came to me. (“Huckleberries,” 492)
in fact, huckleberrying is such an important activity for thoreau that he 
speaks of it as a career: “i served my apprenticeship and have since done 
considerable journeywork in the huckleberry field. though i never paid for 
my schooling and clothing in that way, it was some of the best schooling that 
i got, and paid for itself” (“Huckleberries,” 491).
thoreau still has not spelled out exactly what he has learned from 
huckleberrying. nevertheless, he goes on to argue for the preservation of 
public spaces of natural beauty. He argues for the creation of parks and 
wants primitive natural spaces preserved as common space. this is all 
linked to the ways nature educates us. as he says, “we boast of our system 
of education, but why stop at schoolmasters and schoolhouses? We are all 
schoolmasters and our schoolhouse is the universe. to attend chiefly to the 
desk or schoolhouse, while we neglect the scenery in which it is placed, is 
absurd” (“Huckleberries,” 500). He wants the heads of states and towns 
to see the preservation of nature as politically important and as an invest-
ment in the polity (“Huckleberries,” 496). But why are public spaces in 
nature politically important? How is huckleberrying a politically important 
education, as thoreau understands the terms political and education? this 
appears to be the topic of his essay, yet these are the questions seemingly 
left unanswered. thoreau has told us that huckleberrying is important. But 
he has not told us how it is important. thoreau’s answer, in part, is in the 
following passage:
as in old times they who dwelt on the heath, remote from towns, being back-
ward to adopt the doctrines which prevailed in towns, were called heathen in 
a bad sense, so i trust that we dwellers in the huckleberry pastures, which are 
our heathlands, shall be slow to adopt the notions of large towns and cities, 
though perchance we may be nicknamed huckleberry people. (“Huckleber-
ries,” 491)
if alienation for thoreau seems to be about a loss of critical faculties, 
a loss of the ability to negate, to think for ourselves, then the practice of 
huckleberrying teaches us how to begin to recover some of these lost parts 
of the self. Huckleberrying shows us how to be heathens with respect to 
the mainstream ways of life that thoreau sees as alienated. Huckleberrying 
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is action oriented toward social change, but the target of that change is the 
individual. in calling for the preservation of natural spaces like huckleberry 
pastures, thoreau signals that alienation is a political problem: He thinks that 
“citizens” act like machines, and he wants to teach them how to act like criti-
cal, independent individuals. the huckleberry fields are a space where this 
political education can take place, where we can work against the tendency 
to act like conformist and unthinking subjects and work on being “heathens” 
who hesitate to accept prevailing doctrines and ways of life.
in broad terms, then, thoreau recommends huckleberrying as a coun-
tervailing practice against the modern loss of critical capacities of negation. 
But in fact, he models this practice himself in the essay in specific ways. i 
would like to look beyond what he says to what thoreau does in the essay 
itself. He begins with a seeming digression from the topic of “little things” 
and “education” into a minute natural history of the berries themselves. But 
as i noted earlier, this is not a digression at all. thoreau is modeling how 
we might see the world if we could learn to be “huckleberry people,” if we 
could learn to be less alienated. thoreau models this mode of perception: 
he pays such close attention to these small berries that he is able to describe 
them in the most minute detail. He is able to tell us, “if you look closely at a 
huckleberry you will see that it is dotted, as if sprinkled over with a yellow 
dust or meal, which looks as if it could be rubbed off” (“Huckleberries,” 
471). He observes the changes the huckleberry has gone through from the 
nineteenth of June to early august (“Huckleberries,” 470). there are many 
pages with precise descriptions of thoreau’s observations of these small 
berries. But none of this is a digression from the topic of education; rather, 
thoreau is enacting the outcome of this education in the huckleberry pas-
tures. Huckleberrying is a practice that can teach us to see for ourselves, 
to think for ourselves. thoreau models the importance of noticing particu-
larity. Huckleberries are by no means a universal category. rather, each 
variety of huckleberry gets individual consideration and is differentiated 
from other types in several ways. there is the late whortleberry, the hairy 
huckleberry, the deerberry or squaw huckleberry, among others. and in 
thoreau’s eyes, each is unique and cannot be completely subsumed by the 
category “huckleberry.” each type of huckleberry is different at different 
times of year and in different localities. thoreau thinks it is important and 
vital to perceive these particularities: only then can we truly understand 
huckleberries.
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as a heathen huckleberryer, thoreau is also skeptical about widely 
accepted historical stories. He consults authoritative texts to show how the 
white man did not “discover” huckleberries. He describes a counterhistory 
of native american use of huckleberries that begins in 1615 and goes all 
the way to his present day of the mid-1800s: “Hence you see that the indi-
ans from time immemorial, down to the present day, all over the northern 
part of america—have made far more extensive use of the whortleberry 
[huckleberry]—at all seasons and in various ways—than we—and that 
they were far more important to them than us” (“Huckleberries,” 484). in 
presenting this history, thoreau thinks against commonly accepted opinion 
and the conventional wisdom of society. this is the kind of critical thinking 
that such practices can teach us. 
thoreau associates huckleberrying with paying attention to particularity 
in a way that works against the logic of abstract exchange. Huckleberrying 
gives “preponderance to the object,” to borrow adorno’s term: we get to know 
the berries in all their uniqueness instead of just seeing them as objects to be 
exchanged for objects of “equal” value. Under the logic of abstract exchange, 
we abstract away from the particular features of the object and think only of 
its fungibility with other objects. thoreau describes the transformation that 
even huckleberries undergo under the logic of abstract exchange:
the fruits do not yield their true flavor to the purchaser of them, not to him 
who raises them for the market. there is but one way to obtain it, yet few take 
that way. if you would know the true flavor of huckleberries, ask the cow-boy 
or the partridge. it is a vulgar error to suppose that you had tasted huckleber-
ries who never plucked them. a huckleberry never reaches Boston; they have 
not been known there since they grew on her three hills. the ambrosial and 
essential part of the fruit is lost with the bloom which is rubbed off in the 
market-cart, and they become mere provender. as long as eternal Justice 
remains, not one innocent huckleberry can be transported thither from the 
country hills. (Walden, 164)
thoreau notes that those who purchase huckleberries in the market miss 
their “true flavor,” which derives from the experience of plucking them in 
the fields: “it is a vulgar error to suppose that you had tasted huckleberries 
who never plucked them.” When abstract exchange makes disparate things 
fungible, we do not experience things for themselves; we think of objects 
as means to other ends. Here, huckleberries become a means to profit and 
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are reduced to “mere provender,” mere food to eat or to sell as nourishment. 
in choosing to discuss the commodification of huckleberries, a notoriously 
market-resistant fruit, he signals the increasing pervasiveness of the market 
and the drive toward commodification. Huckleberries are wild fruits that 
resist being domesticated (think of Mark twain’s Huckleberry finn, the 
boy who could not be “sivilized”; twain and thoreau both draw on the 
same untamable qualities of this fruit.)34 the bushes most often die if they 
are transplanted and thrive only in specific kinds of terrain. the berries 
themselves do not ship well. Despite this, attempts are made to ship them 
to Boston markets. Here, thoreau signals the increasing reach of the logic 
of exchange.
in “the Bean-field” chapter of Walden, thoreau describes another 
instance when his ability to know the object might have been threatened by 
the profit motive and the logic of exchange. at Walden pond, thoreau has 
a bean field, but he makes it clear that his aim is not profit but rather a true 
knowledge of beans. He is “determined to know beans” and, through this 
experience, to know himself and be more “attached” to the earth: “What 
shall i learn of beans or beans of me?” (Walden, 155). thoreau implies that 
if profit had been his motive, he would never have gotten to know either 
beans or himself: the experience of planting, hoeing, weeding, threshing, 
and picking over would not have been rich if his only concern had been the 
goods he could buy with his bean money: “it was a singular experience that 
long acquaintance which i cultivated with beans” (Walden, 161). instead 
of just seeing the beans as a means to profit, thoreau speaks of “knowing,” 
“cherishing,” and “cultivating” a relationship with them. He eventually sold 
the beans, though not for a profit, and this part “was the hardest of all” 
because of his intimacy with them (Walden, 161).
Huckleberrying, like hoeing beans, is a practice that changes the way 
we perceive in politically important ways. thoreau wants to let these objects 
speak, and he recognizes how the market drowns out their voices. these 
practices teach us to see carefully, to pay attention to particularity; for 
thoreau, seeing for ourselves is related to thinking for ourselves, to avoid-
ing unthinking conformity to conventions. it seems especially important 
for thoreau that practices that work against alienation, such as walking 
or huckleberrying, be bodily and physical. for thoreau, we cannot work 
against alienation by sitting in a chair and trying very hard to think for 
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ourselves. this is an important difference from adorno’s less corporeal and 
more cognitive practice of negative dialectics. although both work toward 
sharpening our capacities for critical negation, for thoreau, the changes in 
how we think and perceive seem to come from how we move our bodies, 
how we shift our spatial arrangements. as thoreau says in Walden, “My 
head is hands and feet” (98). to some extent, we change what the head 
does by changing what the hands and feet do. the dissonant critique that 
thoreau draws from particular things is strongly connected to his body’s 
movement.
Thoreau’s “Wild Apples”
in his essay “Wild apples,” thoreau describes a similarly violent process 
of abstract exchange. He claims that the most important qualities of wild 
apples are lost when they are “vulgarized” by being bought and sold. the 
objects that end up in the market are not apples at all:
there is thus about all natural products a certain volatile and ethereal qual-
ity which represents their highest value, and which cannot be vulgarized, or 
bought or sold. . . . When i see a particularly mean man carrying a load of fair 
and fragrant early apples to market, i seem to see a contest going on between 
him and his horse, on the one side, and the apples on the other and, to my 
mind, the apples always gain it. . . . Our driver begins to lose his load the 
moment he tries to transport them to where they do not belong. . . . though 
he gets out from time to time, and feels of them, and thinks they are all there, 
i see the stream of their evanescent and celestial qualities going to heaven 
from his cart, while the pulp and skin and core only are going to market. they 
are not apples but pomace.35
pomace is the pulpy material that remains after the juice has been extracted 
from a fruit. thoreau is saying that, in the market, no apple is sold; there, 
one finds only the remains after the fruit’s vital, “volatile” quality has been 
removed.
the evanescence of the important qualities of objects is an effect of the 
market. thoreau describes watching a farmer during apple harvest time, 
“between the fifth and twentieth of October”: 
[He is] selecting some choice barrels to fulfil an order. He turns a specked 
one over many times before he leaves it out. if i were to tell what is passing 
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in my mind, i should say that every one was specked which he had handled; 
for he rubs off all the bloom, and those fugacious ethereal qualities leave it. 
(“Wild apples,” 449)
the quality thoreau values in the apple is that which cannot be captured; it 
is unstable, prone to flying away, fleeting. it is ethereal and intangible. this 
defining quality of the wild apple resists the market, resists commodifica-
tion, so that if apples are sold, they are not apples at all, but only the pulp 
that remains after the fruit’s essential qualities have been drained. to sell 
an apple is to commit violence against their highest quality: their wildness, 
their nonidentity, to use adorno’s term.
in the essay “Wild apples,” thoreau implies that the attempt to cul-
tivate, domesticate, and commodify wild apples reflects a broader trend 
in society. He begins the essay by saying, “it is remarkable how closely the 
history of the apple-tree is connected with that of man” (“Wild apples,” 
444). He goes on to say that there are several varieties of indigenous wild 
apples in north america, but the cultivated apple, the rosy, milder-tasting 
orchard apple, was brought to america by the British, who got it from the 
romans:
We have also two or three varieties of indigenous apples in north america. 
the cultivated apple-tree was first introduced into this country by the earliest 
settlers, and it is thought to do as well or better here than anywhere else. 
probably some of the varieties which are now cultivated were first introduced 
into Britain by the romans. (“Wild apples,” 445)
Having already told us that the history of humans and the history of the 
apple reflect each other, thoreau now draws a parallel between imperialism 
and the cultivated apple. in one sentence he names two empires, the roman 
and the British. the romans passed on varieties of cultivated apples to the 
British, after conquering them to extend the roman empire. interestingly, 
thoreau says these apples have thrived in america as in few other places. He 
draws a connection between the cultivation of apples and acts of conquest 
and empire: this makes sense, as both seek to homogenize, control, do-
mesticate. Just as he critiques the ways modernity tames humans, thoreau 
denigrates cultivated apples: they may be sweet smelling and uniformly 
pretty, but they have been drained of their “spirited flavor,” are “mild,” and 
“commonly turn out to be very tame” (“Wild apples,” 458).
We get a clear picture of the wild apples thoreau values when he extols 
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one particular apple tree, growing on the side of a cliff, that he has seen 
in his walks. this is the most truly wild apple. it grows in a forbidden, 
rocky terrain and was never planted at all. thoreau says that apple trees 
are often found in terrain that is too rocky or too distant for the farmer to 
bother with them. such trees are wholly uncultivated: “there are, or were 
recently, extensive orchards there standing without order. nay, they spring 
up wild and bear well there in the midst of pine, birches, maples and oaks” 
(“Wild apples,” 451). the wild apple tree on the cliff is the exemplar of this 
species. it is in such an inhospitable place that its owner is not even aware 
that he owns this tree. the fruits of the tree cannot be sold, and they cannot 
even be eaten, since the tree grows in such an inaccessible place.
it was a rank wild growth, with many green leaves on it still, and made an 
impression of thorniness. . . . the owner knows nothing of it. . . . When i go 
by this shrub thus late and hardy, and see its dangling fruit, i respect the 
tree, and i am grateful for nature’s bounty, even though i cannot eat it. Here 
on this rugged and woody hill-side has grown an apple-tree, not planted by 
man, no relic of the former orchard, but a natural growth, like the pines and 
oak. Most fruits which we prize and use depend entirely on our care. corn 
and grain, potatoes, peaches, melons, etc., depend on our plantings; but the 
apple emulates man’s independence and enterprise. . . . even the sourest and 
crabbedest apple, growing in the most unfavorable position, suggests such 
thoughts as these, it is so noble a fruit. (“Wild apples,” 451)
this tree’s resistance to cultivation ennobles it. its untamed quality embod-
ies the independence thoreau wants to encourage in humans.
thoreau extols the sourness and unfavorable nature of both apple 
and tree. everything about this “rank” and “wild” growth is unharmoni-
ous and uneasy, even the word thoreau chooses to describe it: crabbedest. 
something is “crabbed” when it is unpleasing, rough, “perverse,” or “cross-
grained.”36 if euphony is defined by a pleasant, smooth sound, often marked 
by long vowel sounds and liquid consonants such as L and R, then crabbed-
est seems to be the opposite of euphony: cacophony or dissonance.37 With 
an ear for the relationship between style and content, thoreau invokes an 
awkward word to describe this singularly incommodious tree. it grows on 
a precipice. never having been touched by human hands, it likely yields 
the most mottled, speckled, wormy apples. their taste would not be mild 
or sweet but would have the real sourness, “zest,” “tang,” or “smack” that 
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thoreau relishes (“Wild apples,” 458; emphasis in original). these apples, 
even in their flavor, wake us up, startle and unsettle us. 
such fruits work against the domestication of all that is different and 
nonidentical, a tendency that, like the cultivated apple, has thrived in 
america. the need to seek out wild experiences and taste wild apples, so to 
speak, is politically important to thoreau because the imperialist tendency 
to drive out “volatile” and “ethereal” qualities, to do violence against what is 
nonidentical, is getting stronger.
the era of the Wild apple will soon be past. it is a fruit which will probably 
become extinct in new england. You may still wander through old orchards 
of native fruit of great extent, which for the most part went to the cider mill, 
now all gone to decay. . . . ah, poor man, there are many pleasures which he 
will not know! . . . i see nobody planting trees today in such out-of-the-way 
places, along the lonely roads and lanes, and at the bottom of the dells in 
the woods. now that they have grafted trees, and pay a price for them, they 
collect them into a plat by their houses, and fence them in,—and the end of it 
all will be that we shall be compelled to look for our apples in a barrel. (“Wild 
apples,” 467)
thoreau foresees a future where there will be no wild apples left, where all 
trees are grafted and fenced in as property. every owner will account for his 
trees. and the only apples we will get will be the apples we can buy. this is 
the future thoreau tries to work against through huckleberrying, walking, 
and courting the wild.
The Political Value of Particular Things
for thoreau and adorno, there is a political value in how particular things 
change the ways we think and perceive. Both articulate their unconven-
tional politics through their engagement with the particular: through the 
practice of negative dialectics for adorno, and through excursions into wild 
nature for thoreau. Both also associate these practices with more demo-
cratic possibilities. But what connection do their dissonant ways of thinking 
have to the participatory, intersubjective politics we typically associate with 
the idea of democracy? thoreau and adorno are notoriously dismissive of 
the conventional, mainstream political activities of their day. But does this 
mean they see all forms of “street-level” politics as inherently, necessar-
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ily useless and corrupt? i would argue against this interpretation. instead, 
both thoreau and adorno see the cultivation of critical thinking practices 
as consonant with, and essential to, a more truly democratic politics.
Before we can form self-governing bodies, we must become self- 
governing individuals. this suggests that democracy is not just a structure 
of political institutions but an individual practice, a way of being in the 
world. the possibility of democracy depends on changing the ways we 
think and perceive. adorno and thoreau are suspicious of conventional 
politics, not because they reject politics as such but because it is so often 
conducted in uncritical, alienated, unthinking ways. they urge us to engage 
particular things to activate and cultivate our critical capacities, to work 
against the mainstream social forces that threaten our ability to negate and 
think against convention and the status quo. thoreau and adorno engage 
particular things in ways that disrupt, fracture, break apart, and negate the 
systematizing monotonies, conventional abstract logics, and illusory harmo-
nies of modern mainstream society.38 But these unconventional microlevel 
practices are conducted toward the end of cultivating more truly democratic 
citizens. Meaningful participatory, intersubjective, street-level politics is a 
possibility that can occur only when it is populated with individuals who are 
capable of critical, negative, independent thought. negative dialectics, for 
adorno, and confronting the wild, for thoreau, are not valuable simply as 
prepolitical practices that prepare us for “real” politics: they are themselves 
politically valuable. in this way, thoreau and adorno push us to expand 
our conceptions of what counts as political and democratic, to widen the 
parameters of democratic political practice.
for adorno, the loss of critical capacities is a fundamental problem for 
democracies, which promise that people will think and decide for them-
selves. in an essay titled “critique,” adorno describes the democratic value 
of this critical practice: “critique is essential to all democracy. not only 
does democracy require the freedom to criticize and need critical impulses. 
Democracy is nothing less than defined by critique.”39 He is concerned with 
people’s willingness to follow the lead of others, to conform to conventional 
opinion, to bend to the will of seemingly immutable historical forces. He 
argues that for a state to be truly democratic, it must have politically ma-
ture, autonomous, critical, thinking citizens.40 Without such constituents, it 
is a democracy in name only. adorno argues that “democracy, according to 
its very idea, promises people that they themselves would make decisions 
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about their world.”41 negative dialectics, by enacting the critical conscious-
ness that is rooted in the realization that things might be otherwise, that 
existing conditions are not necessary, that we might think against the status 
quo, becomes a valuable democratic political practice.
the connections adorno makes between cultivating our critical ca-
pacities and the possibility of democracy help us better understand how 
huckleberrying enacts thoreau’s politics. thoreau is not a political theorist 
in a conventional sense; he does not provide us with a fully fleshed out, 
normative vision of the political state he wants to bring about. He does not 
address the question of what mass-based social changes might result from 
huckleberrying or picking wild apples or other practices in which we confront 
the “wild.” But he does reach toward a more truly democratic polity, and 
he sees these critical practices as opening up more democratic possibilities. 
His excursions into nature are part and parcel of that democratic vision. But 
because of their unconventional form, thoreau’s democratic practices have 
been characterized as a waste of time, politically speaking.
in his funeral eulogy, emerson criticized thoreau for not living up 
to his full potential; emerson thought thoreau was born for greater posi-
tions and more important commands than huckleberry “captain.” But in 
criticizing thoreau for leading a huckleberry party instead of an empire, for 
failing to become a social engineer, emerson misunderstands his project. 
emerson’s eulogy helped solidify the dominant interpretation of thoreau as 
inadequately concerned with society and politics.42 as emerson says:
Had his genius been only contemplative, he had been fitted to his life, but 
with his energy and practical ability he seemed born for great enterprise and 
for command; and i so much regret the loss of his rare powers of action, that 
i cannot help counting it a fault in him that he had no ambition. Wanting this, 
instead of engineering for all america, he was the captain of a huckleberry 
party. pounding beans is good to the end of pounding empires one of these 
days; but if, at the end of years, it is still only beans!43
Here, emerson’s notions of political and social leadership are constrained 
by the conventional understanding of politics as plans for wide-scale social 
change (though, in other texts, emerson too is critical of mass reform). em-
erson fails to appreciate that these kinds of actions are highly problematic 
for thoreau. Being a social engineer and “pounding empires” is antithetical 
to thoreau’s theoretical position. He is critical of the urge to empire, to 
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dominate, control, and “pound” things into shape. But thoreau is also less 
optimistic about the value of the “great enterprises” and mass movements 
that emerson wanted him to lead. thoreau has more faith in political action 
conducted in a different register: a more microcosmic, particular level that 
changes patterns of individual thought. Ultimately, emerson misrepresents 
thoreau’s choice: he presents thoreau as having chosen contemplation over 
action, mindlessly leading huckleberry parties instead of helping to create 
political change. But for thoreau, huckleberrying is itself a political prac-
tice: it cultivates the critical capacities he sees as necessary if we are to be 
truly democratic citizens instead of “machines.”
While walking, thoreau looks closely at wild apples and huckleberries: 
these particular things prompt him to question the practices of domestica-
tion, cultivation, taming, abstract exchange, and conventional notions of 
politics that characterize a modern society where men act as machines. 
thoreau directs his gaze toward the seemingly insignificant objects that 
“philosophically-schooled authors” (to borrow adorno’s phrase) would dis-
regard. But for thoreau, these “little things” contain qualities that stimulate 
critical negation. While walking in the fields and woods and confronting 
“the wild,” he thinks dissonant thoughts about Main street and all it rep-
resents: for example, conventional practices of buying a house, etiquette, 
abstract exchange, labor, furniture, railroads. these practices are political 
for thoreau because they recuperate the critical capacities that define the 
truly democratic citizen as opposed to the wooden citizen-as-machine. 
thoreau famously writes:
the mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly but as machines, 
with their bodies. . . . in most cases, there is no free exercise whatever of the 
judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood 
and earth and stones, and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that 
will serve the purpose as well.44 
He asks, “is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible 
in government? is it not possible to take a step further toward recognizing 
and organizing the rights of man?” (“resistance,” 89). thoreau seems to 
push us toward realizing a more truly democratic government in which we 
act less like machines. paying attention to the dissonant qualities contained 
in particular things helps us work against becoming these kinds of automa-
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tons who move through preset patterns and think in terms of established 
conventions. this, in itself, is part of the practice of democracy.
interestingly, both thoreau and adorno also portray paying attention to 
particular things, and drawing out their rupturing possibilities, as throwing 
a wrench into the machinery of modern society to open up more democratic 
possibilities. adorno says that collective delusions “are rational in the sense 
that they rely on societal tendencies and that anyone who so reacts knows 
he is in accord with the spirit of the times. . . . Whoever doesn’t entertain 
any idle thoughts doesn’t throw any wrenches into the machinery.”45 anyone 
who acts as an automaton, unthinkingly, idly, upholds the “smooth logic” 
of “what is” instead of thinking against reified modern social norms. voic-
ing a similar concern, thoreau tells us that the “mass of men” serve the 
state as “machines” but advises us to be critical of the state and of injustice: 
“Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine” (“resistance,” 
73–74). When the machinery of politics runs smoothly, men do not think 
for themselves. this is the state of affairs that thoreau thinks characterizes 
conventional, everyday politics. this is the condition he wants to disrupt: “i 
am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. 
i am not the son of the engineer” (“resistance,” 81). thoreau enacts his 
democratic politics on a different register; in this way, he valuably expands 
our notions of “the political.”
Democratic politics, for both thoreau and adorno, depends on modest, 
small-scale, daily, seemingly insignificant practices. Whether we are talking 
about walking, huckleberrying, or negative dialectics, we are ultimately talk-
ing about practices that draw out the critical potential of particular things, 
incite us to appreciate what is unique despite the force of sameness, and 
inspire us think for ourselves against the power of convention. adorno breaks 
apart the “abstract monotony” and “smooth logic” of a modern society under 
the sway of an idealist dialectic that violently reconciles and synthesizes ev-
erything unique and different. negative dialectics engages particular objects 
to force recognition of, and widen, these cracks in the system, to highlight 
the “damaged life” of modern society. thoreau’s thought is similarly opposed 
to illusory harmonies. We see him praise “thorny” wild apple trees and fruits 
that taste “acidic,” “crabbed,” “sour,” and “sharp.” On a different level, in ana-
lyzing huckleberries and wild apples, he is prompted to critique the logics of 
abstract exchange, imperialism, and the instrumentalization of nature.
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these are inglorious, inconspicuous, individual acts that change our 
perception, that sharpen our ability to think. But for thoreau and adorno, 
these practices have a critical potential that exceeds their humble appear-
ance. they awaken us to what is violated and lost through the abstract ways 
of thinking that increasingly characterize modern society. By seeking out 
particularity, they both try to rupture, fracture, and negate these smooth-
ing, taming, and domesticating logics. the alienating logics of modern soci-
ety violate our ability to hear the dissonant call of the “nonidentical” or the 
“wild,” but for thoreau and adorno, paying attention to particularity bears 
valuable fruit for democracy. the critical capacities we recuperate through 
these excursions are vital for meaningful democratic citizenship.
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regime and showing how they persist under German parliamentary democracy. 
His major point is that a democracy is not created only by instituting a new form of 
political rule. Democracy depends, initially, on creating citizens who are capable 
of engaging in the practice of critique. the first published version of the essay even 
included a formal discussion between adorno and his students, who pressed him 
to clarify parts of his lecture even more explicitly. theodor adorno, “the Meaning 
of Working through the past,” in Critical Models, 92. see also theodor adorno, 
“appendix 1: Discussion of professor adorno’s Lecture ‘the Meaning of Working 
through the past,’” ibid.
41. adorno, “appendix 1,” 296.
42. as robert sattelmeyer and other scholars have noted, emerson seemed 
to use his now famous eulogy for thoreau as a chance to settle some scores and 
remind everyone that he thought thoreau had wasted his life by not being more 
of a traditional social or political leader. as sattelmeyer notes, “emerson’s eulogy 
seems particularly designed to present thoreau’s life as one of renunciation and 
withdrawal. . . . emerson’s account of thoreau makes him a renouncer, an icono-
clast . . . and a hermit and ascetic.” robert sattelmeyer, “thoreau and emerson,” 
in Cambridge Companion to Thoreau, 37.
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I desire to speak somewhere without bounds; like a man in a waking moment, 
to men in their waking moments; for I am convinced that I cannot exaggerate 
enough even to lay the foundation of a true expression.
—Thoreau, Walden
The publIcaTIon of Stanley cavell’s The Senses of Walden in 1972 
was an extraordinary event in Thoreau scholarship. Thoreau’s reputation 
had waxed and waned, but by the early 1970s the obscurity to which he had 
seemed fated at his death was well past. The author and hero of “civil Dis-
obedience” had achieved lasting fame and considerable status as a political 
thinker via his influence on Tolstoy, Gandhi, Martin luther King Jr., and 
the Dutch anti-nazi resistance in the Second World War, and Walden was 
widely acknowledged to be his masterpiece. although this acknowledgment 
was reflected in significant work in fields as diverse as literary criticism, 
natural history, and american studies, Walden had yet to be recognized as 
making a significant contribution to philosophy; indeed, it is rare even today, 
more than thirty years later, to hear one claim any distinctively philosophi-
cal interest in this most praised of Thoreau’s books. In cavell’s study, more-
over, Thoreau’s magnum opus was taken up by a philosopher who worked 
outside the tradition of american pragmatism, the philosophical tradition 
that comes closest to grudgingly granting a place if not to Thoreau then to 
his mentor emerson. perhaps most importantly, in The Senses of Walden, 
Walden was read by a mind as unorthodox and fiercely independent as its 
chapTer 16
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author’s own. Given the kind of book cavell set out to write, this was of 
necessity the case. The Senses of Walden is not simply a reading of Walden 
but, as its title suggests, a reading of it that takes the form of a rewriting 
of it, a reiteration of its senses or meanings, and hence its perceptions and 
senses of the world.
The first line of cavell’s preface asks, “What hope is there in a book 
about a book?”1 cavell goes on to make clear that this is not meant to dis-
tinguish the plight of his book about Walden from Thoreau’s book about 
Walden, for in writing about Walden, Thoreau describes and plumbs not 
only the pond, Walden, but also his own experience of that pond, what he 
did at and with it. and the first thing Thoreau chooses to tell us of what 
he did there is to write Walden.2 as cavell puts it, “Walden is itself about 
a book, about its own writing and reading.”3 Since this is exactly what 
cavell’s book is about—the writing and reading of Walden—cavell is do-
ing Thoreau’s work over, reinscribing and repeating it, as one might repeat 
the words of another.4 The titles of the chapters of cavell’s book underline 
the importance of this for his understanding of Thoreau’s work. Walden 
is divided into eighteen chapters, only the third (“reading”) and possibly 
the fourth (“Sounds”) and eleventh (“higher laws”) of which refer even 
indirectly to linguistic matters; The Senses of Walden is divided into three 
chapters (“Words,” “Sentences,” and “portions”) that, taken together, do 
just this. Whereas Thoreau’s titles, for the most part, name things in the 
world (“The bean-field,” “The Village,” “Winter animals”) or ways of being 
in the world or events in the world (“Solitude,” “house-Warming”), cavell’s 
titles name three forms in which our utterances might be meaningful, or 
make sense: as independent words, as sentences, and as paragraphs, verses, 
quatrains, or other portions of text.5 If these are the senses of Walden, how-
ever, this distinction must be one of approach or emphasis rather than topic. 
and the fact that cavell writes of the senses rather than the meanings of 
Walden announces plainly enough that these are to be understood as ways 
of perceiving and experiencing the world, like hearing, smelling, touching, 
tasting, and seeing. If Thoreau knows the world so well that he can show it 
to us as something we have not yet seen, this is not because he experienced 
it more directly in his hut than did others back in concord; rather, it is 
because, in writing of it, he comes closer to the language with which we 
give shape and heft to the real in what cavell describes as our “wording of 
the world.”6 Though written in prose, Walden is poetry of the kind Shelley 
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describes in his “Defense of poetry” when he argues that the poet is “the 
unacknowledged legislator of the world” who alone can keep language from 
dying over time; in losing the ability to represent the world in its complexity 
as opposed to mere “classes of thoughts,” one loses the ability to give voice 
to “the nobler purposes of human interaction.”7 poets “in the most universal 
sense of the word” can thus reinvigorate a dying language because of their 
ability, first, to “behold intensely the present as it is [and] the future in the 
present,” and second, to “express the influence of society or nature upon 
their own minds” in “vitally metaphorical” language that “communicates 
[the pleasure of that expression] to others, and gathers a sort of reduplica-
tion from that community.”8 In romantic poetry such as Thoreau’s, we are 
meant to find the ability to sense the world and the society lost in the senses 
of our degenerate language.
This is true even in those texts in which Thoreau seems to set his face 
against society much more decisively than he does in Walden. In “Walk-
ing,” for instance, Thoreau writes of coming to see that the Mississippi is 
“a rhine stream of a different kind; that the foundations of castles were 
yet to be laid, and the famous bridges were yet to be thrown over the river. 
and I felt that this was the heroic age itself, though we know it not, for the 
hero is commonly the simplest and obscurest of men.”9 although this is no 
doubt a reiteration of Thoreau’s repeated claim to find the strange within 
the familiar, and the world within concord, one should not overlook the 
words Thoreau italicizes, words that announce this discovery as one with 
the writing of the epic announcing it. The heroic age of the rhine’s castles 
and bridges is a literary age, one made real in song and verse. In the absence 
of sagas celebrating them, who would know one’s heroes? It is no surprise, 
then, that Thoreau goes on in “Walking” to ask, “Where is the literature 
which gives expression to nature?”10 If “the simplest and obscurest of men” 
are to be revealed as the heroes they are—which is to say, are to become 
the heroes they are—this will require not a new heroic world but a poetry 
adequate to a heroic world.
If we as readers fail to note Thoreau’s demand for a literature adequate 
to the world, we will continue to read Walden as first and foremost an ac-
count of “life in the Woods,” forgetting that Thoreau himself thought the 
subtitle announcing the book as such misleading enough that he instructed 
his publishers to remove it eight years after the book’s initial 1854 publica-
tion.11 Indeed, Thoreau takes care to emphasize early on in Walden the 
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limitations of such a woodsman’s life as a solution to the miserable fact that 
“the mass of men live lives of quiet desperation.” “from the desperate city,” 
he writes, “you go into the desperate country, and have to console yourself 
with the bravery of minks and muskrats. . . . but it is a characteristic of 
wisdom not to do desperate things.”12 It is not simply in removing himself 
to Walden that Thoreau puts himself in a position to address our condi-
tion; he does so by writing Walden.13 our failure to appreciate this receives 
unfortunate encouragement in emerson’s distorted but influential portrait 
of Thoreau in his memoir, according to which Thoreau is a character first 
and a writer only by way of reporting on that character.14 but there is also 
a difficulty peculiar to the romantic project of writing poetry that will be 
adequate to a world and a mode of life that is not yet that of its readers.15 
as Thoreau puts it in “reading,” a chapter title that instructs us to expect 
some guide to the approach to Walden, “The heroic books . . . will always 
be written in a language dead to degenerate times, and we must laboriously 
seek the meaning of each word and line, conjecturing a larger sense than 
common use permits of what wisdom and valor and generosity we have.”16 
In the case of Walden, this involves learning how to read the book’s basic 
“vital metaphors,” those that concern the relation between life at Walden as 
Thoreau depicts it and the writing of Walden. as cavell puts it, if “it is hard 
to keep in mind that the hero of this book is its writer,” this is “because we 
seem to be shown this hero doing everything under the sun but, except very 
infrequently, writing. It takes a while to recognize that each of his actions is 
the act of a writer.”17 Writing as Thoreau does is a way of being in the world, 
for oneself and one’s readers, that is adequate to that world. It is, as cavell 
puts it, redemptive.
Thoreau indicates some of the difficulties and apparent paradoxes of 
such writing in the second paragraph of Walden, in his sly discussion of the 
questions posed by his townsmen that provoked the apparent self-absorption 
of Walden:
I should not obtrude my affairs so much on the notice of my readers if very 
particular inquiries had not been made by my townsmen concerning my 
mode of life, which some would call impertinent, though they do not ap-
pear to me impertinent, but, considering the circumstances, very natural and 
pertinent. Some have asked what I got to eat; if I did not feel lonesome; if I 
was not afraid; and the like. others have been curious to learn what portion 
of my income I devoted to charitable purposes; and some, who have large 
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families, how many poor children I maintained. I will therefore ask those 
of my readers who feel no particular interest in me if I undertake to answer 
some of these questions in this book. In most books, the I, or first person, is 
omitted; in this it will be retained; that, in respect to egotism, is the main 
difference. We commonly do not remember that it is, after all, always the first 
person that is speaking.18
Since it is impossible to imagine a Walden in which Thoreau does not figure 
as prominently as he does, this is a characteristically roundabout way of 
saying that it is because of his townsmen’s questions that he writes the book 
at all.19 To put the point differently, Thoreau announces here that the ques-
tioning of his townsmen reveals them to require the lessons Thoreau can 
teach regarding the I, the use of the first person, and its role in Thoreau’s 
“mode of life.” The townsmen ask Thoreau about his mode of life but do 
not expect him to use the first person in answering them. They think, then, 
that Thoreau can sensibly give an account of himself without speaking for 
himself. This reveals that they do not know how to speak for themselves, 
how to represent themselves—a disastrous lack in “our democratic new 
england towns,” which pride themselves on being governed by the will of 
the people.20 further, if we read Thoreau’s words in light of cavell’s obser-
vation that they often require “an emphasis other than, or in addition to, the 
one their surface grammar suggests,” we can see that Thoreau worries here 
that in the common omission of the I, his townsmen have literally omitted 
themselves from their lives.21 having forgotten themselves and removed 
themselves from the world, they are dead to it, as Thoreau more or less an-
nounces when he writes with bitter irony that in Walden he “would fain say 
something, not so much concerning the chinese and Sandwich Islanders, as 
you who read these pages, who are said to live in new england; something 
about your condition, especially your outward condition or circumstances 
in this world, what it is, whether it is necessary that it be as bad as it is, 
whether it cannot be improved as well as not.”22
Thoreau’s townsmen “are said to live in new england” by others be-
cause they do not announce this themselves in their own speech, an omis-
sion that has everything to do with Thoreau’s ironic suggestion that they do 
not, in fact, live there, do not live there. The answer to the question with 
which cavell begins his “reduplication” of Walden, “What hope is there in 
a book about a book?” is thus the hope that we might find ourselves where 
we are, that we might awake to our lives.23 “Moral reform is,” Thoreau says, 
428  Andrew Norris
“the effort to throw off sleep”—a sleep we falsely attribute to the dead and 
that better characterizes our own inability and refusal to live where we are 
now.24 but a book that attempts such reform will of necessity strike those of 
us in the circumstances of Thoreau’s townsmen—the people for whom the 
book is written, whose dead lives call for it—as “impertinent” and “unnatu-
ral” in its suggestion that we are not yet there, that we still slumber, that in 
our thoughtlessness we are beside ourselves in an insane way.25 Thoreau’s 
own attempt to answer his townsmen is one that will, of necessity, provoke 
their, and our, distrust and suspicion. Thoreau’s announcement of this in 
the opening pages of his book is the first of his efforts to awaken us.
The fact that our heroes are, as Thoreau says, obscure as well as simple 
is, then, not so much a matter of how they are spoken of but a matter of how 
they speak, of how they leave themselves out. The true hero, whose heroism 
is realized in the sense of both being made conscious and being made real, 
is he who awakens to his life here, where he is, his everyday “simple” life, 
and to his voicing of it; a hero is he who awakens to the common and, in so 
doing, fulfills and transforms it. It is crucial for cavell’s reading of Thoreau 
that the existential and the semantic or linguistic thus line up. Immediately 
before writing The Senses of Walden in 1970–1971, cavell published a col-
lection of essays, Must We Mean What We Say? in which, among other 
things, he defends a mode of ordinary language philosophy that, though 
derived from the work of J. l. austin, is far more explicitly “existentially” 
oriented than austin’s—as well as far more openly aligned with the project 
of romantic poetry sketched by Shelley. Whereas austin focused on using 
the analysis of ordinary language as a way of revealing the philosophical er-
rors of positivists such as a. J. ayer, cavell presents it as a way of returning 
us to an everyday or ordinary life we had failed to make our own, and thus 
as a mode of access to an “eventual everyday” in which our meanings and 
our lives would come together, as they currently do not. If, as Wittgenstein 
claims, we need to “lead words back from their metaphysical to their every-
day use,” this is because the everyday as we live it is the uncanny site of our 
self-estrangement.26 ordinary language philosophy as cavell practices it 
combats what he describes as “a version of what Socrates calls the unexam-
ined life” in its engagement with our failure to attend to what we are saying 
and how we are saying it, our failure to really mean what we are saying, and 
our failure to really do all the things we attempt to do with our speech, as 
individuals and as members of political communities.27
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The title of cavell’s collection is intended to be a provocation. accord-
ing to cavell, as strange as it may sound, we must not always mean what we 
say, not simply because we sometimes say things we do not mean (such as 
when we tell fibs and lies) but because we sometimes try to mean things 
we cannot actually mean by certain words and in certain circumstances; 
in so doing, we refuse to mean what we are saying. as an example, cavell 
imagines someone asking, in quite ordinary circumstances, “Would you 
like to use my scooter?” and insisting that, in so asking, he is not suggest-
ing that the person asked may use the scooter if she wishes. In ordinary 
circumstances, cavell points out, this question has to be an offer, not an 
inquiry into the other’s state of mind: “The ‘pragmatic implications’ of our 
utterances are (or, if we are feeling perverse, or tempted to speak carelessly, 
or chafing under an effort of honesty, let us say must be) meant; . . . they 
are an essential part of what we mean when we say something, of what it 
is to mean something.”28 of someone who insists, in the face of the disap-
pointment and irritation of others, that in asking “Would you like to use my 
scooter?” he “just wants to know what’s on your mind,” cavell concludes, 
he has “tuned out, become incomprehensible.”29 unable to foist a meaning 
on his words that they, in this context, will not bear, and unwilling to make 
the meaning that they do bear his own, the speaker succeeds in meaning 
nothing, exactly—a predicament that should recall nietzsche’s diagnosis of 
the nihilist as one who chooses “to will the nothing.”30
although this is a trivial example, the lesson is a central one for cavell’s 
understanding of philosophy in general and of skepticism in particular, an 
attitude toward the world and toward “other minds” that cavell finds to 
be of far greater significance and extent than is usually supposed. In nu-
merous aspects of our lives, but particularly when we reflect on freedom, 
knowledge, and the question of the real überhaupt, we fall, cavell argues, 
into similar senseless expressions and positions. We try to say that we do 
quite ordinary things voluntarily—such as running family errands in unex-
ceptional circumstances—and lead ourselves to believe that everything we 
do that is not a response to actual coercion is voluntary and hence open to 
moral appraisal—as if an entire way of life could be open to moral appraisal 
at any time, by anyone. This is to lose sight of the fact that we say an act is 
voluntary only if there is something unusual or out of the ordinary about it; 
in so doing, we lose sight of the very particular sort of thing it is to evaluate 
an act’s moral worth.31 We say, “I know there are material objects” or “I am 
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not now dreaming” and try to mean such statements as applying to reality 
as such, in the absence of a particular context in which things are seen to 
be fishy, material, or dreamt, and thus in the absence of any desire to make 
a particular claim to knowledge of a particular thing.32 In so doing, we pride 
ourselves on achieving a kind of objectivity in which we set ourselves aside 
and yet still say something about the world, as if language were a matter of 
statements and facts aligning themselves with one another, with human be-
ings such as ourselves acting as only an unreliable medium of exchange.33
language, in short, is something we see at times as wholly pliable and 
responsive to our whims, and at other times as rigid and unyielding, of 
an impersonal significance far beyond any meaning humble beings such as 
ourselves might give it. for cavell, each of these alternatives expresses an 
unhealthy fantasy symptomatic of a more general failure to accept the mode 
of our existence in the world, the ways our language games and correspond-
ing forms of life are responsive to as well as expressive of our needs and 
desires in given situations, but in a manner in which individual assertion 
and communal commitment check and balance each other. language is not 
primarily a matter of either unmediated self-assertion or the impersonal 
recording of facts, but of individual speakers and writers expressing them-
selves to one another. “There must,” cavell argues, “in grammar, be reasons 
for what you say, or be point in your saying of something, if what you say is 
to be comprehensible. We can understand what the words mean apart from 
understanding why you say them; but apart from understanding the point of 
your saying them we cannot understand what you mean.”34 In the model of 
“objectivity” sketched above, this is set aside in a fantasy of self-effacement: 
“In philosophizing we come to be dissatisfied with answers which depend 
upon our meaning something by an expression, as though what we meant 
by it were more or less arbitrary. . . . It is as though we try to get the world to 
provide answers in a way which is independent of our claiming something to 
be so.”35 although my utterances need to express my sense of what is worth 
saying in the specific circumstances in which I speak, the fact that that 
sense is mine does not leave it subject to my arbitrary decision, any more 
than my sense of what is beautiful or just or rude is subject to such decision. 
That we live together in a common language requires and demonstrates a 
shared sense of what follows from what, a sense of what saying X in these 
circumstances means and implies. It is a central aspect of that sense that 
I cannot say—in the sense of meaningfully uttering words—just anything 
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at any time in any context, and I cannot willfully impose meanings on my 
words that magically transcend the conditions of common interaction, ex-
pression, and understanding. This is a matter of the community’s practice, 
of the practice of individuals who are, as cavell puts it, “in attunement with 
one another.”36 It is we, in our practice, in our interactions with one another 
and with the world at large, who decide how we will speak. and in trying to 
say things we cannot quite mean, we reveal ourselves to be in conflict not 
with some extraordinary set of linguistic rules composed by either God or 
nature but with ourselves.
In presenting himself as capable of giving and receiving instruction 
here, the ordinary language philosopher speaks for his fellows and sees 
himself spoken for by them in their reflections of our life in language. It is 
because cavell is a member of the same “form of life” as the scooter owner 
that he can remind him of what it is possible to mean, here and now, by his 
words. ordinary language philosophy is thus an extraordinary medium of 
deliberation in which our discussions are not so much “intersubjective” as 
they are reflective of (and upon) a commonality as basic to our identity as 
our status as discrete “subjects.” cavell compares it to Kant’s characteriza-
tion, in the third Critique, of our common considerations of what is and is 
not beautiful. Kant argues there that our aesthetic, reflective judgments are 
universal but nonetheless subjective.37 In saying that something is beautiful, 
I do not simply announce that I find it so but that others should find it so 
as well, that we find it beautiful. My judgment is thus publicke, as opposed 
to the merely “private judgments” of the “taste of sense,” the pleasures we 
feel in the warmth of the sun, steak, pepsi, and, in Kant’s famous if rather 
obscure example, canary wine.38 as Kant puts it, in making such judgments, 
we express ourselves in the “universal voice” or allgemeine Stimme.39 The 
common sense this voice articulates is, however, a matter of what we (as 
subjects) feel, not what we can prove. When we announce that we find 
something to be beautiful we are, Kant says, “suitors for agreement from 
everyone else,” but we are in no position to demand their assent to our 
judgment, there being no rules to which we might appeal for authority.40 
Instead, we present our subjective judgment as exemplary and ask others 
to share it.41
Thoreau, who turns his face to the woods because his fellow citizens 
“were not likely to find me any room in the court house,” is just such an 
exemplary judge and speaker; he is one who confronts much the same 
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set of metaphysical fantasies, confusions, and internal conflicts as does 
the ordinary language philosopher: “Thoreau is doing with our ordinary 
assertions what Wittgenstein does with our more patently philosophical 
assertions—bringing them back to a context in which they are alive. It is 
the appeal from ordinary language to itself; a rebuke of our lives by what 
we may know of them, if we will.”42 Thoreau’s townsmen resemble cavell’s 
skeptical philosopher in their expectation that Thoreau can, as it were, let 
his words speak for him and give an account of his mode of life without 
expressing himself and making his words his own. his townsmen expect the 
same of themselves and hence succeed, like the “curious” scooter owner, in 
meaning nothing and, in so doing, leading lives that are robbed of meaning 
they would otherwise have. Their culture is, as cavell puts it, character-
ized by an “esotericism” in which they attempt to deny or transcend the 
public meanings of their terms as well as their personal engagement with 
those public meanings and the community in which they are forged.43 The 
exoteric, however, cannot be set aside in favor of the esoteric; rather, the 
disjunction between the two is one that splits the speaker’s words and sets 
the speaker against him- or herself. In combating his culture’s esotericism 
through his example, Thoreau struggles to bring his townsmen back to their 
words and thus to themselves; it is, as cavell puts it, “his subject that the 
word and the reader can only be awakened together.”44
Thoreau’s appeal and example are presented in Walden: it is as a writer 
that Thoreau instructs his townsmen how to begin to live, which involves 
speaking and writing and, in so doing, accepting the terms of public dis-
course and the public life in which they live. Thoreau notes that he builds 
his house one mile from the nearest neighbor; cavell rightly notes that 
this is just far enough to be seen, as an example must be.45 If the writer of 
Walden wants to be seen, it is in large part as the writer of Walden. The 
“reduplications” from the community that the romantic poet evokes involve 
its members in making their language their own, as Thoreau does his in 
Walden; this means, first, making Thoreau’s language their own, which is 
to say, learning how to read his book.46 The difficulty of this is constantly 
stressed by cavell, and he rightly alerts us to the fact that Thoreau himself 
is quite explicit about the challenges this involves.47 as we have already 
seen, Thoreau maintains that “the heroic books . . . will always be written 
in a language dead to degenerate times, and we must laboriously seek the 
meaning of each word and line, conjecturing a larger sense than common 
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use permits of what wisdom and valor and generosity we have.”48 cavell 
identifies heroic writing with what Thoreau elsewhere describes as the 
“Scriptures of nations,” texts that are often unnoticed for what they are and 
bear the task of giving a nation its language. This entails not giving Ger-
man to Germans or english to americans, as our more xenophobic fellow 
citizens might hope, but giving language as it is to people who as yet have 
failed to make themselves present in their language and to see its working 
in their lives and see themselves in it.49
Writing—heroic writing, the writing of a nation’s scripture—must assume the 
conditions of language as such; re-experience, as it were, the fact that there is 
such a thing as language at all and assume responsibility for it—find a way to 
acknowledge it—until the nation is capable of serious speech again. Writing 
must assume responsibility, in particular, for three of the features it lives upon: 
(1) that every mark of a language means something in the language, one thing 
rather than another; that a language is totally, systematically meaningful; (2) 
that words and their orderings are meant by human beings, that they contain 
(or conceal) their beliefs, express (or deny) their convictions; and (3) that the 
saying of something when and as it is said is as significant as the meaning and 
ordering of the words said.50
These three aspects of language that make possible writing such as Tho-
reau’s are clearly three faces of the teaching of ordinary language philoso-
phy as cavell understands it. language is systematically meaningful in ways 
that we ordinarily fail to notice. Most if not all of austin’s readers are, for 
instance, surprised to learn that, if they are native english speakers, they 
say “how do you know?” and “Why do you believe?” but not “Why do you 
know?” and “how do you believe?”51 The systematic nature of our own 
linguistic practice is something that a nation’s scripture needs to reveal to 
us. but this systematic practice is one that rests on the ability of individual 
speakers to express themselves in their words. linguistic expressions have 
meaning insofar as they are our expressions; their meaning is our own. and 
our expressions, of necessity, reveal the concrete details of the situation 
in which we speak and write. a question such as “Is our government our 
enemy?” means something very different if our government spies on us and 
manipulates our elections than if no such unpleasant revelations are made.
To show all this is not to show anything new but to reveal what has been 
there all along, to help us realize what our ordinary practice entails and thus 
return us to it. as Thoreau emphasizes again and again, such revelations, to 
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self and other, require a deliberate practice. Thoreau famously says he went 
to Walden because he wished “to live deliberately,” and he associates such a 
deliberate life with the writing of Walden.52 “books,” he writes,
must be read as deliberately and reservedly as they were written. It is not 
enough even to be able to speak the language of that nation by which they 
are written, for there is a memorable interval between the spoken and the 
written language, the language heard and the language read. The one is com-
monly transitory, a tongue, a dialect merely, almost brutish, and we learn it 
unconsciously, like the brutes, of our mothers. The other is the maturity and 
experience of that; if that is our mother tongue, this is our father tongue, a 
reserved and select expression, too significant to be heard by the ear, which 
we must be born again in order to speak.53
cavell emphasizes in his reading of this passage that the “‘father tongue’ 
is not a new lexicon or syntax at our disposal, but precisely a rededication 
to the inescapable and utterly specific syllables upon which we are already 
disposed.”54 It is, in effect, the “tongue” of the eventual everyday that cavell 
seeks in ordinary language philosophy. In each case, we are reborn—a 
fact that explains Thoreau’s preference here for the father tongue over the 
mother tongue. as cavell explains: “a son of man is born of woman; but 
rebirth, according to our bible, is the business of the father.”55 The rebirth 
of Walden involves baptism in the waters of Walden pond and, by extension, 
Walden, the book Thoreau endeavors to write in the father tongue. for 
Walden to be read as deliberately and reservedly as it was written requires 
that its readers master the tongue in which it is written and thus allow 
themselves and their language to be reborn.
Thoreau introduces the concept of the mother tongue in “The Service,” 
one of his earliest pieces, written in 1840 but published posthumously. here 
our mother tongue is said to be music, the “voice” of both “the brave man” 
and of God.56 but at that point, he does not see the need or perhaps the 
possibility of a father tongue; one speaks the mother tongue of music, or 
one speaks with words. In introducing the idea of the father tongue, he 
introduces the idea that we might be redeemed in ways that require our 
going  forward rather than back, in ways that require us to pass through the 
alienation and confusion that characterize our current state.57 for cavell, 
this is a crucial feature of Walden. Thoreau begins his book by implying 
that his readers are as good as dead, are haunting their lives, because 
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he wants to wake them up. “I do not,” Thoreau writes, “propose to write 
an ode to dejection, but to brag as lustily as chanticleer in the morning, 
standing on his roost, if only to wake my neighbors up.”58 but if waking up 
means becoming conscious, one must first become conscious of one’s lack 
of consciousness. “We must learn,” Thoreau says, “to reawaken and keep 
ourselves awake.”59 This sounds paradoxical only because we do not usually 
wake ourselves up, at least in this sense, and because we do not usually will 
ourselves to sleep—our sleep is not usually a grotesque form of “penance.”60 
Thoreau’s task in Walden is to teach us how to wake up, and to do that, he 
must first wake us up himself, show us that we have been sleeping, that the 
lives we lead are not yet our own and that the words we speak do not yet 
bear the meanings we give them—all tasks Thoreau begins in the unset-
tling opening pages of his book.
The first step in overcoming our estrangement from ourselves and 
from our language is acknowledging that estrangement. as cavell puts it, 
Thoreau “has secrets which can only be told to strangers. The secrets are 
not his, and they are not the confidences of others. They are secrets because 
few are anxious to know them; all but one or two wish to remain foreign. 
only those who recognize themselves as strangers can be told them, be-
cause those who think themselves familiars will think they have already 
heard what the writer is saying.”61 They will mistake the current everyday 
for the eventual everyday it might be. Thoreau, as we have seen, “would fain 
say something . . . about your condition, especially your outward condition 
or circumstances in this world, what it is, whether it is necessary that it 
be as bad as it is, whether it cannot be improved as well as not.” cavell 
asks of this famous passage, “Why does this watchman of the private sea 
insist especially upon his readers’ outward condition or circumstances in 
this world?” and answers:
because the outward position or circumstance in this world is precisely the 
position of outwardness, outsideness to the world, distance from it, the posi-
tion of stranger. The first step in attending to our education is to observe the 
strangeness of our lives, our estrangement from ourselves, the lack of neces-
sity in what we profess to be necessary. The second step is to grasp the true 
necessity of human strangeness as such, the opportunity of outwardness.62
The opportunity of outwardness is the possibility of moving forward into 
our father tongue, actively inheriting our language as opposed to passively 
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repeating it. That we are sleeping means that we might yet wake, a process 
in which Thoreau sees endless promise, as he announces in the closing 
words of Walden: “The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us. only 
that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn. The sun 
is but a morning star.”63
If waking to our lives is to write and read the father tongue, to be, in 
effect, born again, it is a conversion process, one in which we turn and face 
ourselves as we are.64 This concern may seem to be of only indirect political 
significance. Thoreau indicates that he thinks otherwise in his sole reference 
in Walden to the events celebrated in his “civil Disobedience.” although 
Thoreau was arrested and put in jail while living out at Walden pond, he had 
not paid his poll taxes for years. his resistance to the u.S. government’s sup-
port of slavery and its prosecution of the imperialist and unjust war against 
Mexico—a war that threatened to expand the extent of the slaveholding 
territories—was evidently not undertaken on the basis of Thoreau’s life at 
Walden. but Thoreau, strikingly, suggests that something like this was in 
fact the case. Immediately before describing his arrest, Thoreau recounts 
walking at night in the woods near the pond, a recounting that leads him to 
consider the modes of conversion made possible at Walden:
not till we are completely lost, or turned round,—for a man needs only to 
be turned round once with his eyes shut in this world to be lost,—do we 
appreciate the vastness and strangeness of nature. every man has to learn 
the points of compass again as often as he awakes, whether from sleep or any 
abstraction. not till we are lost, in other words, do we begin to find ourselves, 
and realize where we are and the infinite extent of our relations.
It is precisely here that Thoreau refers to “civil Disobedience”:
one afternoon, near the end of the first summer, when I went to the village 
to get a shoe from the cobbler’s, I was seized and put into jail, because, as I 
have elsewhere related, I did not pay a tax to, or recognize the authority of, 
the state which buys and sells men, women, and children, like cattle at the 
door of its senate-house.65
Thoreau could not be clearer that sleep as he understands it is a form of 
abstraction from reality; that waking to it is a conversion experience open 
only to the lost; and that the reality to which that conversion brings us round 
is characterized by infinite relations between people and things that carry 
with them significant moral and political obligations.
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The turn back here is one that moves in opposition to the drift of 
much of our current political and religious talk, which Thoreau condemns 
as degrading patriotism on the one hand and a parochial obsession with 
“our church” on the other.66 “The task of literature,” as cavell puts it, “is to 
rescue the word from both politics and religion.”67 cavell expands on this 
elsewhere: “That our meaning a word is our return to it and its return to 
us—our occurring to one another—is expressed by the word’s literality, its 
being just these letters, just here, rather than any others. In religion and 
politics, literality is defeated because we allow our choices to be made for 
us.”68 as we have seen, the choices that are up to us involve our words, what 
we say, not what we mean with those words: “We have a choice over our 
words, but not their meaning. Their meaning is in their language; and our 
possession of the language is the way we live it.”69 If we allow others to make 
the choices that are open to us (for instance, by limiting reasonable religious 
and political speech to that which respects the compromises of the church 
and the constitution), we attempt to compensate for this by choosing the 
meaning of what is said. (one might say that the fantasy that such things 
are “subjective” and thus “voluntarily” or “freely” chosen is the correlate 
of our failure to accept the burden of the freedom we really do or could 
have.) The attempt to impose a meaning on those words that is not their 
own (to insist that all our actions might be done voluntarily or involuntarily, 
that any question we might ask is really just a way of asking, “What is on 
your mind?”) reflects not our choices but our abdication of them, or, more 
properly, our abdication of the work of being present enough in our lives 
and our language to intelligibly choose anything.
The example cavell gives from politics is denser and harder to un-
derstand than it at first appears: “In politics we allow ourselves to say, e.g., 
that a man is a fugitive who is merely running from enslavement. That is an 
attempted choice of meaning, not an autonomous choice of words. beyond 
the bondage to institutions, we have put nature in bondage, bound it to our 
uses and to our hurried capacities for sensing, rather than learning of its 
autonomy.”70 It is plain enough that cavell means to indicate that a fugitive 
flees from more than “merely” enslavement. but beyond that it gets trickier. 
What we “allow ourselves to say” appears to be—and is—a statement about 
fugitives. That cavell has something else in mind as well is indicated by 
his awkward construction: “a man is a fugitive who is merely running from 
enslavement.” This is a definition not just of a fugitive, a kind of man, but of 
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man as such: a man is a fugitive who is merely running from enslavement. 
This is what we allow ourselves to say, and in doing so, we attempt to choose 
the meaning of our terms in ways that our terms will not allow. but if this is 
not what the terms mean, what do they mean? first, that a man is a fugitive 
who flees more than merely enslavement—that he, or rather we, also flee 
justice and nature. locke’s depiction of us as creatures who in health seek 
freedom and fair trade and face opposition only from without, from tyrants 
and other “beasts of prey” who choose to live by a rule other than that 
of reason and common equity, needs amending.71 Second, that a man is a 
fugitive who flees freedom as well as enslavement and who finds his “escape 
from freedom” in flight. Third, and following from this, that a man as such 
is not a fugitive, and that living as if one were a fugitive is a betrayal of 
nature, of one’s own nature. a fugitive is one who seeks freedom in flight, 
but our freedom is to be achieved not in flight but in standing still.
In “Visitors,” Thoreau mocks the “runaway slaves with plantation man-
ners” who visited him and “listened from time to time, like that fox in the 
fable, as if they heard the hounds a-baying on their track, and looked at 
me beseechingly, as much to say,—‘o christian, will you send me back?’” 
In immediately going on to speak of a “real runaway slave” he had helped, 
Thoreau makes it plain that he is not denying the fact of chattel slavery 
and the need of flight from it, but only the latter’s adequacy. That a slave 
in Maryland must flee to the north to find freedom does not mean that a 
person in Massachusetts must or can find his or her freedom in flight. our 
commitment to flight, our sense that freedom is found in flight, expresses 
our hurried capacities for sensing, our reluctance to speak and live, as 
Thoreau puts it, deliberately: “It appears,” Thoreau writes, “as if men had 
deliberately chosen the common mode of living because they preferred it to 
any other. Yet they honestly think there is no choice left.”72 What appears 
to be an exercise of freedom is a denial of it, of its possibility. Denying 
ourselves the freedom to choose the lives we desire, we live like slaves. 
finding ourselves incapable of stepping back from ourselves and our lives, 
we submit to our lives, submit to ourselves. “I sometimes wonder,” Thoreau 
(the author of “a plea for captain John brown”) writes,
that we can be so frivolous, I may almost say, as to attend to the gross but 
somewhat foreign form of servitude called negro Slavery, there are so many 
keen and subtle masters that enslave both north and south. It is hard to have 
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a southern overseer; it is worse to have a northern one; but worst of all when 
you are slave-driver of yourself.73
Trapped in the quiet desperation of lives that are not our own, lives 
that represent our submission rather than our fulfillment, we naturally 
identify freedom with flight, with escape: when there is no choice left, the 
only choice is to flee. but doing so leaves us unable to do any of the things 
Thoreau’s neighbors, in their initial questioning of him, rightfully take to 
be essential parts of a “mode of life” worth living: getting something to eat, 
avoiding being lonesome and afraid, being charitable, helping to raise chil-
dren. hence we spend our days shifting unhappily back and forth between 
fantasies of inevitability and fantasies of whimsy. as cavell puts it in regard 
to the questions Walden was written to answer, Thoreau’s “problem—at 
once philosophical, religious, literary, and, I will argue, political—is to get 
us to ask the questions, and then show us that we do not know what we are 
asking, and then to show us that we have the answer.”74 only in this way is 
autonomy and democracy, or people power (demos kratos), possible.75 Tho-
reau announces twice in Walden that he moved to Walden pond on July 4, 
during a period he describes in characteristically elliptical fashion as one of 
personal crisis.76 This, as is widely recognized, is Thoreau’s way of declaring 
his independence, a declaration that throws into question the sufficiency 
of Jefferson’s and the nation’s. as cavell puts it, “america’s revolution never 
happened. The colonists fought a war against england all right, and they 
won it. but it was not a war of independence that was won, because we 
are not free; nor was even secession the outcome, because we have not 
departed from the conditions england lives under, either in our literature 
or in our political and economic lives.”77 cavell goes on to ask, as others 
have not, why Thoreau emphasizes that he went to Walden pond on the 
fourth of July “by accident.”78 cavell suggests, quite rightly, that the answer 
has to do with the superficiality of our understanding of what independence 
and hence freedom consist of. although Thoreau acknowledges fortuitous 
accidents in his life and in nature, he suggests that we reserve our respect 
for “only what is inevitable and has a right to be.”79 our freedom does not 
pass this test. We are free from the interference of others, perhaps, but we 
are not yet free in ourselves; our freedom does not flow from within, as it 
would if it were necessary, if it had a right to be.
To be a fugitive, as we say a man is, is to move quickly. To be free or 
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autonomous requires standing still and accepting the limits of that freedom 
in nature, in language, and in others. (as austin suggests, the fact that we 
cannot do everything voluntarily does not mean that we do it involuntarily, 
and the fact that we cannot choose whether to say we do everything vol-
untarily does not mean that we are constrained.) cavell notes, “The most 
characteristic of [Thoreau’s] reflexive descriptions is that of finding himself 
in some attitude or locale.”80 a free life as an individual and a citizen requires 
self-knowledge; this, in turn, requires knowing where one is. “for the most 
part,” Thoreau writes, “we are not where we are, but in a false position.”81 he 
calls it a position, not just a situation, as this false position is our own stance 
toward the world, our aversion to it, our lack of interest in the reality of our 
own lives.82 and this position is ours, not just mine and not just yours. “prac-
tically,” Thoreau writes, “the old have no very important advice to give the 
young, their own experience has been so partial, and their lives have been 
such miserable failures, for private reasons, as they must believe.”83 but the 
reasons are public ones. Thoreau himself finds no private relief at Walden 
from our shared condition, which he as much as announces in 1854’s “Slavery 
in Massachusetts.” here, as in Walden, Thoreau condemns the servitude of 
his fellow citizens, their inability to accept that the solution to a problem they 
wish to locate in nebraska and the South begins in Massachusetts, in their 
own homes. “I walk toward one of our ponds, but what signifies the beauty 
of nature when men are base? We walk to lakes to see our serenity reflected 
in them; when we are not serene, we go not to them. Who can be serene 
in a country where both the rulers and the ruled are without principle?”84 
If Thoreau finds some relief at “one of our ponds,” it is a relief not in flight 
but in achieving a position from which he might address his fellow citizens. 
Thoreau may have lived alone at Walden pond, but he wrote Walden for us.
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